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




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Cum permissu superiorum.

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# THE THEORY OF THE COMPOSITION OF THE SACRAMENTS IN EARLY SCHOLASTICISM

(1125—1240)

(*Continued*)

## III. ATTEMPTED SOLUTIONS

Shortly after the publication of the *Summa Aurea* of William of Auxerre, theology revises its attitude towards the problem of the composition of the sacraments. Whereas previously it made but a scanty contribution to its solution and indulged in a rather confused terminology, from now on it meets us with a simplified vocabulary and with more mature views on the matter.

This improvement was chiefly due to the growing authority of the *Libri Sententiarum*. Around 1230, the handy summary, issued by Peter Lombard eighty years before, becomes the starting point for all theological teaching. At Paris, the faculty of theology adopts it as textbook for the schools, and famous masters, like Alexander of Hales, Hugh of St. Cher and John of St. Gilles, write extensive commentaries on it. As a result, every detail of its terminology and of its doctrine was put under close examination.

As on most other matters, the new method had its bearing on the problem of the composition of the sacraments. On the one hand, most of the theologians now dismiss the Victorine formula with all the consequences it entails, to concentrate on one single theory, that of Peter Lombard. On the other, they no longer ignore the difficulties inherent in that theory; forced to compare Lombard's general principle with its applications, they could not fail to perceive the divergence that separated both.

However, since nobody dreamt of giving up a principle championed by the Master of Sentences and already fixed by tradition, they all try to save it by broadening its original meaning. Consequently, theology as a whole tends to consider all sacraments as a compound, in some way or other, of two sensible realities.

Nevertheless, in spite of this common tendency, theologians are sharply divided in two groups. Some, headed by Alexander of Hales, only accept the theory of the bipartite composition of the sacraments in a very broad and analogical sense, which allows of exceptions. Others, especially Hugh of St. Cher and his disciples, grant it a strictly universal value and assimilate it to the hylomorphic doctrine of Aristotle.

### 1. Alexander of Hales

Alexander has not treated the problem in a systematical and exhaustive way. His ultimate thought has to be gathered from all kinds of occasional remarks, casual statements and small incidental questions, scattered throughout the whole fourth book of his *Glossa in Libros Sententiarum* (before 1230).<sup>1</sup> In spite though of these deficiencies at exposition, his teaching is so much superior to all that had been said before that it may rightly be considered as the first conscious attempt to bring some clarity to a hitherto confusing problem.

His ideas on the matter are mainly traditional. To a great extent, they reflect faithfully the fundamental teachings of Lombard and the different tendencies, the erroneous ones as well as others, that were at work for nearly seventy years. But where previous theology only looked askance at the difficulties, Alexander faces up to them.

Already on the first pages of the fourth book of his Gloss, he adopts without more ado Lombard's formula on the composition of "the sacrament" from the *res* and *verba*. In the comment that follows, he explains these terms in the usual manner, and discards, in wordings taken from the Gloss of Pseudo-Peter<sup>2</sup> of Poitiers the Victorine formula as applying to the sacrament in the wide and improper sense.<sup>3</sup>

**Duo autem sunt** etc. Duo dicit, res et verba: verba ad auditum, res ad visum pertinent. Tantum haec duo ideo exiguntur, quia sacramentum est invisibilis gratiae visibilis forma, id est, signum perceptibile visui vel auditui; hi enim sensus disciplinares sunt. Quod autem oportet signum sacramenti terminari ad auditum sicut ad visum, patet, quia si quis baptizaret et non esset ibi adrogatio Trinitatis non sufficeret, et ita de aliis.<sup>4</sup>

**Verba et res.** Contra, Magister Hugo: "Sunt quaedam sacramenta in Ecclesia, in quibus, etsi principaliter salus non constat, tamen salus ex eis augetur in quantum devotio exercetur. Alia autem huiusmodi constant in rebus, qualia sunt aqua expiationis, susceptio cineris, benedictio cereorum et ramorum. Alia constant in factis, qualia sunt crucis signaculum, exsufflatio exorcizationis, expansio manuum. Alia in dictis, sicut est invocatio Trinitatis. Haec autem omnia per verbum Dei sanctificantur, sive per prolationem verborum divina virtute invocata, sive sola fide exhibita per eandem divinam virtutem, quia ubi est fides, verbum deesse non potest quod fide concipitur." Ex hoc sumitur quod in tribus consistunt sacramenta, scil. in rebus, dictis et factis. Ipse autem solum duo membra ponit.

1. On the authenticity and chronology of this work, see V. Doucet, *Prolegomena CCIII-CCXI*, to *Alexandri de Hales Summa theologica*, IV (Quaracchi, 1948), and especially *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor Libros Sententiarum*, I ("Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica," 12) (Quaracchi, 1951, 76\*-130\*).

2. Cf *Franciscan Studies*, XI (1951), 119.

3. The texts of Alexander's Gloss quoted in this article are taken from the following manuscripts: Assisi 189 (A), Erfurt cod. Ampl. 8°68 (E), Paris nat. lat. 16406 (=P) and Todi 121 (=T).

4. A f. 117c, T f. 145d. The phrase *Tantum haec duo ideo exiguntur* is corrected from *T Tamen haec duo non exiguntur* and *A Cum haec duo ideo exiguntur*.

**Respondeo.** Loquitur Magister Hugo ibi de aliis generibus sacramentorum quam hic: quia hic agitur de sacramentis prout sunt Veteris aut Novae Legis, ibi vero de sacramentis prout significant res sacras, sive sint sacramenta Novae Legis aut Veteris sive non.<sup>5</sup>

In the further course of his work, although he still employs occasionally the words *res* and *verba*, he shares, with the theology of the last forty years, a decided preference for the more recent terms *materia* and *forma* (*verborum*). These he uses freely, either separately or, at least as far as baptism and the eucharist are concerned, in close association.

Here follow a few texts that illustrate the manner in which Alexander speaks of the components of the sacraments:

**Baptism:** a) Sed propter hoc (baptismus Ioannis) est medius, quia expressius erat signum baptismi Christi, quantum ad formam in parte et quantum ad materiam, quia ille in nomine Venturi, hic autem in nomine Christi.<sup>6</sup> b) Conveniebat enim (baptismus Ioannis) in materia et in forma in parte cum sacramento Novae Legis, quia in aqua et in nomine Venturi, qui est Christus.<sup>7</sup> c) Altera vero definitio Magistri Hugonis tangit, cum materia et forma, finem, in eo quod dicit "diluendis criminibus."<sup>8</sup> d) Quaestio est, cum ad esse sacramenti exigatur elementum, forma verborum et intentio, videtur ipsum sacramentum habere partes.<sup>9</sup>

**Confirmation:** Nunc de sacramento confirmationis. Quaeritur quot exiguntur ad hoc sacramentum. Respondeo quod quinque: intentio et dignitas confirmantis; materia, scil. chrisma, et forma verborum quae sunt: "Ego te signo signo crucis et confirmo te chrismate salutis in nomine Patris etc.; locus, scil. frons.<sup>10</sup>

**The Eucharist;** Item quaeritur utrum maiorem efficaciam habuit corpus Christi post passionem quam ante, sicut baptismus habuit.

Respondeo, quod hoc sacramentum ibi completum quoad materiam et quoad formam, scil. in coena, sacramentum vero baptismi quoad materiam, non quoad formam; non enim instituta fuit forma adhuc. Habuit ergo baptismus maiorem effectum post quam ante; hoc autem sacramentum, ut sacramentum passionis, habuit plenum effectum, ut dicit hic Magister.<sup>11</sup>

**Extreme Unction:** Deinde quaeritur de materia<sup>12</sup> . . . Deinde quaeritur de forma unctionis, utrum haec sit forma . . . an alia sit forma.<sup>13</sup>

**Orders:** a) Si vero quaeratur utrum forma verborum sit de substantia ordinis, dicendum<sup>14</sup> . . . b) Si quaeratur propter quid differenter est oleum in confirmatione et extrema unctione ex una parte, et in baptismo et ordine ex alia, respondemus quod in confirmatione et extrema unctione non duplicatur materia sacramentalis, in aliis duobus duplicatur. Baptismus enim . . . Similiter in sacramento ordinis . . . Et ideo utrobique duo sunt sacramentalia.<sup>15</sup>

5. A f.117cd, E f.222v, P f.155v, T f.145d.

6. A f.119d, E f.225r, P f.158v, T f.147a.

7. A f.119d, E f.225v, P f.159r, T f.147a.

8. A f.120b, E f.226r, P f.159v, T f.147b.

9. A f.120b, E f.226r, P f.159v, T f.147b.

10. A f.127b, E f.238r, P f.175v, T f.151c.

11. A f.131c, E f.245c, P f.181v, T f.154a.

12. A f.153d.

13. A f. 154a.

14. A f.158c.

15. A f.161cd, E f.288v, T f.172b.

In all these instances, Alexander attaches to the words *materia* and *forma* and their synonyms the strictly traditional and hitherto exclusive sense of "physical element" and "formula." Much as he likes to apply the hylomorphic theory to theological matters,<sup>16</sup> he does not speak yet of the *materia* and *forma* of the sacraments as of their determinable and determining elements. Indeed for him, as for his predecessors, *res* and *materia* are general terms to designate such realities as water, chrism, oil, bread and wine or the instruments used at ordinations, to the exclusion of what he calls the *opera* or ritual actions performed with or without *materia*, like ablution or imposition of hands. Neither does the term *forma*, as corresponding to *materia sacramenti*, ever receive in his vocabulary another meaning than *forma verborum*, that is, formula.

The texts quoted above evidence then that Alexander grants to most of the sacraments a *materia* and *forma*, in other words, a physical element and a formula. From others though, it is no less clear that he attaches no absolute value to Lombard's general statement. Indeed with reference to penance and matrimony, he expressly asserts that these sacraments have no *materia*.<sup>17</sup> As for the other five, he is by no means sure that all and each of them are essentially performed through the application of the *materia* and *forma*.<sup>18</sup>

Indeed, to him only baptism and the eucharist fit to perfection the pattern set up by Lombard. In these the essence of the sacrament or rather of the sacramental sign<sup>19</sup> consists really in a *materia*, viz.

16. To quote but a couple of examples taken from the fourth book: in dist. 11, c. 1, Alexander states that in the process of transubstantiation not only the *forma* of the bread ceases to exist, but even the *materia remota non remanet* (A f.130b); in dist. 11, c. 2, he writes: "Ad secundum dicimus quod per visibilia intelliguntur species panis et vini et per invisibilia corpus Christi et sanguis ut sunt sub sacramento. Ex ipsis autem fit unum, non sicut ex partibus integralibus, sed definitivis. Dicunt tamen quidam quod ipsa species panis et vini est materia sacramenti, corpus vero Christi forma; quod si esset verum, essent partes essentiales" (A f. 130c).

17. Cf. *infra* pp. 8-9.

18. Cf. A f.157a, E f.282r, P f.214b, T f.169c: "Praeterea si virtus imprimendi characterem est in ordinatione superioris, habentis potestatem ordinandi, vel in impositione manus, sicut in quibusdam ordinibus, vel in unctione, sicut in quibusdam, hac existente causa inherit effectus; sicut in quibusdam sacramentis ex virtute verborum in debita materia conficitur sacramentum vel ex debita materia."

Alexander's way of speaking implies clearly that according to him some sacraments are performed with a *forma verborum* and a *debita materia*, some with *debita materia* without *forma verborum*, some (Orders) through a mere rite without *materia* and *forma verborum*. See also *infra* p. 15.

19. This distinction is necessary, because Alexander includes in the essence of some sacraments, like baptism, the eucharist, matrimony, not only the *signum*, or *sacramentum tantum* but also the *sacramentum et res*. On that particular view, see D. Van den Eynde, *Les Définitions des Sacraments pendant la première période de la théologie scolaistique* (Louvain, 1950) pp. 124-126.

water and the species, sanctified through a fixed *forma verborum*.<sup>20</sup> On the contrary, in confirmation and extreme unction the words, he thinks, probably do not belong to the substance of the sacrament, because, in their *propria forma* and *ut haec*, they were not instituted by the Lord or his Apostles, but by the Church.<sup>21</sup> Therefore, according to him, confirmation most likely consists in the *materia* or chrism only<sup>22</sup> and extreme unction in the rite performed with the *debita materia*.<sup>23</sup> In regard to Orders, he holds a still more extreme view, as in treating of that sacrament, he extolls the *opus* or rite at the expense of both *materia* (instruments and oil) and *forma*. On the one hand, he denies categorically, for the reason already mentioned, that the *forma verborum* used by the bishop would be essential.<sup>24</sup> On the other hand, he asserts that the substance of the sacrament, at least in the case of the diaconate and priesthood, rests solely in the laying on of hands; only in the minor orders and subdiaconate is the sacrament conferred through the handing over of the instruments, and therefore

20. Besides the texts quoted above p. 2, cf. A f.120c, E f. 226r, T f. 147b: "Est ergo aqua sanctificata sacramentum secundum quod dicitur invisibilis gratiae visibiliis forma." A f. 127d: "Cum virtus sacramenti consistat in iis verbis: 'Accipite et comedite etc.'"; A f. 161d, E f.289r, T f.172b: "Panis et vinum sunt ad conservationem nutrimentalem corporis humani, generantia similitudinem spiritualis nutrimenti. Sicut ergo aqua fuit de primis generantibus, ita haec de ultimis conservantibus. Et propter hoc recte cedunt in materiam nutrimentalis sacramenti, sicut illa in materiam sacramenti regenerationis."

21. A f.127b, E f.238r, P f.175v, T f.151c: "De forma (confirmationis) dubitatur, quae non est instituta a Domino vel Apostolis. Sed in securiore partem est vergendum secundum Ecclesiae institutionem;" A f.153c, E f.277c, P f.210a, T f.167c: "Praeterea oratio videtur esse de substantia sacramenti (extremae unctionis) per illud Iacobi: 'Infirmatur aliquis in vobis' etc. et ita coniungitur oratio unctioni ad eliciendum effectum alleviationis. Quod etiam videtur ex forma orationis, quae est: 'Per istam suavissimam unctionem et suam piissimam misericordiam dimittat tibi Deus quidquid peccasti per visum etc.' Sed contra. Illa oratio non est instituta in propria forma ab Apostolis. Sed simile tunc posset obici de forma confirmationis, quae est per unctionem chrismatum et significationem Trinitatis; non enim ista fuit instituta ab Apostolis. Praeterea non est oratio in extrema unctione nisi deprecatoria effectus conferenda in unctione, et ita potius est sacramentalis quam de esse sacramenti"; A f.153d, E f.277v, P f.210b, T f.167c: "Utrum vero oratio illa, instituta ab Ecclesia, sit sacramentalis aut de esse sacramenti, non definio. Sed patet quod sacramentalis est ad minus. Forte est de esse. Sed ut est haec sacramentalis est. Tamen propter consuetudinem Ecclesiae in diversis partibus esset peccatum, si in illa parte omitteretur, et esset etiam haereticum si pertinaciter fieret contra statuta Ecclesiae." See also *infra* n. 29.

22. Cf. *supra* n. 18.

23. A f.153d, E f.277v, P f.210b, T f.167c: "Unctio quae est per oleum ad infirmos facta a sacerdote, cuius est officium, cum intentione faciendi quod facit Ecclesia et oratione fidei, est sacramentum. Haec enim requiruntur. Sed proprie esse sacramenti tenet unctio in debita materia: habet enim similitudinem cum unctione spirituali quae fit per gratiam."

24. A f.157d: "Huius etiam gratia quaeritur utrum verba quae dicuntur ab episcopo sint de substantia sacramenti, ut in quibusdam aliis sacramentis. Quod non videtur: nam in illis verbis signatur recta executio potestatis; sed exsecutio est post potestatis collationem; ergo illis verbis non confertur potestas. Praeterea, dicitur quod forma illa verborum quae est in confirmatione, eo quod non est expressa a Domino vel ab

through a rite with *debita materia*.<sup>25</sup> From these statements, one must conclude that, for Alexander, neither the *materia* nor the *forma* play an essential part in the performing of the ordination of deacons and priests; they are merely sacramentals.

All this of course remains, in Alexander's eyes, a matter of opinion. On several occasions, he enumerates, sometimes with insistence, the *forma verborum* among the requisites to the validity of the three sacraments last mentioned.<sup>26</sup> Apropos of orders especially, he stresses the point that the sacramental effect is produced when the *opera manus et linguae concur*;<sup>27</sup> in one place, he even supposes that it is the *virtus* of the *forma verborum*, pronounced by the ordaining minister, which effects with the *operatio congrua* the impression of the character.<sup>28</sup> But these concessions to the more current theology do not alter the fact that at heart he supports the opinion which reduces the whole essence of some sacraments either to the *materia* or to the rite alone.

On all these points Alexander's teaching remains in keeping with that of previous theology. On others though, it is quite in advance. Indeed, Alexander not only provides a much clearer and ampler exposé; he also positively enriches the traditional doctrine by new contributions.

In the first place, Alexander, more than any of his predecessors, promoted the cause of the seven sacraments, by proclaiming all and

Apostolis, non est de substantia sacramenti confirmationis, sed tantum inunctio chris-  
matis in fronte; multo fortius ergo forma horum verborum non erit de substantia  
sacramenti ordinis; A f.158c: "Si vero queratur utrum forma verborum  
sit de substantia ordinis, dicendum quod sacramentale est, sed non de substantia sacra-  
menti, sed ad bene esse est ordinata, ut intelligat ad quid ordinatur.

25. A f.158a: "Si vero quaeratur in quo opere conferatur haec potestas, dicimus  
quod in diversis ordinibus in diversis operibus. Nam in minoribus ordinibus in tradi-  
tione instrumenti pertinentis ad potestatem. Similiter etiam in ordine subdiaconatus  
accidit: nam primitus crat ordo non sacer, et in hoc habuit convenientiam aliquam cum  
aliis minoribus ordinibus. Ordo vero diaconatus et presbyteratus impositione manuum  
confertur.

26. On confirmation, see *supra* p. 2; on extreme unction *supra* n. 23 and also A f.154b: "Per hoc patet quod ad hoc ut fiat hoc sacramentum exigitur oleum consecra-  
tum, ordo sacerdotalis et intentio faciendi quod facit Ecclesia et oratio fidei quam dicit  
Iacobus."

27. A f.158b: "Impositio vero manus significat collationem potestatis, nam in hoc  
quod imponitur manus signatur conferri potestas. Manus enim ad potestatem et ad  
opus pertinet. Causa autem huius est quia manus est organum organorum. Alia enim  
organa per eam rectificantur, sicut lingua est organum organorum in ostendendo. Cum  
ergo concurrunt haec duo opera linguae et manus, recte designatur conferri potestas.

28. A f.163b, E f.290v, T f.173a: "Quaeritur si vis matrimonii consistit in iis  
verbis: 'Accipio te in uxorem' etc. Etenim, modo in ordinando aliquem dicat ordinato-  
r verba spectantia ad ordinem, imprimitur character ordinis, quia est operatio congrua  
et debita forma verborum et potestas ordinantis; et suscipitur ordo, licet sit irregulari-  
tas ex parte ordinati. Cum igitur sic sit in ordine, eritne sic in matrimonio, ut vis illa  
verborum efficiat matrimonium, licet sit irregularitas in personis?" The words *Etenim*  
*modo* are corrected from AE *Et eodem modo* and T *Et modo*.

each of them true *signa et causae gratiae*, regardless of the differences that might occur in their external structure. Whether they be performed by *materia* and *forma*, like baptism and the eucharist, or by *materia* only, as confirmation, or by a rite *in debita materia*, as extreme unction, or by a rite alone, as orders, or by actions without *materia*, like penance and matrimony, as long as they verify the notion of *signum et causa gratiae*, they are all in Alexander's estimation perfectly equivalent sacraments. The composition in *res* and *verba* or any other structure of the sacramental sign is to him of secondary importance. The fact for instance that in extreme unction the *forma verborum*, instead of determining the *materia*, as in baptism, merely signifies the grace already produced by the unction, does not in Alexander's opinion affect the sacrament itself.<sup>29</sup> He likewise points out that the sacrament of orders, even though its substance consists, as he thinks it does, in a mere rite without *materia* and *forma*, produces its effects no less surely than the sacraments that are performed *ex virtute verborum in debita materia*.<sup>30</sup> As for penance and matrimony, he is the first scholastic to claim for them a real efficacy as regards grace, although he expressly admits that their structure differs greatly from that of the others.<sup>31</sup> Though excessive in several respects, this attitude was nevertheless instrumental in disconnecting the problem of the notion of the sacrament from that of its composition. It consti-

29. In order to understand the text that follows, it is necessary to know that the ritual to which Alexander is referring, apparently prescribed two different prayers, one preceding, the other following the unction: A f.154ab, E f.278r, P f.210d-211a, T f.167d: "Deinde quaeritur de forma unctionis utrum haec sit forma:" *Ungo te oleo sanctificato in nomine Patris etc., ut more militis uncti praeparatus ad certamen aereas possis superare potestates, an illa sit forma quae dicta est, quae in forma petitionis petitur sic: Per istam suavissimam unctionem etc.* Et videtur quod prima sit forma, per simile in aliis sacramentis; sic enim dicitur in baptismate, sic in confirmatione. Praeterea, videtur . . . quod sacramenta quae proprie sunt Novae Legis cum signaculo Trinitatis fiunt; sed reliqua forma non fit signaculo Trinitatis sicut et haec; unde videtur potius haec esse forma quam illa. Praeterea, forma sacramenti non fit modo orationis sive optativo modo; optativus enim modus affectum exprimit, non effectum. Indicativus modus effectum exprimit sive essentiam rei, et propter hoc indicative traditur forma sacramentorum, ad designandum quod, quantum est de sacramentis, est effectus eorum cum significatione. Reliqua vero forma optativa sumpta non erit forma sacramenti. Quod autem non sit haec forma sacramenti, videtur per hoc quod praecedit unctionio et post sequitur haec forma; sed si unctionio illa est sacramentum, efficit quod figurat; non ergo tunc efficitur cum dicitur: *Ungo te etc.* Respondeo quod haec forma figurat gratiam collatam in unctione et non est forma quae effectum principalem sacramenti conferat, ut accidit in baptismo; sanctificatur enim aqua ex forma verborum: ex sanctificatione vero per ablutionem consequitur effectus. Unde non est hic aliqua forma quae cum materia producat effectum, sed forma praecedens disponit af effectum consequendum, forma sequens significat effectum consecutum, quantum est de virtute sacramenti.

30. Cf. *supra* n. 18.

31. On this question, see D. Van den Eynde. *Les Définitions des sacrements pendant la première période de la théologie scholastique*, Louvain 1950, 107-109.

tuted also a healthy reaction against the tendency to cast all sacraments, with regard to their external structure, in the same mould and to reduce them at all costs to one single type. Actually it is at the origin of the theological current which throughout the centuries has always muffled attempts at oversimplifying the problem of the composition of the sacraments.

Another improvement concerns the sacramental formula or rather the notion of the *substantia sacramentorum*. Like many authors since Huguccio of Ferrara,<sup>32</sup> Alexander cannot bring himself to believe that a *forma verborum*, originating from the Church, belongs to the substance of the sacrament. That is the only reason why he hesitates to admit the existence of two sensible constituents in confirmation, extreme unction and orders. Still his opposition to that kind of *forma verborum* is not an absolute one. Directly he does not level his criticism at the *forma* as such, but at the *forma* in as far as it has been concretely fixed by the Church. About the concrete specified formula, Alexander has no doubts: it does not belong to the substance or *esse sacramenti*, but only to its *bene esse*; hence he deems it a mere sacramental.<sup>33</sup> About the *forma* in general on the contrary, he is not so sure: after all, he thinks, it might be substantial.<sup>34</sup> Alexander did not go to the bottom of the problem. Yet the distinction he makes is very important. It foreshadows the much later theological doctrine that the *substantia sacramenti* cannot contain any specifications originating from the Church, not even those that would be necessary requirements for validity. It supplies, furthermore, the possibility of maintaining the *forma* as an essential component, without including its concrete shape within the substance of the sacrament. Alexander does not avail himself of that opportunity, but soon after him many will do so.<sup>35</sup>

A last and most valuable contribution rests with the question *de differentia materiae in sacramentis*. Before Alexander no author is known to have treated it. It occurs in dist. 26 of the fourth book of his *Gloss* and covers several topics. Of these only the first has a bearing on the problem of the composition of the sacraments.

Alexander himself tells us that he was prompted to the question by the obvious fact that neither matrimony nor penance have a true *materia*. All reasoning to the contrary is of no avail. Take for

32. Cf. *Franciscan Studies*, XI (1951), pp. 120-121.

33. Cf. *supra* n. 21 and 24.

34. Cf. *supra* n. 21, especially the words: "Forte est de esse."

35. For instance, St. Bonaventure, who refutes Alexander's opinion in *Comment. Sent.*, IV, d. 23, a. 1, q. 4 (ed. Quaracchi, p. 595).

instance matrimony. One cannot pretend that its *materia* would consist in the *personae legitimae* or contracting parties, since they are rational beings without resemblance to the invisible grace. Neither can we call by that name the exchange of rings, the blessing imparted by the priest or any suchlike ceremony, for matrimony consists in the consent, which again is a spiritual reality. How then is this peculiarity of matrimony — and of penance as well — to be explained?

Alexander gives a rather subtle answer. Penance and matrimony, he says, differ from all other sacraments by their institution and by their nature. Indeed, they alone were instituted in paradise, at a time when mankind was not yet subjected through sin to sensible things. Again, they alone draw their external sign from an internal affection: for in matrimony, the external words express the internal consent, and in penance the external manifestations of sorrow, especially the words of confession, express the internal passion of the contrite soul. For these two reasons, penance and matrimony are performed without an external sensible *materia*. In return they have something proper to themselves, which is lacking in the other five: indeed, they alone are performed — matrimony entirely and penance partially — by the persons who receive them. In default then of a real separate *materia*, penance and matrimony take their *materia* from the acts of the subjects themselves.

Consequenter quaeritur de differentia materiae in sacramentis. Et hoc ratione coniugii, quod non videtur habere materiam. Et est prima quaestio quare plura sacramenta communicant in oleo tanquam in materia, in quodam vero appropriatur aqua, in quodam species panis et vini, coniugium vero et paenitentia nullam videntur habere materiam sensibilem.

Praeterea in matrimonio materia videtur esse ipsae legitimae personae. Cum enim matrimonium sit vinculum, respectu autem vinculi ea quae vinciuntur sunt materia, videntur tunc res rationales materia huius sacramenti. Qualiter ergo convenit eis haec ratio sacramenti: "invisibilis gratiae visibilis forma"? Oportet enim visibilem formam habere aliquam similitudinem cum invisibili gratia, cuius est signum.

Praeter haec, ita est in aliis sacramentis quod ad esse sacramenti requiritur determinata materia ex qua fit sacramentum. Propter quid similiter non est in paenitentia et sacramento coniugii? Non enim potest dici in coniugii quod subarratio anuli vel benedictio vel aliquid talium pertinentium ad solemnitatem coniugii sit materia coniugii, cum coniugium sit consensus animorum; consensus autem res spiritualis est.

Respondeo quod aliter est in his duobus sacramentis et in aliis quinque. Haec enim duo instituta erant in paradyso, dum adhuc homo spirituali mente praeditus erat, nec per conversionem ad sensibilia subiectus peccato. Praeterea ex natura sacramenti hoc accipitur. Coniugium enim consistit in consensu expresso per verba de praesenti. Quid enim habet maiorem convenientiam cum verbo interiori quam verbum exterius, quod ab ipso generatur? Similiter in paenitentia passio quae fit in corpore convenientiam habet cum passione mentis, a qua generatur, et verbum affectui attestatur. Recte ergo haec duo sacramenta, quorum signa generantur ab affectione animi, sunt universalia sacramenta legem naturae concomitantia.

Non sic autem est in aliis. Sed sicut homo fuit seductus per sensibilia ab ipso separata, ita per sensibilia separata reducetur. Et propter hoc omnia sacramenta instituta post lapsum hominis, exteriorem habent materiam.

Praeterea in his duobus sacramentis est homo sicut cooperans Deo; dico autem de homine qui recipit effectum sacramenti. Deus enim non iustificat hominem nisi homo faciat quod in ipso est. Similiter non fit sacramentum matrimonii in aliquo nisi eo consentiente. Non sic autem est in aliis sacramentis, immo actiones sacramentales ad alias pertinent personas quam ad eas quae suscipiunt sacramentum. Quod patet ex definitionibus sacramentorum. Paenitentia enim est cum commissa deflemus etc.; matrimonium etiam est consensus animorum etc.; baptismus vero est aqua diluendis animis et corporibus sanctificans, et ita de aliis. Per quod signatur quod, postquam lapsus fuit homo in peccatum, indiguit alio adiutore ad resurgendum. Sed ante lapsum potuit stare et proficere nullo alio adiutore quam Deo. Et ideo sacramenta illa quae ante peccatum erant instituta, materiam acceperunt ex ipso qui suscepit sacramentum per ipsius operationem.

Secus tamen est de sacramento paenitentiae et de sacramento coniugii. Nam sacramentum paenitentiae quoad partes suas non habuit effectum antequam lapsus esset homo in peccatum; et propter hoc in parte dependet effectus eius a ministris Ecclesiae prout de virtute clavium fit in parte relaxatio poenae aut commutatio. Coniugium vero est inter omnia quoad hoc specialius. Eius enim effectus melius permansisset, si homo in statu innocentiae perstitisset.<sup>36</sup>

Alexander's exposé calls for some explanation. He evidently starts from the supposition that matrimony and penance have no *materia* in the usual sense of physical element. But already in the exposition of the case, he abstracts from this particular meaning of the word. Indeed, although the absence of any bodily elements in those two sacraments is obvious, he says only that "apparently" they have no "sensible *materia*." Moreover among the reasons why the *materia* of matrimony cannot be identified with persons or ceremonies or consent, he never mentions the fact that such *materia* would not be a physical element. On the contrary, he implicitly admits that the *legitima personae* could be the *materia sacramenti* but for their being *res rationales* without resemblance to the invisible grace. He even gives us to understand that the ceremonies of the ring and the blessing, as well as the consent, could be called *materia determinata ex qua fit sacramentum*, if only the former would belong to the substance of matrimony and the latter be a sensible instead of a spiritual reality.

His answer alike operates with a meaning of *materia* which is wider than that of physical element. For him, penance and matrimony differ from the other sacraments, not precisely in that they make no use of any *materia* at all, but because they are performed without the help of an objective *materia*, free from all activity of the subjects that receive them. He opposes then to the *materia externa*, which is a *sensibile ab homine separatum*, of the other sacraments the *materia* of pen-

36. A f.161b, E f.288r, T f.172a.

ance and matrimony, consisting in the respective acts of the penitent and the contracting parties. Though primarily internal and spiritual, these substitutes for a physical element have nevertheless a sensible side. Alexander indeed points out that in penance the inner contrition is linked to the outward manifestations of the satisfaction and to the words of the confession, and that in matrimony the consent must be expressed by words.

In his *Gloss*, Alexander does not give to this idea any further development. While he often insists on the part of the priest in penance, he never speaks of it as a *forma verborum* or *forma absolutionis* and he never opposes it to the *materia* or acts of the penitent. He does not explain either how the consent expressed by words, which according to him constitute the whole essence of matrimony, can at the same time be called its *materia*. Therefore, I suspect Alexander uses the word *materia* here, as in a few other instances, in the sense of "stuff of which a sacrament is made," which applies to all components indistinctly, be they physical things, rites, acts or words.<sup>37</sup>

Be that as it may, Alexander's opinion shows that the theology of his time was inclined to broaden the traditional meaning of the word *materia* and to apply it to real or possible equivalents of the physical element, such as persons, ceremonies, consent. He himself uses it with this new meaning only once, namely for the acts of the penitent and the contracting parties. Even in the supposition that he did not yet oppose it to a *forma verborum*, his particular view on the constitution of these two sacraments has deeply impressed subsequent theology. As will be seen, it was noticed by his immediate successors,<sup>38</sup> and it is still the solution adopted by S. Albert the Great<sup>39</sup> and St. Thomas.<sup>40</sup>

Alexander's teaching on the composition of the sacraments can be summarized in the following sentences: 1) Only two sacraments—baptism and the eucharist—can certainly be said to consist essentially in a *res* or *materia* and a *verbum*, or a *forma verborum*, in other words, in a physical element and a formula. Still, Lombard's prin-

37. In one instance Alexander uses indeed the same expression *cedere in materiam* for the water of baptism, the bread and wine in the eucharist and the words in all sacraments: A f.161d, E f.289r, T f.172b: "Et propter hoc (panis et vinum) recte cedunt in materiam nutrimentalis sacramenti, sicut illa (aqua) in materiam sacramenti regenerationis. Si vero quaeratur propter quid verba cedunt in omnem materiam sacramentalem aliquo modo . . .".

38. Cf. *infra* pp. 23-24

39. In IV S

40. In IV Sent., d.26,q.2,a.1,ad 2um: "Sacramentum matrimonii perficitur per actum eius qui sacramento illo utitur, sicut paenitentia; et ideo sicut paenitentia non habet aliam materiam nisi ipsos actus sensui subiectos, qui sunt loco materialis elementi, ita est de matrimonio".

ciple can be accepted in its universality, provided that for some sacraments it be not restricted to the substantial components alone and provided the word *res* viz. *materia* with regard to penance and matrimony be extended to the acts of the subjects; 2) It is possible that all sacraments consist essentially in two sensible elements, the first being either a *res* viz. *materia* or some equivalent rites or acts, the second a *verbum* viz. *forma verborum* or formula. The chances are, though, that in confirmation, extreme unction and orders, the formula does not belong to the substance of the sacrament.

## 2. Hugh of St. Cher.

The Second Dominican Master at the University of Paris is rightly considered as the true creator of the theory which grants to all and each of the sacraments a bipartite and hylomorphic composition. From Hugh of St. Cher indeed originates the idea, not only of identifying in each sacrament two sensible constituents, namely *res* viz. *materia* and *verba* viz. *forma verborum*, but also of establishing their mutual relation as one of matter and form.

He exposes his theory first in his *Commentary on the Sentences* (around 1230)<sup>41</sup> and afterwards in his *Quaestiones* (before 1236), some of which have been detected lately.<sup>42</sup>

Fond of method and clarity, Hugh starts by setting up his general principle; he then goes on by applying it to all the sacraments, from baptism to matrimony.

Speaking of the sacraments in general, both in his *Commentary* and in his *Quaestio de sacramentis in communi*, he makes a clear distinction between the essence of a sacrament and the mere requisites for its valid administration, such as intention, ritual, minister and subject.

The sacrament proper, he declares, consists of two constituents, materially of a *res* and formally of a *verbum*. That composition is so characteristic of the sacraments of the New Testament as to prevent the sacrifices, offerings and libations of the Old Convenant from being called sacraments in the true sense of the word. Indeed the efficacy, which exclusively belongs to the evangelical sacraments, rests in the

41. The references to this work are to the manuscripts *Vatican lat. 1098* (=V) and *1174* (=V<sup>1</sup>).

42. Cf. O. Lottin, *Quelques "Quaestiones" de maîtres parisiens aux environs de 1225-1230*, in *Rech. théol. anc. méd.*, 5 (1933) 468-475; D. Van den Eynde, *Nouvelles Questions de Hugues de Saint-Cher*, in *Mélanges de Joseph de Ghellinck S. J.* ("Mu-

conjunction of the *elementum* and *verbum* for, as the sacrament itself is constituted of an *elementum* as matter and a *verbum* as form, so does its *vis* or power result from the combination of the material *vis* of the former with the formal *vis* of the latter.

## COMMENT.

"Quid sit sacramentum," id est in quo fieri habeat, ut baptismus in aqua; "in quibus consistat," id est, quot exiguntur ad esse cuiuslibet.

"Duo autem sunt" etc. Tamen plura exiguntur in sacramento quodam, ut forma, intentio, persona. Verba formaliter et res materialiter, ut sacramenta voceamus impropter tantum sacrificia de animalibus, oblationes de pane et fructibus et huiusmodi libamina.<sup>43</sup>

## DE SACRAMENTIS IN COMMUNI

Ad sextum quo quaeritur quot exiguntur ad essentiam sacramenti, dico quod sacramentum in duobus consistit essentialiter, quae sunt verbum et res: verbum, ut in baptismo invocatio Trinitatis, res aqua; et est alterum ut materia, (alterum) ut forma. Et haec sunt in quolibet sacramento.

Praeter haec autem exiguntur aliqua alia, quae sunt quasi extrinseca, scil. similitudo naturalis, institutio specialis, sanctificatio spiritualis, intentio ministrantis, persona suscipientis.<sup>44</sup>

. . . sicut sacramentum omne in duobus consistit, elemento scilicet quasi materia et verbo quasi forma, ut vult Augustinus super Ioannem, sic duplex est vis sacramenti, una materialis quae est in elemento, alia formalis sive activa quae est in verbo.<sup>45</sup>

Hugh of St. Cher has tried to apply his general principle to each of the seven sacraments in particular. The result is a theory in which older views and prejudices alternate with more recent ideas and personal innovations. On the one hand, indeed, Hugh strives to save as much as possible of the teachings of the past; on the other hand, he does not hesitate to break away from them, whenever his general principle is at stake. A review of his main statements on the composition of the different sacraments will make this point clear.

In Hugh's estimation, baptism supplies the ideal illustration of his theory. Was it not apropos of this sacrament that St. Augustine said: "Without the word, what is water but water? But let the word join the element and at once the water becomes a sacrament." From this

saeum Lessianum," sect. hist. 14) (Gembloux 1951) pp. 815-835 — Hugh's questions that have been discovered so far are all contained in the collection of Douai 434, I and II (=D). Up to now they are seven: one *de sacramentis in communis* (D I f.110d-111d), one *de baptismo* (D I f.111d-112b), four on penance (D II f.78a-82b) and one *de matrimonio* (D I f.107 a-c).

43. V f.132b and 133b, V' f.66d and 67b.

44. D I f.110d.

45. D I f.111c.

text Hugh concludes two things: first that baptism consists essentially of the water sanctified by the words; secondly, that the word plays a more important part than the element. On St. Augustine's authority then he states, both in his *Commentary* and his corresponding question, that baptism is essentially made up of the water as matter and of the invocation of the Trinity as form and, furthermore, that its power derives from the material *vis* which the water received at the touch of Christ's body in the Jordan, and from the formal or active *vis* of the word, at the invocation of which grace is infused. A comparison with the statements Hugh announced in regard to the sacraments in general shows that his description of the constitution of baptism responds in every detail to his general scheme. No wonder then that in treating of the other sacraments, Alexander repeatedly invokes the example of baptism and the text of St. Augustine that supports it.

## COMMENT.

"Vim regenerativam." Nota quod duplex est vis regenerativa: una quasi materialis, alia quasi formalis sive activa. Prima collata est aquis ex contactu mundissimae carnis Christi quando baptizatus est a Ioanne; prius enim aquae erant steriles et infecundae. Quando fecundae factae sunt? Quando verus Elisaeus eas fecundavit. Secunda vis est in verbo, id est, in invocatione Trinitatis, quae est causa efficiens baptismi. Unde Augustinus: "Accedit verbum ad elementum et fit sacramentum."<sup>46</sup>

## DE BAPTISMO

Dico sine praefudicio quod baptismus sive sacramentum baptismi est aqua abluens verbo vitae sanctificata, sicut dicit Augustinus super Ioannem: "Non aqua tantum, nec verbum tantum, sed aqua cum verbo." Unde in duobus et ex duobus constat sacramentum baptismi substantialiter, verbo scil. et elemento; elementum est aqua quasi materia, verbum quasi forma. Et habet aqua vim quamdam materialem ex contactu corporis Christi, ut in ea solum, non in alio liquore possit fieri baptismus. Verbum vero habet vim formalem, qua ad eius prolationem infunditur gratia pueri.<sup>47</sup>

The question of the components of confirmation escaped Hugh's attention where he deals *ex professo* with it in his *Commentary*. On that occasion he quotes only, as Alexander did,<sup>48</sup> the five conditions laid down by Willam of Auxerre for a valid administration of that sacrament.<sup>49</sup> Among them appear the *forma verborum* and the *materia* or chrism, through which Hugh shows confirmation to differ from baptism.<sup>50</sup> But further on, in his treatise on penance, and again in his *Question* dedicated to the same subject, he cites confirmation, besides baptism and the eucharist, as a case in point for his general

46. V f.137a, V' f.70d.

47. D I f.111d.

48. Cf. *supra* p. 3.

49. Cf. *Franciscan Studies* 11 (1951) 140.

50. V f.142c, V' f.75d: "Circa hoc sacramentum tria dubia occurunt: primo,

principle. Here he says: this sacrament also consists of two parts, the chrism and the formula, which stand respectively for its matter and form.<sup>51</sup>

On the eucharist, he repeats, *mutatis mutandis*, all he had said apropos of baptism. He reduces its essence to the species as matter and to the words of consecration as form. Both constituents he endows with a proper causality: the first with a material, the second with a formal or active one. By manner of proof, he quotes the example of baptism. As the baptismal grace is conferred only by the water, since only that element received materially the power of regeneration at the touch of Christ's body, so is the eucharistic body of Christ given only under the species of wheaten bread, since only such bread is materially fit to be transsubstantiated. Again, as the formula of baptism possesses the formal or active power of regenerating, so has the formula of consecration the formal or effective power of transsubstantiating the bread and wine into the body of Christ under the species.

Ali dicunt et planius quod forma panis efficit corpus mysticum, quia unit recipientem corpori mystico. Efficit autem, non per modum causae efficientis, sed per modum causae materialis, sicut de aqua baptismi dictum est. Nam sicut in alio liquore non datur gratia baptismalis, quia sola aqua vim regenerandi materialem recepit a contactu dominici corporis, ita sub alia forma quam forma panis triticei non datur corpus Christi, quia solus ille panis habet materialiter vim transsubstantiandi in corpus Christi. Et sicut forma verborum in sacramento baptismi habet formaliter sive active vim regenerandi, ita in sacramento isto forma verborum praescripta habet formaliter sive effective vim transsubstantiandi panem in corpus Christi in altari.

[Unde sicut sacramentum baptismi in duobus et ex duobus consistit, scil. aqua pro materia et forma verborum pro forma, et sicut vis eius ex duobus scil. ex vi aquae tanquam materia et vi verborum tanquam forma, ita hoc sacramentum ex duobus consistit, scil. ex specie panis et vini pro materia et forma verborum tanquam forma; et similiter virtus huius sacramenti ex duplice vi consistit: ex vi materiali quae est in specie panis et vini, et vi formaliter sive activa quae est in forma verborum. Sicut ergo ex virtute sacramenti baptismi fit gratia in anima baptizati, ita ex virtute huius sacramenti fit corpus Christi in altari] sub specie panis et vini.<sup>52</sup>

The case of penance presented more difficulties. Hugh was aware of them, as a comparison between the pertinent passages of the *Commentary* and his *quaestio disputata* sufficiently shows. Yet, they did not deter him.

quae et quot exiguntur ad esse huius sacramenti . . . De primo ergo sciendum quod quinque exiguntur ad esse huius sacramenti: primum est forma verborum: secundum est intentio confirmantis: tertium dignitas sive ordo confirmantis: quartum materia huius sacramenti, scil. chrisma: quintum, locus in quo fit scil. frons illius qui confirmatur." V f.143a, V' f.76a: "Differt autem sacramentum a sacramento in materia, quia materia baptismi est aqua, confirmationis chrisma. Differunt etiam in forma verborum."

51. Cf. *infra*, pp. 16-17.

52. V f.143d-144a, V' f.77a. The words placed between brackets are omitted by the scribe of V (case of homoioteleuton).

In his *Commentary*, Hugh of St. Cher refers to baptism and confirmation to prove that the sacrament of penance consists essentially of two components, the confession of the sinner and the absolution of the priest, in such manner that the former is related to the latter as the material element. Both constituents then are strictly correlated, so that neither the confession is the sacrament without the absolution, nor the absolution without the confession.

. . . in paenitentia sacramentum tantum est confessio cum absolutione sacerdotis. Sicut enim sacramentum baptismi in duobus consistit, scil. elemento et verbo, et confirmatio in duobus, scil. chrismate et forma verborum, ita in paenitentia sacramentum in duobus consistit, scil. in confessione peccatoris et absolutione sacerdotis. Et sicut in sacramento baptismi elementum est materiale respectu verbi, ita in sacramento paenitentiae confessio est materiale respectu absolutionis.<sup>53</sup>

At this point though an objection arises. What becomes, in this opinion, of contrition and satisfaction, which the common teaching claims to be no less parts of penance? Hugh replies that strictly speaking the contrition does not belong to the sacrament proper or *signum tantum*, as it is a *sacramentum et res, sacramentum* in regard to the forgiveness of sins, *res* in regard to confession.<sup>54</sup> As for satisfaction, he agrees with the Masters of theology that it constitutes with the confession, just like the bread with the wine in the eucharist, one single sacrament, both parts signifying the same identical *res*. Now, just as absolution is the form of confession, so is the imposition of penance the form of satisfaction.<sup>55</sup>

Hugh's answer to the foresaid objection, when combined with his main statement, would lead to the belief that in his *Commentary* he presents the sacrament of penance as compounded of a double matter, confession and absolution, and of a double form, absolution and imposition of penance. This, however, does not reflect his ultimate thought. Indeed, in his question on penance, he straightens out the deficiencies of his former exposé by stating clearly that the sacrament of penance consists of one matter and one form, though either of them comprises two distinct acts.

53. V f.151ab.

54. V f.151b: "Res tantum est remissio peccati. Sacramentum et res est contritio cordis, quae (est) res respectu confessionis et sacramentum respectu remissionis peccati."

55. V. f.151b: *Objection*: "Item, satisfactio pars est paenitentiae: ergo est res vel sacramentum. Res non: hoc patet, quia non significatur ab aliquo quod fit in paenitentia. Ergo est sacramentum. Quaeritur cuius. Si dicatur: contritionis, contra: prior est ipsa, ergo non est sacramentum eius; si dicatur: remissionis peccati. contra: unius rei proprie unum est signum sive sacramentum; sed confessio est signum remissionis peccati, non ergo satisfactio." *Answers*: "Ad aliud dicunt magistri quod satisfactio et confessio sunt unum sacramentum contritionis interioris et remissionis peccati. Et dicitur unum, sicut species panis et vini, ab unitate principalis significati quod est peccati remissio. (Et sicut) absolutio forma est confessionis, ita iniunctio

**Solutio.** Sicut dictum est in praedictis sacramentis, id est baptismo, confirmatione et eucharistia, quod unumquodque sacramentum in duobus consistit—verbi gratia, sacramentum baptismi in verbo et elemento, sacramentum confirmationis in chrismate et verbo, sacramentum eucharistiae in specie visibili et verbo consecrationis, et est unum pro materia, alterum pro forma—ita dicimus quod sacramentum paenitentiae in duobus consistit: uno quod est ex parte confitentis quasi materia, scil. confessio et satisfactio, et altero, id est forma, quod est ex parte confessoris, scil. absolutio quae informat confessionem, et iniunctio quae informat satisfactionem. Unde sicut in baptismo elementum est materia sacramenti et verbum forma et perfectio, nec elementum sine verbo nec verbum sine elemento est perfectum sacramentum, ita confessio et satisfactio sunt materia sacramenti, absolutio et iniunctio confessoris est forma et perfectio huius sacramenti. Nec confessio sine absolutione, nec satisfactio sine iniunctione est sacramentum vel e converso.<sup>56</sup>

With extreme unction, we strike again the normal case. Among the different opinions of the time in regard to its essence, Hugh of St. Cher selects the one that best suits his general idea of the composition of the sacrament. He holds in effect that extreme unction, exactly like baptism, consists of two things, one being the consecrated oil, the other the *forma verborum*. If that same composition, he adds, be not found in all sacraments, the notion of the sacrament itself would not be verified in each of them in a univocal manner.

Ideo dicunt alii quod sicut sacramentum baptismi constat ex duobus, scil. ex elemento et verbo, secundum quod dicit Augustinus: "Accedit verbum ad elementum et fit sacramentum," ita hoc sacramentum constat ex duobus, scil. ex oleo consecrato et verbo. Et sicut in baptismo non dicitur proprie sacramentum aqua per se nec forma per se sed constans ex his, ita et hic. Et hoc est generale in omnibus sacramentis, sicut patet in praecedentibus et patebit in aliis per Dei gratiam. Aliter enim non esset univoca ratio sacramenti.<sup>57</sup>

The sacrament of orders has a constitution other than baptism. Indeed, the instruments, that are used in its celebration, are objects made of a *materia* rather than a *materia* itself. Nevertheless, the dictum of St. Augustine *Accedit verbum* etc. holds good for the sacrament of orders as well, in this sense that its essence consists of a rite or *signaculum*, namely the handing over of instruments, and of the accompanying formula.

Sacmentum (ordinis) est aliquod signaculum visibile quo spiritualis potestas tradi ostenditur cum forma verborum determinata: ut ostiariis traditio clavium materialium cum forma verborum sacramentum est; in lectoribus et exorcistis traditio libri cum forma verborum est sacramentum, et sic de aliis. Unde patet quod una est ratio sacramenti in hoc et in praecedentibus. Illud enim verbum Augustini: "Accedit verbum ad elementum et fit sacramentum," ad omnia sacramenta extenditur.<sup>58</sup>

As might be expected, Hugh of St. Cher fully maintains his principle

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sacerdotis informat satisfactionem ut sit sacramentum: quia sicut confessio sine absolutione non est sacramentum et e converso, ita satisfactio sine iniunctione sui sacerdotis non est sacramentum nec e converso.

56. D II f.78d.

57. V f.168c, V' f.96c.

58. V f.170d, V' f.98a.

in regard to matrimony, but he is at a loss when it comes to specify the matter and form of this sacrament. Already in his *Commentary* he is not too sure. To the question indeed what the sacrament of matrimony precisely is, he proposes his own two different solutions. According to the first, matrimony would be the right to physical intercourse, originating from the consent of the minds; in this opinion, the "union of the bodies" would constitute the material cause, the "union of the souls" the formal or efficient cause of matrimony. The second solution of the *Commentary* sees the essence of the sacrament in the consent expressed by words; from this Hugh concludes that the consent itself is like the matter of the sacrament, whereas the formula that expresses the consent is like its form. Hugh considers the second solution as the better one, no doubt because it is more in keeping with his general idea. Still, it must not have satisfied him either: for in his *quaestio de matrimonio*, which comes later, he now identifies the matter with the contracting parties and the form with the consent expressed by words.

## COMMENT.

Item quaeritur quid sit ibi sacramentum, quid res sacramenti.

**Solutio.** Ad hoc dicimus quod matrimonium utramque coniunctionem complectitur, scil. corporum et animorum. Coniunctio corporum est quasi causa materialis, coniunctio animorum est quasi causa formalis sive efficiens matrimonii. Unde definitio illa data est per causam et debet sic intelligi: "Matrimonium est ius cohabitandi corporaliter ex consensu animorum proveniens." Et per hoc patet quid sit ibi sacramentum, scil. corporalis coabitatio cum consensu animorum.

Vel melius potest dici, scil. quod consensus in copulam maritalem per verba de praesenti expressus est sacramentum, et ipse est quasi materia sacramenti, forma verborum est quasi forma sacramenti, sicut in baptismo aqua est materia sacramenti et forma verborum est forma sacramenti eiusdem.<sup>59</sup>

More than any of his clear-cut statements, this change of mind on Hugh's part gives us a real understanding of what he ultimately meant by the *res* and *verbum* or matter and form of the sacraments. His preference indeed for those solutions, which admit of finding in matrimony as in the other sacraments a matter and form, bespeaks his con-

## DE MATRIMONIO

Tertio quaeritur: matrimonium, cum sit sacramentum, habet materiam et formam. Quaero quid pro materia, sicut video in aliis sacramentis, ut in baptismo, quod aqua est ibi pro materia, verborum prolatione pro forma? Si coniunctio corporum pro materia, non est reperire in quolibet sacramento; si mas et femina, quid erit pro forma?

**Solutio.** Materia de qua fit est masculus et femina, (consensus) verbo(-rum) prolatione expres-sus modo debito est ibi pro forma.<sup>60</sup>

59. V f.174d. V' f.101a.

60. D I f.107b. The words or parts of words between brackets have been blotted out in the manuscript; we restored them according to the context.

viction that such composition is indispensable for the notion of the sacrament itself. Nevertheless, by substituting the contracting parties for the internal consent, he shows that in his idea, not either, but both constituents, the matter as well as the form, should be sensible realities. Moreover, the same substitution implies that he required the matter and form, in this as in all other cases, be two distinct realities. Only admitting of this preconception, can we understand how, against his own initial statements to the contrary, he finally selects for the matter of the sacrament of matrimony an element, namely the contracting parties, which he pertinently knows to be external to its substance.

Hugh's hesitations on the matter and form of matrimony prove thus that his principle, like that of Geroch of Reichersberg and Lombard, is not based on all the facts available. His, for sure, has a larger field of application than theirs. Yet, for all its width, it was still too narrow to include the sacrament of matrimony.

In its main features, this then is the first general attempt of scholastic theology to explain the physical structure of all seven sacraments. In view of the difficulties it had to overcome, it can not be expected to be perfect in all respects. In fact, Hugh of St. Cher pays still a high tribute to the prejudices of the past. Fascinated by Lombard's conception, which up to this time held the field, he discards from the essence of all the sacraments performed with a *res* viz. *materia*, the ritual actions by which that *materia* is applied. In this manner he entirely overlooks the importance of the ablution in baptism, of the use of chrism in confirmation and of the unction in the sacrament of the sick; to him, these sacraments, just as the eucharist, consist only of a physical element sanctified by the words. In treating of the other sacraments, too, he gives in to the same tendency. Although here he is compelled to replace the physical element by a mere substitute, his choice falls regularly on an element which, thanks to its more expressive and spectacular character, remains more akin to the genuine *res* viz. *materia* of the others. This explains why he makes the handing over of instruments the matter of the sacrament of orders in preference to other rites, why also he excludes the contrition from the essential matter of penance, and why finally he replaces the consent as the matter of matrimony by the *personae*. Indeed, whatever it cost, Hugh of St. Cher was firmly decided to save Lombard's endangered principle which placed the composition of all sacraments in two essential parts.

By this aprioristic attitude, his method differs greatly from that of Alexander of Hales. The latter starts from what he presumes to be the actual facts, without preconception as to the real value or possible

adaptability of Lombard's general principle. When he extends, in behalf of penance and matrimony, the original sense of *res* viz. *materia*, he is moved, not so much by the preoccupation of saving the traditional axiom, as by the consideration that in these sacraments the acts of the subjects constitute a perfect equivalent for the *res* viz. *materia* of the others. In fact, in some instances, he renounces the principle rather than admit that a formula, specified by the Church, would enter the substance of a sacrament.

Hugh of St. Cher, on the contrary, *a priori* defends the thesis of the bipartite and hylomorphic constitution of each of all sacraments without exception. So much is he taken over by this novelty that he does not shrink from making the very notion of sacrament dependent on it. Consequently, he broadens the import of Lombard's axiom for the benefit of all sacraments whether their matter consist of a physical element or of something else. For the same reason, he drops altogether the difficulty arising from the ecclesiastical origin of some of the formulas; he simply ignores this, because to admit it would endanger his preconceived idea.

Nevertheless, for all its imperfection, the solution proposed by Hugh of St. Cher will finally prevail not only in theology but also in the official teaching of the *magisterium*. Apart from its qualities as a clear and systematical exposition, two main reasons warranted its final success.

In the first place, it embodied nearly to perfection the more common doctrine that most of the sacraments, if not all, are performed either by a real *res* viz. *materia* and *verba* viz. *forma verborum* or at least by some equivalents, and that of both parts the words are the more important. Even Alexander recognized that fact: for, among the requisites of confirmation and extreme unction, he enumerates regularly the *materia* and *forma verborum*; he likewise speaks of the virtue of the words, which in the sacrament of orders produce with the suitable rite the character and the grace.<sup>61</sup> Perhaps Hugh of St. Cher was unable to solve Alexander's difficulty on the *formae verborum* of some of the sacraments. But from a theological point of view, he was right in refusing to sacrifice a deep-rooted belief in favor of provisionally unanswered objections.

Secondly, the application he made of the hylomorphic theory to the composition of the sacraments supplied a welcome escape from the narrow bounds to which the problem, from its inception, had been

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61. See above, p. 3 and also notes 26-28.

confined. The theologians, though paying lip service to Lombard's authority, had never admitted that all and each of the sacraments consists essentially of a *res* viz. *materia* and a *verbum* viz. *forma verborum*, in other words, of a physical element and a formula. But little by little they had come to the conviction that in one way or another most of them have two sensible constituents. Agreed on the term *forma* or *verba*, they dislike to call the other component, in penance, orders and matrimony, by the proper names of the physical element. Even Hugh of St. Cher, although he invokes in favor of these sacraments the text of St. Augustine *Accedit verbum etc.*<sup>62</sup>, never uses the terms *res*, *elementum* or *materia* as a counterpart to their *verba* or *forma verborum*.<sup>63</sup> Only Alexander's *Gloss* offers a couple of examples where the word *materia*, as a synonym of *res* or *elementum*, is extended to some particular substitutes for the physical element.<sup>64</sup>

Yet, the very terms *materia* and *forma* (*verborum*) held out a possibility of overcoming the difficulties of terminology and of clarifying at the same time the doctrine itself. Prior to Hugh of St. Cher they had no hylomorphic meaning. But by now they had grown, under the indirect influence of the Aristotelian vocabulary, into the standard expression *materia et forma*.<sup>65</sup> Once the sacramental expression had thus become identical with the hylomorphic one, it was but a step to transfer to the former the meaning of the latter. Henceforth, the sacramental constituents, which hitherto had only been considered as real or equivalent physical elements and formulas, could also be referred to as matter and form or determinable and determining principles.

Hugh of St. Cher is responsible for transforming the bipartite composition of the sacraments into a hylomorphic one. In keeping with common theology, which set more faith in the formula than in the other component, he identified the first with the *forma* or determining factor, the second with the *materia* or determinable part.

His initiative entailed more than one advantage. On the one hand it created a satisfactory terminology for those sacraments that were performed without a *res* viz. *materia* in the old sense of the word: for on account of their abstract character, the terms "matter" and "form" fit any sensible reality regardless of its concrete nature. On the other

62. Cf. especially the texts on the sacrament of orders, *supra* P.

63. Though he designates the respective parts of these sacraments as *materia et forma*, that is, as matter and form, he never calls them *res et verbum* or *materia et forma verborum*.

64. Cf. *supra* p. 10.

65. See *Franciscan Studies* 11 (1951) 137-144 and p. 2.

hand, being correlative terms, they connote the exact connexion which links up the one component with the other. In this manner the new expression supplied some of the shortcomings of Lombard's formula.

Unfortunately, it rendered the Latin words *materia* and *forma*, as applied to the sacraments, extremely ambiguous. Indeed from now on theology will employ these same words to designate a) the physical elements and formulas, which are used in the celebration of some sacraments, like baptism and the eucharist; 2) the sensible realities which in some others, as matrimony, take the place of the physical element and the formula; c) the determinable and determining elements, of which all sacraments consist. From this angle, it would have been better if theology, in speaking of the determinable and determining parts of a sacrament, had fixed its choice upon the terms *materiale* and *formale*, which Hugh of St. Cher uses occasionally as alternatives for *materia* and *forma*.

### 3. Further Developments

The differences between the respective theories of Alexander of Hales and Hugh of St. Cher were neither fundamental nor irreducible. In the next fifty years, most of them will be settled peacefully and without hurt, thanks to the gradual elimination of the old prejudices. But in the last decade (1230-1240) of early Scholasticism, as far at least as our fragmentary documentation permits to judge, the problem of the composition of the sacraments has undergone no other important changes. In a question *de confessione*, attributed to Alexander of Hales *antequam esset frater* (1236),<sup>66</sup> one may find the express statement that in penance, the acts of the penitent take the place of the *res*, whereas the formula of absolution constitutes the *verba*. . . But besides this valuable item, we can detect no signs of any real progress.

A good many authors still remain indifferent to the latest ideas. The abbreviations of the *Summa aurea* by Ardengus and Herbert of Auxerre, the anonymous *Summa* of Madrid on the seven sacraments, the *Summa* of John of Treviso and nearly all the sacramental questions of the collection of Douai, continue to speak of the components of the

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66. Cf. Assisi 138, f.129a: "Ad hoc quod obicitur quod res exiguntur in hoc sacramento, quia aut verbum simul cum re aut sine; si cum re, quid est illud elementum etc., dico quo illud quod est loco rei in hoc sacramento sunt interiores lacrymae vel exteriores, verbum autem absolutionis accedens ad voluntatem conterendi vel atterendi facit sacramentum. Si enim verbum fuerit tantum sine huiusmodi dispositione, dico quod est signum tantum, deficiens a causalitate; et, si haec dispositio affuerit, poterit sequi aliquem effectum, licet non plenum. Plenus autem effectus habetur contritione praecedente et confessione et satisfactione."

sacramental sign in the same haphazard way and to use the same inconsistent terminology as did the older theologians. Even the author of the *Summa Filia Magistri* shows no interest in the theory of his master, Hugh of St. Cher.

Nevertheless, the theological literature of the years 1230-1240 contains a number of indications which point out that the ideas, developed lately by Alexander of Hales and Hugh of St. Cher, were spreading rapidly. In this respect three documents are of special significance.

The first is an anonymous question of the collection of Douai,<sup>67</sup> which bears such a resemblance to Alexander's question *de differentia materia in sacramentis* that the dependency of one upon the other is evident. In fact, it is the anonymous who exploits Alexander, as he proposes both a more advanced and at the same time less subtle teaching.

Like Alexander, our anonymous theologian examines at the beginning of his *Question* why, in contrast with the other five sacraments, matrimony and penance have no *materia*. His answer, too, is taken from Alexander. Penance and matrimony, he declares, were instituted in paradise, before the Fall, and consequently before mankind had any use for the *sensibilia*. Therefore they could and still can dispense with a sensible *materia*.

Quaeritur quare quedam sacramenta habent materiam, ut patet in baptismo et in eucharistia, in confirmatione et ordine et extrema unctione; quedam non habent, ut matrimonium et paenitentia . . . Item videtur quod magis deberet esse materia in matrimonio, quoniam vis concupisibilis magis est materialis quam rationalis; sed sacramentum quod est contra defectum rationalis materiam habet; ergo multo fortius matrimonium, quod est contra defectum concupisibilis . . . Solutio. Sicut supra diximus, matrimonium et paenitentia in paradyso instituta sunt, quamvis aliter et aliter, et ante lapsum hominis; alia vero post lapsum: Matrimonium quod (!) in officium, non in remedium, et secundum se totum et propriam rationem, paenitentia vero non secundum suas partes sed in praeservationem contra lapsum ne fieret; post vero instituta est in correptionem. Cum itaque in illorum institutione nullum praecesserit sensibile ratione cuius lapsus esset, cum adhuc nullus esset, merito nullam materiam exigebant, quia non sunt data contra lapsum iam factum. Alia vero, cum data sint in remedium contra lapsum qui ex demptione sensibilium processit, merito debuerunt habere materiam sensibilem, ut medicina morbo congrueret. Unde materia baptismi aqua, oleum vero materia confirmationis, extremae unctionis et ordinis, eucharistiae vero panis et vinum. Per hoc patet quod non valet haec argumentatio: concupisibilis magis materialis quam rationalis etc. cum deberet addere; et fuit post lapsum institutum sicut alia sacramenta, at hoc falsum.<sup>68</sup>

But how does that agree with Lombard's axiom, which grants to all sacraments a *res* and a *verbum*? Could it be that some sacraments consist only of a *res* viz. *materia*, and some others only of a *verbum*?

67. Douai 434 II, f.382a-383b.

68. L.c. 382ab.

To these questions again, our author gives an answer which reflects exactly Alexander's position. For him also, only two sacraments, baptism and the eucharist, are essentially made up of a *certa materia* and of *certa verba*. Among the others, three, namely confirmation, extreme unction and orders, consist exclusively of a *materia*, not of words, and it is even possible that in the last sacrament mentioned the *materia* also does not belong to the substance. The two remaining sacraments, penance and matrimony, as noticed before, have no *materia*. But that does not mean that they consist of *verba* only. Since both are essentially based on the will, the acts of the penitent and of the contracting parties have a share in the constitution of these sacraments.

Although our author does not say so in so many words, he certainly adopts Alexander's idea on the *quasi-materia* of penance and matrimony. He goes even further. Indeed he expressly asserts that penance, having parts, has a *certa forma verborum*, by which he can only mean the formula of absolution. As to matrimony he likewise brings a further explanation, but here he becomes confused. Unable to find in that sacrament any other sensible element but the words, he fancies that the *verba* expressing the consent takes the place of the *res*; this, however, seems to contradict his former statements.

Item, habemus quoddam sacramentum in quo res et verba, ut in baptismo; item quoddam in quo res et non verba, ut in ordine at aliis in quibus verba non sunt necessaria. Quare non habemus aliquod in quo tantum verba? . . . Soluto . . . Ad aliud dicimus quod in baptismo et in sacramento eucharisticae res sunt et verba et certa materia, quae de substantia sacramenti sunt; et hoc inde quoniam dominus Jesus Christus, Verbum increatum, ipse instituit in istis certa verba et certam materiam, et ita voluit esse ut ostenderet totam virtutem sacramentorum esse a se, Verbo increato. Unde, quia ipse in aliis non instituit, res sunt tantum de substantia, verba non, ut in confirmatione et ordine et in extrema unctione; in ordine tamen fortasse oleum non est substantiale. Fuit autem impossibile ut in solis verbis fieret sacramentum post lapsum datum in remedium, quoniam lapsus sive morbus mediantibus rebus contractus est; ergo mediantibus rebus remedium dandum. Item matrimonium non poterat iterum esse in verbis tantum, quoniam eius essentia fundatur supra voluntatem, paenitentia vero super factum et voluntatem. Paenitentia tamen, quae habet partes, habet certam formam verborum. Matrimonium etiam consistit in re ratione signi, quoniam verba experientia verbum mentis vel voluntatem pro re sunt; nec exigitur quod signum sit visible oculis, immo sat est ut quocunque sensu percipiatur; unde et in forma propria et in signo proprio mansit.<sup>69</sup>

In its turn, the *Summa de sacramentis* of Herbert of Auxerre brings proof of the influence exercised by Hugh of St. Cher. At the example of the Dominican master, this author distinguishes in the water of baptism two *vires* or powers, differing from one another but coordinated to the one single *actus* of sanctification. Indeed, at the touch of Christ's

body the water received already a material and imperfect *vis*, and at the uttering of the *verba* or sacramental formula it now receives a formal and perfective one.

Item quaeritur si est in aquis una vis sola aut plures. Et videtur quod una, quoniam unius actus potentia una est; ergo cum aqua secundum vim spiritualem unum habeat actum solum, scil. purgare sordes animae, vis sua spiritualis una est et non plures. **Sed contra:** secundum Bedam quamdam vim accepit aqua ex tactu mundissimae carnis Christi, aliam vero ex verbo et voce, quibus secundum Augustinum sanctificantur; et ita forma verborum baptismi videtur aquis sanctificationem imprimere.

Item quaeritur si vis aquae, quam habet ex verbo et voce, transeat vel maneat. Et permanere videtur, quoniam et illa vis permanet quam contraxit ex tactu mundissimae carnis Christi; illa enim omnibus aquis praesto est, quae ipsam solam reddit aptam inter omnes liquores ad baptismum. Exemplo igitur illius videtur quod et illa vis, quam accepit aqua ex verbo et voce permaneat. **Sed contra:** si baptizaretur aliquis in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti, virtus spiritualis aquae eius abluit animam. Ergo repetita immissione earumdem aquarum in personam aliam baptizandam, non invocato nomine Trinitatis, et ille alius a peccatis mundabitur illa aquarum virtute qua primus. Cur igitur necesse est vocabula Trinitatis repeti super aquam illam, quae per ipsa prius prolata virtutem purgativam accepit, quam postmodum non amisit? . . .

**Respondentes** autem dicimus, sicut obiectum est, quod spirituales (vires) aquae duae sunt, tamen ad actum unum, quod est animas sanctificare. Nihil enim impedit duas esse potentias ad actum unum ordinatas, unam materialem et imperfectam—talis est ista quam acceperunt aquae ex tactu mundissimae carnis Christi—aliam vero formalem et completivam, cuiusmodi est illa quam contrahunt aquae ex verbo, et sic habent duae potentiae actum unum; una tamen ad illum ordinata est per aliam. Hoc autem non contingit in potentiis ad actum pariter ordinatis.

Dicimus etiam quod harum virtutum prima permanens est, secunda transiens. Cuius causa est quod prima virtus aquis collata est ad distinguendas ipsas generaliter ab omni liquore, nullam specialiter considerando personam. Secunda vero aquis accedit ex verbis hac intentione prolatis ut hic spiritualiter intingatur persona: qua instincta, quia ad hoc fuit intentio, verborum cedit virtus et, si in eisdem aliam personam velit baptizare, oportet verba repeti et novam aquis virtutem imprimi.<sup>70</sup>

Unlike the two previous documents, the *Gloss* of Pseudo-Guerric of St. Quentin on the Sentences draws on both Alexander's and Hugh's *Commentaries*. Hence its fourth book shows a definite tendency to bring the theories of these authors closer together. For instance, by way of comment on the text of Lombard: *Duo autem sunt in quibus sacramentum consistit, res et verba*, he writes *materialiter* underneath the word *res* and *formaliter* underneath the word *verba*, approving thus of the application Hugh of St. Cher made of the hylomorphic theory.<sup>71</sup> With reference to confirmation and orders, he refrains from copying Alexander's statements on the *formae verborum* of these sacraments. If he takes over his observations on the *verba* of extreme unction, he, nonetheless, gives them a twist. Alexander,

70. Ms. The Hague, Kon. Bibl. 132, f.260ab.

71. Ms. Vat. lat. 691, f.122c.

it will be remembered, said that the *forma verborum* in that sacrament is perhaps essential, though *ut haec* it certainly is not; Pseudo-Gueric writes that, doubtful though the question might be, it is nevertheless safe to say that the *forma verborum* belongs to the substance.<sup>72</sup> As for orders, he is strongly inclined to admit a *materia* and *forma* in the celebration of that sacrament. Indeed, besides the opinion of Alexander, he quotes at some length that of Hugh of St. Cher, and even a third one, which reduces the whole substance of orders to the *benedictio* or words pronounced by the bishop and nevertheless pretends that these *verba* stand for the matter and the form.<sup>73</sup>

From this attitude of Pseudo-Gueric of St. Quentin, one can then foresee along what lines the problem of the composition of the sacraments will develop in subsequent theology.

(Conclusion)

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Rome, Italy.

72. L.c. f.148b: "Utrum autem illa oratio instituta ab Ecclesia sit sacramentale a de essentia sacramenti, non est certum. Tamen potest dici quod oratio est de essentia. Sed licet est sacramentale, tamen propter consuetudinem Ecclesiae in diversis partibus esset peccatum si illa omitteretur." Compare with the text of Alexander *supra*, n. 21.

73. L.c. 151c: "Cum in sacramento baptismi sit materia et forma, queritur quid dicitur in hoc sacramento (ordinis) materia et quid forma. Si dicatur quod forma dicitur prolatio verborum ab episcopo facta sive benedictio, materia vero est quod tradit episcopus ordinato, sicut ostiario claves, librum lectori et sic de aliis, ergo videtur quod sicut non est baptismus sine materia, sic non est ordo nisi ordinatus tangat illa . . . Ad aliud dicendum quod per quosdam (id) quod traditur ab episcopo ordinato dicitur materia et sine hoc non esset ordinatus. Alii dicunt quod ipsa benedictio est pro materia et forma; et est benedictio sive forma verborum signum solum, character signum et res, potestas data ordinato res solum. Notandum tamen quod aliter datur haec potestas in diversis ordinibus: in minoribus enim ordinibus traditio instrumenti facit ad potestatem spiritualem; similiter est in ordine subdiaconatus, qui solebat esse minor ordo; ordo vero diaconatus et subdiaconatus (*lege presbyteratus*) in impositione manuum; alii vero dicunt quod in traditione calicis."

## ST. AUGUSTINE'S DOCTRINE ON ILLUMINATION

Few points in Augustinian doctrine have been discussed as much and interpreted as differently as that on "illumination." It may appear presumptuous if one tries to resume this discussion. It seems, however, that there is one approach which has not found the attention it deserves. I shall not review the various opinions on the nature of illumination; this is the more superfluous since it has been done in an exhaustive manner by F. Cayre.<sup>1</sup> From his survey one gathers that there is as yet no agreement on what illumination means.

This lack of agreement is largely the result of the scant explanation St. Augustine himself gives of his idea. Nowhere in his work is the doctrine of illumination treated systematically or comprehensively. He assumed, probably, that his meaning would be intelligible to his readers. This may have been the case because light appears as an explanatory principle also in Platonic and Neo-Platonic theories of cognition, quite apart from the fact that certain Scriptural texts, of which St. Augustine avails himself frequently, refer to light in more than one sense.

According to St. Augustine, light is the principle of all cognition. The performance of sight appears to him as the prototype of all, not only sensible, knowledge. "Since light is the most subtle thing in the body and, therefore, closer to the soul than any other thing, it is first diffused alone by the eyes and radiates forth in the rays of the eyes towards the sensible things at which we look." In the other senses, the light is mixed up with other matters; first with pure air, then with dark and nebulous air, thirdly with the still darker humidity—or liquid, *humor*—finally with the toughness of earth. Correspondingly, the knowledge mediated by the other four senses becomes less and less clear.<sup>2</sup>

Light is the principle of sensory cognition. In this case it is "corporeal" light. Intellectual cognition requires an "intelligible" or "incorporeal" light, on which more will be said below.

Since all cognition requires light, "vision" becomes the prototype of all cognitive performances. Thus, St. Augustine remarks that in reading a letter one makes use of "three kinds of vision." There is, first, that of the eyes by which the letter and its words are seen, then another vision of the spirit by which one thinks or has the image of the absent writer, and a third vision of the mind which looks at love (*con-*

1. F. Cayré, *Initiation à la philosophie de saint Augustin* (Paris, 1947), p. 209ff.

2. *De gen. ad lit.*, XII., c.16., n. 32.

*tuitus*) and therein envisages love understood by the mind (*dilectio intellecta conspicitur*).<sup>3</sup> The representation by means of a memory image, thus, is called a vision, and so also the intellectual understanding. The basic likeness of these cognitive performances appears to St. Augustine as so evident that he refers to it as a proof for the eminence of sight above other senses: the vision of the eye is able as is that of the spirit to envisage simultaneously many things.<sup>4</sup>

It should be noted that the term "vision" signifies sometimes the performance of sight or of another cognitive power, frequently however also the product of such performances. The image which comes to be in the sense or in imagination is called vision. "The form which is impressed (on the mind) by the sense is called vision."<sup>5</sup>

Neither the idea of light as the principle of cognition nor that of vision as the prototype of all cognitive performances is original with St. Augustine. These conceptions rest, as do several others, on certain presuppositions which St. Augustine shared with many of his contemporaries and with which he had become acquainted through his studies.

One of these presuppositions is common to almost all thinkers of Antiquity and also shared by many of the Middle Ages. Since Empedocles it had been the common conviction that there has to be a "connaturality" between agent and acted upon, therefore, also between knower and known. This conception is, for instance, implied in the well-known argument for the immateriality of the intellect: the intellect knows the immaterial, because not individualized, universals and, hence, has to be immaterial itself.

The eye sees things in the light and sees the light too. Consequently, the eye must be of the nature of light. Plato calls the eye "the most sun-like of all organs concerned with sensing."<sup>6</sup> Its "power is dispensed by the sun, like a stream flooding the eye."<sup>7</sup> The participants of the discussion take it obviously for granted that the eye is "sunlike". Elsewhere Plato speaks of the eye as "light bearing," φωσφόρα; the gods "caused the pure fire within to flow out through the eyes in a continuous and dense stream." "Whenever the stream of vision is surrounded by mid-day light, it flows out (of the eyes) like unto like, ὅμοιον πρὸς ὅμοιον, and merging therewith forms a kindred substance."<sup>8</sup>

3. *Ibid.* XII., c. 6, n. 15.

4. *De Trin.*, XI., c. 1.

5. *Ibid.* XI., c. 2, n. 2.

6. *Rep.* VI., 508, a.b. ήλιοδέστατον τῶν περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις δργάνων.

7. F. M. Cornford, *The Republic of Plato* (New York, 1945), p. 219: Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἦν ἔχει ἐκ τούτου ταμιευμένην ὁσπερ ἐπίρρυτον κέκτηται; . . .

8. *Tim.*, 45 c; cf. 67, c.

According to Plato, there is light or “fire” in the eyes which emanates from them to meet the light coming from the luminous bodies, a name which applies to all colored things. “Light is thus a kind of extended touch or contact at a distance.”<sup>9</sup>

Light is fire, not only its effect. Fire is one of the “elements” and therefore corporeal; fire and, therefore, light consist of particles, as one gathers from the account on color-vision in *Timaeus*.

Since Plato does not explain any further his ideas, one may presume that they were not new to his readers. They may have reached St. Augustine through many channels. His main source is, as in most instances, Plotinus. “The eye would never see the sun were it not sunlike itself nor would the soul see the beautiful were it not beautiful itself.”<sup>10</sup> Plotinus, says St. Augustine, taught that the Good is the sun which illuminates the intelligible world in a manner comparable to that by which the sun illuminates the sensible world. The soul is, in some way, like the moon which receives its light from the sun.<sup>11</sup> This doctrine appears to St. Augustine as “consonant” with the Gospel, namely *John*, 1, 6-9. He also adopts the Plotinian expression “father of light” which refers with Plotinus to the One and is applied by St. Augustine to God, obviously in remembrance of *James* 1, 7.<sup>12</sup>

There are many passages in St. Augustine in which he returns to this idea. He addresses God as “the intelligible light and our illumination”;<sup>13</sup> or calls Him “that superior light by which the human mind is illuminated.”<sup>14</sup> The quotations can be easily multiplied; but these two may suffice.

There is a number of texts in Plotinus which refer to the “light-like” nature of the eye and to “illumination” as the essence of cognition.<sup>15</sup> Of these texts, one deserves mention because it states an empirical reason for the notion of the eye possessing a light of its own. “We also see in animals whose eyes shine naturally that a light proceeds from their eyes, and that in animals which possess in their interior condensed fire, light shines out into darkness when they open the eyes”.<sup>16</sup>

9. A. E. Taylor, *A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus* (Oxford, 1928), p. 278.

10. *Enn.* I., 6, 9.: οὐ γάρ ἀν πώποτε εἰδεν ὄφθαλμός ἡλιού ήλιοειδές μὴ γεγενημένος, οὐδὲ τὸ καλὸν ἀν ἵδοι ψυχὴ μὴ καλὴ γενομένη.

11. *De civ. Dei*, X. c. 2; referring to *Enn.* V, 1, 10; 9, 1.

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Solil.* I. c. 1, n. 2.

14. *In Joan.* tr. XV, n. 5.

15. See, e.g., *Enn.* IV; 5, 6, 5, 7; V, 1, 10; 9, 1.

16. *Enn.* VI., 7., 41.: ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ὄφθαλμῶν ἰδεῖν ζώων λαμπόντων τῶν ὅμιμάτων, γιγνομένουν αὐτοῖς φωτὸς καὶ ἔξω τῶν ὅμιμάτων· καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ ζώων, ἀ ἔνδον συνεστραμμένον πῦρ ἔχοντα ταῖς ἀνοιδάνσεσιν ἐν σκοτῷ ἐκλάμπει εἰς τὸ ἔξω ...

Apart from the fact referred to by Plotinus, there are other phenomena which might have suggested the notion of light being contained, as it were, in the eye. Many people observe particularly shining colors when they close their eyes in darkness; also, pressure causes such "photismata" to appear. These facts have led H. V. Helmholtz to speak of a "proper light of the retina."<sup>17</sup> He supposes that we never see perfect darkness or perfect black but always a dark grey because the "proper light" is mixed up with the black. I shall adopt the term "proper light" for both the "corporeal light" which supposedly emanates from the eyes and that "incorporeal light" which emanates from reason.

The theory of vision, conceived of by Plato or Plotinus, and others, too, demands that light be seen by light and that, therefore, the organ of sight be itself of a light-like nature. Vision rests on the "growing together" *sumpagis* of the light emanating from the eye and the light coming from the visible body. Both these lights have to be present for vision to become possible.

Since the idea of light emanating from the eye was not new and apparently widely accepted, St. Augustine was not under any obligation to explain this point. It is important that this conception of the nature of vision underlies all views of St. Augustine on cognition in general. No cognition, be it of the senses or of other powers, can be achieved if there is not some sort of light in the known and in the knower. "Light is that by which anything whatsoever—*unaquaeque res*—becomes manifest."<sup>18</sup> As the proper light of the sense is not sufficient for vision to arise, but has to be joined to the light outside, so also is the inner vision possible only if its objects be illuminated and become, as it were, luminous themselves, sending out light which then is joined to the "proper light" of the cognitive power. By itself, says St. Augustine, the eye suffices only for not seeing the darkness; to see and to know it must receive assistance from a light not its own.

The things apprehended by inner vision are not such as to be illuminated by the same light which renders visible corporeal things. The light which makes them visible must be of another kind. It is an "incorporeal light," a notion St. Augustine may have found in Plotinus.<sup>19</sup> The principle of "connaturality" makes it necessary that the "proper

I have rendered συνεστραμμένον by "condensed;" literally it means "twisted into one" from συνστρέφω.

17. H. V. Helmholtz, *Physiologische Optik* (2d. ed.; Leipzig, 1896).

18. *De gen. ad lit. lib. imperf.*, c. 5, n. 24.

19. *Enn.* IV, 5, 7.: ἀσώματον δὲ πάντως δεῖ τιθέναι . . .

light" of the operating powers be likewise incorporeal. This incorporeal light or, at least one such light is created. St. Augustine considers the possibility that the light created at the beginning, prior to the celestial bodies, might have been a "non-corporeal spiritual light".<sup>20</sup>

Since he saw in sight the prototype of all cognition and interpreted the performance of the eyes in the manner outlined above, St. Augustine could not arrive at any other conception of knowledge but one resting on the notion of illumination. His admiration for Plotinus — an attitude which persisted in spite of becoming more critical in later times — contributed to his forming the doctrine under consideration.

If one tries to arrive at a clear and consistent interpretation of St. Augustine's doctrine of illumination, one must guard against taking all passages as referring to this particular point which mention light or similar notions. In some passages the term "light" is almost nothing but a metaphor, as when it is said that the mind calls "light" the truth it discovers within and above itself.<sup>21</sup>

Whenever light is seen, there must be, of course, illumination. But what is seen is not the light but that which is illuminated, that is, some luminous thing, whether it shine by itself or by light received from some source.

The kind of vision depends on the kind of objects made visible. The visual power is another when the object is another. Correspondingly, there must exist different kinds of light.

The objects of vision belong to four classes or levels. First, there are the sensible things, of which the mind attains knowledge by means of the senses of the body, hence, by the corporeal light which proceeds from the eyes on the one hand and from the visible objects on the other. This light is part of the human body, one of its constituent "elements"; it is the same in the seen things and the two lights are joined, and unite, so to speak, the organ and its object. The second kind of vision is called by St. Augustine sometimes "spiritual" — his use of the term varies — and renders the mind cognizant of things not actually present but retained in memory and "seen" as images. In the terminology of Thomism, one may speak of vision of the internal senses. But St. Augustine's conception is another, since he does not consider the "spiritual" vision as corporeal. The third level is that of rational truths. Of these there are two types.

The sensible truths are, indeed, less certain but they, too, are ex-

20. *De gen. ad lit.*, IV, c. 23, n. 39.

21. *Conf.* VII, c. 10, n. 16.

pressed in judgments formed by reason. The intellectual truths, commonly referred to as "eternal verities", are absolutely certain and they deal with objects other than either things or images.<sup>23</sup> The fourth class comprises all those truths which the mind cannot attain by means of its natural power and of which it becomes cognizant only in faith and through revelation.

One may debate whether the difference of the truths of the senses and those of reason is great enough to make necessary two different cognitive powers, hence two different operations, and two different kinds of "intelligible" light. This is, however, a minor point which need not be elaborated.

There is, however, another problem which presents serious difficulties. St. Augustine calls the objects of the intellectual vision "ideas", but also *formae*, *species*, *rationes*, *regulae*.<sup>24</sup> Form or species, he says, renders the Greek idea; these two terms are, therefore, strictly synonymous. *Ratio* corresponds to *logos*, but it is not incorrect to use it also for idea. Whether the correspondence is as close as St. Augustine assumes may be doubtful. There is, on the other hand, a notable difference between idea and *regula*. In the parlance of Plato as well as of later writers, idea refers to "concept" or "universal". But *regula* is necessarily of the nature of a proposition or, at least, such as to be expressible in a proposition; it is a judgment and not a concept.

Several authors have remarked that the "ideas" of St. Augustine are not concepts but "verities" and, therefore, judgments. This is evidenced also by the comparison of "sensible" and "intelligible" truths; the former are indubitably judgments on sensible things or "states of affairs".<sup>25</sup>

Furthermore, St. Augustine refers often to the "eternal verities" under the name of "laws": law of numbers, law of morals, law of beauty. He also exemplifies them by pointing out, not concepts, but propositions.<sup>26</sup> He speaks of a "natural power of judgment" by which the mind discerns truth from falsity.<sup>27</sup> The eternal verities are also

23. Although this matter is not within the scope of the present essay it should be noted that there are definite relations of this Augustinian distinction and that of Leibniz of *verités de fait* and *verités de raison*, and also Kant's synthetic judgments *a posteriori* and *a priori*.

24. *De div. quaest.* 83, q. 46, c. 1-2.

25. *De ord.*, II, c. 11, n. 32; *De quant. an.*, c. 23, n. 71; *De mus.*, V, c. 10.

26. e.g., *Contra Acad.*, III, c. 25: "if there are six worlds and one more, there are seven . . ."

27. *De civ. Dei.*, XI, c. 27, n. 2.

called "rules of virtue"<sup>28</sup> and are, therefore, of the nature of judgments.<sup>29</sup>

St. Augustine knows that reason and reasoning are two different things; the former "serves vision", the latter search.<sup>30</sup> Reasoning, *ratiocinatio*, is the name given to what is usually called discursive reasoning, the progress from premises to conclusion. Reason, *ratio*, designates, as it seems, some intuitive power. Here precisely lies the difficulty.

Perhaps, the problem would vanish if one were to think consistently in the terms peculiar to St. Augustine and free oneself of all connotations the names have acquired in later times. As long as one conceives of *ratio* as performing chiefly the operations of abstracting, judging, and discursive reasoning, it is difficult to understand how a judgment, or that denoted by it, can be the object of intuition or vision. We are accustomed to envisage a judgment as resulting from combination or division, as the technical terms read, hence, as an elaboration of data the intellect has at its disposal. But it may be that the idea of St. Augustine was different.

In this regard, too, it may be helpful to recall the primary position given to vision in St. Augustine's theory of cognition. The numerous references to light, illumination, and the many comparisons between intellectual and sensory vision, suggest that St. Augustine based his whole conception on an analysis of sight. Reference has been made above to his remark that the eminence of sight is shown in that the eye may grasp simultaneously many objects, just as the spirit may. Unprejudiced observation teaches, in fact, that the eye does not only see many things, but sees them as related to each other. It is an error to suppose that all knowledge of relations is an achievement of the intellect. Relations in space and time are immediately apprehended by the senses, even though to express them in judgments the co-operation of reason is needed. The eye apprehends also relations obtaining among colors; their difference and similitude are seen, not concluded. This is evidenced, apart from self-observation, by the fact that animals recognize colors as similar or dissimilar. Hence, it is conceivable that St. Augustine attributed to the intellectual vision a like capacity, namely one by which the mind would immediately apprehend relations,

28. *De lib. arb.*, II, c. 10, n. 29; *De Trin.*, XV, c. 15; n. 1, cf. J. Rohmer, *La finalité morale chez les théologiens de saint Augustin à Duns Scotus!* (Paris, 1939). *Et. de Phil. Médiév.*, XXVII, p. 15.

29. On the judgment character of these truths, see E. Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin* (2d ed.; Paris, 1943), p. 120; M. C. d'Arcy, "The Philosophy of St. Augustine," in *A Monument to St. Augustine* (London, 1930), p. 182.

30. *De quant. anim.* c. 15, n. 53.

hence that state of affairs to which a judgment refers, immediately, without any further operation. It may well be that for him a relation, or a "state of affairs", was simply a *res*, something to be apprehended intuitively, be it by the sense or by the intellect.

If this interpretation of St. Augustine's thought is correct, one understands that the eternal verities, for instance, the "law of numbers", are said to be objects of vision.

Many times St. Augustine dwells on the properties of numbers which never cease to fascinate him. One recalls his speculation on the number six, one of the "perfect numbers". But it is, in truth, not the number itself with which he is concerned but the totality of relation for which the number stands. The number represents or symbolizes the "immutable law of numbers."<sup>31</sup> In a thoroughly Platonic spirit he believes that to know about this law is an indispensable prerequisite for philosophical inquiry.

It was pointed out above that St. Augustine speaks of two kinds of incorporeal light, one created and one uncreated. The created incorporeal light must possess some function; it must illuminate and render visible some incorporeal things. These incorporeal things are the memory images on the one hand, the eternal verities on the other. It is submitted that this uncorporeal light is the "proper light" of reason and also that which emanates from — or is "reflected" by — the intelligible objects reason apprehends.

One of the most obscure points in St. Augustine's doctrine of illumination is undoubtedly that of the nature of the light in which the intelligible things are envisaged. It has to be admitted that there are many passages which suggest that St. Augustine did not, or not always, sharply distinguish between the created and the uncreated intelligible light. It seems that he never arrived at a final formulation of his idea on the nature and mode of illumination. But one may say that he gradually abandoned his original view which seems to have been that illumination is something directly worked by divine influence. This is, at least, the idea stated in the *Soliloquies* where he speaks of a divine light emanating from God and making intelligible the spiritual things.<sup>32</sup>

31. *De lib. arb.* c. 11, n. 30; c. 16, n. 24; many references to number may be found in *De mus.*, e.g., VI, c. 4, n. 5; c. 7, n. 18, 19; c. 9, n. 23. On the rôle of numbers in the thought of St. Augustine, see Nourisson, *La Philosophie de saint Augustin* (Paris, 1865), I, 118.

32. *Soliloquy* I, c. 6-7, n. 13-14.

The main reason for his modifying his original conception seems to be that he came to realize more fully the significance of *John* 1, 14 where it is said that the light lighteth every man coming into this world. There are many truths every rational soul may discover within itself, and some of these truths are "eternal" verities, like the law of number.

In his earlier writings, this point does not appear to have played a greater role. But even in *De magistro*, when he speaks of "consulting God" he affirms that this may be done by every rational soul.<sup>33</sup> This consulting, therefore, is independent of the state of the soul. Of course, "the pious, chaste and diligent quest"<sup>34</sup> will arrive at a better comprehension of certain truths, especially in regard to morals, and there are some truths the "impious" cannot recognize, whereas these truths are visible to men striving strenuously and piously because they receive divine help.<sup>35</sup> The "impious" are not however unable to attain truth,<sup>36</sup> and pious striving is not a privilege of the Christian faithful.

All people, whoever and whatever they be, hitherto unacquainted with the eternal truths or the disciplines dealing with them, may give the right answers if the questions are formulated in the right manner. "There is present in them the light of eternal reason, in which light the immutable truths are envisaged."<sup>37</sup> One must beware of taking all texts speaking of the "eternal" as referring to things of a strictly divine nature. This is the more necessary in regard to the term *ratio* which has so many meanings with St. Augustine.

The light which renders visible these eternal verities is said to be *sui generis*.<sup>38</sup> This passage has been interpreted by some thus that the *sui* is taken as referring back to *anima*; the meaning would then be that the light is of the same nature as the soul. Others, however, take these words to indicate a peculiar nature of this light.<sup>39</sup> This interpretation is supported by reasons both of context and of grammar. In regard to the latter, it seems almost certain that St. Augustine would have written *illius* or *ipsius generis* had he intended to say what the first interpretation assumes.<sup>40</sup> One may, of course, say that this light is of the same na-

33. *De mag.*, c. 11, n. 36.

34. *De quant. anim.*, c. 14, n. 24.

35. *De vera relig.*, c. 10, n. 20.

36. *De Trin.*, IV, c. 18, n. 24.

37. *Retract.*, I, c. 4, n. 4. One senses an echo of Plato's doctrine of reminiscence, although St. Augustine had abandoned this idea when he wrote this passage — if he ever seriously held it.

38. *De Trin.*, IX, c. 15, n. 24.

39. E. Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin* (2d ed.; Paris, 1943), p. 107. See also, of the older interpreters, Mathaeus ab Aquasparta, *Quaest. disput.* (Quaracchi, 1903), I, 243, 264.

40. E. Hendrikx, *Augustins Verhältnis zur Mystik* (Würzburg, 1936), p. 42.

ture as the soul in so far as the latter, too, is "incorporeal".<sup>41</sup> One may furthermore consider that the light has to be in some manner "part" of the soul, as the corporeal light, which emanates from the eyes, is supposed to be one of the elements constituting the body. But the light emanates not only from the cognitive power which envisages the intelligible objects but also from these objects. It is difficult to understand how the light emitted by the eternal verities could be of the "same nature" as the soul.

It is particularly important that one bear in mind the distinction between the created and the uncreated intelligible light. The latter is strictly supernatural. It is identified with divine wisdom and that immutable truth which "shines like the sun into man's soul"<sup>42</sup> and which, therefore, is not of the same nature as the soul. But this is not the created incorporeal light in which "all intelligible things are reluent".<sup>43</sup>

This appears to be the basic conviction of St. Augustine, although he is not always consistent in his expressions. In fact, he says, in the same work, that God makes all intelligible things visible as light makes visible corporeal things.<sup>44</sup> These and similar inconsistencies are troubling. They are also largely responsible for the disagreement on St. Augustine's true meaning.

One wonders at the contradictions, or at least, the inconsistencies in the Augustinian texts. They may, to some measure, be caused by the pressure of work and the many disturbances to which the writer was exposed. But there may be also another reason. Most of the inconsistencies occur, apparently, on points which are more or less closely related to the philosophical ideas of Plotinus. St. Augustine came gradually to see that Plotinus' philosophy was not as close to Christian doctrine as he had believed at first. St. Augustine, however, was an eminently grateful personality. He may speak rather harshly of Cicero in one place; on the whole he never forgets that he is indebted to *Hortensius* for awakening his interest in philosophy. He may have become critical of Neo-Platonism, but he remembered forever how much he owed to the study of the *Enneades*. His old admiration for the Greek thinker, his everlasting gratefulness for the furthering he received from

41. This seems to be the opinion of St. Bonaventura, II Sent., d. 17, a. 1, q. 1, ad 3m.: et vocat (Augustinus) illam lucem incretam quam dicit esse 'sui generis' propter hoc quod spiritualis est sicut anima. However, it is not quite sure that St. Augustine speaks in this passage of the uncreated intelligible light.

42. *De gen. contra Man.*, VII, c. 25, n. 43. Cf. *De doctr. christ.*, I, c. 32, n. 35; *De vera relig.*, c. 1, n. 2; *Confess.* VII, c. 12, n. 18.

43. *Ennar. in Psalm.*, VII, n. 8.

44. *Ibid.*, n. 10.

him—it was Plotinus who convinced him of the existence of spiritual substances—and also his habit of thinking in Plotinian terms interferes somehow with St. Augustine's own ideas. It is almost as if he regretted that Plotinus could not be interpreted in a more Christian spirit.

There is, however, another reason for the apparent contradictions in the statements of St. Augustine; and this reason may explain also some of the obscurities in his doctrine of illumination. Before this point can be further elucidated, several other matters must be mentioned.

If the parallel between sensory and intellectual vision is carried through one comes to the conclusion that there must exist a "proper light" of the intellect as there is one of or in the eye. The latter, corporeal, light is said by Plato to form part of the body; light and fire are the same thing, and the latter is one of the four elements. Can one assume that the incorporeal light be a "part" of the soul?

If the idea of the soul as a simple substance is taken in its most precise significance, the existence of any parts in it is excluded. One may, however, recall that in some sense even St. Thomas uses the term *partes animae*. Surely not in the sense as if the soul were composed of these parts as the body is supposed to consist of the four elements. But it would be possible to conceive of the soul as possessing light as a "part", if the soul were somehow itself luminous.

It should be remembered also that the doctrine of the simplicity of the soul was not always held and not by all. Avicenna did not doubt that the soul is immortal, nor that it is immaterial; nonetheless, he assumed that the soul is a composite of form and "spiritual matter". His views depend, indeed, on Aristotelian hylemorphism. St. Augustine did not think in the terms of the Peripatos. His thought was formed by Platonism, particularly by the philosophy of Plotinus. In the latter's system, perfect simplicity is proper to the One only. Even the *nous* is somehow composed, since it is at once pure thought and the object of this thought, the intelligible world. Hence, the notion of a spiritual being possessing parts might not have been alien to the mind of St. Augustine.

The "ideas" which the mind envisions in the intelligible light are not "parts" of the soul. They are strictly set over against the cognitive power, as its proper objects. They become objects of the intellectual vision because they are reluent in the intelligible light as the visible things are reluent in the corporeal light. The objects of the intellectual vision are not substances, and the incorporeal light cannot be a "part" of them. On the other hand, it must be the same light as the "proper light" of reason, as has been explained above. Hence, the incorporeal

or intelligible light, even if it becomes a “part” of the soul in a way comparable to one of the “elements” in the material world, cannot well be conceived of as being of the substance of the soul. In fact, it is this that St. Augustine seems to have in mind when he refers to this incorporeal and created light as “irradiating” into the soul.<sup>45</sup>

In view of the preceding observations, the following questions may be asked: (1) From where stem the “ideas” the mind discovers within itself? (2) What is the origin and the mode of operation of the created incorporeal light in which and by which these ideas come to be known to reason? (3) What is the relation of the created intelligible light and its function to the uncreated intelligible light and the knowledge it allows the mind to obtain?

(1) St. Augustine insists that the ideas are not derived from experience. They are neither “parts” of the mind. Since there is “nothing between the mind and God”<sup>46</sup> the only source of the ideas seems to be God Himself. The ideas are said to be “the eternal and immutable forms contained in divine reason”.<sup>47</sup> However, this does not necessarily mean that the ideas are in the human mind according to the same mode as they are in God.

St. Augustine does not think that these ideas are directly “given” to consciousness. He speaks repeatedly of the ideas as being latent in the mind and discovered there only by diligent search.<sup>48</sup> But once discovered they are immediately evident. Although hidden in the mind, the ideas are not innate.

It is not quite clear why the ideas cannot be innate. One should think that it does not make any difference whether the ideas, whatever their origin, be donated to the mind prior to birth or at a later time. The reason for denying the innateness of the ideas is, probably, that St. Augustine wanted to emphasize that the ideas do not pertain to human nature. They are something added to nature. However, this addition could take place any time.<sup>49</sup>

Another reason for the rejection of the notion of innateness may have

45. *De civ. Dei*, XI, c. 27, n. 2. M. Grabmann, *Der göttliche Grund der menschlichen Wahrheitserkenntnis nach Augustin und Thomas* (Münster, 1924), p. 2, uses this term in reference to the origin of ideas in the human mind. This terminology will be adopted here and the term “illumination” reserved for the cognitive performance.

46. *De div. quest.* 83, q. 51, n. 2.

47. *Ibid.*, q. 46, n. 2; *In Joann.* tr. IV, c. 29, n. 62.

48. *Contra Acad.*, III, c. 13; *de lib. arb.*, II c. 12, n. 34; *Confess.* X, c. 10; *De Trin.*, IV, c. 3, n. 4.

49. E. Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin* (2d. ed.; Paris, 1943), p. 122, writes “Man possesses a long series of ideas which are utterly independent of

been that this notion was closely related, in the mind of St. Augustine and with many of his contemporaries, with the Platonic doctrine of "reminiscence." This doctrine implies the idea of pre-existence which has no place within a Christian philosophy. Quite apart from the thesis that every soul owes its existence to a particular creative act of God, pre-existence entails the view that the soul existed in a perfect state before it came to be united with the body. Hence, the Platonic doctrine is incompatible with that of original sin.

The ideas, then, are "irradiated" into the mind from above, by virtue of a special divine decree. Not, however, as a supernatural gift since these ideas are granted to every rational soul.

This point seems one of minor importance within the doctrine of illumination. One can conceive of these ideas as discoverable within the mind without the intervention of a "peculiar light".<sup>50</sup>

(2) It has been pointed out that St. Augustine makes a distinction between the "eternal verities" knowable to every rational soul, and the truths of faith or any such truth pertaining strictly to the realm of the supernatural. One can hardly attribute to St. Augustine the notion that insight into the "law of numbers" as such is conducive to a good life and salvation. Meditation on this law may, indeed, prove a step towards the recognition of supernatural truth, when and in so far as man is granted divine help. But in itself, the law of numbers is not part of a knowledge one might call supernatural.

One has to take account of this distinction in reading passages like this one: "The rational soul is above all things God created and is nearest to God. To the measure in which the soul is 'coherent' with God it envisions truth, because perfected and illuminated by Him, in some way by the intelligible light. It sees...by means of its own highest power (*principale*) by which it excels, that is, by means of its reason...these ideas (*rationes*) by virtue of which it attains beatitude."<sup>51</sup> St. Augus-

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all sensible origin.... Since St. Augustine denies absolutely all empirical origin, and, on the other hand, rejects the doctrine of innate ideas...what other origin could one imagine of the content of our concept besides divine illumination?" The argument of the eminent scholar is not quite convincing. First, it seems that one has to distinguish between the mode by which the ideas come to be in the mind, which shall be called here "irradiation," on one hand, and the cognitive process, on the other hand, which shall be termed strictly "illumination." Secondly, ideas need not be innate and still originate in the mind itself when reason reflects on its own mode of operation. But the main point is that "irradiation" must be viewed as something other than "illumination."

50. This is evidenced, e.g., by the views Descartes held on our knowledge of first truths. True, he assumed that ideas were innate. But the origin of ideas, once more, has no bearing on the theory of intellectual cognition. It suffices that ideas be in the mind to make them discoverable.

51. *De div. quaest.* 83, q. 46, n. 2.

tine refers, in this passage, obviously, not to those "eternal verities" which every rational soul discovers. Neither the profoundest understanding of mathematics, nor the possession of "natural virtues" — those virtues of the pagans which are but "splendid vices" — nor the most refined understanding of art and poetry ensure the attainment of beatitude.

As the truths every rational soul may know are not those which man is allowed to know by faith, the light which "illuminates" the former can neither be the light rendering visible the latter. Only to the supernatural truths, to those "by virtue of which the soul attains beatitude", refer all the statements on an intelligible light which is God's wisdom. These truths are beyond any natural capacity of the soul, however widely this term may be interpreted. The "proper light" operative in this sort of cognition must be connatural to the truths which are known.<sup>52</sup>

The same applies to the truths known by every rational soul. They, too, require a light corresponding to their nature.

The ideas are not concepts but "states of affairs", or relational contexts. They are intuited, but can be expressed only in judgments. At first sight, it appears questionable whether such an object of reason can be said to be made "relicent" by the intelligible light. The notion of an illumination, comparable to that of bodies by the corporeal light, seems understandable if the illuminated objects may be compared to things; one might argue that this may be affirmed of concepts but not of relational contexts.

It is possible, however, that St. Augustine had of these matters a more correct conception than modern psychology — or also epistemology. But some psychologists, at least, have come to realize that the old notion of sensory awareness needs rather far-reaching corrections. We do not apprehend elementary sensations to combine them afterwards into things; we see things, that is contexts of data which coexist in the thing. As soon as sensory awareness goes beyond mere consciousness of "something present" it becomes the knowledge of a complex or context of data none of which possesses independent existence. Furthermore, anything appears not only as this one thing but as related in

52. V. J. Bourke, *Augustine's Quest of Wisdom* (Milwaukee, 1944), p. 217, underrates, perhaps, the significance of certain statements in St. Augustine when he writes: "Whether the spiritual light is natural as well as supernatural, whether it falls within the framework of the general *concurrus* with which God the Creator supports creation, or whether this light is a special help given to the individual mind by God — these are questions for which there appears to be no satisfactory answer in the works of St. Augustine." At least, the first question seems to allow for a definite answer, and the other two may be answered satisfactorily, even though the answers may still be somewhat hypothetical.

a manifold manner to other things; it is a part of a "situation." It is also one of its kind, it resembles others, and this is known also without the intervention of reason, since resemblance is, obviously, noted by animals.

If one abandons the old notion, one strongly influenced by sensationalistic theories and Kant's idea of a primary "chaos" or "rhapsody" of sensations, and replaces it by a view more in accord with the facts, the parallel of sensory and intellectual vision loses much of its strangeness.

The intelligible light may well render "visible" contexts as it is the case with the corporeal light.

A more serious difficulty arises, as has been pointed out above, when one considers the relation of the intelligible light to the knowing power. The corporeal light is present in the eye, because the light is an "element" of the organism. Is any analogy to this doctrine conceivable on the level of intellectual cognition?

One looks in vain for any definite answer in the writings of St. Augustine. However, a hypothesis seems possible. The soul—or its highest power—might be conceived of as being "truth-like" in the sense in which the eye is called "sun-like". The eye possesses this property independently of its seeing or not seeing; the proper light of the eye is insufficient by itself to engender vision, but it pre-exists prior to all actual seeing. The eye sees when a visible object is present and the corporeal light without joins with the proper light of the eye. Likewise, reason might be endowed with a proper light and nonetheless be able to operate only if there is an intelligible object present—or presented—and an intelligible light at hand rendering visible the objects. The "proper light" of reason would, then, pertain to the natural endowment of man.

This hypothesis is in agreement with St. Augustine's statement that the idea does not form part of man's natural equipment. It does so as little as the objects of sight are part of man's nature. They must be presented to the sense of sight, and so must be presented, too, the intelligible objects.

Such a doctrine may appear to the modern mind as utterly fantastic. But it is consistent with St. Augustine's fundamental conceptions of the nature of knowledge, and with his theory of vision, or sensory awareness in general.

Consequently, the main problem is that of the ontological status of the ideas. To be "irradiated" into the mind and to be illuminated there by the intelligible light, they must have some sort of being in themselves.

In some manner they have to be "things".<sup>53</sup> In this regard, it is not enough if one refers to the influence of Platonism. The position of St. Augustine in what concerns the ontological status of the ideas is not, and cannot be, that of either Plato or Plotinus. Nor did St. Augustine consider a world of created ideas as one finds it in the system of Philo Judaeus.<sup>54</sup> The ideas, according to St. Augustine, are either in the divine or in the human mind. They have no existence outside of a mind. He is able to reconcile somehow this view with that of Plotinus in so far as the *nous* is equated to God's Wisdom or the Word. But therewith falls the notion of an intelligible cosmos above and outside of the universe.

Nonetheless, the ideas are not formed out of the human mind, even though they reside there. They truly come "from without"; they enter the human mind by virtue of divine power. But St. Augustine "is too sure of the infirmity of human nature and the human mind to give the latter a vision of the ideas as they are in God's mind."<sup>55</sup> Why, indeed, should the ideas as man conceives of them be such as they are in God when the things God created according to His ideas are so unlike the divine ideas, being material, contingent, and what not?

St. Augustine was not much concerned with questions of ontology. It would be difficult to find any definite statement on such things in his works. One may, however, safely presume that his views were what may be called a mitigated Platonism. That is, he did not doubt that the ideas have some sort of being independently of their being known. But he had to place them in the divine mind, since there is nothing in between the rational soul and God. It is not improbable that this remark which occurs more than once, is meant to reject the doctrine of a "realm of ideas", be it in the sense of Plato, of Philo, or of Plotinus.<sup>56</sup>

Although ideas exist, within the range of human experience, only in the human mind, they exist nonetheless objectively. They are "objects" in the true sense of the term. The mind encounters them when it sets out to search itself.

This encounter is rendered possible by the intelligible light, the created intelligible light. It seems that one has to think of this light as

53. "Things" more or less in the same sense as that which E. Husserl had in mind when he admonished the philosophical world to "go back to things." Cf. *Confess.* X, c.q.; in science and art memory contains the "things" themselves.

54. H. A. Wolfson, *Philo. Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam* (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), I, 200ff., *et pass.*

55. M. C. d'Arcy, "The Philosophy of St. Augustine," in *A Monument to St. Augustine* (London, 1930), p. 181.

56. It is not without interest to note that recently a philosopher, without referring

surrounding the intelligible things in a manner analogical<sup>57</sup> to that in which the corporeal light pervades the world of sensibles. But there is no darkness in the intelligible world. The created incorporeal light has been granted to every rational soul and the soul has been endowed with the "eternal verities." Every man "coming into the world" receives the light by which he is enabled to discover the eternal verities.

In this created light man envisages the truths and cannot but conceive of the notion that these truths must come from some source. They are not of his making; they are not derived from experience. He cannot but wonder at the mysteries of number; he cannot but recognize a moral order or an order of goodness which, so St. Augustine believes, is as evident as is that of numbers. The order of goodness possesses moreover the character of imposing an obligation and thus becomes an evident principle regulating action.<sup>58</sup>

But if this interpretation of Augustinian thought is correct, why is it that the question arose at all whether or not the principle of illumination is God Himself and whether or not the human mind in itself envisages in itself the divine ideas?

(3) It has been claimed that one must acknowledge two illuminations; one by the created intelligible light which renders visible the eternal, but not supernatural, truths, and another by the uncreated intelligible light in which man may, so far as his abilities go, attain a vision—in a "dark mirror"—of the supernatural truths. This distinction follows from St. Augustine's own statements on the two lights.

But, there are many passages which seem to affirm that even the knowledge of those truths which every rational soul may attain is achieved under the influence of a light which not only comes from God—as a gift, indeed, above nature, but nevertheless not a supernatural gift—but in some way is God. It is unnecessary to mention such passages; they are numerous and well known.

When St. Augustine speaks of illumination in reference to the uncreated light he attributes to the light an effect "not only epistemo-

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to and probably without being influenced by St. Augustine, proposed an ontology of "spiritual beings," or ideas, which could be related to the notions of St. Augustine—see Nic. Hartmann, *Das Problem des geistigen Seins* (2d. ed.; Berlin, 1949).

57. If the term "analogical" is used here, it does not imply the particular significance it has within the system of St. Thomas. Although St. Augustine recognizes the hierarchical order of being, he does not see it as dominated by the principle of the *analogia entis*. Many of his statements on similarities can well be expressed also within the framework of the *analogia entis*; but St. Augustine's conception is, nevertheless, different.

58. See, e.g., B. Roland-Gosselin, "St. Augustine's System of Morals," in *A Monument to St. Augustine* (London, 1930), p. 236.

logical but also ontological.”<sup>59</sup> By divine illumination, in the strict sense, man is not only enabled to know truth, and to know some truths more perfectly; he is himself perfected. One surely will not credit St. Augustine with the notion that a thorough understanding of mathematics makes a man better.

There is one rather remarkable statement: “The light which illuminates a mind according to rules of truth is lightened by the First Truth and tends to return there.”<sup>60</sup> What St. Augustine means to say is, probably, more or less this: Whenever the mind becomes cognizant of some evident, absolute truth the very fact of evidence as well as the fact of “objectivity”—that is, of being independent of man’s activity—point beyond the truth at a source. It is for that reason, that the fullness of truth becomes known to the “saintly and pious soul”; not as if these qualities were prerequisites for the understanding of the law of numbers, for instance, but they are for the understanding of what is “behind” and above this law.

Reason, however, cannot proceed much beyond the mere discovery of the source or the existence of a first truth. But reason, or the mind, once enlightened by the uncreated light, will never forget that the verities it knows by means of the created light are but parts of The Truth or “perfect similitudes of the principle”,<sup>61</sup> perfect but still only similitudes.

Knowledge granted to man by God through the uncreated light makes the rational verities not only “reluctant” but, as it were, “transparent.” These verities then lose their independence; they are no longer true by and in themselves but owe their being true to the First Truth which they somehow mirror.

Things transparent are apt to be overlooked. When we look at things through a perfectly transparent glass, we see only the things but not the glass, even though it may be glass which enables us to see things, as it is with our eyeglasses or even more so with optical instruments. The astronomer at his telescope or the anatomist at his microscope sees the objects of his study only by means of the lenses; but they do not see the lenses.

... Thus, the mind accustomed, by God’s grace, to see things in the uncreated light may arrive at a point where the knowledge of the rational verities and that of things divine are fused or merged into one another.

59. V. J. Bourke, *Augustine's Quest of Wisdom* (Milwaukee, 1944), p. 226.

60. *De vera relig.*, c. 39, n. 72.

61. *Ibid.*, c. 36, n. 66.

And the splendor of the uncreated light is so strong that the illuminating power of the created intelligible light passes unnoticed.

This seems to have been the case with St. Augustine. It would be easy to bring together instances of his intellectual and religious development and to show that his progress in philosophical thought is so much intertwined with his penetrating ever more deeply into the truths of faith as to render him incapable of clearly keeping separate the two kinds of knowledge. More and more it becomes a habit of his mind to envisage the eternal verities, accessible to every rational soul, but as the preambles of supernatural truths. He is the more inclined to disregard the knowledge on the created intelligible light and to attribute all knowledge to divine illumination since to him all knowledge has become thoroughly "transparent." He almost is compelled, by the habits of his mind, to conceive of every triade he discovers as a "vestige" of the Trinity, of every beauty he admires as a reflexion of Beauty Itself, of every good, however, humble as an out pouring of Goodness Itself.

Only if one takes account of those passages in which he distinguishes between the created and the uncreated intelligible light, or remembers that knowledge, even of the eternal and immutable verities, is attained also by the "impious," does one arrive, it seems, at an understanding of his doctrine of illumination. These passages are not inconsistencies, least of all concessions made to divergent views; they are rather the expression of his true systematic conception.

There remain several problems which cannot be discussed within the scope of this article. One of these problems is that of the relation of the uncreated intelligible light to grace. Another, that of the relation of "illumination" to the *concurrus*. In this regard one might venture to say that the illumination through the created intelligible light is the manifestation of the *concurrus* on the level of rationality. The divine *concurrus* takes on, if one may say so, different forms according to the ontological status of the created thing to which the *concurrus* is granted. God provides for the things He created not only that they persist in being but also that they operate according to the nature He has given to everything. A third problem is that of the mode in which the created intelligible light becomes the "proper light" of reason. Whether this question can be answered at all is debatable.

It is not the intention of the foregoing considerations to furnish a "proof" for the theory of illumination. It is not claimed that this doctrine can be maintained or defended without modifications. Whether or not this be the case is a question not to be discussed here.

This article pursued no other aim than to submit a contribution to the understanding of the Augustinian theory of cognition and to show that the ideas of the *doctor gratiae* are consistent with themselves and sufficiently clear. They do not require any particularly ingenious hypotheses to become intelligible. Least of all, do these ideas entail any danger of "ontologism". This apparent danger vanishes at once if one realizes that there are, according to St. Augustine, two intellectual illuminations, as this study tried to demonstrate.

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## ST. LEONARD OF PORT MAURICE AND PROPAGATION OF DEVOTION TO THE WAY OF THE CROSS

The history of the Way of the Cross may be summed up in two main considerations: First, what is the origin of this devotion, and how did it happen that the Passion of Jesus was represented in this exact form, numbering exactly fourteen mysteries, no more and no less? Second, how did this practice achieve such universal propagation that in the whole wide world today there is hardly a church or chapel to be found without a Via Crucis?

Many authors have explored the first question, especially the Jesuits' Herbert Thurston<sup>1</sup> and K. A. Kneller.<sup>2</sup> From these studies we know that German piety and art in the 15th and 16th centuries had a substantial part in the rise and development of the Via Crucis; that this art carried the consideration of Christ's Passion from the Low Countries to Spain; where in many places it was zealously fostered; especially in Franciscan houses. There, it received substantially its present form. In 1628, the Franciscan Salvator Vitale, returning from Spain, erected the first Via on Italian soil on the road leading up to the Franciscan Monastery of S. Francesco al Monte from the city of Florence. According to Father Vitale, the Stations were at this time in use in Spain, Belgium, the East and West Indies, and not only in the cloisters of the Franciscan Observants, Discalced, and Recollects, but among the Capuchins, in many convents, and even in the houses of lay people.<sup>3</sup>

The Friars Minor identified themselves ever more closely with this devotion, the heads of the Order seeking indulgences which were granted by the church in generous measure to the participants. A brief of Innocent XI, September 5, 1686, contained the first bestowal of a Stations Indulgence. From this brief stems the conception that erection of Vias and promotion of the devotion is a responsibility and privilege of the Franciscan Order: Only the Stations erected in their churches

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1. H. Thurston, *The Stations of the Cross* (London, 1906).

2. K. A. Kneller, *Geschichte der Kreuzwegandacht von den Anfängen bis zur vollen Ausbildung* (Freiburg, 1908). Cf. also M. Bihl's articles in *Arch. Franc. Hist.*, vols. I & II; J. M. Freudenreich, *Origines du Chemin de La Crois*, in *Revue d' Histoire Franciscaine*, VIII (1931), 371 ff.

3. Bihl, in *Arch. Franc. Hist.* II (1901), 340.

enjoyed the indulgence, only the faithful in any way subject to the Minister General of this Order could share in them. This was the situation in 1700, when Saint Leonard entered on the scene.<sup>4</sup>

It is interesting to note how this Saint himself described the origin and spread of the devotion: The Mother of Jesus, after the Ascension of her Son, with other pious Christians daily walked the road which her Son walked during His Passion, from Pilate's house to Calvary. Wherever Jesus had stopped, she also stood, describing to her companions the torments suffered there by her Son, with the deepest feelings of sympathy and love. Since Jesus had made fourteen stops on His road of agony, twelve before His death and two after the descent from the Cross, the road was called the Way of the fourteen stations, or the Way of the Cross. The Christians of the first centuries continued this pious custom. From it, the processions of the Church also derive their origin. During the reigns of the heathens and Mohammedans, this Christian tradition was for a long period interrupted. But when King Robert of Sicily and Jerusalem entrusted the care of the Holy Places to the Friars Minor in 1333, it was their first concern to re-establish the practice of the Stations of the Cross. They sought rich indulgences for the performance of this exercise from the Popes, and made it known throughout the world.<sup>5</sup>

As to the number and subject of each station, Leonard had not the least qualms. To the scruples which he sometimes encountered on this point, he always replied by referring to the universal custom approved by the Church.

The second question on the history of the Way of the Cross, to which this article offers a reply, is this: How did it achieve such universal propagation? We will see that in this expansion, Saint Leonard of Port Maurice's forty years of ceaseless labors play no inconsiderable part.<sup>6</sup>

We find the Saint active in the interest of the devotion for the first time in the period from 1704 to 1709, which he spent in his native Port Maurice (the present Imperia), a town on the Ligurian Coast between Genoa and Nice. On his arrival there, he was a young priest of 28 years, belonging to the "Ritiro" (as the houses of the more cloistered Franciscans were called) founded in Rome on the Palatine Hill, in 1677 by Blessed Bonaventure of Barcelona in honor of St. Bonaventure. There, after his ordination in 1702, Leonard had spent a

4. Kneller, *op. cit.*, p. 178ff.

5. *Opere Complete di S. Leonardo da Porto Maurizio*, IV (Venezia, 1868), 382ff.

6. The author hopes to present these efforts of St. Leonard as part of a new biography of the Saint.

short period as Instructor in philosophy, after which he was taken seriously ill with a lung disease. The loving care of his confreres in Rome, Naples and Vallecorsa could not halt the progress of the disease. As a last resort, the doctors recommended a return home. But even in Port Maurice the hemorrhages grew steadily worse. When all hope of effecting a cure by natural means was gone, the young religious turned in complete trust to the Mother of God, and promised her, if he were cured, to devote himself to the end of his life to the salvation of sinners by means of public missions. Within a few days he felt himself completely cured. This was about 1706. From then on, to the end of his life in 1751, in spite of uninterrupted exertions and severe penances, he never suffered a serious illness.<sup>7</sup>

His Superiors prudently had Leonard remain yet a while at home. But he was anxious to fulfill his promise. He could not give missions right away, for he was not prepared for the work, and further had no power to hear confessions, which according to the regulations of his Institute were granted only to those who were thirty years old. He therefore decided to arouse enthusiasm among the people for the devotion of the Stations of the Cross. The people there did not yet know of this practice, even in the Franciscan Convent the fourteen Stations had not been erected. From relatives, friends and benefactors, Leonard begged alms sufficient to erect fourteen little shrines, with the pictures of the fourteen stations, in the square before the above-mentioned convent and for devotion in poor weather, a second Via Crucis inside the monastery church. With his own hand, he painted the inscription on each Station. Now, every Sunday and holy day, under the leadership of the Friars, a great part of the people made the Stations in public procession. Each time, Leonard gave an inspiring sermon.<sup>8</sup>

Why did young Father Leonard choose the Way of the Cross as the particular means of making his apostolic labors effective? The answer to this question gives us the key to his extraordinary and ceaseless efforts for the deep-rooting and wide dissemination of this devotion.

We may safely assume at the outset that the contemplation of the Passion of Christ, and particularly the Way of the Cross, had already become a beloved and intimate devotion of the man himself. When, as a student at the Roman College, he attended the nightly meetings in

7. Raffaele da Rome, *Vita del Servo di Dio Padre Leonardo da Porto Maurizio* (Roma, 1754), p. 19ff.; "Summarium Super Dubio: An Sit Signanda Commissio Introductionis Causae . . .," p. 19; "Summarium Super Dubio: An Constet de Virtutibus . . . in Gradu Heroico etc.," II (Rome, 1781), 566.

8. Raffaele, *Vita*, p. 20.

the Oratory of Father Caravita, S. J. and there sang hymns on the sufferings of Christ, it must have made a deep impression on his sympathetic nature.<sup>9</sup> We have no special evidence associating him with the Way of the Cross in his first years of religious life. Yet there can be no doubt that he not only knew it well, but practiced it daily with great zeal. We would have to believe this of a member of the Roman Retiro, without further proof. This Institute was founded by Blessed Bonaventure of Barcelona, from whose life story we know that he made the Stations, bearing a heavy cross, at the Via erected on the steep slopes behind the Ritiro Monastery of Sant' Angelo, in the Sabine Mountains. But Bonaventure did not make this practice obligatory for his Religious.<sup>10</sup> We know too that prior to Leonard's reception, the Franciscan Order had several times been expressly made responsible for the care of the devotion of the Way of the Cross by the highest officials—by the General Chapter of the Order in 1688,<sup>11</sup> the Procurator General in 1695<sup>12</sup>, and by Innocent XII in 1696<sup>13</sup>. So that, at the latest, Leonard had learned of this devotion in 1697 when he was a Novice, and had practiced it in the first nine years of his life in the Order. How often, especially during the long months and years of his serious illness, which kept him from all serious work, he must have found comfort and strength in contemplating its mysteries!

Unusually close, penetrating and wholehearted as his union with his suffering Savior must have been then, still it grew even deeper in the course of his life, and fully dominated all his thoughts and aspirations. To give a few examples: The three hours of meditation prescribed as a daily practice by the rules of his Institute, he chose to begin by the consideration of Christ's Passion. To what degree of union with God this practice led him is indicated in his Resolutions.<sup>14</sup> During the Divine Office, he again considered certain scenes in the Passion and death of Jesus, keeping faithfully to this practice through the years until his death. The wealth of time and strength he devoted to his meditation is revealed by the fact that the midnight matins and lauds of the Office lasted two full hours in the Ritiro, and to these were added another hour of contemplation. Even when he recited the

9. Anonymous (S.J.?), *Vita di Santo Leonardo da Porto Maurizio* (Rome, 1867), p. 13.

10. A. Daza, *Essercitii spirituali dell'i rofomitorii etc.* (trans. from Spanish) (Rome, 1626) — referred to by Bihl, *op. cit.*, p. 341.

11. *Chronologiae historico-legalis Seraphici Ordinis, tomus tertius, Caroli Mariae Perusini* (Rome, 1752), Part I, p. 316.

12. "Summarium super dubio" I, 69.

13. *Chronologiae historico-legalis*, III, i, 421f.

14. Resolution No. 4. See n. 16 below.

breviary privately, he did so in the same way he would in choir--never while traveling, but kneeling in quiet seclusion. He often kissed the Crucifix worn openly on his breast.<sup>15</sup> A little cross with five metal points that he always wore against his bare body over his heart must have reminded him continually of the Redeemer's sufferings.<sup>16</sup> Never would he pass a roadside cross without kissing it and saluting it: "Hail, O Cross, our only hope!"<sup>17</sup> We learn from his Florentine period (1709-1730) that he went every night to the Via erected in a room of the monastery, bearing a heavy cross, wearing a crown of thorns, a rope around his neck. Bloodstains on the wall at the 12th Station testified that he frequently scourged himself to blood there.<sup>18</sup> Even when he was an old man, he was seen weeping bitterly while making the Stations.<sup>19</sup> When he read the Passion during Holy Week, he was so overcome and moved to tears that many times he could not finish it.<sup>20</sup> While he preached on the missions, one of the friars with him or a layman held up a great crucifix. This he would embrace with such fervor that the people sobbed aloud, and cried for mercy, while the most stubborn sinners were softened and converted. Then tears would come into his own eyes.<sup>21</sup> His whole life was dominated by the thought: The Son of God has died for me. It is no wonder then, that Leonard was thoroughly convinced of the powerful impact which a lively conception of the Passion of Christ must have on all men.

There is yet a third consideration. The call of St. Leonard to the Franciscan Order was a real vocation in the highest sense of the word.<sup>22</sup> In his youth, he had, through his own experience, become well acquainted with the piety and work of the Jesuits and the Oratorians, and had taken to himself as much as possible of their spirit. But he did not feel in his heart drawn either to the life of the Jesuit Order or to that of the Oratory of St. Philip Neri, and therefore did not enter either one, although both would gladly have received him. How different it was when he came in contact with the life of the Ritiro of St. Bonaven-

15. "Summarium super dubio" I, 69.

16. Resolutions of Leonard in 1728, No. 29 (printed in Wallenstein, *Katechismus der christlichen Vollkommenheit* (Freiburg, 1936). Cf. resolutions of 1745 in J. Creusen, *Geistliche Lebensordnung des Hl. L.*, (Paderborn, 1931), p. 19 (Published in English in Isoleri's translation, *Life of St. Leonard of Port Maurice*) (Philadelphia, 1909).

17. "Summarium super dubio" I, 69f, 72.

18. "Processus informativus Florentiae . . ." (The authentic copy is in the Franciscan Postulator General's Office in Rome), fol. 1717b; 551b.

19. "Summarium super dubio . . ." II, 372.

20. "Summarium super dubio . . ." I, 69.

21. "Summarium super dubio . . ." I, 38f; 75; "Summarium super dubio . . ." II, 457.

22. Compare M. Müller, *Gotteskinder vor dem Vater* (Freiburg, 1938), p. 231ff.

ture in Rome. Here he was satisfied to the depths of his soul. With his whole heart he embraced its life, and remained utterly devoted to it to the time of his death. This special vocation expressed itself at once in the serious and enduring effort to approach as closely as possible to the thoughts and example of the Founder and great saints of the Order. It was natural therefore that at the start of his apostolic labors he kept before him the ways and the teachings of the Saint of Assisi, and his great son, Peter of Alcantara. He himself lived the doctrine he received from them, and preached it in the sermons he gave before erection of each new Way of the Cross: To lead the world to the crucified Savior, draw men to meditate on what the Godman suffered for them and their salvation is assured.<sup>23</sup>

Another didactic motive must also have influenced young Leonard, methodical-minded as he was. In contrast to all other means of contemplating the Passion of Christ, the Via Crucis forces a man for a little while to hold the particular mysteries literally before his eyes through pictures, thus making the devotion easier, especially for people unaccustomed to meditation. Leonard did not believe it possible to look upon these scenes on the Via Crucis without the thought forming in one's mind: Jesus Christ has died for me!<sup>24</sup> They would also be as fourteen mirrors held before sinners in which they could clearly see the contrast between the state of their own souls and the state to which, for love of them, the Godman was brought.<sup>25</sup>

A particularly ascetic nature, the deepest personal experience of prayer, the example and teachings of Saint Francis of Assisi, the traditions of the Order, as well as sound teaching principles all conducted to promotion of the Via Crucis. One other motive remained in the background — the indulgences to be gained.

That the Saint had chosen well, was proved to him in his experiences in Port Maurice, and his native diocese of Albenga, where he remained until 1709. Soon he was to receive amazing evidence of the effect of the Via Crucis on Christian people. This happened in exercises he conducted under distinctly adverse conditions at the historic Way of the Cross already referred to, in Florence.

Toward the end of the year 1709, Father Leonard was transferred to the Retreat of S. Francesco on Monte Alle Croci, near the gates of Florence. This house, originally the property of the Franciscan Observants, had a few months before been offered by the Grand Duke Co-

23. *Opere Complete di S. Leonardo*, IV, 380; 387.

24. "Sumarium Super dubio . . ." I, 69.

25. *Opere Complete di S. Leonardo*, IV, 390.

simo III of Tuscany to the Friars of the Retreat of St. Bonaventure's in Rome, was accepted by them, and erected into a Ritiro. As with most new foundations of this kind, the people showed great opposition to the new Friars from the start — not only opposition, but outspoken hostility, for they refused even sufficient alms to maintain life. In order to placate the aroused populace, the Superior, the Spanish Father Pius of St. Colomba, had the 33-year old Father Leonard of Port Maurice come to Florence. He knew the zeal and capabilities of the latter from his Roman days.

Leonard was to begin his new spiritual activity with the exercise of the Way of the Cross on the Fridays of the coming March, at the Via situated in the immediate vicinity of the Monastery, which Father Vitale had erected in 1628, the first on Italian soil. Here the people of the neighboring cities and villages were accustomed to assemble on the Fridays of Lent in great crowds, to make the Stations under the lead of the Observants. Now for the first time, they were to see at their head the new and hated Brothers of the Ritiro.

The young preacher had some other difficulties to face as well. In the course of the years, a very worldly traffic had associated itself with this religious function. The Via devotions of March had degenerated into a sort of annual affair. In countless booths, in spite of the Lenten season, food and drink were liberally indulged in, and even much worse went on.<sup>26</sup>

Leonard as ever proceeded with great wisdom. He petitioned the pious Grand Duke Cosimo to forbid the worldly diversions and make them impossible. Instead, he wanted to give the Stations a truly solemn character by a special short address at each cross. The Grand Duke approved the desires of the Saint. On the First Friday of March, 1710, the first procession took place. At each cross, Leonard described in clear and forceful words, to a tremendous following, the love of the Godman and the evil of sin.

The tone and make-up of his preaching bore the character of mission sermons. They lasted over an hour and a half, so that with the concluding ceremonies in the monastery church, nearly two hours were consumed. The preacher laid special, recurring emphasis on the value

26. Cf. "Processus informativus Florentiae," 486a; "Summarium super dubio . . ." I, 20f.; "Summarium super dubio . . ." II, 89; 143; Palandri, in *Stud. Franc.* (1924), p. 26ff. The view expressed here that the evils attending the Stations devotion on Monte alle Croci resulted from the great concourse of people drawn by St. Leonard's sermons, is contradicted by the very sources cited. Compare also the evidence of an eyewitness, viz. "Processus informativus Florentiae," f. 486a; also *Stud. Franc.* VII (1935), p. 115.

of a good confession. This procedure was repeated on the succeeding Fridays of the month.

The result was overwhelming. The number of participants mounted with each week. Not only common folks, but the nobility likewise took part, and even the Princesses of the Grand Duchy were found in attendance. The hostile attitude of the people changed into respect and gratitude for the new friars, the worldly tendencies were fully rooted out and not overlooked and at the end of the services, people returned in a recollected and contrite mood to their homes. In the whole city and its surroundings, a fundamental improvement of behavior was noticeable.

Thus Leonard's work relieved the tense situation for the Retiro of S. Francesco, and improved its relations with the neighboring communities; as he himself wrote: "Up to that time, they could hardly obtain support for 10 or 12 friars, where today nearly 45 religious subsist on alms alone. How many general confessions had they heard daily! How many sins did they constantly prevent! How many souls had they led to the Master's feet! There are few among the men and women of the neighboring communities who have not made their general confession on Monte Alle Croci. A deeper recollection is seen in church, more seemly behavior at home. The abuses of the balls, revelries and other such sinful excesses have been rooted out. A woman visiting here wanted to give such a party in the neighborhood, and went to all the houses of three districts but found only two girls who would take part in the affair."<sup>27</sup>

These tangible results must have confirmed Leonard in his conviction that the frequent contemplation of what the Redeemer suffered for us was "the true way to sanctify the world and free it from the power of Satan,"<sup>28</sup> and that the Way of the Cross was a powerful means to draw men close to the Passion of Christ.

He conducted this devotion on the Fridays of March for the succeeding six or seven years, and even later at times, the last being in 1744.<sup>29</sup> In all, he gave ten different series of the exercise. In the years to come, and for a long while after his death, his confreres maintained the devotion with similar success.<sup>30</sup>

27. *Opere Complete di S. Leonardo*, I, 206; "Processus informativus Florentiae," f. 1000a.

28. "Summarium super dubio . . ." I, 75.

29. *Diario delle Missioni di Santo Leonardo da Porto Maurizio*, written by Fra Diego of Florence in *Opere Complete di S. Leonardo*, V, 1-299.

30. *Prediche e Lettere inedite di Santo Leonardo da Porto Maurizio* by Benedetto Innocenti (Florence, 1915), p. X ff., and p. 1 ff.

## LEONARD PROMOTES THE VIA CRUCIS OUTSIDE FRANCISCAN CHURCHES

Not long afterward, the Stations Apostolate of our Saint entered upon a new, significant stage. Until 1709, he kept within the limits of the prevailing tradition in the Order, promoting the devotion only in places under the jurisdiction of its General. Now the time had come when he wanted to break these narrow bounds, to carry the blessings of the devotion into the churches of all parishes and of all other Orders. Hitherto, his efforts served to intensify existing devotion, now he undertook its universal propagation. Here also, Divine Providence and his faithful cooperation worked harmoniously together.<sup>31</sup>

The mighty effect of his Stations sermons induced his Superiors, with the hearty endorsement of Grand Duke Cosimo, to have Father Leonard conduct public missions. The latter had already given a few missions in his native diocese of Albenga. But now, for the first time, as a result of this important assignment, he seriously takes up his life work in accordance with the vow he made to the Mother of God. As always, he proceeded methodically. He made a careful study of both mission methods then in use — the proportionately short but soul-stirring art of the Jesuits, and the month-long, calm way of the Lazarists, the latter aiming at the goal of a thorough general confession. Leonard combined the principles of both in his personal method.

As a true apostle, the key question in his heart was: How can I ensure the perseverance in their good resolutions of those who make the missions? He was always concerned to achieve the fullest and most lasting conversion of all people.

This search for a special means of perseverance led him again to the Via Crucis. He knew and highly treasured other means, such as regularity and good intention in daily prayer, attentive participation in the Mass, zealous reception of the Sacraments, the daily rosary, and so on, and he highly recommended them. But he was convinced that these means would be faithfully adhered to and fruitful only when the soul, in quiet contemplation of great, deep-moving truths, found ever constant personal union with its God, renewing control over its own life,

31. On Leonard's work in the missions from 1709-1730 we have few details. The investigations of Innocenti and Palandri lift the veil somewhat so one can perceive outlines with some surety. In order not to encumber this work with citations, general reference is made here to these two authors' works in the *Studi Francescani* from 1922 on. Cf. also, Del Campana, *Stud. Franc.*, X (1924), 207 ff, as well as Fra Diego, *Diario delle Missioni*, p. 13.

being daily penetrated and impressed by the example of the Godman. All this but added to his conviction that the best means as well as the easiest for all to practice, was the devotion of the Way of the Cross. He called it with delight "an enduring mission" and a "battery against hell."<sup>32</sup> But there were real obstacles to be overcome to achieve unlimited propagation of the Via Crucis. According to the general opinion in the Order, at least in Italy, the rich indulgences could be gained only at those Vias erected in Franciscan Churches. But Leonard did not let this hold him back. For one thing, the gaining of indulgences was not a primary concern with him. The Via should above all be a means of stirring up the sinful and invigorating the good.<sup>33</sup> Further, he had arrived at the conclusion, from a thorough study of the indulgence question, that the Order traditions were wrong, and that all Vias, wherever located, shared the indulgences if they were but properly erected by a Franciscan.<sup>34</sup> This stemmed from the Circular of the Procurator General of the Order, Francesco Diaz, dated December 18, 1695, in which all Friars Minor were urged to erect Stations everywhere in the world and to teach the faithful to frequent them.<sup>35</sup> It is true, Diaz' words were not intended to give the meaning Leonard derived from them.<sup>36</sup> The Saint however called directly on the Pope himself for support of his views.<sup>37</sup>

Leonard proceeded, therefore, from about the year 1712, to erect the Via in all parishes and cloisters where opportunity offered, especially on the mission, and to teach that the indulgences could be obtained at them. In the *Regulations for the Mission* which date from this period, written for himself and his colleagues, he says in No. 53: "Everywhere the Mission is given, the Via shall be set up, and instruction on it given, and at least once a public procession of the Stations shall be held. The Vias shall be erected not only in the churches but also in oratories and chapels so people can make them more easily and without hindrance."<sup>38</sup> Brother Gaetano testified in the Canonization Process: "Leonard succeeded in having the Stations practiced everywhere, in all churches, not only the parish churches of the cities, but also in the country chapels and in Sister's convents. He began with the performance of the Stations at the Via near our Monastery (at Florence) on the Fridays of March, then he started to promote

32. "Summarium super dubio" I, 69; 71.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 122.

34. Cf. Innocenti, in *Stud. Franc.*, IX (1923), p. 398.

35. Cf. Palandri, in *Stud. Franc.*, X (1924), p. 34.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 37.

37. Benedetto Innocenti, O.F.M., *Operette e Lettere inedite* (Arezzo, 1925).

38. *Opere Complete di S. Leonardo*, I, 228.

this devotion throughout Tuscany.”<sup>39</sup> The readiness of the people to accept this devotion was constantly proved. At the dedication of a Via on a hill near Monticelli, for example, in 1717, there were some 20,000 people present.<sup>40</sup>

The interior, spiritual results, too, met his expectations. As early as 1715, he could write in his “Dilucidazione” (referred to again below) an appeal to all prelates, that daily and tangible experience bore witness to the significant improvement of customs and ways of life wherever the Via had been introduced. On the basis of these experiences, several Bishops had personally erected the Stations in the parishes of their dioceses, others procured paintings of the Stations for their Cathedrals, some had them erected in the Convents, and some had even ordered their pastors to hold the pious devotion by solemn procession at least once a month, and with their whole flock. These words of Leonard were moreover made known in Germany, where Father Pauck, Guardian of Warendorf, published them in a pamphlet which he composed in Rome, without however acknowledging the author.<sup>41</sup>

One can easily imagine the young missioner’s feelings at the sight of these wonderful fruits. His faithful companion, Bro. Diego speaks of it in the Process: “When he erected a Via, he showed such great joy that there was something extraordinary about it. Several times I asked him why he was so happy. He answered: Does the erection of this work seem so insignificant to you? It will be a permanent mission. The many who frequent these Stations will learn a horror of sin at the sight of what Jesus suffered for sinners, and will no more fall into it. If they are at the time guilty of sin, they will, by consideration of this exercise, become penitent and rue their sins.”<sup>42</sup> He preferred to assign the Stations to his penitents for their penance, and urged his companions and all confessors to do so. In the conferences which he gave after each mission to the clergy of the district, in order to instruct them in uniform and proper procedure in the confessional, he spoke in this wise: This is why we introduce in all missions the holy exercise of the Way of the Cross, which the Popes have so richly indulged . . . For two reasons the practice is one of the most valuable of penances, that confessors can assign: First on account of the value of the indulgences, which remit fully the remaining punishment that would have to be

39. Cited by Palandri, in *Stud. Franc.*, X (1924), 24f.; cf. *ibid.*, p. 34, note 2; Del Campana, *ibid.*, p. 207ff.; Innocenti, *ibid.* (1923), p. 398ff., *ibid.* (1937) p. 377.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 79.

41. Cf. Kneller, *op. cit.*, p. 180ff.

42. “Summarium super dubio . . .” II, 581.

atoned for in Purgatory; next on account of the meditation on Christ's Passion, which has the most salutary effect. For even the briefest pious thought on the suffering of the Redeemer is, according to the mystic Blosius, a more useful and meritorious work than fasting on bread and water, disciplining oneself to blood, or reciting all the psalms of David. And finally, it is the most excellent means of preventing relapse of habitual sinners. Therefore, I urge all confessors to make use of this great treasure to bring their penitents to grace and merit, assigning the Stations as a medicinal penance every so often.<sup>43</sup>

### REACTION ON THE PART OF THE FRANCISCAN ORDER

Thus St. Leonard, in the very first years of his residence in Tuscany, stirred to life a mighty Station movement. There appeared during this period a whole series of pamphlets on the Stations, of which, on the matter of indulgences, some shared Leonard's attitude, and some took the opposite.<sup>44</sup> Quite probably our Saint himself had by that time written and published a devotional booklet of the sort, and was already exerting himself for wider propagation.<sup>45</sup> It is certain that, for educated circles, he wrote one particular work in which he formally set forth and defended his views on the indulgences of the Via Crucis. It was entitled, "Explanation of the indulgences granted to all Via Crucis wherever erected by the Friars Minor". To his explanation was added the summons to bishops, pastors and other clergy, referred to above, urging the zealous promotion of this spiritually-rich devotion. The last section comprised a meditation on the Stations. Early in 1715 he himself carried the manuscript to the Tribunal of the General Inquisitor in Florence to obtain the Church's *Imprimatur*.<sup>46</sup>

Now the reaction set in. As censor of the work, the zealous and competent chronister of the Franciscan Observant Province of Tuscany, Father Hippolytus of Florence, was appointed. He also had been active for some time in producing propaganda for the Stations. Two little pamphlets were issued by him, one for use on the Via of Monte Alle Croci and another for general use.<sup>47</sup> From 1712 to 1715, every year at Shrovetide, he conducted the Stations on the Mount for the Guild of St. Anthony in Florence, and like Leonard, he gave a short talk at each

43. *Opere Complete di S. Leonardo*, I, 423.

44. Cf. Palandri in *Stud. Franc.*, X (1924), 38, note 1.

45. Cf. Innocenti, in *Stud. Franc.*, IX (1937), 385ff. and *Opere Complete di S. Leonardo*, IV, 542.

46. *Operette e Lettere Inedite*, p. XLff.

47. Cf. Z. Lazzeri in *Stud. Franc.*, VIII (1922), 69, 81, 83.

station.<sup>48</sup> This priest was a keen champion of the prevailing opinion in the Order on the question of the Stations. He therefore declared himself against granting the *imprimatur* to Leonard's little work.<sup>49</sup> So the latter went to Lucca and there obtained the desired approbation. The pamphlet was issued there that same year, 1715.<sup>50</sup>

Father Hippolytus went further. He believed, with many officials and friars of the time, that unlimited propagation of the Stations would lessen their value and be detrimental to the Order; so he appealed to the Generalate in Rome. In 1716, he was there in person, and on October 9, 1717, a circular was issued by the incumbent Vice Commissary General (later Cardinal) Cozza, which took a strong stand against the unlimited spread of the Via Crucis.<sup>51</sup> The pronouncement definitely shows how strong feelings were on the Via question, and that already the Order of Friars Minor was divided into two camps over it. In 1718, the Provincial of the Tuscan Observant Province added, in the spirit of Cozza's circular stringent instructions to Lenten preachers and public missionaries of his Province against the propagation of the devotion outside the Order's churches.<sup>52</sup> The same year the Sacred Penitentiary considered the question,<sup>53</sup> but its decision is not known.<sup>54</sup>

What did St. Leonard do in the face of these circumstances? He went right on erecting Vias, but did not proclaim them indulgenced. He presented them from now on simply as a devotional practice by means of which people could with particular ease and penetration meditate on Christ's passion. He thus writes in his Resolutions of 1728, which were a condensed form of those previously made in 1717: "I will exert myself to introduce everywhere and in all parishes the holy practice of the Way of the Cross, and will instruct the people to make the Stations often, even if no indulgences are obtained thereby. I will present the most powerful motives possible, to lead them to frequent meditation on the sufferings of the good Jesus."<sup>55</sup> His opponents could find nothing wrong with that.

However, indulgences were then unusual, and carried great weight

48. Cf. Palandri in *Stud. Franc.*, X (1924), 32, note 1.

49. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 35ff.

50. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 37.

51. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 38ff. Cozza was previously custos of the Holy Land and had confirmed the Statutes of the Ritiro of the Roman Observant Province as their Provincial. In these, the daily Stations of the Cross was prescribed for the members.

52. Cf. Palandri in *Stud. Franc.*, X (1924), p. 39f.

53. Cf. *Opere Complete di S. Leonardo*, IV, 544.

54. Cf. Palandri, *loc. cit.*, p. 40.

55. Cf. Wallenstein, *loc. cit.*, p. 230.

with the people. In order to bestir them to greater interest in special ceremonies frequent recourse was had to the Pope to obtain a plenary indulgence for participants.<sup>56</sup> Leonard therefore must have discovered to his pain that the Vias which were not indulged did not have the same attraction. This had been the greatest obstacle also to the zealous efforts of Father Vitale some 90 years earlier.<sup>57</sup> In the 1749 edition of Leonard's pamphlet, while he trumpets anew the passion and death of the Savior, we sense his own sufferings when he cries: "See how the illusion prevailing before the badly needed definition (of Pope Clement XII, Jan. 16, 1731) resulted in neglect. Because they were doubtful about gaining the indulgences, people were indifferent to this holy exercise however perfect a meditation it might be. The most exalted reasons were necessary to entice their hearts to sympathetic contemplation of the Savior's passion. The gaining of indulgences is certainly by a good intention. But it is not the most powerful motive for devout souls who treasure a degree of grace higher than all indulgences. The strongest motive must be the wonderful joy which they give to the Sacred Heart of Jesus."<sup>58</sup>

The Saint saw his favorite instrument for saving and sanctifying men who were otherwise in danger of suffering from too severe restrictions. The only procedure remaining to him, who never shrank from any difficulty in his life where the honor of God or salvation of souls were concerned, was to try by all possible means to secure from the Holy See the extension of indulgences to all Vias. That after prolonged efforts he succeeded and ensured this great means of grace, makes him in truth the Apostle of the Way of the Cross.<sup>59</sup> It is interesting to retrace his steps toward his goal.

### THE STRUGGLE, AND THE VICTORY

As early as 1720, Leonard sought to obtain Papal approval for his own interpretation of the indulgences. At his instigation his friend Archbishop Frosini of Pisa on October 28, 1720, sent a letter to the Prefect of the Congregation of Indulgences asking him to influence the Pope to extend indulgences to all Vias, and not just those located in Franciscan churches. He cited a list of places in his Diocese where Vias had been erected by Friars of the Florentine Ritiro, and which were very popular and beneficial. The blessing would be even richer

56. Cf. Innocenti in *Stud. Franc.*, IX (1923), 410.

57. Cf. Bihl, *loc. cit.*, p. 342.

58. *Opere Complete di S. Leonardo*, II, 165f.

59. Kneller had already acknowledged him as such, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

if it were confirmed that the indulgences could be gained at these Vias also.<sup>60</sup> This request apparently was not acted upon.

On March 3, 1727, a Brief of Benedict XIII shed some light on the question of indulgences. To be sure, it put Leonard in the wrong, in that it limited the application of the indulgences to Vias located where they might in any way come under the Minister General of the Friars Minor. But it also opposed the interpretation of those who restricted the gaining of indulgences to members of the Seraphic Order and organizations associated with it.<sup>61</sup>

Then Leonard made a most opportune discovery in a chance visit to the Ambrogian Monastery of the Spanish Alcantarins near Florence. There he learned that the Franciscans in Spain and Portugal erected Vias both in town and country, without this restriction, and represented them as being indulgenced.<sup>62</sup> He was greatly pleased with the news, for he was sure he could by citing these facts achieve a decided step forward. In his prudence, however, he did not seek immediately the complete disregard of the existing restrictions, but aimed at obtaining unrestricted erection of indulgenced Vias just for himself and his confreres of the Tuscan Ritiro as well as for the Ambrogians. As he knew such an undertaking could be successfully achieved only with strong support, he turned with his plan to his spiritual daughter, the Crown Princess Violante of Tuscany, widow of the Crown Prince and daughter of the Elector of Bavaria, who sent his request with her earnest recommendation to Rome. Here, due to her intercession, the request was granted on November 10, 1729. A Papal grant was issued, which also conveyed the indulgences to all Vias previously erected by the personnel of these two Franciscan houses.<sup>63</sup> We can well imagine Leonard's jubilation on receiving this welcome news. He at once wrote to all pastors of parishes where he had previously erected and blessed Vias, to report their new status on the indulgence question.<sup>64</sup>

Yet a saint like Leonard, constantly aiming at perfection, would not remain satisfied with a partial success. The restrictions hampering

60. Cf. Innocenti in *Stud. Franc.*, XIV (1928), 406ff.

61. Cf. *Chronologiae historicico-legalis*, III, 1, 83f.

62. *Opere Complete di S. Leonardo*, II, 192. Cf. M. Bibl in *Arch. Franc. Hist.* VI (1913), 420. "Ambrogiana" was an independent cloister with exclusively Spanish occupants, in fact, Spanish Alcantarins. Pope Cosimo III, who had a special affection for strict reform groups, had it brought from Spain and erected in Tuscany.

63. *Opere Complete di S. Leonardo*, II, 193. From the context it appears the grant of indulgences applied only to the territory of Tuscany. Cf. Palandri, *op. cit.*, X (1924), 33; *Operette e Lettere Inedite*, p. 91f.

64. Cf. Innocenti in *Stud. Franc.* IX (1923), 419.

the effectiveness of the *Via* must be wholly removed. Here again, providence smoothed the way for him.

On July 12, 1730, the Florentine Cardinal Corsini was unanimously elected Pope. This he owed in part to the same Princess Violante, who had successfully used her influence at the Austrian Court to move the Emperor to withdraw his opposition to Corsini's candidature.<sup>65</sup> The new Pope, Clement XII, had formerly been the Protector of the Order of Friars Minor. As such, he had allowed himself to be completely prejudiced against the Ritiros by their opponents, and he was now expected to suppress them. The Friars of St. Bonaventure's in Rome were convinced that their only hope of salvation from this impending disaster rested in the highly respected Friar Leonard in Florence who for some time had been looked upon as a saint. Under some pretext, therefore, they summoned him to Rome to defeat the efforts of their adversaries.

Leonard obeyed this call with joy. In the center of Christianity there would be more opportunity for him to procure fulfillment of his great apostolic desires. Once again the Princess Violante came to his aid. Provided with a letter of recommendation from her he set out at the end of September 1730 for the Eternal City. Early in October he was granted an audience with the Pope. He delivered the letter of the Crown Princess on the merit of the Ritiros. With this, their continuation was assured.<sup>66</sup> Not yet did Leonard attempt to speak of the *Via Crucis*, and of another matter very dear to his heart. But he had already begun work on these affairs through some Cardinals.<sup>67</sup>

Toward the end of the month he held his first mission in Rome. It took place in the little church of Santa Galla — church of the beggars. Its attendance was poor at first, but soon it drew such crowds that the little church could not hold them — people from every walk of life, and from the noblest circles of Rome. The mission made such a stir that the Pope on the evening it closed had his Vicegerent ask the preacher if he could at once undertake another mission in a large church. Gladly the latter agreed, and opened a new mission the very next night in the Church of the Florentines. This mission too was blessed by God, yielding extraordinary fruit. The missioner was now summoned by the Pope to an audience, and in fact to several successive ones. The elderly sovereign of the Church displayed such fatherly benevolence that Leonard believed the time opportune to present his other cherished

65. L. Pastor, *Geschichte der Päpste* (Freiburg), XV, 618ff.

66. *Diario delle Missioni*, p. 14ff.

67. *Opere Complete di S. Leonardo*, II., 193.

desires. First he spoke of the Via Crucis, describing the immeasurable blessing that would result from the propagation of this devotion among all Christian people. Clement was particularly influenced by the fact that this devotion would draw the faithful, almost imperceptibly, to practice mental prayer. He granted the petition of the Saint, and by Brief of January 16, 1731, attached to all Viae Crucis erected by the Friars Minor, even those outside their own churches, all the indulgences then available for a Via Crucis.<sup>68</sup> Leonard's joy was indescribable, for he saw the efforts of twenty-two long years crowned with success, while at the same time a source of the richest blessings was made available to all Christians.<sup>69</sup> The generous cooperation of the Pope gave him courage to put before him the third of his cherished projects. He begged the Vicar of Christ to define the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary.<sup>70</sup> For this, however, the time ordained by God had not yet come.

In these exertions for the extention of the indulgences of the Way of the Cross Leonard had not gone over the heads of the superiors of his Order. He had succeeded in winning over the Procurator General of the Order, Father Bernardo Monterde, to full cooperation. The latter for his part obtained the necessary approval from the Minister General who was in Spain at the time.<sup>71</sup>

To obviate all difficulties and doubts, Leonard petitioned the Congregation of indulgences to regulate more specifically the procedure for erection of the Stations. The instruction was published on March 3, 1731, and embraced nine points.<sup>72</sup> Particularly interesting was the decision that, wherever possible, two Vias were to be erected, one for men, one for women. Leonard publicly recommended the most frequent practice of the devotion, and therefore desired to see the separation, customary during the missions, of the two sexes continued in this way. He himself erected the first double Via in June of the same year in Marino.<sup>73</sup> Now the road had been cleared for the Via Crucis, and the devotion could enter on its victorious path through the world everywhere unfolding its quiet effectiveness. Leonard made the greatest possible use of the new Papal grant. With particular zeal he at once devoted himself to erecting Vias in all the convents of Rome itself.

68. "Summarium super dubio . . ." II, 185; *Opere Complete di S. Leonardo*, IV, 389; *Chronologiae historico-legalis*, III, 2, 147ff.

69. "Summarium super dubio . . ." I, 123; 185.

70. *Opere Complete di S. Leonardo*, IV, 481ff.

71. *Opere Complete di S. Leonardo*, II, 193.

72. *Ibid.*, 193; *Chronologiae historico-legalis*, III, 2, 148ff.

73. *Diarjo delle Missioni*, p. 19.

In his "Holy Handbook" for Sisters, he could write in 1734: "Almost all convents in Rome have taken up this beautiful devotion. It is not hard to achieve, for it is left to each convent to decide whether they will have one or not. Yet the eagerness with which the Via is usually received, is so great, that there are few Orders which do not prescribe its holy practice daily, or even several times daily."<sup>74</sup> That Leonard proceeded in earnest to erect the Via Crucis at all missions goes without saying. He prepared everything required beforehand — the necessary permissions, the purchasing of the crosses.<sup>75</sup>

His confreres among the Observants and Reformed Friars with few exceptions showed their whole-hearted acceptance of the new situation and zealously took up the work. They could well be satisfied with the results they experienced, for they found that the patronage of their churches and the Stations erected in them not only did not decline but notably increased.<sup>76</sup>

Yet the higher officials of the Order in general kept strictly aloof—in fact, they took Leonard's forging to the front rather poorly.<sup>77</sup> They made use of some questions that arose to request of the Pope a new declaration furthering their desires. He stated in a decree published May 3, 1731, that Superiors were not to proceed too readily to erection of Vias outside the Order churches, but should go along prudently so that further propagation of the devotion would not give rise to neglect or confusion. In the smaller cities and villages where Franciscan houses were located no Vias outside their churches were to be erected. In the larger cities, a proper distance should be observed.

On May 26, the Commissary General Krisper communicated these regulations in a circular to all Superiors, appending directions which were more after the nature of further restrictions than an explanation of the Papal declaration.<sup>78</sup>

Leonard was not satisfied with the new limitations obtained by the heads of the Order. He obtained directly from the Pope a dispensation from these conditions for himself and his companions. His petition is very brief, and forms, both in what he says and what he omits, a protest against the Superiors. His petition was granted on June 19.<sup>79</sup> It seems that the answer of the Pope made an impression on Krisper, for

74. *Opere Complete di s. Leonardo*, I, 345ff.

75. "Summarium super dubio . . ." II, 172.

76. *Opere Complete di S. Leonardo*, II, 195; IV, 385.

77. *Prediche e Lettere*, p. 247; cf. Innocenti, in *Stud. Franc.*, IV (1932), 28; *Diario delle Missioni*, p. 17.

78. Cf. Palandri in *Stud. Franc.*, X (1924), 42ff.

79. *Prediche e Lettere*, p. 193f; cf. Palandri, *op. cit.*, p. 44f.

his circular, issued four days later to the Riformati, dealt very moderately on the subject of the Way of the Cross.<sup>80</sup>

For the time being, Leonard was satisfied. He awaited a better opportunity to attain complete fulfillment of his wishes. This presented itself under Benedict XIV, successor to Clement XII. He spurred the new Pope, his friend and admirer, to confirm the Clementine Brief, and to add to the Congregation's nine points of instruction, as a tenth, the declaration that it was his wish to have Vias erected in all parish churches and all pious places, and that the distances of the individual Vias, one from the other, held no significance. Yet, wherever a Franciscan house was located, a new Via should be erected only when it was difficult to visit the Franciscan Church. Publication of the Brief took place on August 30, 1741, that the tenth point on May 10, 1742.<sup>81</sup>

Now there remained nothing more for Leonard to desire. His zeal increased, if possible, even more. This is demonstrated by the records of the missions he gave in the summer of 1744, in the extremely difficult territory of Corsica. In the first six missions he and his companions erected no less than one hundred Vias which were "wonderfully frequented" by the Corsicans.<sup>82</sup> From 1731 until his death, he personally blessed five hundred and seventy-two Ways of the Cross.<sup>83</sup>

His concern for the Stations never left the Saint until he died. We find proof of this in his canonization process: "The opposition of one Minister General was hardly overcome when the same revived under his successor, but Leonard's watchfulness likewise increased, as he sought with ever burning zeal to foster and spread this devotion everywhere."<sup>84</sup> And Bro. Diego, of Florence, testified: "I know that a certain one of our Generals looked askance on the privileges that were granted, and were proposed to be granted, to the Servant of God, regarding the Stations of the Cross. For this reason he considered taking steps to obstruct their realization. When they were granted to the Servant of God, the General brought out his measures to nullify Leonard's efforts. That Superior did this, and I know that he spoke then with but little respect for the Servant of God."<sup>85</sup> Here the testimony undoubtedly refers to the Minister General Laurino, of whom Leonard wrote in

80. Cf. Palandri in *Stud. Franc.*, (1924), p. 45f.

81. *Opere Complete di S. Leonardo*, II, 189ff.; *Chronologiae Historico-legalis*, III, 2, 267.

82. *Opere Complete di S. Leonardo*, V, 334, 337.

83. *Opere Complete di S. Leonardo*, II, 201ff.

84. "Processus Informativus Romanus" (The original copy is had in the Archives of the Postulator General of the Order of Friars Minor in Rome), fol. 1972.

85. *Ibid.*, fol. 993b.

1746: "At first he was wholly mine, but after I received the Brief for propagation of the Stations, he was no longer the same."<sup>86</sup> At any rate, the Minister General soon became reconciled.

On the 30th of July, 1748, a decree of the Congregation of Indulgences proclaimed that for the proper erection of a new *Via Crucis*, a threefold written permission was required: That of the local Bishop, the pastor of the church concerned, and the Superior of the nearest Franciscan Monastery.<sup>87</sup> These conditions must have seriously handicapped Father Leonard from time to time on his mission trips when opportunities to erect the Stations arose. Postal service at the time was exceedingly slow,<sup>88</sup> so he obtained from the Pope, in May 1749, the power to erect *Vias* without a particular written permission from the Superiors.<sup>89</sup>

In 1749 there must still have been tangible opposition on the part of the Order to these hard-won concessions in the matter of the Way of the Cross,<sup>90</sup> but Leonard did not slacken his vigilance. As early as February 1750 he made arrangements to be present in Rome for the General Chapter scheduled for Pentecost "so the Fathers would make no regulations against the Way of the Cross." In fact, he made use of the strong influence he held through his close relations with the Pope to impress on the entire Order three things that he was convinced must be for its welfare and a blessing to all Christianity. At his instigation, the Pope, who personally presided at the opening of the General Chapter, addressed the newly-elected General, Peter Joannetius, a message directing him to make known to the Order these three desires: First, the conscientious observance of the Holy Rule, especially poverty; second, the erection of one or more Retreats in each province; and third, the zealous promotion of the Way of the Cross both inside and outside its cloisters.<sup>91</sup>

In the meantime, the upsurge of the *Via Crucis* had spread in ever-widening circles. By 1749 almost all cloisters of monks and nuns in Rome had many *Vias* inside their confines for the ready use of their occupants.<sup>92</sup> Bishop Rondinelli of Comacchio said in the Canonization process: "Many, on the basis of his admonition, erected *Vias* in all places, as I myself have done in my Diocese after considering what I

86. *Prediche e Lettere*, p. 247.

87. *Opere Complete di S. Leonardo*, II, 190.

88. Cf. *Prediche e Lettere*, p. 247.

89. *Operette e Lettere Inedite*, p. 170.

90. *Opere Complete di S. Leonardo*, II, 195.

91. *Chronologiae historico-legalis*, III, 2, 442f.

92. *Opere Complete di S. Leonardo*, II, 198; *Prediche e Lettere*, p. 271.

heard from the servant of God."<sup>93</sup> Leonard himself could publicly declare that there was hardly a parish or a cloister in Italy or France, Spain, Portugal, or even in the Indies, without a properly blessed and popularly visited Way of the Cross.<sup>94</sup>

The Saint might also have included Germany among the lands possessing this devotion. Here we are best informed on the Bavarian Franciscan Province. In its territory the first Via was erected in Angerkloster in Munich. The Provincial in 1729 ordered the erection of the Via in all churches of the Order under his jurisdiction and its public performance on all Fridays of Lent. In the twenty years following the Clementine Brief of 1731, there were far more than a thousand Vias erected by the Bavarian Friars Minor alone.<sup>95</sup> Similar conditions must have existed in the other German Provinces. We have already seen that the Guardian of Warendorf, Father Pauck, published a pamphlet on the Stations in 1720 which brought the exhortations of Leonard to the attention of the prelates. In 1737, the Franciscans of Fulda constructed a huge Via Crucis near their convent on the Frauenberg. Perhaps in the same year and certainly at the latest in 1744, a Friar of this cloister, Father Brinckmann, produced a very devotional pamphlet on the Stations which was re-edited and published several times during the 19th century.<sup>96</sup>

Thus the Stations were truly popular with many nations and peoples. Long years after Leonard died a witness testified at the process: "Even today, the devotion of the Stations in Rome, which before Leonard's arrival was hardly known or practiced, is one of the most universal and faithfully practiced of all pious exercises."<sup>97</sup> An especially notable example in this connection was given by the city of Ravenna. Leonard, as was his custom, had given the warmest recommendation of the devotion on his mission there in December, 1746. Six weeks later he reported: "The Church of the Observants is always full of people making the Stations. Each evening after the Angelus there are about three thousand men practicing the devotion with great sincerity."<sup>98</sup> Two years later he could say practically the same thing.<sup>99</sup>

Of the popularity of the Stations in a country parish he tells the following: "Once when I gave a mission in a small town I discovered a

93. "Summarium super dubio . . ." II, 382.

94. *Opere Complete di S. Leonardo*, IV, 382.

95. Joh. Stockerl, in *Franzis. Stud.*, 12 (1925), 80f.

96. G. Haselbeck, in the *Arch. Franc. Hist.*, VI., 117f.

97. "Summarium super dubio . . ." II, 417.

98. *Prediche e Lettere*, p. 250.

99. *Opere Complete di S. Leonardo*, II, 196.

very holy flock where the people made the Stations every day. In winter they made them before going out into the fields, and in summer they made them upon returning. At every Cross they renewed their resolution never to commit a mortal sin, and they kept their holy promise remarkably well.”<sup>100</sup> This was the community of Monte Flavio, where Leonard gave a mission in August, 1732, and where he was particularly pleased with the purity of the young people.<sup>101</sup>

There would be no danger of error in setting the number of Vias erected through the immediate influence of Leonard at several thousand, and the number of times the Stations were made at several million. The most decisive accounting factor for their propagation however was that through his efforts the indulgences were extended to all Ways of the Cross.

On the 27th of December, 1750, the Zealous Apostle of the Via Crucis experienced a particularly great joy: a beautiful Via Crucis with fourteen little shrines was consecrated in the Colosseum in Rome, for the erection of which he had put forth tremendous efforts during the preceding months. Benedict XIV, the Hear of Christendom, was eagerly planning to personally preside at this function, but at the last minute, on the advice of his physician, he had to forego it and to send his Vicegerent as substitute. Leonard delivered an impressive sermon. Earlier, he had called into existence a confraternity the sole concern of which was the care of this Via Crucis. He was now able to say that in the very center of Christendom, in a location historically famous, a Via Crucis was erected where at least twice a week the Stations were made publicly in solemn procession, thus holding up before the eyes of the Catholic world something constant to remind it to cherish this devotion.<sup>102</sup> A few months later, the seventy-four-year-old Saint left on his last mission journey. On November 26, 1751, he returned at nightfall mortally ill to the Eternal City, and on the same night after piously receiving the Holy Viaticum he gave back his great soul to his Creator. This took place in the Monastery of St. Bonaventure on the Palatine, where his mortal remains now repose beneath the high Altar of the church.

The development of the Via Crucis into a universal Catholic devotion has not been a world-stirring event, to be sure. It has rather been

100. *Opere Complete di S. Leonard*, II, 166f.

101. “Summarium super dubio . . .” II, 193.

102. “Summarium super dubio . . .” I, 37, 71, 77, 92, 122: “Summarium super dubio . . .” II, 294, 410; *Operette e Lettere Inedite*, p. 191, 195, 204; “Processus Informativus Romanus,” p. 3271b; *Diario delle Missioni*, op. cit., p. 269.

like a silent, omnipresent rainfall which by its gentle, steady descent, brought abundant fertility to earth. For that very reason we must seek out the significance of the Via Crucis in the history of Christian piety. It is noteworthy that, just prior to the mighty flourishing of the devotion, and soon after the death of its great Apostle, two pernicious novelties of religious thought sought root among Christian people.

In the latter part of the 17th Century, the Quietism of De Molinos penetrated into many clerical circles, and especially in Rome. According to this doctrine Christ should be omitted from every activity of the life of prayer and virtue, and one should passively surrender to the operation of God. Even veneration of the Humanity of Christ interfered with direct access to God, and should therefore be omitted. Exterior devotions were frowned upon. This false mysticism took deepest root in some of the convents of Rome, where it went so far that nuns would not use holy water, nor adore the Sacred Host after Consecration, nor have Jesuits — whose teachings on the need of personal activity in the spiritual life so contradicted the erroneous belief of the Molinos—for confessors. The condemnation of Quietism was pronounced in 1687.<sup>103</sup> In the year following, the first recommendation of the General Chapter of the Friars Minor appeared, urging zealous propagation of the devotion of the Way of the Cross, which offered a specific antidote to the poison of Quietism.

Thirty years after the death of St. Leonard, Jansenist and critical-minded circles felt that Catholic pious practices needed reform. Their leader was Scipione de' Ricci, Bishop of Pistoia. He created considerable commotion by approving a pamphlet on the Stations issued in Florence by the Monk Puiati of Friaul, of the Monastery of Monte Casino. This, in opposition to the generally accepted form, proposed a new practice which he thought more excellent and more closely conformed to Holy Scripture.

A great controversy arose on this matter. Learned and pious men, among them at least seven Franciscans, successfully defended in their writings the accepted form of the devotion which Leonard had propagated. Three of these Friars Minor, Fathers Affo, Annibali and Gaggioli, worked under orders of the General of the Order, and it appears, at the request of Pius VI.<sup>104</sup> Thus the devotion was preserved in its original form to Christianity — in fact, this very controversy caused it

103. Cf. Pastor, XIV, 2, 985ff.

104. Cf. Olinger in *Arch. Franc. Hist.*, VII, (1914), 591f.

to become more deeply rooted than ever in the cultured circles of the time.<sup>105</sup>

The devotion of the Way of the Cross, practiced in the spirit of Saint Leonard of Port Maurice, and in keeping with pious tradition from the earliest times, actually formed a dam against false mysticism and unhealthy rationalism in religion.

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105. Cf. Palandri, the "Via Crucis del Puiati," in *Stud. Franc.*, X (1924), p. 27. This article has also been published in book form (Florence, 1928).

# THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY ACCORDING TO DUNS SCOTUS

## (Continued)

### Specific Groups in Social Life

Besides these ideas on the origin and nature of political authority,\* Scotus discusses the problems confronting the ruler of a community, and also the other social groups in society, the family, and the community of nations.

#### *I. Ruler of The Community*

Scotus now discusses the qualities that are demanded of a ruler, the powers he is given, and the duties that are assigned to him. Most of the time he is simply called the *princeps* by Scotus. Other names appearing are *rector*,<sup>1</sup> *legislator*,<sup>2</sup> and *praesidens*.<sup>3</sup> *Rex* is used, but less frequently.<sup>4</sup>

In applying what he says about rulers, the medieval background must be kept in mind. The structure of society was different then; the status of the laborer was one of practical serfdom; the medium of exchange was beginning to be money, although the real basis of economic life was still the land. People took a different attitude toward suffering and the use of force. The European world was not considered an aggregate of nations, but as Christendom, as an *orbis Christianus*. There was but one society with two rulers, one over the spiritual and the other over the temporal.

Scotus has no separate treatise on the functions of public authority or the duties of rulers. Rather he treats of these duties as the occasion presents itself. Thus these duties are stated in the tract on justice, on the function of money, trade, property, and religion. Hence much more research has to be done in this field. A few of the main ideas expressed by Scotus on this subject will be brought out here.

1. *Qualities of a Ruler.* First of all, he requires of a ruler, prudence and authority. The latter has already been discussed. Prudence the ruler needs "that he may judge according to right and practical reason what is to be done for the community."<sup>5</sup> Prudence, however, has a very special meaning for Scotus; it is not the Thomistic notion. For Thomas it is the *recta ratio agibilium*.<sup>6</sup> For Scotus, it is a virtue inclining the practical intellect to determine and recommend to the will, particular

1. *Rep. Par.*, IV, d. 36, q. 2, n. 6, (XXIV, 459a).

2. *Opus Oxon.*, IX, d. 16, q. 1, n. 11, (XX, 427).

3. *Opus Oxon.*, III, d. 34, q. 1, n. 17, (XIV, 522).

4. *Opus Oxon.*, IV, d. 3, q. 4, n. 19, (XVI, 370).

5. *Opus Oxon.*, IV, d. 15, q. 2, n. 6, (XVIII, 265).

6. *Summa Theol.*, II, q. 47, a. 3.

means and *proximate ends*.<sup>7</sup> He explains the development of prudence as follows: the will elects the end; it then commands the intellect to discover means and more proximate ends for attaining this end.<sup>8</sup> This definition allows prudence to determine more proximate ends. In this Scotus disagrees with St. Thomas. For the former it is not merely a matter of judging rightly, but of choosing in conformity. St. Thomas, following Aristotle closely, did not stress the role of the will in prudence; hence the close connection between knowledge and conduct. Scotus has a clearer notion of voluntary action by bringing morality into a closer harmony of the will with reason, rather than of a direct governing of the passions by the intellect. The implication for the ruler here is (although Scotus did not apply it in this context) that it is not enough to *know* what is the right thing to do. He must *choose* in conformity with right reason and select the means and more *proximate* ends for attaining these ends. It is a more active and practical prudence that Scotus demands of a ruler. The true Christian ruler will realize that it is not sufficient merely to know the dictates of right reason, or of justice and charity, but it will be necessary to choose in conformity with them.

Scotus also speaks of a distinct type of justice which belongs to the role of one in authority. It is thus a sort of political justice. He is not sure just what name to give it, but says it can simply be called the virtue of authority, *praesidentia*. It is a typical Scotistic notion for he refuses to confine the idea of justice to a strict *quid pro quo*. Rather, he divides up justice into four species, each being closely interrelated with the others. The species with which he is concerned here, is called *praesidentia* and is that virtue by which one is inclined to rule well. In order to understand this, it must be remembered that, according to Scotus, the formal object of justice is that natural honesty which requires that one should desire the welfare of another. The activity or practice of justice is divided up by Scotus according to the things which can be given to one's neighbor. The acts of giving are called the species of justice and are all true subjective parts of the virtue.<sup>9</sup> Such

7. *Opus Oxon.*, III, d. 33, q. 1, n. 13, (XV, 447): *Sicut in intellectu, vel per primum actum, vel per plures actus elicitos, recte generatur habitus prudentiae, ita etiam per ipsum rectum eligere consonum rectae rationi, vel recto dictamini rationis, vel per multis tales electiones generatur in voluntate virtus recta, inclinans ipsam ad recte eligendum . . . Voluntas prius vult aliquid in se, quam imperet potentiae inferiori actum circa illud, non enim quia vult, sed e converso . . . Generare in seipsa ex rectis electionibus habitum inclinanter ad recte eligendum; et hic habitus propriissime erit virtus, quia propriissime habitus electivus inclinans ad recte eligendum, sicut ex electionibus generatur.*

8. *Ibid.*, n. 12.

9. *Ibid.*, d. 34, q. 1. Cf. *Commentarius* n. 59, (XIV, 501).

things as potential parts or integral parts, do not enter into the Scotistic treatment of justice, as is the case with St. Thomas.<sup>10</sup> He begins by approaching justice as a facility of bringing about the good of our neighbor. The act of justice involved in "giving each one what is his due,"<sup>11</sup> is strict justice and is basic to Scotus, but it is only part of the framework of justice for him.

This is the way in which he arrives at his notion of *praesidentia* as the virtue for those in authority: through justice we aim at attaining the good of another. The most perfect form in which this can be done is *friendship*, for here we share ourselves with another. Next we share our external goods with another in regard to what is his due. This is the most important species of justice but not all of it. This is commutative justice. Finally, we share our internal goods or our service with others. This is either that "by which we are inclined to rule well, which has no name but which can be called *praesidentia*, or a just domination, or it is that by which we are inclined to subject ourselves to others according to the dictates of reason, and this can be called obedience."<sup>12</sup> Thus we have the words of Scotus:

Justice can be thus divided: one can share oneself rightly with another in so far as he can do so, or one can share something else with him. The virtue inclining one to the first is friendship, by which one gives himself to one's neighbor . . . and this is the most perfect moral virtue . . . But if one shares something else with another, these goods are either extrinsic or intrinsic pertaining to human life. Commutative justice is concerned with the former, namely, external goods which men need to exchange. This is frequently called the justice by which one exchanges equivalents. But if one shares a necessary part of oneself, this is either to rule *regimen* and this pertains to one in authority, and this species is not named, but can be called *praesidentia*, or *justa dominatio*. Or one subjects oneself justly, and this . . . can be called obedience.<sup>13</sup>

There is yet one more element to add to the virtue of *praesidentia*. Consistent with his idea that entities are not to be multiplied without necessity, Scotus refuses to posit different habits for the virtues, gifts, and beatitudes. Hence he says that the beatitudes found in the Gospel of St. Matthew are the same habits as the habits of virtues.<sup>14</sup> To the virtue of *praesidentia* he ascribes the beatitude: "Blessed are the peacemakers." In fact, the beatitude is the same thing as the virtue. He includes the virtue of obedience under this too:

10. *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 79-80.

11. *Ibid.*, q. 58, a. 1.

12. *Commentarius in Opus Oxon.*, III, d. 34, q. 1, n. 17, (XV, 522).

13. *Opus Oxon.*, loc. cit., (XV, 521-522).

14. *Opus Oxon.*, III, d. 34, q. 1, n. 18, (XV, 524): His intellectis, dico quod beatitudines, quas ponit Salvator Matth. 5, sunt idem habitus, cum habitibus virtutum.

According to St. Thomas, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are infused separately and impart docility to our faculties, while "the beatitudes are distinct from the virtues and gifts, not as different habits, but as acts that are distinguished from their habits." (Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 69, a. 1).

The other species which is divided into a just domination and obedience, is expressed by the words "Blessed are the peacemakers." For, peace is attained in this that the one in authority rules rightly, and the subject obeys rightly.<sup>15</sup>

These qualities are demanded by Scotus of all those in the chair of authority. *A fortiori* they apply to one in the role of supreme authority. To say that a ruler must be just and prudent is not enough; one should know what Scotus means by justice and prudence. That is why we have gone into some length to explain what he means by these virtues. In another place he speaks with approval of Aristotle's division of justice into distributive and commutative justice.<sup>16</sup>

*2. Duties of a Ruler.* This particular section is important for its timeliness. In recent years there has appeared the theory, even among Catholics, that "the civil government is purely natural in purpose and authority, that the civil ruler as such has no direct obligation toward the supernatural law proclaimed by Christ."<sup>17</sup> Such a view raises doubt as to whether the civil rulers in their official capacity, and not merely as individuals, are obliged to submit to Christ the King. Are men bound not only as individuals, but also in so far as they are members of civil society, a state or a nation? Thus, according to this view, a civil ruler would not be bound to manifest officially any laws of Christ above the natural law. Strangely enough, this view appears in a recent study on Scotus' contemporary, John of Paris.<sup>18</sup> Apparently the author writes with a certain measure of approval of the idea that the state has a purely natural scope. It might be interesting to note, that the work of John of Paris, *De Potestate Regia et Papali* was written in 1302 or 1303, during the controversy between Pope and King, and the same year that Scotus had to leave Paris because of his loyalty to the Pope. John of Paris took the side of the King. Hence he may reasonably be considered to be one of the adversaries of Scotus on this question. Scotus held the opposite opinion on the purpose of public authority.

Another thing that must be taken into consideration in trying to understand Scotus' stand on the duties of rulers and the purpose of civil

15. *Opus Oxon.*, loc. cit., n. 19.

16. *Rep. Par.*, IV, d. 24, q. 1, n. 13, (XXIV, 357).

17. From the article written by Fr. Francis Connell, C.S.S.R. against this view, "Christ the King of Civil Rulers," *American Ecclesiastical Review*, CXIX (July- December, 1948), 245.

18. Cf. Jean Leclercq, O.S.B., *Jean de Paris et l'Écclesiologie du XIII Siècle* (Paris, 1942). Whether Dom Leclercq interprets John of Paris correctly is another question. Fr. Connell does not attempt to solve it. However, the article in the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* also states that John "restricts the ethical ends of the state to the moral and not the theological spheres," but otherwise follows Aristotle and St. Thomas. Richard Stoltz, "John Quidort of Paris," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, VIII, 407.

law, is the fact that he left his work not only unfinished, but unsystematized. His early death must have been the main reason for this. Yet much can be learned about his ideas on this question from the many applications he makes of his principles of law to social life. Of course, the main argument against any theory such as that attributed to John of Paris, is the doctrine of the Kingship of Christ. Later on in this article there will be mention of Scotus' distinctive teaching on this important doctrine which has so many social implications.

3. *Duty toward Religion.* Contrary to any false notion such as that explained above and attributed to John of Paris, Scotus makes it one of the main duties of the ruler to look out for the spiritual good of the country. This includes the fostering and protection of the true religion. He does not teach that the ruler has a direct jurisdiction over spiritual things. Indirectly, however, he must care for the spiritual good of his people.<sup>19</sup> He has to provide the best conditions favorable to the promotion of the true religion and the keeping of social peace in the country:

The ruler must above all, be zealous in looking out for the rights of the Supreme Lord, God.<sup>20</sup>

This problem was, however, no less thorny in those days than it is today. The main question then was, how far could the ruler go in curtailing the liberties of those who steadfastly refused to embrace the true religion? Scotus is just as severe as the other Scholastics, if not more. It would take us too far afield, however, to explain the peculiar background of the times, the attitude toward subjective states of mind, and the identification between the idea of "Christian" and "citizen." Add to this the difficulty in trying to interpret various texts in Scotus concerning this point. There may even be some inconsistency involved here which further research will have to clear up.

The difficulty arose with the pagans and Jews living among the Christians. Many had, no doubt, received baptism for material gains, while others had been forced to be baptized by various Christian Kings. The questions arose as to what kind of intention was needed for a valid baptism and as to whether the children of infidel parents should be baptized against the will of those parents. He does not think that anyone, not even the children of Jews and infidels, is to be baptized against his will or that of his parents. This is because such a one would either be brought up in error as a baptized Christian, or because he

19. *Commentarius*, n. 14, XVI, 49b.

20. *Opus Oxon.*, IV, d. 4, q. 9, n. 1, (XVI, 488a) : Maxime debet Princeps zelare pro dominio servando supremi Domini, scilicet Dei.

would have to be taken from his parents. This latter case would violate the natural parental right. But then he goes on to say that, although this applies to the action of individuals trying to proselytize, it does not seem to hold regarding the ruler to whom such are subject in the government of the state; for God has a greater right of dominion over the child than the parents.<sup>21</sup> Thus a ruler would have the power even to take the children from their parents if they intended to bring them up *contra cultum Dei*. God is the supreme and most upright Lord, and the ruler has a duty to see that his subjects apply themselves to the true worship of God.<sup>22</sup>

He does not say whether these are children who have reached the age of reason or not. St. Thomas had stated his case more clearly and precisely. He had said that those under the age of reason cannot be baptized against the will of their parents, according to the custom of the Church; but those over this age could of their own consent be baptized. Therefore, "such can be licitly exhorted and induced to receive baptism."<sup>23</sup> He is not talking here, however, about the duties of rulers as such. If it refers to individuals in general, then his case is identical with that of Scotus. According to the *Commentary*, however, infants are included in the powers of the ruler according to Scotus. But it goes on to explain that the ruler can interfere only in so far as it pertains to the public good or detriment. If the ruler can interfere when the parents are violating a natural law in the education of their children, then he can do so in regard to the true worship of God since nothing is more conducive to the peace and prosperity of the Republic. Therefore, the ruler has the power of correcting an error in religion which is to the public detriment, even against the will of the parents who are educating the children in contempt of religion and the true worship of God. While the ruler does not have direct power over spiritual things, he does have an indirect power when the error is to the detriment of the public good.<sup>24</sup>

21. *Opus Oxon.*, IV, d. 4, q. 9, n. 1, (XVI, 487): *De parvulis Judaeorum et infidelium an sint invititi parentibus baptizandi, dicitur quod non, quia aut redderentur parentibus et tunc baptizatio eorum esset in contumeliam fidei Christianae . . . aut non reddentur et tunc fieret injuria, quia dum sunt parvuli, ius habent parentes in eos. Sed haec ratio, licet forte concludat de quacumque persona privata, . . . non videtur tamen concludere de Principe, cui in regime reipublicae tales sunt subditi. Nam in parvulo Deus habet majus ius dominii quam parentes.*

22. *Ibid.*, p. 488: *Maxime debet Princeps zelare pro dominio servando supremi domini et per consequens non solum licet, sed debet Princeps auferre parvulos a dominio parentum volentium eos educare contra cultum Dei qui est supremus et honestissimus Dominus et debet eos applicare cultui divino . . .*

23. *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 68, a. 10: *Et ideo tales licite moneri possunt et induci ad suscipiendum baptismum.*

24. *Commentarius*, n. 14, (XVI, 494): *Si parentes . . . male educant filios contra*

In another place he approves of the prince who would even induce the parents by various forceful measures to receive baptism.<sup>25</sup> All this, of course, holds only provided that no greater harm would come to the faith, which is certainly to be considered. It would be a lesser evil, he says, for them not to be able to observe their illicit law, than freely to observe it. Moreover, their third and fourth generations would be Christians. These applications need not detain us.<sup>26</sup>

In all this he claims to be expressing the mind of St. Augustine and also of the IV Council of Toledo, both of which forbade the threat of death as a means to force baptism, but said that the children of unwilling parents were validly baptized. He has the words of the Council before him which said:

The Holy Synod has decreed that henceforth no one is to be forced to believe, for such as are unwilling are not saved, but only those that are willing.....

However, he quotes only the sentence which follows the above: "But those who have already been forced to accept Christianity, as was done in the times of the most religious prince, Assebuci ...." He points out that the prince Assebucus is called "most religious" and yet compelled the infidels to accept the faith.<sup>27</sup> The correct name of the prince was Sisebucus. Ferdinand of Spain and Edward I of England were other rulers who carried on this practice.

We must understand passages like these, not taken alone, but in their context, and in view of the principles enunciated in the beginning of the respective treatises. Scotus has said a few pages before, that an adult cannot receive baptism validly if he is opposed to it in every way.<sup>28</sup> He concludes his treatise on consent by saying:

legem naturalem, potest Princeps emendare error; sed nihil magis est de lege naturali quam Dei cultus verus, nihilque magis conductit ad pacem publicam et profectum Reipublicae; ergo Princeps habet potestatem corrigendi errorem in religione qui redundat in publicum detrimentum, invitis etiam parentibus educantibus filios in contemptum religionis et veri cultus . . .

25. Others, like Suarez, allowed an indirect forcing of baptism. Cf. Suarez, *De Fide, Spe, Caritate*, Disp. 18, sect. IV, n. 2, I, 1130: Principes Christiani possunt infideles sibi subditos cogere ad profitendum unius veri Dei cultum, adeoque ad relinquendos suos errores naturali rationi contrarios. However, he exempts the Jews from this.

26. For instance he goes into the hypothetical situation of what could be done lest the prophecy of St. Paul be frustrated regarding the conversion of the Jews on the last day. Lest they all be converted he would have a small group of them follow their law in a separate place.

27. *Opus Oxon.*, IV, d. 4, q. 9, n. 3, (XVI, 489b): Qui iam pridem ad christianitatem venire coacti sunt, sicut factum est temporibus religiosissimi principis Sisebuci . . . quia iam constat eos sacramentis divinis associatos et baptismi gratiam suscepisse . . . tenere cogantur . . . These are the words of the Council, can. 55, dist. 45.

28. *Opus Oxon.*, IV, d. 4, q. 4, n. 3, (XVI, 419): De adulto utente ratione, distinguo de eo quod ponitur in quaestione, 'non consentiens,' quod potest intelligi contrarie vel negative. Negative tantum negat actualem consensum; contrarie vero ponit

I grant that the custom of the Church is a good one, namely that it baptizes no adult unless he can answer for himself; and this custom is praiseworthy and reasonable so that only those who are willing will be ascribed to the family of Christ.<sup>29</sup>

Whatever the difficulty in reconciling these texts, it may be possible that in some he is merely trying to justify the decrees of the Council of Toledo, for he quotes it as his main authority and refers to it here and there throughout the text. Or, he may be trying to justify the practices of kings both before and after him, and thus giving perhaps too much to the temporal ruler in his zeal for the faith. Like other medievalists he is apparently not able to see how a person can be subjected to Christian teaching and environment and still not accept it.

4. *Promotion of a Just Trade.* It is also the duty of a ruler to promote a just trade. This includes the duty of what today is called social legislation. In particular, if his country is poor, he must foster trade and commerce with other countries. He must even bring in merchants who will import what is necessary and in the meantime, subsidize them and their families:

Thus a good legislator in a needy country, would have to hire such merchants for a good price. These would bring in the necessary material and preserve it. He would not only have to support them and their families, but also hire their industry, skill, and risks.<sup>30</sup>

But within the country itself, two things must above all regulate trade and a good ruler must see to it that these two conditions are observed, since both refer to the public good. First of all, such trade must not in any way be harmful to the State: on the contrary it must redound to the public good. Secondly, the one engaging in trade must receive a price corresponding to his diligence, prudence, solicitude, and risks. This follows from the fact that everyone helping the State by his honest work must live by his own labor:

Besides what has been said about what is just and unjust in these things, I add two things: first of all, that such trade must be useful to the State. Secondly, that such a one receive a price corresponding to his diligence, prudence, solicitude, and risks.....The second follows because each one serving the fatherland in honest work, must live by his work. But such a one bringing in goods or conserving them honestly and usefully, serves the fatherland; therefore, he must live by his work.<sup>31</sup>

Thus he continues to give the rules that would regulate trade according to justice. It is only in passing that he mentions the duties of the ruler (whom he now calls a *legislator*). If the legislator would have

actualem dissensum . . . Si ergo iste sit utroque modo dissentiens, dico quod non recipit sacramentum.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 421b.

30. *Opus Oxon.*, IV, d. 15, q. 2, n. 2, (XVIII, 318).

31. *Opus Oxon.*, IV, d. 15, q. 2, n. 22, (XVIII, 317).

a duty of bringing in such tradesmen and paying them according to their labor and the dangers entailed in their business together with what they needed for their families, the tradesmen themselves, could charge a price in accordance with these norms. Hence, Scotus, like a good medievalist, is quite perturbed in treating of those who:

hinder the immediate exchange of those things which are desired commercially or economically, and in this way bring it about that these things are sold more dearly to the buyer than they should be, and cheaper to the seller, and thus they harm both parties.....<sup>32</sup>

Such men, he thinks, ought to be expelled from the country. He calls them by their French name *regratiers*, a word appearing suddenly amidst the steady stream of Latin. He apparently wants his readers (or listeners, since these lectures were given to many students of different nationalities) to understand whom he is pointing out.

Also basing his arguments on the primacy of spiritual goods over physical and material goods, he censures emphatically those rulers who punish more the sins committed against themselves than those against God, and attend more to temporal gain than to the honor of God.<sup>33</sup>

**5. Morality of Slavery.** What about the institution of slavery? This was another knotty problem for the theologians of the Middle Ages. It has been said that slavery was considered in the Middle Ages as a necessity which had its origin in the fall of man, and that thus it was accepted by the theologians, and that no "medievalist late or early had any desire to deny that slavery was part of the human condition and required for the steady life of mankind."<sup>34</sup> And indeed, St. Thomas had said that slavery was introduced as a punishment for sin and that it was a useful institution. He apparently puts it on a par with private property which was introduced as an addition of human reason to the natural law.<sup>35</sup>

32. *Ibid.*, XVIII, 318b.

33. *Rep. Par.*, IV, d. 15, q. 4, n. 42. (XXIV, 249): Hoc igitur de facto juste potest statui et fieri sed quod factum et statutum est modo pro istis, scandalosum est in aliquibus partibus. in quibus Principes plus puniunt peccata in se commissa quam in Deum et magis attendant ad lucrum temporalem quam in honorem Deo. Cf. also *ibid.*, p. 247a: Pejores corruptores morum, quam qui corporum substantias diripiunt . . . igitur si in aliis bonis est restitutio facienda, magis hic . . .

34. Jarrett, *Social Theories of the Middle Ages* (Westminster: Newman Bookshop, 1942), p. 100.

35. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 94, a. 5: Quia scilicet distinctio possessionum et servitus non sunt inductae a naturae, sed per hominum rationem ad utilitatem humanae vitae. Et sic etiam in hoc lex naturae non est mutata nisi per additionem. *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 57, a. 3: Dicendum quod hunc hominem esse servum magis quam alium non habet rationem naturalem, sed solum secundum aliquam utilitatem consequentem, inquantum utile est huic ut regatur a sapientiore et illi quod ab hoc juvetur . . . et ideo servitus pertinens ad jus gentium est naturale secundo modo, licet non primo modo. *Ibid.*, Suppl. ad

Scotus is much more liberal on this point. He refuses to see anything of the natural law in this institution. "By the law of nature all are born free," he says, and "slavery was not brought about except through some positive law."<sup>36</sup> He makes it clear that he is speaking about slavery in its strict sense.<sup>37</sup> However, once it is inflicted by positive law, the slave must serve his master, according to the words of St. Paul: "Servi, subditi estote dominis."<sup>38</sup> But can it be justified in any way? Yes, he says, but only in two ways: first, if a man voluntarily submits himself to such servitude (which would be foolish), or if a just ruler of a community sees that some individuals are vicious, and that their liberty is harmful to the State, he could punish them with slavery, just as he could in certain cases inflict capital punishment on them for the good of the State.<sup>39</sup>

Neither does it appear just to enslave those captured in war, on the spurious plea that if you have a right to kill captives you are more merciful by only enslaving them. You have a right to kill in self-defense, which is not the case if you are invading a country.<sup>40</sup>

Therefore, we must reject completely "that cursed servitude . . . by which a slave is as a beast, because no matter in what way he be a slave, he is still a man and thus with free will."<sup>41</sup>

Finally, although the medieval law said that the slave could not take a husband of her own will,<sup>42</sup> Scotus insists that the slave can contract a marriage whether the master gives consent or not. And if the master would prevent the two from living together, or send the husband to distant parts that he might not visit his wife, the master would sin mortally and in manifest cases, should be punished by the Church.<sup>43</sup> In another place he remarks:

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36. *Opus Oxon.*, IV, d. 36, q. 1, n. 2, (XIX, 446a).

37. *Ibid.*: Ista autem servitus, de qua loquimur, secundum quam dominus potest vendere servum sicut pecudem . . .

38. *Rep. Par.*, IV, d. 36, q. 2, n. 5, (XXIV, 460).

39. *Ibid.*: Sed an justa? . . . Dico quod ista vilis servitus non potest esse juste inducta nisi dupliciter: uno modo quia aliquis voluntarie se subiecit tali servitutis, licet talis subiectio esset fatua, imo forte contra legem naturae, quod homo libertatem suam a se abdicet . . . Alio modo si aliquis juste dominans communitati, videntis aliquos vitiosos quod libertas eorum nocet eis et reipublicae, potest iuste punire eos poena servitutis, sicut et iuste posset eos occidere in certis casibus propter bonum republicae.

40. *Ibid.*, no. 3: Si dicas quod est tertia causa servitutis, utpote si captus in bello servetur et sic servatus a morte fiat servus deputatus ad serviendum, non appetat manifeste iustitia hic, quia forte etsi captor potuerit occidere captivum, si habuit bellum iuste defendendo se, non autem invadendo . . . inhumanum videtur infligere sibi poenam contra legem naturae. In another place he appears to justify slavery by war, but adds: "sed de hoc dubito" (*Ibid.*, n. 5).

41. *Ibid.*, no. 9, p. 453.

42. Jarrett, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

43. *Op. cit.*, nn. 7-8, p. 452: Potest etiam contrahere domino invito, pro quanto

Neither does anyone have to sell himself into servitude on account of having taken some temporal thing unjustly, for . . . liberty is the most precious and noble thing that is in the soul and thus in man.<sup>44</sup>

*6. The Purpose of Public Law.* A brief note on the purpose of public law is added in this connection, both because Scotus treats it from the standpoint of the ruler of the community, and because it has been asserted that he ignored this aspect of public law. In regard to the latter point, the unrevised status of his works must be remembered. Nevertheless, he mentions specifically his ideas on this. Most often he is concerned with public law in so far as it is meant to preserve the social peace. Yet in discussing the corrective and punitive functions of law in regard to the nature of the sacramental act of penance, he states the purpose of public law as it is found among men:

The purpose of human law, however, is not the legislator himself, nor his own good but the common good; therefore law and its observance is for this end.<sup>45</sup>

While the legislator must look out for the common good in what is just, he is not to be hindered from also legislating for minorities or other private rights. Thus, however, must always be in proportion to the common good:

In political matters the legislator is concerned with what is **simpliciter** just; this is the public good. **Secundum quid**, however, he is concerned with other private goods, but always in proportion to this common good, and therefore, in certain cases it is licit not to observe just laws when their observance would be detrimental to the public good, such as the good of the State.<sup>46</sup>

The peace-making function of law is usually mentioned in relation to some other aspect of law, rather than to that function as such. Thus, in relating civil laws to the new Christian law, he states that although Christ left us very few laws, these have been determined and amplified by those ruling a Christian people. The purpose of these laws is the social peace:

Christian princes . . . can make laws to preserve the peace, like the judges of old . . . and the subjects are bound to observe them as long as they do not violate the divine law . . . Thus therefore, although it seems that the burdens of the Christian law are lighter in so far as they have been handed down to us by

3am, q. 51, a. 1, ad 2um: Similiter etiam dico quod servitus est contra primam intentionem naturae, sed non est contra secundam . . . Sed ex quo aliquis peccat, natura eum inclinat ut ex peccato poenam reportet, et sic servitus in poenam peccati introductus est.

habet aliquid iuris in corpore suo . . . Et si dominus postea revocaret istam concessionem, utpote ipsum totaliter impediendo a copula carnali vel mittendo eum in partes longinquas . . . ita quod non posset aliquando visitare uxorem, peccaret mortaliter et in manifestis esse per ecclesiam corrigendum.

44. *Rep. Par.*, IV, d. 15, q. 4, n. 38, (XXIV, 246).

45. *Opus Oxon.*, IV, d. 14, q. 2, n. 7, (XVIII, 59b): Finis autem legis positae ab homine legem ferente, non est ipse legislator, vel bonum ejus, sed bonum commune; propter illud ergo finem est lex et observatio ejus.

46. *Ibid.*, IX, d. 16, q. 1, n. 11, (XX, 427a).

Christ, there are perhaps more in so far as more have been added by those who rule a Christian people.<sup>47</sup>

Again he talks about laws not only in so far as they are meant to promote peace and equity, but also in that they must be in accordance with right reason, the statutes of a Christian legislator or Emperor, and are confirmed by the authority of the Gospel and the Church:

Christ did not revoke them in so far as they were in accordance with reason and the just ruling of a Christian people and were justly instituted by a Prelate or Prince for the observance of a most well ordered peace and equity.<sup>48</sup>

With these words comes to a close this brief treatment on the ruler of the community according to Scotus. An outline would show that only a few ideas have been touched upon and hence we have by no means done justice to them. Yet, they give us an idea of the complexity of medieval social life. All this, and more has to be studied in order to understand adequately the various pronouncements made by Scotus on social and political matters. We first touched upon three virtues mentioned by Scotus as specifically pertaining to the ruler of a community: prudence, justice, and *praesidentia*. Representative duties of the ruler were studied such as his duty toward religion, toward just trading, and in connection with slavery. Finally, we tried to clear up a difficulty concerning Scotus' idea of the purpose of public law in relation to the ruler of the community.

## *II. The Family*

The ideal type of family is that which would have existed before the fall of man. From the family as it would have existed in the state of innocence, Scotus derives certain fundamental notions such as the origin of the family, its structure, and its relations to society and the state. He does not himself draw out all of these implications, but they are almost self-evident from the text. Furthermore, he often makes explicit reference to the family as a unit, sometimes in relation to the origin of property, sometimes to the computation of profits, wages, the sacrament of matrimony, etc. The three fundamental ideas of the origin, structure, and support of the family have been chosen here for examination.

1. *Origin.* In the preceding pages, Scotus had divided up all authority into paternal and political. The first authority is that of the head of the family, and this is received from the law of nature itself. Men were first gathered into families before the State came into being.

47. *Ibid.*, III, d. 40, q. 1, n. 6, (XV, 1086).

48. *Rep. Par.*, IV, d. 15, q. 4, n. 41: *Observare ea, non quia illius legis (Judeo-*

Man's urge to family life is therefore primary and antecedent to his creation of political society. The family authority, in fact, is so basic to the natural law, that it existed before the fall and continued after it; nor was it revoked by the Mosaic or Evangelical legislation; on the contrary, it was confirmed:

The first, that is, the paternal authority is justified by the law of nature, by which all children are held to obey their parents; nor was it revoked by any Mosaic or Evangelical law; on the contrary, it was confirmed.<sup>49</sup>

He singles out for approval the dictum of Aristotle that "homo naturaliter est animal conjugale et domesticum."<sup>50</sup>

He used this same idea in his arguments against free love. Such promiscuity would be against the *bonum familiae* which consists in a certain firm cohesion between the principal parts of the family. These members are bound together by the natural ties of marriage and the home.<sup>51</sup>

A well-ordered family also contributes greatly toward friendship between the citizens of a city. This is so because such friendship arises from a certain degree of determined relationship with each other. But without a stable family such as would be the case in promiscuous mating, there would be no such relationship as a basis for friendship between the members of a community. This would be against right reason.<sup>52</sup>

In the same connection he rejects such communism as had been advocated by Plato. Therefore the polity of Aristotle is to be preferred. Communism of property he had already rejected in another context, on the grounds that in the present state of man there is need of private property. Communism in regard to this would be impracticable. Thus, while private property came only after the fall and in the ideal state of innocence there would have been a community of possessions (a

orum) sed quia consona rectae rationi, et statuta a Legislatore Christiano Rege, vel Imperatore confirmata auctoritate Evangelii et Ecclesiae, non esset judaizare . . . Ibid., n. 43: Christus non removit ea inquantum essent juste a Praelato, vel Principe ad pacem, vel aequitatem ordinatissimam observandam.

49. *Opus Oxon.*, IV, d. 15, q. 2, n. 5, (XVIII, 266a).

50. *Opus Oxon.*, IV, d. 26, q. 1, n. 5, (XIX, 149).

51. *Ibid.*: Vaga conjunctio est contra bonum prolis . . . contra bonum familiae, et contra bonum civitatis . . . Primum probatur quia proles non religiosae educaretur . . . Secundum probatur quia bonum familiae consistit in aliqua firma adhaesione principalium personarum familiae; alias esset bonum vagum; et propter hoc dicit Philosophus 8, *Ethic.*, quod homo naturaliter est animal conjugale et domesticum.

52. *Ibid.*: Amicitia civium ut plurimum est ex determinata propinquitate in certo gradu. Sed ibi nulla esset propinquitas nova certa, quae esset causa amicitiae. Ideo propter ista recte reprehendit Aristoteles politiam Socratis 3, *Pol.*, quia pro statu naturae lapsae multo melior est illa quam ipse ordinat; et pro omni statu fuisse contra rectam rationem vaga coniunctio maris cum femina.

common opinion among the Scholastics), in the present state it is better to distinguish as Aristotle did, between polities, families, and possessions. Thus private property and the family are connected.<sup>53</sup>

Indeed, this family unity and authority would be so strong in the state of innocence, that, as was noted before, certain Scotists such as John Poncius and Montefortino interpreted Scotus to say that apart from patriarchal organization, there would have been no need for any authority beyond that of the family. In the state of innocence, man would have been endowed (as he was before the fall) with the supernatural gifts enlightening his intellect and giving him control over all his faculties through the gift of integrity. Hence, there would not have been any need of another directing or compelling power to bring about order. There would have been no sadness, but only interior and exterior peace. Charity would reign between the members. On the one hand there would be the authority of parents and patriarchs (John Poncius mentions *avi, proavi, respectu descendantium*) and on the other there would be a perfect and peaceful society in which charity was supreme. There would have been such a docility toward God that there would have been no need of political jurisdiction to compel the following of the right order.<sup>54</sup>

Since this interpretation of Scotus was not followed, and since he himself did not go into this question, this opinion of John Poncius is mentioned only to complete the picture of the family as held by some Scotists.

**2. Structure.** The structure of the family is derived from the evident plan of nature as it would have existed in the state of innocence. The father is the head and the mother is subordinate to him in authority and function. This is inherent in the patriarchal system. Scotus mentions specifically only the equality that reigns between man and woman as regards the fundamental things of life and the difference of function and office in regard to ecclesiastical duties.<sup>55</sup> Montefortino explains how subordination is in no way against the dignity of any man since it would have existed in the ideal state. It is inherent in the very idea

53. *Rep. Par.*, IV, d. 15, q. 4, n. 8, (XXIV, 234): Et secundum hoc, melior est opinio Aristotelis, qui politias et familias distinguit, quam Socratis qui voluit omnia esse communia, quia utilius est distingue domina in statu illo quem Philosophus invenit in mundo, quam esse penitus indistincta.

54. *Commentarius*, nn. 25-27, (XVIII, 267-268). Montefortino, op. cit., III, 872-873.

55. *Rep. Par.*, IV, d. 25, q. 2, n. 9, (XXIV, 371): Quantum ad salutem et vitam aeternam habetur quod non sit differentia inter masculum et feminam, servum et liberum; est tamen differentia inter eos quantum ad officium et gradum eminentem in Ecclesia possidendum . . .

of order and beauty, he says, to have differences. This can be seen from the simple fact that even in the state of innocence, some would have been placed over others.<sup>56</sup> This same idea was brought out in the discussion about order in society. Scotus quoted Augustine concerning the idea that inequality of some sort is inherent in the concept of order. Thus "the unity and equality of human nature in all its individuals in any state, demands disparity."<sup>57</sup> God placed Adam over Eve and made him responsible for the transmission of original sin. But in the state of innocence the subordination of wife to husband would have been orderly and happily integrated with her function in society. While all were equal in these important things, still, the primeval state was most orderly, upright and beautiful, and therefore, there could have been nothing inordinate about it. Just as the most wise Creator arranged a certain order for the propagation of the human race, so in other things, He left differences among men.<sup>58</sup>

3. *Support.* Scotus alludes to the family once more in the same *quaestio*. The text has already been examined in regard to what regulates the price of man's labor. Suffice it is to note that, according to Scotus, the price of a thing is not something arbitrarily to be fixed by the legislator alone or by custom, as some of the other Scholastics held. Those who compute it, must base it on the value of man's labor which includes the support of his family:

Each one engaged in honest work serving his country, (*respublica*) ought to live from his labor . . . Not only this, but he can justly sell his industry and solicitude; the industry required from one transporting goods from one country to another, is great when one considers those things that a country either abounds in or needs. Therefore, he can justly receive beyond what is necessary for the support of himself and his family.<sup>59</sup>

The same idea is repeated later on when he mentions the duties of a ruler, who, if such merchants were lacking, would have to bring in such persons and find them and their families the necessary sustenance.<sup>60</sup>

The references to the family in these passages are made casually and in passing. Yet there was no particular problem about the family in his day, for it was the Christian family that flourished, and everywhere Christian principles were taken for granted.

56. Montefortino, *op. cit.*, III, 873:

57. *Ibid.*, III, 872.

58. *Ibid.*

59. *Opus Oxon.*, IV, d. 15, q. 2, n. 2, (XVIII, 317).

60. *Ibid.*, p. 318.

### *III. The World Community.*

The modern man looks wistfully back to that spirit of universalism which dominated the thinking of the Middle Ages. Our modern world, broken into warring nations, presents a sad departure from the spirit of a former Christian culture. Under that culture there was a single universal society. Temporal and spiritual orders were integrated into a Christian order. Although bitter disputes were to arise as time went on between Pope and King, it was not the idea of the *orbis Christianus* that was being attacked. It was really a struggle as to who would rule that *orbis Christianus*. "In this struggle, it was never denied that the Church universal was the real community."<sup>61</sup> Church and State formed *one* society, but this society had two governments. To be a Christian and to be a citizen were the same thing in the minds of all. The teachings of the Church were not always lived up to, but the Church was the living embodiment of a united world. In the village as in the Christian world, the Church was the center of individual and communal life. And thus one arrives at the idea of the world state based on the moral consciousness and common purpose of mankind.

It is also this idea that runs through Scotus. Again it is the idea of *communitas* that he uses. He had used that term for the small village or city; the same for the larger political community or state. Now he is speaking about the entire Christian *communitas* in the world.

1. *Ordo*. Order in society is explained by Scotus according to the mind of Aristotle and St. Augustine. It is that of an ascending order or hierarchy, the members receiving their place with relation to the first in that order. In these statements, however, he is speaking primarily of the spiritual community which is the Church. He gives the example of the relation which members of an army have to their leader. Thus in the Church there is only one order of all and they are related to their Head which is Christ.<sup>62</sup> "And thus," he says, "the entire *community* of the faithful can be said to be ordered in that way to Christ in the Church."<sup>63</sup> Further on, he speaks of the same idea again in

61. H. Rommen, *The State in Catholic Thought* (St. Louis: Herder Book Co., 1945), p. 460.

62. *Rep. Par.*, IV, d. 24, q. 1, n. 5, (XXIV, 351): Quo etiam modo loquitur Philosophus 12, *Metaph.* text. 5, de ordine, quod dicit bonum universum consistere in 'habitudine et ordine ad primum' cui partes universi magis et minus appropinquantes magis et minus sunt perfectae, quia omnes ordine essentiali dependent ad eum sicut exercitus ad ducem, et illo modo in Ecclesia non est nisi tantum unus ordo omnium, qui sunt in Ecclesia ut membra ad Christum qui est caput nostrum secundum Apostolum.

63. *Ibid.*: Et ideo tota *communitas* fidelium potest dici ordinari illo modo ad Christum in Ecclesia.

terms of the *universitas fidelium* and the *congregatio fidelium*.

What determines the place of the members in this order? It is the degree of the excellence of their function. Some activities will always be of greater excellence and nobility than others, for in no polity are the acts of all common. Two kinds of orders must be distinguished. The first is that by which all members are related to their Head. The second is that which pertains to the more eminent places in the hierarchy of the Church. In this latter order will be those that can administer the sacraments by which those of the first order are united with their Head. For the entire community of the faithful in so far as they are members of one body, the Church, are united to its Head, Christ, and this by the ministry of those highest in that Church.<sup>64</sup> The same holds for all communities, for in no polity are there actions that are common to all in value; this would merely lead to confusion. Hence, in all communities some will be able to perform acts that are more excellent than those of others.<sup>65</sup>

2. *The Mystical Body.* The structure and unity of order are explained more satisfactorily in terms of the Mystical Body. Thus Scotus explains that the unity of the Mystical Body of Christ and that which springs from the common good of the members, must be preserved according to the same law of nature that obliges the priest to keep the sacramental secret. It is the unity of order in both of these which is sacred. Thus, a community has the proportions of a living body since in both there is a hierarchy of order. The higher must administer to the lower, and the latter must submit to the higher, according to St. Paul's teaching on the Mystical Body. Scotus uses the words: "According to what St. Paul has told us in the parable of the mystical and *natural* body in different places."<sup>66</sup> The same holds in civil life, for the lower order is made up of those who are less capable and of less knowledge.<sup>67</sup>

64. *Ibid.*: Secundus qui est gradus eminentis ordinatus ad actum aliquem nobilem et excellentem, qui non potest competere aliis . . . Actus excellentes in Ecclesia sunt actus sacramentales ministrandi sacramenta Ecclesiae, per quos inferiores in Ecclesia junguntur cum supremo, nam fideles universitatis per susceptionem sacramentorum Ecclesiae conjunguntur ut membra unius corporis Ecclesiae capiti suo Christo, et hoc mediante ministerio supremorum in Ecclesia, quia illis regulariter, et non aliis, committitur potestas exequendi illos actus excellentes . . .

65. *Ibid.*: In nulla Politia sunt omnes actus communes, ita quod omnes actus convenient omnibus in communi, quia tunc esset magis confusio quam ordo; sed sunt aliqui actus excellentes, alii communes et mediocres.

66. *Opus Oxon.*, IV, d. 21, q. 2, n. 7, (XVIII, 736): In hoc communitas aliquam habet unitatem corporis unitati proportionatam, quia ibi est ordo Superioris et inferioris; et tenetur Superior influere in inferiorem, et inferior subministrare superiori, juxta illam parabolam Pauli de corpore mystico et naturali in diversis locis.

67. *Ibid.*: In civilitate inferior est minus sufficiens, et minus sciens.

But since it is the duty of the Superior in the Church to counsel and reconcile, therefore it is of the law of nature that no one be barred from recourse to the Superior, for this is the common good of the members to each other.<sup>68</sup>

But the revelation of the secret would exclude this right of recourse, since no one would have recourse if it were violated:

Therefore, from the same law of nature that each one is bound to preserve the unity of the Mystical Body of Christ and for the common good of the others as members of one body, the secret must be kept.<sup>69</sup>

Thus the idea of *communitas* has now been applied to the Mystical Body of Christ. The precious unity and cohesiveness of this Body is so taken for granted that he uses it to prove the sacredness of the sacramental secret. The analogy of the community as an organism is clearly not meant to be complete in every sense, but only in so far as it shows the hierarchy and unity of parts.

3. *The Kingship of Christ.* There is yet needed one more idea to complete the notion of world unity according to Scotus, not indeed because he himself applied it to social life, but because of its very nature it includes it. We refer to his well-known doctrine on the absolute primacy and kingship of Christ.<sup>70</sup> The same Scotus that stood up in the famous public disputation at Paris in 1307 and pitted his keen theological reasoning against the weight of all the doctors from St. Bernard to St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure in defence of the Immaculate Conception, also held a doctrine about Christ which exalted Him most highly as the masterpiece and final cause of all creation. The social implications of this teaching have already been ably drawn out by Pius XI in his encyclical *Quas Primas*.<sup>71</sup> As is evident today, nothing less than a complete subjection of all men to Christ the King, individually as well as socially, will bring about unity and peace. For this Kingship no deeper foundation has been laid than that theologically reasoned out by the Subtle Doctor. Christ is the first and foremost in the decrees of God; in a very real way, the entire world is His Kingdom. In Scotus, as in all Franciscan thinking, this underlies all thought. And thus in a very special way a very deep foundation for a true social order has been laid.

68. *Ibid.*

69. *Ibid.*

70. Cf. Leonardo Bello, O.F.M., Min. Gen., "Litterae Encyclicae de Universalis Christi Primatu atque Regalitate," *Acta Ordinis Fratrum Minorum*, LII (November-December, 1933), 292-311.

71. Pope Pius XI, *Quas Primas*, in *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* XVII (1925), 593-610.

*IV. Conclusions*

In part II of this study we have seen how Duns Scotus has studied the various communities against the social and political background of his day. He requires of the ruler of the community, prudence and authority. In his idea of prudence which is distinctly Scotistic, he is influenced by his doctrine on the close connection between intellect and will. He allows the intellect not only to select means, but also to determine and recommend to the will proximate ends. He also develops his idea of a new virtue, that of *praesidentia*, a species of political justice. Finally, to the virtue of justice demanded of a ruler is assigned the beatitude of peacemakers.

It is also the duty of the ruler to protect and promote the true religion. The various applications which are made in the text are to be understood against the background of the times, although it was pointed out that certain ideas still remain unclear about the position taken by Scotus. Also selected for discussion were the duties of the ruler to promote a just trade in his community. A note was added on the subject of slavery to show the liberal ideas that Scotus had on this topic when compared with some of his Scholastic contemporaries.

The purpose of public law was explicitly stated to be the common good. He develops the idea that laws are to be made by the ruler, not only in so far as they are meant to promote peace and equity, but also in that they must be in accordance with right reason.

The family was treated briefly from the viewpoint of its origin, structure, and support. Its origin was found to be in nature itself and man's urge to form families prior to that which leads him to form political communities. Paternal authority was distinguished from political in that the former is from the law of nature itself, whereas the latter is from the people, although in accordance with the natural law. Finally, the support of the family, in the teaching of Scotus, must be taken into account when determining the worth of a man's labor.

His idea of the world community was treated from the standpoint of its structure, unity, and universality. In regard to the first two of these points, he dealt primarily with the world community of the faithful. All are related in some way to their Head who is Christ; their status in this structure is determined by the degree of excellence of their function. This principle he applies to all communities. The unity of these communities, and of the world community in particular, is as

strong and sacred as that of the Mystical Body of Christ itself. All this, of course, is based on the unity of faith. Finally, through his special teaching on the absolute primacy and kingship of Christ, Scotus lays down a foundation for the true universality of this world community. At the same time, this doctrine goes beyond any other in providing a firm basis for the whole social order.

(Conclusion)

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## THE ILLATIVE SENSE (Continued)

### TRUTH AND CERTITUDE

#### 1. *Introduction.*

1. *Truth and its Test.* Logical truth (*veritas logica*) is the conformity between our knowledge and its objects, between our judgments and objectivity. We have already observed that Newman does not hold any other notion about logical truth<sup>1</sup> *Truth is the proper object of the intellect.*<sup>2</sup>

*Truth need not be universal, but it must be certain of necessity, and certainty, in order to be certainty, must endure.*<sup>3</sup>

*Truth is the object of knowledge of whatever kind; and when we inquire what is meant by truth, I suppose it is right to answer that truth means facts and their relations . . . Knowledge is the apprehension of these facts.*<sup>4</sup>

*Truth is the real object of our reason.*<sup>5</sup>

*That . . . one doctrine is as good as another; that the Governor of the world does not intend that we should gain truth; that there is no truth; . . . this is the principle of heresies.*<sup>6</sup>

We are certain that our judgments refer to things which are distinct from these judgments; but how are we certain? How are we able to distinguish truth from falsehood? Not by argument, says Newman,

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The writings of John Henry Cardinal Newman referred to in the following footnotes are those found in the standard edition of his works by Longmans, Green and Co., London, viz., *Fifteen Sermons Preached before the University of Oxford* (1871) (= *Univ. Serm.*); *The Idea of a University* (1912) (= *Idea*); *Loss and Gain, The Story of a Convert* (1903) (= *Loss*); *Callista. A Tale of the Third Century* (1890) (= *Call.*); *Discussions and Arguments on Various Subjects* (1891) (= *Disc. and Arg.*); *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent* (1891) (= *Gramm.*); *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine* (1890) (= *Ess. on Dev.*); *Apologia pro Vita Sua* (1890) (= *Apol.*); Wilfrid Ward, *The Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman*, vols. I and II (New impression; London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1913) is quoted as Ward, *Life*. The present periodical is referred to as *Franc. Stud.*

1. Dr. Zeno, "Newman's Psychological Discovery, The Illative Sense," *Franciscan Studies*, X (1950), 232ff., 235ff., 236ff.

2. J. H. Newman, *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent*, (Standard edition; Longmans, Green and Co., London), p. 172.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 242.

4. J. H. Newman, *The Idea of a University*, (Standard edition; Longmans, Green and Co., London), p. 45.

5. J. H. Newman, *Apologia pro Vita Sua*, (Standard edition; Longmans, Green and Co., London), p. 243.

6. J. H. Newman, *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, (Standard edition; Longmans, Green and Co., London), pp. 357-358.

not by strict demonstration, but by reflection or by the analysis of our acts of thinking.<sup>7</sup>

We have already proved that Newman is not a phenomenalist.<sup>8</sup> He was convinced that we are necessarily driven into scepticism if we limit our knowledge to phenomena.<sup>9</sup>

Nor do Newman's doctrines run counter to the maxim of the Scholastics that the "evidentia" is the last criterion of truth when in his *Grammar* he informs us that the ultimate test to distinguish truth from falsehood is the healthy operation of the illative sense. He most certainly holds that the light which radiates from things determines our mind, or in other words the "evidentia" of things is the cause of a judgment that is logically true.

Locke and his school required hard and fast syllogisms to obtain truth and certitude and ruled that those syllogisms should be as strong and irresistible as mathematical proofs. Newman wanted to explode this doctrine and to show that it was not the syllogism, however strong and irrefragable, which ultimately determined what was true and what was not, but the mind itself, which by means of its illative sense, is able to discover the "evidentia" of a conclusion. In seeing the truth of a conclusion, the illative sense at the same time sees that our minds naturally and essentially view things as they are. When something is obvious and clear, not so much on the strength of the syllogisms that lead to it but more by means of the illative sense, our minds grasp in the same act, although implicitly, how right it is to take this road to certitude. Hence he calls the illative sense the ultimate criterion of truth. If we consider the matter well, Newman looks at a thing from the point of view of the subject or the onlooker, viz., himself, whereas Thomism looks at a thing from the point of view of the object, or the thing itself. Newman is certain because his mind receives the rays of light emitted by the object, and Thomas is certain because the object irradiates its light to the mind. Newman as a psychologist sees the subjective aspect, Thomas the metaphysician sees the objective aspect. Thomas calls the perspicuity or intelligibility of the thing, revealed to the mind, the ultimate test of truth (*perspicuitas veritatis, intelligibilitas veritatis, menti manifestata*), Newman calls the mind seeing the perspicuity of truth the ultimate test. There is no contradiction between them.

Now we may understand exactly what Newman means when he says: "There is no ultimate test of truth besides the testimony born to truth

7. *Franc. Stud.*, X (1950), 232ff.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 236ff.

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 239-240.

by the mind itself.”<sup>10</sup> And again “in no class of concrete reasoning . . . is there any ultimate test of truth and error . . . besides the trustworthiness of the Illative Sense.”<sup>11</sup> And lastly: “is there any *criterion* of the accuracy of an inference such as may be our warrant that certitude is rightly elicited . . .?” “I have already said that the sole and final judgment on the validity of an inference in concrete matter is committed to the personal action of the ratiocinative faculty, the perfection or virtue of which I have called the Illative Sense.”<sup>12</sup>

## 2. Newman's Preliminary on Certitude and Certainty.

Before Newman begins his elucidations on certitude and certainty, he draws up an original introduction to his subject which occupies a considerable part of his *Grammar of Assent*. A schematic treatment of these preliminary chapters will be useful, if indeed not necessary, for a good understanding of the matter in hand.

He commences his book with the description of what propositions look like, and deals widely with their outward shape, or, in other words, with the “modes of holding propositions.” Then he goes on to speak about the ways in which our minds apprehend or grasp the propositions, in other words about “the modes of apprehending propositions.” In all this he makes abstraction from the objectivity of the judgments which these propositions express.

This grasping of a proposition is called apprehension. Considering the matter psychologically, he draws a distinction between two kinds of apprehension, viz., the apprehension of something abstract, i. e., the notional apprehension, in which the thing is apprehended or grasped as a purely mental notion, a mere creation of the mind, not as a living reality, not as something experienced—and on the other hand, the real apprehension or concrete apprehension, in which the matter is looked upon as something concrete, full of life, as an object of experience.

Whereas apprehension is an intelligent acceptance of a judgment, assent is the acceptance of its objectivity, the unconditional agreement to its truth; in other words, it is the acknowledgment of the contents of the proposition as true, which acknowledgment excludes every kind of conditionality. We should not lose sight of Newman's meaning: When I assent, I do not say: It is so if only this or that be certain, but assent unconditionally implies: So it is, and that is the end of it. Whenever we accept the truth of a judgment on the strength of a con-

10. *Gramm.*, p. 350.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 359.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 345.

dition, or dependently on something else, Newman speaks of an inference. Every conclusion, therefore, accepted on account of the premisses, is an inference.

Where apprehension may be either real or notional, assent also may be either real or notional. The distinction between real and notional assent is to be found in the apprehension. Assent will be real when the apprehension of the proposition is real, it will be notional when the apprehension of the proposition is notional.

In a few words, this is the framework of the first part of the book. These pages will be unintelligible if we should forget that they are meant as an introduction. For Newman wants to speak about certitude and certainty.

After having dealt with both notions, viz., notional and real apprehension and assent, and after having written a chapter of instances, taken from our religious beliefs, he goes on and considers assent under another aspect, viz., as simple or complex. Simple assent to a truth is assent without reflection, complex assent implies reflection.

Reflex or confirmatory assent is always notional or abstract.<sup>13</sup> Whenever the apprehension of a proposition, accepted with simple assent, is notional, and we go on to reflect upon it, then the combination of the simple and reflex assent forms the notional complex assent. But complex assent may also be real, viz., when the apprehension of the proposition is real. As reflection itself, however, is always notional or purely intellectual, this abstractness may diminish or even discard the reality of the proposition and its operating force.

Now, although all assent, both real and notional, both simple and complex, is popularly called certitude, Newman prefers to reserve that name for complex assent.<sup>14</sup> In every day life and even in ordinary religious teaching, that state of the mind is called certitude to which Newman has given the name of assent. He observes, however, that the course of his investigation has nevertheless led him to another use of the words.

So according to Newman, certitude is the unconditional assent to a proposition after reflection; in other words, certitude combines simple assent and the unconditionally accepted result of an inference.

Now, inference may be formal, i. e., we may argue about our simple assents by means of syllogisms and in this way conclude their truth; but generally we lose sight of formal syllogisms, and reason in an informal natural way by means of our illative sense. This faculty reflects

13. *Gramm.*, p. 214.

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 210, 195-196.

on our simple assents, especially when they are real, and takes us to complex assent or certitude. Certitude, therefore, arises from simple assent—which itself was originated by the illative sense,<sup>15</sup>—and from reflection, which is always based upon a function of the illative sense, even if conducted by means of syllogisms.<sup>16</sup>

After this general survey we are able to develop *in extenso* Newman's doctrine about assent, inference, certitude and certainty.

## II. Assent.

1. *What is Assent?* In several chapters of the *Grammar* Newman gives a definition of assent. Assent is “the absolute acceptance of a proposition without any condition.”<sup>17</sup> “To assent is to acquiesce in a proposition as true.”<sup>18</sup> Assent is “an absolute adhesion of the mind to a proposition.”<sup>19</sup>

So, according to Newman's terminology, assent is the acceptance of a judgment as true, without any reference to premisses or previous arguments. Argument may intervene for the judgment; reasoning may have taken place; the premisses may have been in one's mind before, but assent makes abstraction from them and we consider it for its own sake and in its intrinsic sense.<sup>20</sup>

Assent does not so often occur as we should think. We often seem to give assent to a proposition, and say so—whereas there is no assent at all. This so-called assent is nothing but an assertion. How easily we declare this or that to be certain and maintain that we hold this or that for a truth although we do not even sufficiently comprehend what the terms of the proposition stand for. We just pretend assent, whereas we but repeat what is said by others who have a right to be certain and by whose authority we feel impressed.<sup>21</sup> For assent in its full sense we want the apprehension of at least one of the terms of the proposition.<sup>22</sup>

It is a remarkable fact that our assents are generally accompanied by a real apprehension; in other words, when we are convinced of the truth of a proposition and possess certitude in the popular sense of the word, at least one of the terms of the proposition is a living reality, an experience, and not a mere abstract notion.<sup>23</sup>

15. See, e.g., *Gramm.* p. 216 about instincts.

16. *Gramm.*, pp. 344-345.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 13, 43.

22. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14. On pp. 43-45 Newman classifies this repetition of the words of others among the notional assents, although hesitatingly.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

## 2. *The Different Kinds of Assent.*

*A. Real and Notional Assent.* We have already drawn attention to the fact that Newman makes a distinction between real and notional assent.<sup>24</sup> Concerning this, it is important to remind the reader of what has already been said about Newman's distinction between things and notions, the real and the notional, images and notions.<sup>25</sup> By things he means the particular and the individual, or what has been experienced; by notions he means a mere thought, something abstract which is no experience, or rather the concrete as opposite to the abstract. He applies this duality to apprehension and assent; he enlarges extensively on the relation to inference and certitude; and from all this he draws his conclusions in connection with the illative sense.

We wish to explain more fully his distinction between real assent and notional assent, or concrete assent and abstract assent, and in this we should like to follow Newman's method by giving such instances of real and notional assent as occur most frequently.

*a. Notional Assent.* Newman calls notional assent, given by many people to the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, a cold, ineffective and indeed unconditional acceptance of the proposition. He calls it "the elaborate, subtle, triumphant exhibition of a truth, completely developed, and happily adjusted, and accurately balanced on its centre, and impregnable on every side, as a scientific view." But this assent does not kindle the imagination nor inflame the hearts nor affect the conduct.<sup>26</sup> In another passage he describes notional assent as the "dreamy acquiescence in an abstract truth."<sup>27</sup> In the chapter on notional assents<sup>28</sup> he classifies them under five heads. 1. "There are assents so feeble and superficial as to be little more than assertions." Those assents are all put together by Newman under the heading of *profession*. Very often we unreservedly accept propositions without reflection although we do not grasp the meaning of the words nor have any experience of the contents. We are apt to adopt "the literary or other fashions of the day, admiring the poems, or the novel, or the music, or the personages, or the costumes, or the wines, or the manners, which happen to be popular, or are patronized in the higher circles." In the same way a disciple may unconditionally assent to the teachings of his master; but to all intents and purposes he does but assert, even though he knows the arguments by heart like a schoolboy his Euclid.

24. See this article, I. p. 2.

25. *Franc. Stud.*, X (1950), p. 217ff.

26. *Gramm.*, p. 126.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 78.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 42-74.

"It is thus that political and religious watchwords are created; first, one man of name then another adopts them, till their use becomes popular, and then every one professes them, because every one else does." If they were to be received on authority, Newman would call it assenting to the authority of the one informing, but no profession. It is, however, no assent given to authority because these people disown this motive and claim themselves to judge of the worth of arguments which require some real knowledge which they have not. In this way facts and conditions are labelled as Jesuitism, Gallicanism, Ultramontanism. In this way many Protestants use the phrase "the Bible and nothing but the Bible;" so too do liberals speak of progress, light, civilization. In the mouths of conscientious thinkers all these terms have a definite meaning, but the mass of men uses them "as war-cries, nicknames, and shibboleths," with only so much apprehension of them as to call them assertions. This is profession: assenting to abstractions by simply repeating the sayings of others.<sup>29</sup>

2. A second series of notional assents is classified by Newman under the title of *credence*. Credence is the spontaneous, unconditional acceptance of propositions which are presented to us as common property by modern civilization. The number of these assents is very numerous and they comprise a great variety. He who has received a thorough intellectual education, especially he who has been trained in what is called liberal knowledge, possesses many notions about many subjects and assents to them without much examination. "From the time that we begin to observe, think, and reason, to the final failure of our powers, we are ever acquiring fresh and fresh informations by means of our senses, and still more from others and from books." These "informations," received with spontaneous assent, constitute "the furniture of the mind."

Credence is the means by which, in high and low, in the man of the world and in the recluse, our bare and barren nature is overrun and diversified from without with a rich and living clothing. It is by such ungrudging, prompt assents to what is offered to us lavishly, that we become possessed of the principles, doctrines, sentiments, facts, which constitute useful, and especially liberal knowledge.

This knowledge is only superficial. It is "a gentleman's knowledge" as contrasted with that of a professional man and gives us sufficient information to talk sensibly on all subjects, literature, history, politics, philosophy and art, and to follow those who are really deep in them. But there is no full living, real apprehension of them, and for

29. *Ibid.*, pp. 42-45.

this reason our assents to such propositions can hardly be more than notional assents.<sup>30</sup>

This does not apply to secular knowledge only. Even in matters of religion many assents are but notional, says Newman, especially in England, where the Protestant religion is not a religion of persons and things, of acts of faith and direct devotion. Protestants do not like to speak of Our Lord, the Blessed Virgin, or the Holy Apostles as real beings. This is quite different with Catholic populations, as those of Spain or of medieval Europe. "To them the Supreme Being, Our Lord, the Blessed Virgin, Angels and Saints, heaven and hell are as present as if they were objects of sight." Here we meet with real assents, whereas with the mass of religious Englishmen only the doctrine of God's Providence is held with a real assent, and their other religious assents are but credence.<sup>31</sup>

3. We could have called these assents opinions but Newman reserves the name *opinion* for a third class of notional assent, viz., assent to the probability of a proposition, whereas credence assents to the truth of a proposition. Moreover, opinion is more or less reflex because by means of some reflection we have drawn the conclusion that the proposition itself cannot claim an unconditional assent, but has only much in its favor; and therefore we are convinced of its probability. Consequently, such an assent is always notional for we unreservedly affirm that the abstract predicate "probable" may be applied to a proposition of which we are not certain. Thus Protestants possess hardly more than opinions in religious matters and therefore speak of convictions: their highest opinion in religion does not proceed further than assent to a probability while they admit the possibility of the truth of the contradictory proposition.<sup>32</sup>

4. The following class of assents is given the name of presumptions. *Presumption* denotes assent to first principles. As we have already seen Newman calls first principle those "propositions with which we start in reasoning on any given subject-matter." They necessarily will be abstractions or notions because they are not living individual experiences or images but generalizations although built up from concrete facts.<sup>33</sup> Thus it is a first principle that there is an external world; this proposition goes beyond our experience.<sup>34</sup> If, however, we are led on to view those abstractions and general propositions in the light of our particular, concrete associations, our abstract notion changes

30. *Ibid.*, pp. 53-55.

31. *Ibid.*, pp. 55-57.

32. *Ibid.*, pp. 58-60.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 60.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 62.

into an image, a fact from experience, and then notional assent becomes real. A practical instance will be found in our assents to the dictates of conscience.<sup>35</sup>

5. The last class of notional assents comprises what Newman calls *speculation*,<sup>36</sup> i.e., the unconditional acceptance of general propositions. All notional assents which cannot be referred to one of the foregoing classes belong to this group: assents to conclusions, rules for conduct, proverbs, mathematical truths, legal judgments, constitutional maxims, inferences from science and doctrines of theology, etc.<sup>37</sup>

To have a good idea of Newman's meaning we should try to understand what Newman aims at when using the word *speculation*. He excludes any conversational signification and uses it as the opposite of experience. Every firm, conscious acceptance of a proposition as true, or in other words, all propositions to which we give our assent after intellectual apprehension but without experience belong to this class.

*Profession*, therefore, assents without reflection to prevailing opinions which are not thoroughly mastered; *credence* is assent to abstract propositions urged upon us by civilization and our cultured surroundings; *opinion* gives assent to the probability of propositions; *presumption* means assent to propositions which are the starting-point in our reasonings, without examination; *speculation* designates the most direct, explicit and perfect notional assent being the conscious and firm acceptance of a proposition as true.

b. *Real Assent*. By showing in a series of examples how notional assent is changed into real assent, Newman explains what real assent is.

There are people who have a special gift for a special department of science or for a special function in society. They know the rules and laws, connected with their science or their task, not only theoretically, but they enter into them. Hence they may dispense with them and even substitute other rules for them. They have what is called an eye for their work, an eye for trade matters, or for engineering or a special taste for literature. As they have the whole matter before them as if it were drawn out on a map, they at once form their views and give their decision when new questions are opened and arguments are offered on one side or the other. They have what Newman calls images of those things and know them and adhere to them with a real assent,

35. *Ibid.*, p. 65.

36. *Ibid.*, pp. 73, 244.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 73.

whereas when they still were boys at school, they were like all others and learned theories perhaps with little promise of proficiency. But contact with reality changed their notional assent into real and made them what they are.<sup>38</sup>

Another instance is the abolition of slavery. Every Englishman was theoretically convinced of the utter injustice and inhuman barbarism of this practice. But this conviction appeared to be assent to a theory only. "Probitas laudatur et alget." But as soon as an organized action had been started against this abuse, and numerous articles had been written and speeches made, the imagination of the English was affected and the notional assent became real; and not until then did the abstract principle begin to produce effects.<sup>39</sup>

Holy Scripture provides us with a third example. From our youth up we have heard the words of the Gospel. But they remain mere history and theories to which we give a notional assent until we feel disconsolate or tempted or perplexed and then reality appears in its passages so that our notional assent becomes real. Hence the practice of meditation on the Gospels to make us realize them.<sup>40</sup> In a very striking way this change is suggested to us in the confession of the Patriarch Job. He always had a true notion of the divine attributes. But when his trials fell upon him his apprehension of the Almighty changed altogether: "With the hearing of the ear," he says, "I have heard Thee, but now mine eye seeth Thee; therefore I reprehend myself, and do penance in dust and ashes."<sup>41</sup>

To these instances Newman adds three remarks in further illustration: 1. Strong real assents do not prove the truth of the proposition assented to, or in Newman's words: the fact of the distinctness of the images, which are required for real assent, is no warrant for the existence of the objects which those images represent. An image, with the characters of perfect veracity and faithfulness, may be ever so distinct and eloquent an object presented before the mind, nevertheless, it remains possible that there should be no external reality corresponding to it, in spite of its impressiveness. More is required.<sup>42</sup> Hence, for certitude Newman demands reflection and refuses to identify simple assent with certitude.<sup>43</sup> 2. A second remark to this effect: real assent does not lead to acts directly but only indirectly. The image impresses our affections and passions, and these carry us on to action. Unless our minds have been prepared and the image find an element in our

38. *Ibid.*, pp. 75-76.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 80.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 77.

42. *Ibid.*, pp. 80-82

40. *Ibid.*, p. 79.

43. See this article, I, p. 2.

minds which is congenial to it, real assent will not be of a practical nature.<sup>44</sup> 3. Lastly, real assent is of a personal character, i.e., every individual has his own real assents and is known by them, which does not apply to notional assents. This is a matter of course, because what is real and concrete is individual, what is notional and abstract is universal or general. Real assents are bound up with personal experiences and personal images. Consequently we all feel the difficulty in arguing with somebody else.<sup>45</sup> Even when our images are the same, real assent remains individual. Many people assent with a real assent to the being of God. But with different individuals, different experiences and different disposing causes, variously combined, have caused this assent. These experiences and causes may be:

a warm or strong imagination, great sensibility, compunction and horror at sin, frequenting Mass and other rites of the Church, meditating on the contents of the Gospels, familiarity with hymns and religious poems, dwelling on the Evidences, parental example and instruction, religious friends, strange providences, powerful preaching.

But in each case the result will be different, the image in the mind and the experiences will be personal, which would not be the case if the assent were merely notional and abstract.<sup>46</sup>

We should like to quote here the panegyric Newman made on real assent at the end of his section in this subject:<sup>47</sup>

I have now said all that occurs to me on the subject of Real Assents, perhaps not without some risk of subtlety and minuteness. They are sometimes called beliefs, convictions, certitudes; and, as given to moral objects, they are perhaps as rare as they are powerful. Till we have them, in spite of a full apprehension and assent in the field of notions, we have no intellectual moorings, and are at the mercy of impulses, fancies, and wandering lights, whether as regards personal conduct, social and political action or religion. These beliefs, be they true or false in the particular case, form the mind out of which they grow and impart to it a seriousness and manliness which inspires in other minds a confidence in its views, and is one secret of persuasiveness and influence in the public stage of the world. They create, as the case may be, heroes and saints, great leaders, statesmen, preachers and reformers, the pioneers of discovery in science, visionaries, fanatics, knight-errants, demagogues, and adventurers. They have together the innumerable units which constitute a race and a nation. They give to the world men of one idea, of immense energy, of adamantic will, of revolutionary power. They kindle sympathies between man and man, and knit become the principle of its political existence; they impart to it homogeneity of thought and fellowship of purpose. They have given form to the medieval theocracy and to the Mahometan superstition; they are now the life both of "Holy Russia," and of that freedom of speech and action which is the special boast of Englishman.

*B. Simple and Complex Assent.* In the begining of this chapter we mentioned already another division of assent, viz., simple and complex assent—complex assent being also called reflex assent.

44. Gramm., pp. 82-83.

46. *Ibid.*, pp. 86-87.

45. *Ibid.*, pp. 83-84.

47. *Ibid.*, pp. 87-88.

Simple assent is given, as it were, unconsciously. In our constant mental operations all kinds of propositions will come into our minds and we very often assent to them unawares. When, however, we want to account for them, something may change: either the simple assent vanishes because we discover a falsehood, or it becomes a conscious act: we accept unconditionally the proposition knowing at once why we receive it.<sup>48</sup> This may happen without any doubt entering our thoughts. For without suspending our assent we may look for the grounds of that assent just as a boy looks for the solution of an arithmetical problem without in the least doubting the answer set down in his book.<sup>49</sup> Acts of assent and of inference are not incompatible, and the conclusiveness of a proposition is not identical with its truth, because a proposition may be true although it cannot be inferred, and a proposition may be a conclusion and at the same time a falsehood.<sup>50</sup> This conversion of our simple assent into reflex assent by means of reflection does but fulfill a law of our nature. When we have simple assents, there are implicit grounds for them indeed, but they do not equal in importance and energy the assents themselves. When we become older, we gradually and spontaneously affirm or correct our judgments by reflection and experience. And whether the original assent retains its grounds or not, our new assent differs from it in so far as it is deliberate and explicit. It has become an assent not only to a certain proposition, but "to the claim of the proposition on our assent as true; it is an assent to an assent, or what is commonly called a conviction".<sup>51</sup>

In other places Newman enlarges on the fact that simple assent—the assent of the young, the generous, the brave, the impetuous, the unreflecting<sup>52</sup>—is much more a motive cause to actions and great achievements<sup>53</sup> than the reflex assents of more mature minds, however grave, deep, calm and prudent these assents may be.

### *3. Assent does not Admit Degrees.*

Nothing, perhaps, is more strongly emphasized by Newman than his thesis that assent is naturally "one and indivisible."<sup>53</sup> He thinks it fatal to the notions of truth and certitude to admit, as some do, that assent to a proposition is stronger or weaker according to the strength or weakness of its proofs and that, in other words, "assent cannot rise higher than its source." This latter theory proves too much "for it de-

48. *Ibid.*, pp. 189-190.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 220.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 190.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 216.

50. *Ibid.*, pp. 192-195.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 38.

bars us from unconditional assent in cases in which the common voice of mankind, the advocates of this theory included, would protest against the prohibition." Assent is absolute, unconditional, independent, but the terms "strong and weak" suppose dependence, they involve a contradiction.<sup>54</sup> We could as well speak about degrees of truth as about degrees of assent.<sup>55</sup> There is no means between assenting and not assenting, and when we mention half assent, weak assent, etc., we do not refer to an unconditional acceptance of a proposition as true but we mean to say that we are inclined to accept the proposition, or that we are not certain of its truth, or that we think it probable or attractive.<sup>56</sup> At most we give assent to the probability, etc., of the proposition, viz., when we make the proposition the subject of a new proposition: "It is probable that such or such a thing has happened" and give assent to it. Other expressions, too, which seem to indicate degrees of assent, as, e.g., a modified or qualified assent, a presumptive and "prima facie" assent, half-assent etc., do not imply assent at all. A qualified assent, e.g., may be given when I say that there was a fire in London and then add: at least it is in the morning papers. In this way I exclude positive doubt, but I do not take on myself the responsibility of the statement. In like manner I may give a presumptive or "prima facie" assent to a plausible theory on the personality of Homer without pledging myself. Half-assent is nothing but an inclination to give assent, as is said above.<sup>57</sup>

Phrases like "conditional assent," "deliberate assent," "rational assent," "sudden assent," "impulsive assent," or "hesitating assent" do not denote kinds of assent, but the circumstances of assenting, circumstances which do not enter into the essence of the matter. In this way a deliberate assent is an assent following deliberation, whereas a hesitating assent is an assent to which we have been slow and intermittent in coming.<sup>58</sup>

Nor do the above-mentioned terms "strong or weak assent" imply degrees, for we may explain them in two ways. As time goes on, assent may become a habit of mind by its constant influence on our thinking and acting and this habit may acquire an ever greater hold upon us. But the assent does not change intrinsically, only its consequences are more and more visible. Then the concomitants and circumstances of assent may vary. As the attendant emotions, the apprehension of the terms, and the arguments which led to assent may be stronger or

54. *Ibid.*, pp. 159-160.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 174.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 174.

57. *Ibid.*, pp. 181-182.

58. *Ibid.*, pp. 182-183.

weaker, so we speak of strong or weak assent and strong or feeble faith, for supernatural faith is a kind of assent.<sup>59</sup> Since under the guidance of grace faith may get hold upon us in an ever stronger way and since this form of assent is always superior in nature and kind, we may say that belief in revelation implies a singularly strong assent. But nevertheless, assent is ever assent: the unconditional acceptance of a proposition as true.<sup>60</sup>

When, therefore, we speak about degrees of assent or degrees of certitude, we express ourselves in an inaccurate way, meaning degrees of probability or degrees of proof.<sup>61</sup> If only the slightest conditionality is connected with what we call assent, or if we cannot call a proposition certain in every sense, there is no question of certitude nor of assent.

Moreover, by altering the meaning of the term "assent" we would take away the distinction between assent and inference.

#### *4. The Road to Assent.*

Newman blames Locke and his school, who exclude unconditional assent unless it be the result of an act of intuition or demonstration.<sup>62</sup> He proves the falsehood of this thesis by illustrating how often we give assent to propositions although there is no intuition nor demonstration.

He deals therefore with the three roads to certitude: 1. Intuition; 2. Demonstration, i.e., syllogistic reasoning or formal inference; 3. Natural reasoning or informal inference, i.e., the exercise of the illative sense.

a. *Intuition.* At first one might think that by intuition Newman means any perception of an object which is directly perceptible, in other words not only the mental perception of a self-evident truth, as e.g., twice two make four, but also sense-perception, i.e., the perception of sense objects by the senses. This view is confirmed when he implies in a certain passage of his *Grammar* that he knows by intuition what is self-evident.<sup>63</sup> Nevertheless this is not so. Newman indeed maintains that we give assent to information received by means of our senses; he states that "by means of sense we gain knowledge directly"<sup>64</sup> and in another place: "I allow then as much as this, that, when an argument is in itself and by itself conclusive of a truth, it has by a law

59. *Ibid.*, p. 184.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 159 ff.

60. *Ibid.*, pp. 184-187.

63. *Ibid.*, p. 227.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 324.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 260.

of our nature the same command over our assent, or rather the truth which it has reached has the same command, as our senses have.”<sup>65</sup> But by intuition he means: the realization of a general fact, without assignable or recognizable media of realization.<sup>66</sup>

To this definition he adds this example: by means of intuition we draw from ever-recurring experiences of phenomena of sense the general proposition, viz., that there is an external world.<sup>67</sup> Without knowing exactly how we arrived at that conclusion we maintain beyond any doubt the existence of an external world. In another chapter he asserts that “sense, sensation, instinct, intuition supply us with facts and the intellect uses them.”<sup>68</sup> It follows from this that Newman must draw a distinction between assent to data of sense and assent to data of intuition. But he does not clarify this. Once he uses the term intuition in the meaning of Kant when speaking of a school of philosophers who “have recourse to the hypothesis of intuitions, intellectual forms, and the like” “in order to vindicate the certainty of our knowledge.” He observes that with them he earnestly maintains the certainty of knowledge, but he does not think it imperative to follow their method because an appeal to “the common voice of mankind” would be sufficient for the purpose.<sup>69</sup>

In another chapter he identifies a truth, received by means of intuition, with the voice of nature.<sup>70</sup> To give an instance of intuition he mentions the proposition “We exist.”<sup>71</sup> Further, as has been said already, he teaches that the object of intuition is the self-evident.<sup>72</sup> Intuition in the sense of Kant he rejects.<sup>73</sup> When, then, we consider that he contrasts knowledge gained by means of the illative sense to knowledge gained by intuition, it follows from all this that this definition may be given for Newman’s intuition: Intuition is the knowledge of general propositions gained by the mind without any discursive reasoning.

Some authors writing on Newman use the word “intuition” for his illative sense. Sometimes they even insinuate by it that the illative sense is nothing but intuition, meaning by that term a kind of immediate and spontaneous perception or feeling of truths without any discursive preparation. Newman indeed may be said to have given occa-

65. *Ibid.*, p. 170.

66. Wilfrid Ward, *The Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman*, (New impression: Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1913) II, p. 258, Letter to Maynell.

67. *Gramm.*, pp. 61-63.

68. *Ibid.*, p. 98.

69. *Ibid.*, pp. 343-344.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 66.

71. *Ibid.*, p. 177.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 227.

73. *Ibid.*, pp. 343-344.

sion to this confusion of notions, for he calls the illative sense a power of guessing when he says: "This divination comes by nature, and belongs to all of us in a measure, to women more than to men, hitting or missing as the case may be;"<sup>74</sup> and in another passage he calls the operation of the illative sense an instinctive perception, acting by a spontaneous impulse, without our knowing how we use it.<sup>75</sup> He ascribes the quick and accurate judgments of genius like those of Napoleon and Columbus to the illative sense.<sup>76</sup> In one passage he speaks about it as intuition perception,<sup>77</sup> in another simply as intuition.<sup>78</sup>

But from the foregoing chapters<sup>79</sup> it is clear that the illative sense cannot be called intuition in the current meaning of the word. Again and again Newman draws our attention to the fact that there are antecedents, premisses, but that they are not consciously recognized as such. The operation of the illative sense must be called reasoning, but it is reasoning without the formal application of the rules of logic and without a clear insight into the road taken by the mind. The conclusions of the illative sense require a process of thought, an aggregate of mental acts, which is apparently very simple, but in reality very complicated — hence not to be expressed in satisfactory logical formulas.

Nor does Newman teach that a kind of immediate perception, actuated according to some philosophers, by the will and by feelings, complements our intellectual knowledge, a doctrine, perhaps best qualified by the name of emotional intuition. Again he supplies us with a ground for this opinion when he recounts the story of the heroine in Sir Walter Scott's "Peveril of the Peak." She felt an instinctive fear for the manner of her hostess and for the unusually luxurious surroundings in which she found herself. He calls this fear a feeling and attributes it to the illative sense.<sup>80</sup>

Stronger still are his expressions when he enlarges on his thesis: it is the whole man who reasons.<sup>81</sup> But we should do Newman a wrong if we gave his illative sense the name of emotional intuition, because as has been shown,<sup>82</sup> Newman teaches the primacy of intellect and reason; unless reason takes the lead we fall into error, prejudice,

b. *Demonstration.* Demonstration in the Newmanian sense is a syllogism that is objectively irresistible; in other words, it is a syllogism

74. *Ibid.*, p. 331.

75. *Ibid.*, p. 260.

76. *Ibid.*, pp. 261, 334.

77. *Ibid.*, p. 332.

78. *Ibid.*, p. 333.

79. *Franc. Stud.*, X (1950), 128 ff., 207 ff.

80. *Gramm.*, p. 335.

81. *Franc. Stud.*, XI (1951), 65 ff.

82. *Ibid.*, p. 67 ff.

which commands assent by the irresistible compulsion of the "evidentia." This is actually the case only in mathematical proofs and then exclusively in short and simple reasonings.<sup>83</sup>

Here Newman seems to contradict himself. Perfect logical demonstration does but rarely occur, he says, except in short mathematical proof. Even religion cannot be demonstrated in perfectly strict syllogisms.<sup>84</sup> Nevertheless, in another passage Newman teaches that the truth of religion may be intrinsically, objectively and abstractedly demonstrated.<sup>85</sup> This sounds like a contradiction in terms. But his meaning is clear and his doctrine consistent.

As has been said, the solution of this apparent contradiction lies in the distinction between subjectively irresistible proofs and objectively irresistible proofs. Religion is not demonstrable on subjectively irresistible grounds; in other words, we cannot give grounds, syllogisms, reasons, for our faith which will infallibly convince anybody without exception. There will always be an opening for objections with at least some appearance of reasonableness for a certain class of persons. But it is indeed possible to construe evidence for religion which is objectively and intrinsically irresistible, abstraction being made of the state of mind of individuals whom we want to convince.<sup>86</sup>

We suppose that nobody will make an objection against this thesis, although some may think his distinctions far-fetched. Nobody except a sceptic will deny that we may attain assent and certitude by objectively and subjectively irresistible proofs.

The narrowness of Newman's notion of demonstration is to be explained from the doctrines of Locke and his followers, which were propagated with great enthusiasm in the eighteenth century and which were closely connected with the overestimation of mathematics and science. In these branches of knowledge absolute certitude was only reached by mathematical demonstration. They concluded therefore that mathematical demonstration was also the only road to certitude in other departments. Newman adopted the term and its meaning but he did not agree with the doctrine. With all his might he defended his belief that there existed another road to certitude.

This demonstration is also called by Newman formal inference.<sup>87</sup>

83. *Ibid.*, X (1950), 146 ff.

84. Ward, *Life II*, pp. 248, 276.

85. Gramm., p. 410; J. H. Newman, *The Present Position of Catholics in England*, (Standard Edition; Longmans, Green and Co., London) p.x.

86. Gramm., pp. 169-171.

87. *Ibid.*, p. 266.

Formal inference is syllogizing, formal argument, paper-logic. It will be useful and reliable, effective and safe, only in case of abstractions, as in mathematics, but not when the concrete is concerned, because the concrete can never be adequately put into words, and words denoting concrete things have innumerable implications.<sup>88</sup> Of course we may "circumscribe and stint their import" by means of abstraction but then our conclusion will be abstract and we do not reach the concrete, which is our aim. Does it follow from all this that we cannot attain to truth in concrete things? By no means, replies Newman, because we possess a finer, subtler and more elastic organon than formal inference or paper-logic, viz., the illative sense.

c. *The Illative Sense.* As we have proved from many texts, Newman teaches as his firm conviction and as his explicit doctrine that in ordinary life, nay, even in most cases of scientific investigation, we do not reach certitude on the strength of verbal reasoning, formal inference, demonstration, but by means of the quick, subtle and mysterious acts of the mind, which he calls the function of the illative sense. Apart from concrete knowledge, gained directly from sense perception, apart from knowledge gained from intuition and demonstration as explained above, there are many more truths about which we possess absolute certitude. This certitude cannot be sufficiently explained, Newman maintains, unless we attribute to our minds a power to reach a rational conclusion from a mass of accumulating and converging probabilities so that after reflection we give it our full assent, i.e., become certain.

The illative sense, therefore, is but the human mind as far as it sees the truth of a proposition without formal syllogisms but not without antecedents or discursive preparations. In the following chapter we intend to prove the correctness of this definition.

### *III. Inference.*

#### *1. What is Inference?*

Inference is the conditional acceptance of a proposition. When we infer or conclude or draw a conclusion, we consider a proposition, viz., a conclusion in relation to other propositions.<sup>89</sup> For in that case there is always a relation to premisses. We arrive at what is unknown by means of what is known and in this sense we are dependent on the known. As soon as this relation has disappeared, i.e., as soon as we have abstracted from the means leading to the conclusion, and accepted

88. *Ibid.*, p. 267.

89. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

the conclusion unconditionally and independently of the premisses as true, we no longer have an inference but assent.

Now, in inferences we always find variations. As the premisses are stronger or weaker, the inferences will be stronger or weaker.<sup>90</sup> Even though the reasoning is both subjectively and objectively convincing, i.e., demonstrative, the dependence on the premisses and so the conditionality will remain up to the moment that assent is given, or, in other words, the conclusion is accepted without any reference to the premisses or dependence on them. We find the highest degree of convincing and irresistible *evidentia* in such a conclusion if looked upon as an inference; but looked upon as assent there is no degree at all. For assent is the acceptance of something as true; and what is accepted as true, cannot at the same time be accepted as conditionally true.<sup>91</sup>

Newman assigns the name of inference to verbal reasoning, i.e., to all modes of reasoning which are conducted by means of terms: so too induction, deduction, analogy, etc.<sup>92</sup> His main subdivision, however, is the distinction between formal inference on the one hand and informal and natural inference on the other.

Formal inference comprises all sorts of syllogistic reasoning which proceeds by means of major or minor premisses and generally with the aid of well-formulated propositions.<sup>93</sup> These propositions, consisting of terms denoting ideas, work like symbols in mathematics. The science which is the regulating principle is logic.<sup>93a</sup> Hence he sometimes uses the words logic and inference indiscriminately.<sup>94</sup> We have seen what value Newman attributed to this kind of inference.<sup>95</sup> Later on we shall prove that formal inference needs the supplemental help of the illative sense.

Informal inference is nothing but the operation of the illative sense, the subtle power of the mind to see the truth in an accumulation of probabilities, all pointing to the same conclusion but each of them too weak to justify this conclusion. Our mind is so constituted that it may view a concrete problem from such a variety of standpoints, in such a vast number of aspects that it becomes altogether unfeasible to register this mass of mental acts in logical formulas, while, nevertheless, contact with truth and certitude is established by this mental process.<sup>96</sup>

Natural inference hardly differs from informal inference; it is a

90. *Ibid.*, p. 38.

93. *Ibid.*, p. 263.

91. *Ibid.*, p. 172.

93a. *Ibid.*

92. *Ibid.*, pp. 263-264, 883.

94. *Ibid.*, p. 264.

95. *Franc. Stud.*, X (1950), 132-133; cf. also this article, II, 4, C.

96. *Grammer*, p. 288.

simple act of the mind arguing from one concrete thing to another. It is an almost unconscious transition from the known to the unknown. The difference between informal inference and natural inference lies in the fact that with the former the antecedents, i.e., the probable propositions converging to one definite point, are more or less explicitly prominent in the mind though not in all details, whereas with the latter, there is no explicit consciousness of antecedents at all. This is our most natural mode of arguing and this explains its name.<sup>97</sup> Newman calls it instinct because this reasoning is spontaneous and takes place without assignable or recognizable means.<sup>98</sup> This difference however, is neither great nor important because with both natural and informal inference the mental process goes on spontaneously, and with both we look at things "per modum unius" disregarding the details.<sup>99</sup>

This informal, natural inference forms the basis, the starting-point of all formal, logical inference, in other words, logic is based on the illative sense, and scientific, syllogistic reasoning is but a form of ordinary, natural thinking. All sciences have their foundations in this natural mode of thinking.<sup>100</sup> We need the rules and the science of logic, however, as the only means of communicating our thoughts and the roads to our conclusions with others; it is the only "common measure of mind" between one man and the other.

Formal inference is notional,<sup>101</sup> informal and natural inference are real. The former is the principle of advancement of knowledge because without abstraction and the use of notions we should always move in a small circle, the circle of the surrounding concrete, individual beings. But the latter deepens our thinking so that we do not "waste ourselves in vague speculations." While it implies a certain narrow-mindedness viz., as regards the number of objects, it supposes a firm hold upon things, a profound insight and an extreme clearness, which we do not possess in notional assent and formal inference.<sup>102</sup>

## *2. The Distinction and the Relation Between Inference and Assent.*

Locke insists upon degrees of assent in such a way that he virtually identifies assent and inference and makes certitude depend on syllogisms. Hence Newman takes many pains to illustrate the intrinsic

97. *Ibid.*, pp. 330-331.

100. *Ibid.*, p. 292.

98. *Ibid.*, p. 334.

101. *Ibid.*, p. 265.

99. *Ibid.*, pp. 301, 330-331, 338.

102. *Ibid.*, p. 34.

difference.<sup>103</sup> He proves that assent often remains while the inferences, preparatory to our assent, have vanished long ago. He shows that assent may disappear—often under the influence of the will—while the reasons which had led to assent keep their value and strength. This proves at any rate that assent and inference differ intrinsically. Sometimes an inference may be absolutely convincing, whereas we do not give assent. Good but weak arguments for a proposition may prevent our assenting to it; why do we not give a weak assent then? An inference may grow in strength, but assent exists or does not exist. to give assent. If all premisses of other inferences would be as clear as those, assent would always follow inference immediately. But when the mathematical proofs are long and complicated, we cannot unconditionally accept the conclusion unless we are convinced of the absolute accuracy of every step in the reasoning process, and this “condition sine qua non” may so much impress us that we withhold assent. All this proves that demonstrative proofs are not identical with assent, or in other words, inference is not assent.<sup>104</sup>

However, though inference and assent are distinct acts of the mind, this does not imply the absence of a close relation between them. First, all arguments against a conclusion tend to hinder assent. On the other hand, the more probable the arguments, the greater our inclination to give assent. When we assent we generally have reasons either implicit or explicit.<sup>105</sup> Indeed, they are not adequate causes of our assent but they are the *sine qua non* conditions.<sup>106</sup> Newman even doubts whether there is any case in which assent is given without some preliminary or an antecedent functioning as a reason.<sup>107</sup> Not only does inference precede assent as a rule, very often acts of inference are its usual concomitants; e.g., we are certain, on sufficient grounds, that Great Britain is an island; in other words we assent to the proposition. Now, while the same reasons are before us we may persist in this assent.<sup>108</sup>

Inference has a special relation with notional assent while it is distinct from it. There exists a remarkable distinction also between inference and real assent. The explanation of these statements may illustrate Newman's thoughts.

103. *Ibid.*, pp. 167-172.

106. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

104. *Ibid.*, pp. 169-171.

107. *Ibid.*, p. 172.

105. *Ibid.*, p. 41, 157, 171, 194, 13.

108. *Ibid.*, p. 189.

At the beginning of the *Grammar*,<sup>109</sup> Newman had already drawn attention to the fact that inferences show a special affinity to notional apprehension, as assent does to real apprehension. He enlarges upon this subject in a following chapter<sup>110</sup> and maintains that notional assent resembles inference since the apprehension in both cases is notional. Hence we are apt to mix up inference with notional assent and *vice versa*. When, e.g., a Stoic assent to the proposition that a just man "struggling in the storms of fate" is endowed with moral nobleness, he gives it a notional assent. But we might easily mistake this mental act for an inference, consistently derived from his Stoic principles or for an assent to "the inferential necessity of the nobleness of that struggle."

This special affinity between inference and notional assent makes Newman connect the normal state of inference with notional apprehension and the normal state of assent with real apprehension, i.e., inferences are generally notional, assents are generally real.<sup>111</sup> For inference implies that we perceive and state the dependence on premisses, in other words, that we accept a relation; now, a relation is abstract and notional. Assent, however, is entirely and exclusively directed to the proposition itself, without any relation, without reserves, without dependence. Only a concrete or real proposition is easily accepted by the mind in this way; an abstract or notional proposition does not so easily get an unconditional acception. Hence Newman considers an act of assent most perfect when it has for its object a proposition which is apprehended as an experience and an image, the representation of things, not of notions. On the other hand, an act of inference is most perfect when it has for its object a proposition which is notionally apprehended, the representation of a creation of the mind. Indeed, inferences may be apprehended really as well as notionally; the same applies to assent. But when inferences are concerned with things, with the concrete, they tend to be conjectures and have little logical force; and when assents are concerned with notions, they tend to be mere assertions, and he who enunciates them has not got hold of them with a personal grasp.<sup>111a</sup>

That is why Newman ventures to pronounce the following paradox: "When inference is clearest, assent may be less forcible, and, when assent is most intense, inference may be the least distinct, for . . . while the apprehension strengthens assent, inference often weakens

109. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

110. *Ibid.*, pp. 38-40.

111. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

111a. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

the apprehension.”<sup>112</sup> In other words: The more clearly we see the explicit proofs before our minds and the more accurately we have unravelled and weighed them with our reason and intellect, the weaker our adhesion to the proposition, and the more doubtful our certitude. But if we assent powerfully to a truth, we often see only vaguely its proofs and reasons. For the more we have assimilated the concrete object by grasping it from all sides and the more we have experienced its reality, the stronger will be our assent, whereas the more abstractly we reason about the concrete, the looser will the contact be with the real object.

Hence Newman unhesitatingly states: “The object of assent is a truth, the object of inference is the truth-like or a verisimilitude.”<sup>113</sup> Without the preceding explanation this would sound very strange, to say the least.

Hence, too, acts of real assent will influence our conduct, whereas notional assent and inferences often will not.<sup>114</sup> For inferences are concerned with aspects only, i.e., the surface of things. They are engaged on formulas, not on concrete facts. Even if they deal with motives and acts, character and behavior, art and science, morals and religion etc., they do not treat these subjects as living realities, as real things, but as material of inference, i.e., as abstract ideas, as mere notions. On the other hand, assents generally deal with reality, with the concrete, with living beings, which stimulate the mind in several ways by their characteristics working on the imagination. They have for their objects not only what is true, but at the same time what is beautiful, instructive, useful, admirable, heroic, etc. These objects excite devotion, inflame the passions and stimulate the affections. In this way assent leads to all sorts of acts, it forms principles and characters and is intimately connected with everything individual and personal.

The description of these theories may seem to be full of the notionality and unreality of abstraction, but read Newman’s fascinating pages on the problem of whether the study of science makes man religious<sup>115</sup> and see how all this comes to life.

### *3. Degrees of Inference and Its Relation to Certitude.*

What are exactly the degrees of assent mentioned by Locke? This philosopher states that these degrees vary according to the “degree in

112. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

113. *Ibid.*, p. 259.

114. *Ibid.*, p. 90.

115. *Ibid.*, p. 91 ff.

which the evidence on one side preponderates, or exceeds that on the other.”<sup>116</sup> So on the balance of assent the degree is determined according to the weight of the proofs or the degrees of evidence. Against this thesis Newman makes head in a masterfully worded argumentation. He considers a great number of assents and illustrates that the alleged reasons are but probabilities, no convincing proofs, no immediate evidence, no demonstration. According to Locke those assents should vary in strength as the proofs vary in strength; an unconditional acceptance would be unlawful, illegitimate; there would be no room for certitude in these cases. Nevertheless, Newman says, there is an unconditional acceptance of these propositions as true, i.e., a rational certitude:<sup>117</sup>

We are sure beyond all hazard of a mistake, that our own self is not the only being existing; that there is an external world; that it is a system with parts and a whole, a universe carried on by laws; and that the future is affected by the past. We accept and hold with an unqualified assent, that the earth, considered as a phenomenon, is a globe, that all its regions see the sun by turns; that there are vast tracts on it of land and water; that there are really existing cities on definite sites, which go by the names of London, Paris, Florence, and Madrid. We are sure that Paris or London, unless suddenly swallowed up by an earthquake or burned to the ground, is to-day just what it was yesterday, when we left it.

We laugh to scorn the idea that we had no parents though we have no memory of our birth; that we shall never depart this life, though we can have no experience of the future; that we are able to live without food, though we have never tried; that a world of men did not live before our time, or that the world has had no history; that there has been no rise and fall of states, no great men, no wars, no revolutions, no art, no science, no literature, no religion.

We should be either indignant or amused at the report of our intimate friend being false to us; and we are able sometimes, without any hesitation, to accuse certain parties of hostility and injustice to us. We may have a deep consciousness, which we never can lose, that we on our part have been cruel to others, and that they have felt us to be so, or that we have been, and have been felt to be, ungenerous to those who love us. We may have an overpowering sense of our moral weakness, of the precariousness of our life, health, wealth, position, and good fortune. We may have a clear view of the weak points of our physical constitution, of what food or medicine is good for us, and what does us harm. We may be able to master, at least in part, the course of our past history; its turning points, our hits, and our great mistakes. We may have a sense of the presence of a Supreme Being, which never has been dimmed by even a passing shadow, which has inhabited us ever since we can recollect any thing, and which we cannot imagine our losing. We may be able, for others have been able, so to realize the precepts and truths of Christianity, as deliberately to surrender our life, rather than transgress the one or to deny the other.

On all these truths we have an immediate and unhesitating hold, nor do we think ourselves guilty of not loving truth for truth's sake, because we cannot reach them through a series of intuitive propositions. Assent on reasonings not demonstrative is too widely recognized an act to be irrational, unless man's nature is irrational, too familiar to the prudent and clearminded to be an infirmity or an extravagance. None of us can think or act without the acceptance of truths, not intuitive, not demonstrated, yet sovereign. If our nature has any constitution, any laws, one of them is this absolute reception of propositions as true, which lie outside the narrow range of conclusions to which logic, formal or virtual, is te-

116. *Ibid.*, pp. 174-175.

117. *Ibid.*, pp. 177-179.

thered; nor has any philosophical theory the power to force on us a rule which will not work for a day.

What Newman teaches in these pages is but this: the power of the arguments or the value of inferences is not proportionate to assent and certitude;<sup>118</sup> logic is not the measure of assent and certitude; of course there is a relation between logic and assent, but it is not the relation of cause and effect, as little as the thermometer is the cause of the cold and the heat it indicates;<sup>119</sup> logic supplies us with the symbols, the outward tokens of our assent and certitude; we refer to it for our own satisfaction and our justification with others<sup>120</sup> but it is not certitude itself.

The conclusion follows: Locke's degrees of assent are but degrees of inference. "His assents are but inferences," Newman observes.<sup>121</sup> And all his proofs from conversational sources and colloquial phrases have to be explained in quite another way, as was done before.<sup>122</sup>

#### *IV. Certitude.*

##### *1. The Word Certitude Often Misused.*

As Newman draws a well-marked distinction between assent and inference, in the same way he objects to the identification of assent and certitude. He thought it a distressing fact that the word "certitude" was being hopelessly misused in every day life. There is nothing on earth which is more valuable for the human mind, and nothing for which it longs more than the possession of truth, the repose of certitude. But Newman experienced how often something was called certain which appeared to be false, and this even to such an extent that there were those who considered certitude in the strict sense of the word, an impossibility. This phenomenon had its fatal effects as regards the knowledge of religious truths. He knew victims of this theory. Therefore he made it his great concern to explain clearly what certainty is and how it is distinguished from assent.

All certitude is assent, but not all assent is certitude. For simple assent, i.e., assent without reflection, is only certitude in the popular sense: "Whatever a man holds to be true, he will say he holds for certain."<sup>123</sup> Newman prefers to call such certitude, material, virtual, or interpretative certitude.<sup>124</sup> As soon as reflection becomes necessary and is exercised upon simple assent, material certitude is converted

118. *Ibid.*, p. 197.

119. *Ibid.*, p. 180.

120. *Ibid.*, pp. 286-287.

121. *Ibid.*, p. 175.

122. See this article, section III, 2.

123. *Gramm.*, pp. 196, 210.

124. *Ibid.*, pp. 210-212.

into formal or actual certitude, unless, of course, assent vanished owing to reflection, which shows that there was no assent after all. "Mere assent is not certitude and must not be confused with it."<sup>125</sup> Newman has acquired this definition by means of his psychological insight into our mental attitude when we are certain. We intend to follow his explanations step by step.

He states, then, that there exist three conditions for certitude: 1) Certitude follows investigation and proof; 2) certitude is indefectible; 3) certitude is accompanied by a specific sense of intellectual satisfaction and repose.<sup>126</sup> These characteristics are not to be found in simple assent, or in certitude in the popular sense. Therefore, simple assent and popular certitude are not certitude.

Where does Newman get these notes of certitude or how does he prove their legitimacy? Is he objective in this matter?

In order not to be led astray in the arguments which Newman gives for these notes, we should never forget that he looks at things from a psychological point of view. He examines what mankind thinks certitude to be, or in other words, what on second thought is required for true certitude. These requirements appear to be universal, i.e., everybody demands them as soon as he reflects on the notion of certitude. Not everybody, however, is consistent so that there may be found those who call themselves certain although these conditions have not been fulfilled. This explains why Newman uses the word "certitude" promiscuously for popular certitude and for certitude in the strict sense, i.e., for reflex assent.

## *2. Certitude Follows Investigation and Proof.*

Very often we give our assent to propositions in an almost unconscious and mechanical way. We assert that we are certain of them. Nevertheless these propositions are but "expressions of our personal likings, tastes, principles, motives and opinions as dictated by nature or resulting from habit." They are "acts and manifestations of self." And as we know ourselves least, so we are often unconscious of the acts of assent we are making. And if we were to compare our reflex assents with these almost unconscious acts of assent, we should observe how few in number reflex assents are.<sup>127</sup>

The kernel of Newman's theory lies in this assertion: what we call certitude in every day life, is often no certitude at all. If we should

125. *Ibid.*, pp. 213, 203.

126. *Ibid.*, p. 258.

127. *Ibid.*, pp. 188-189.

persist in calling and considering these assents real certitude, all truths would be uncertain and doubtful. The greater number of these so-called certitudes would be but rash judgments, imaginings, prejudices, etc., which come into existence mechanically, with no consciousness or only a partial one. In this way "the very idea of certitude falls into disrepute."<sup>128</sup>

In these cases we may use the word "assent," viz., simple assent, and sometimes "material certitude" but we must not call it certitude in the strict sense of the word.

It may happen, however, that these, our simple assents, suddenly call for their grounds.<sup>129</sup> We had never felt the need of accounting for them, but now we feel it necessary to institute an examination. This need not imply any doubt as to the truth of the propositions involved. We do not suspend our assents. We only want to know the motives which justify them.<sup>130</sup> If educated people are concerned, the investigation of the grounds of their assents is even a duty and a necessity. For, as knowledge grows their intellects are put upon trial and the intellectual assents, taught them at school, want testing, realizing and developing by the exercise of their mature judgment.<sup>131</sup> Very often we find that the assents disappear after the investigation of their basis. Although we do not start an inquiry on account of any doubt—as doubt excludes assent and inquiry is something quite different from doubt—if the assent disappears it does not follow that our assent was not what it professed to be.<sup>132</sup> We had not begun our inquiry supposing that it would lead us to another conclusion, nor with the intention never to withdraw our assent. It is one of the characteristics of certitude, even in the popular sense, that we do not feel the least suspicion or fear or anticipation of the failure of our assents. The force and the unconditionality of assent precludes such an attitude of mind.<sup>133</sup>

Newman maintains that this examination "does but fulfill a law of our nature." For the grounds of our simple assents are not proportionate to the certainty and importance of our beliefs. Hence we spontaneously try to find those grounds in a more explicit or reflex way.<sup>134</sup>

It does not matter whether our assent vanishes or not after the examination. But if a new assent is the result, there will be this difference between the former simple assent and the latter reflex one, *viz.*, that

128. *Ibid.*, pp. 234-235, cf. 258.

129. *Ibid.*, p. 189.

130. *Ibid.*, pp. 189-190.

131. *Ibid.*, p. 192.

132. *Ibid.*, pp. 190-192.

133. *Ibid.*, pp. 192-194.

134. *Ibid.*, p. 194.

the new assent will be energetic on account of its explicitness and deliberateness. It is no longer a prejudice. It is not only an assent to a proposition but it is an assent to an assent, it is a complex and reflex act, it is certitude in the full sense of the word. Certitude, therefore, is the perception of a truth with the perception that it is a truth, in other words, conscious, reflex knowledge or the consciousness of knowing, expressed in "I know that I know."<sup>135</sup>

In the process of examining the grounds for our simple assents, we begin to find out whether they had virtual certitude or not. For there are assents that cannot be called virtual or material certitudes, but assents to a falsehood. Unless we withdraw those assents to untruths after we have reflected on them, we have false assents and false certitudes. Often, however, after reflection, we will refuse assent for once and for all. Nor is it impossible even to withdraw our assent to a true proposition, *viz.*, when—as Newman says—we are overcome by the number of views which we have to confront, or swayed by the urgency of special objections, or biased by our imaginations. And in this way it becomes clear that our assent was not genuine, but a mere profession, a self-delusion or a cloak for unbelief.<sup>136</sup>

These considerations lead Newman to conclude that certitude supposes a reflex argumentation or a conscious examination into the object of our simple assents.

### *3. Certitude is Indefectible.*

Another argument proving Newman's definition of certitude lies in his discussion about the indefectibility of this state of mind. "Assents may and do change; certitudes endure."<sup>137</sup>

It is a matter of course that "what is once true is always true." Consequently, whenever I am certain of a proposition, I feel convinced that the opposite can never be true even if I should ever deny that truth. Whoever is certain of a truth is proof against objections. Suppose these objections were to return again and again, and to attack us repeatedly, they will remain imaginations, phantoms, dreams, as compared to the light of our certitude.<sup>138</sup> He who is certain that Ireland lies west of England and that the Pope is the Vicar of Christ, will be intolerant of objections because he is convinced of the falsehood of the contradictory. He would believe that these propositions remain true even if his certitude should fail.<sup>139</sup>

135. *Ibid.*, pp. 194-195, 197.

136. *Ibid.*, pp. 213-214.

137. *Ibid.*, pp. 220, 243.

138. *Ibid.*, pp. 197-198.

139. *Ibid.*, pp. 198-199.

But how often we think ourselves certain while we feel doubts whenever an objection occurs. Then it becomes clear that our certitude was not genuine. It was a mere assent, given without sufficient implicit or explicit grounds. How confidently, e.g., people often speak in the court. How absolute their assertions are. But as soon as an oath is required, a conscientious man becomes careful and begins to guard his statements with restrictions and qualifications. His so-called certitude disappears. When people are afraid of attacks on their assents, this generally implies doubt and incertitude; he who is certain smiles at objections. This, too, proves that mere assents are not certitudes. Many more examples of the kind could be cited.<sup>140</sup>

So it must be a characteristic of certitude that its object is a truth, and a truth as such or a proposition as true.

There are right and wrong convictions, and certitude is a right conviction; if it is not right with a consciousness of being right, it is not certitude. Now, truth cannot change; what is once truth is always truth; and the human mind is made for truth, and so rests in truth, as it cannot rest in falsehood. When then it once becomes possessed of a truth, what is to dispossess it?

But this state of mind is certitude. "Therefore once certitude, always certitude." Indefectibility almost enters into the very notion of certitude.<sup>141</sup>

It does not follow from this that all assents which do not change are certitudes. Every assent may persist with certain persons and in certain cases. There is no definite line between genuine certitudes and false certitudes.<sup>142</sup> The unchangeableness is only a negative test, i.e., when certitudes fail, it proves that the person who said he was certain was not certain after all, but possessed only apparent certitude and mere assent.<sup>143</sup>

This statement seems to be fatal to the possibility of any certitude. How often, says Newman, were we certain, whereas this certitude proved false in the event. If we cannot draw a line between certitude which has truth as its object, and certitude which has not, ought not we always be uneasy and full of doubts? In this case even Newman's definition of certitude would be valueless, for certitude would be something chimeric, "opinions or anticipations, judgments on the verisimilitude of intellectual views, not the possession and enjoyment of truths."<sup>144</sup> This objection requires careful consideration.

No, says Newman, this does not follow by any means. True, there are apparent certitudes proving false in the end. But certitude is re-

140. *Ibid.*, pp. 200-203.

141. *Ibid.*, p. 221.

142. *Ibid.*, p. 222.

143. *Ibid.*, p. 256.

144. *Ibid.*, p. 228.

flex assent, i.e., assent deliberately given after reasoning. So if our assent was given wrongly, the reasoning must have been faulty, not the assent to it.<sup>145</sup> What determined our conviction was not the "evidentia," but other factors, personal inclinations and motives, the power of prejudice or delusion.<sup>146</sup> We have made a mistake ourselves, not our reason.<sup>146a</sup> We should have trained our reasoning powers; we should have been wary and not so easily satisfied with our reflection. If we could not be certain anymore because we were once certain on a false ground, we should for the same reason abstain from looking for proofs if we have been given a bad proof once. Errors in reasoning are lessons and warnings, not to give up all reasoning but to reason with more caution—"Usum non tollit abusus."<sup>147</sup> We do not do away with clocks and watches because from time to time they go wrong.<sup>148</sup>

Deficiency in intellectual training causes another error as regards certitude, *viz.*, the mistaking of simple assents for certitudes, and the probable and possible for certainties. People easily mix up those notional assents which Newman calls profession, credence and opinion, with assent given after reflection. These notional assents often prove to have been wrongly given and they have to be discarded after examination. People infer from this that certitudes are defectionable, whereas there was no certitude at all. Consequently "the very idea of certitude falls into disrepute."<sup>149</sup> This, too, takes away the edge of the objection quoted above in connection with false certitude.

Another fact also weakens the power of this objection, *viz.*, the truth that in many matters certitude is an impossibility. Apart from the province of the senses we may have certitudes about the principles and the basis of the sciences, about elementary truths relating to ourselves, to our daily habits and needs, our homes and families, our friends, neighborhood, country and civil state. But outside these provinces there is a large field of probabilities. It is all that is connected with public affairs, social life, professional matters, business, duty, literature, taste and even experimental sciences. Discussions, arguments and proofs concerning these departments vary to an infinite degree: "Mundum tradidit disputationi eorum."<sup>150</sup> This is even the case as regards religion. We are certain about the existence of God, His Providence, His acts and His will, whether this knowledge be natural

145. *Ibid.*, pp. 228-229.

146. *Ibid.*, p. 234.

146a. *Ibid.*, p. 229.

147. *Ibid.*, p. 230.

148. *Ibid.*, p. 233.

149. *Ibid.*, pp. 234-235.

150. *Ibid.*, pp. 236-237.

or whether it reached us by means of revelation. But outside this field there is an extensive province, in natural and revealed theology as well as in ethics, of probable opinions.<sup>151</sup>

All this explains how it comes about that we so often change our assents which we wrongly called certitudes. The objection therefore holds no ground against Newman's statement: certitude is indefectible, consequently it must be deliberate, conscious and reflex.

#### *4. Certitude Causes a Sense of Repose and Triumph.*

Certitude is distinct from mere assent. This follows, too, from the fact that the frame of mind which immediately arises out of certitude differs widely from the feelings which attend simple assent.<sup>152</sup>

In order to understand what Newman means, we only need to consider and to analyze certitude as a psychological phenomenon.

What feeling accompanies the possession of certitude? "It is a feeling of satisfaction and self-congratulation, of intellectual security, arising out of a sense of success, attainment, possession, finality." As the fulfillment of duty causes peace of mind, and enjoyable self-approval, in the same way the attainment of truth causes a feeling of intellectual security and self-repose. Now, this feeling never attends assents or other intellectual acts. It is a characteristic of certitude only, it is "its token and in a certain sense its form."<sup>153</sup>

Philosophers, Newman observes, like to dwell on the delights of knowledge, i. e., knowledge as such or simple assent. But these delights differ widely from those caused by the consciousness of knowledge, the knowing that one knows, or certitude. A great satisfaction and pleasure indeed is derived from the direct perception of things, i.e., from simple assent, but unless the mind sees those things as known, the specific pleasure which characterizes certitude does not arise in us. According to Newman, the pleasure in perceiving truth without reflecting on it as truth, does not differ much from the pleasure felt in listening to stories or in passively receiving propositions which are not true. Any communication of other people's thoughts contains its own pleasure whether those thoughts be true or not, whether they pretend to be true or not. We feel delighted when reading a novel or a biography, irrespective of the question of fact or fiction. Hence we persuade young people to read history by telling them that it is as interesting as a romance or novel. The mere acquisition of new images gives us

151. *Ibid.*, pp. 239-240.

152. *Ibid.*, pp. 203ff.

153. *Ibid.*, p. 204.

pleasure and satisfaction, especially when these images are impressive, great, various, unexpected, beautiful, when they are related to one another as parts to a whole, with mutual relations, with continuity, succession, evolution, with recurring complications and their solutions, with a crisis and a catastrophe. This pleasure and satisfaction does not depend at all on the truth and the reality of those images. Of course Newman does not ignore the disappointment which would befall us if somebody told us that everything was untrue, but this has its ground in the fact that in that case we feel taken in. On the other hand, our pleasure would be greater if we knew that those stories were true to life because of the element of marvellousness and other factors. But even in this case the pleasure lies not in the triumphant repose of the mind after a struggle. This is the characteristic of certitude only.<sup>154</sup>

Reasoning, too, or the pursuit of knowledge, has its own pleasure, differing from the pleasure of assent as well as from the pleasure of certitude. Anybody who has experienced the vacuity and depression of mind which we may feel after finishing an inquiry, will grant the truth of this assertion. The pleasure of inquiry and investigation and pursuit of knowledge lies in a search like that of a hunt, and it has its end where the pleasure of certitude begins. The successive stages of discovery imply an ever increasing knowledge, and this fact cannot but cause pleasure. But this pleasure chiefly arises from the exertion exercised and from the feeling that these efforts are an earnest of future success. It contains, moreover, the fascination of something mysterious which we hope to see gradually unveiled. It is a pleasure consisting of wonder, expectation, sudden surprises, suspense and hope, and of the progress to the unknown with irregular but sure advances. It is the pleasure, bestowed on the strong by toil and struggle arising from the consciousness and the proofs of intellectual and moral strength, contained in the pride of ingenuity and skill, assiduity, patience, accuracy and perseverance. This exertion of mind is often attended by a logical satisfaction, for there lies great pleasure "in proceeding from particular facts to principles, in generalizing, discriminating, reducing to order and meaning the maze of phenomena which nature presents to us." Even for those who do not believe that reasoning leads to certitude, the search after arguments yields a special joy though only the joy of a game of chance or of skill. There is something poetical in this specific feeling of pleasure when compared with the delights of certitude, "as twilight has more poetry in it than noonday."<sup>155</sup>

154. *Ibid.*, pp. 205-206.

155. *Ibid.*, pp. 206-207.

Therefore, since certitude—assent after reflection—gives us the satisfaction of repose after conflict, of intellectual security, of final and indelible success, and since other mental acts and attitudes—as simple assent and inference—do not cause this satisfaction, Newman concludes that by these characteristics certitude is distinguished from mere assent and other mental acts.

### 5. *False Certitude and Error.*

In studying Newman's doctrine of certitude we might come to the conclusion that he contradicts himself in this matter. On the one hand he stresses the indefectibility of certitude by maintaining that certitude which disappears is no certitude but error. On the other hand, however, he holds that certitude may fail when he says: "If I am certain of a thing I believe it will remain what I now hold it to be, even though my mind should have the bad fortune to let it drop." He gives an instance and tells us that he would resist a man who would try to betray him into injustice on so-called philosophical views, and this not because he thinks that immutable principles may become untrue on philosophical grounds but because man is fickle and changeable and easily commits intellectual sins against truth.<sup>156</sup> So he shows fear of the loss of certitude and seems to grant its defectibility although in rare cases only. Moreover, he states that "no line can be drawn between such real certitudes as have truth for their object and apparent certitudes. No distinct test can be named sufficient to discriminate between what may be called the false prophet and the true. What looks like certitude always is exposed to the chance of turning out to be a mistake."<sup>157</sup> The simple solution of this difficulty is given in a few words written in a letter to Dr. Charles Meynell: "I have defined certitude, a conviction of what is *true*. When a conviction of what is not true is considered as if it was a conviction of what is true, I have called it a false certitude."<sup>158</sup> Hence he wrote a great deal to prove "that failures of what was taken for certitude are the exception."<sup>159</sup>

From all this it follows that reflex assent or assent after reflection is not necessarily certitude. It may be false certitude. He calls these certitudes "professed certitudes"<sup>160</sup> or "mere convictions"<sup>161</sup> or "wrong convictions."<sup>162</sup>

156. *Ibid.*, p. 199.

157. *Ibid.*, p. 222.

158. Letter of 17 Nov. 1869, published in the author's "Newman's leer over het menselijk denken," (Neymegen, Dekker en van de Vegt, 1943) p. 289. Cf. *Gramm.*, p. 252.

159. *Gramm.*, pp. 221-222.

160. *Ibid.*, p. 253.

161. *Ibid.*, p. 258.

162. *Ibid.*, p. 221.

Newman comprises these certitudes under the name "error" and writes wonderful pages about the psychology of error.<sup>163</sup> He also gives the name of false certitude or error to some prejudices and enlarges on them in a fascinating way.<sup>164</sup>

### 6. *Material Certitude An Objection.*

After these explanations it will be possible to speak about the several subdivisions of certitude, mentioned by Newman. And first about material certitude.

Material certitude, as we have seen, is certitude in the popular sense of the word. Newman identifies it with simple assent and calls it also virtual and interpretative certitude.<sup>165</sup> This act of the mind occurs much more frequently than reflex assent or formal certitude.<sup>166</sup>

There were Martyrs, says Newman, who died for their faith with simple assent, without reflection. The youths who defied tyrants and the maidens who were silent under terrible tortures, often possessed simple, material certitude only, there being no occasion to turn it into reflex assent or formal certitude. This was the assent which impelled them to great achievements. It was a confidence, originating more in spontaneous workings of the mind—instincts, says Newman—than in arguments; a conviction, based on a vivid apprehension and inspired by a particular logic, and more concentrated in will and in deed than in the abstract intellectual development of notions.<sup>167</sup> But this simple assent of young, energetic, generous people was characterized by the fact that it could be turned into reflex assent at will if it were required. And this is what religious belief demands: it requires at least an assent which is convertible into certitude on demand.<sup>168</sup>

This proviso solves an objection which could undoubtedly be made against the *Grammar of Assent*. Newman had written this work to explain and to justify the belief of simple Christians who assented to the doctrines of their creed without reflection. For years and years he had felt a difficulty as to how they could be absolutely certain about the truth of dogmas without being able to give a satisfying explication of their grounds. Such belief resembled prejudice. Now, this latter problem found its solution in the fact that most of our beliefs were based on implicit reasons which do not admit of an adequate expression in words. We become certain, not by means of explicit proofs,

163. A summary is contained in this article: 3. Certitude is Indefectible.

164. *Pres. Pos.*, p. 227ff., *Gramm.*, pp. 254-255.

165. *Gramm.*, pp. 210-212.

167. *Ibid.*, p. 216.

166. *Ibid.*, p. 189.

168. *Ibid.*, p. 220.

i.e., by means of logic, but by means of the often untraceable workings of the illative sense. Every one possesses an illative sense, so every one can have certitude. But while explaining all this Newman analyzes the idea of certitude and excludes from it vulgar certitude, the certitude of the unlearned and unreflecting, and he maintains that their simple assent is no certitude. And this seems to be an evident contradiction, because Newman requires certitude in the full sense of the word for religion; certitude implies reflection; most people do not reflect on religious truths but accept them with simple assent and nevertheless their certitude is valid and reasonable!

In order to answer this objection we remind the reader of the proviso just quoted. Religion requires as a minimum condition such simple assent as can be turned into reflex assent at the first call of necessity. In other words, simple assent will be sufficient if it is at the same time virtual certitude, i.e., if it is apt to be changed into certitude in the full sense of the word by means of reflection. From this it follows that simple assent is not always material or virtual certitude, although Newman seems to insinuate this. Thus he apparently identifies ordinary assent with simple assent to religious truths when he states:

In proceeding to compare together simple assent and complex, that is Assent and Certitude, I begin by observing, that popularly no distinction is made between the two; or rather, that in religious teaching that is called Certitude to which I have given the name of Assent.<sup>169</sup>

A little farther, however, he draws a clear distinction:

As there is a condition of mind which is characterized by invincible ignorance, so there is another which may be said to be possessed of invincible knowledge; and it would be paradoxical in me to deny to such a mental state the highest quality of religious faith,—I mean certitude.

I allow this, and therefore I will call simple assent material certitude; or, to use a still more apposite term for it, *interpretative* certitude, I call it interpretative, signifying thereby that, though the assent in the individuals here contemplated is not a reflex act, still the question only has to be started about the truth of the objects of their assent, in order to elicit from them an act of faith in response which will fulfill the conditions of certitude, as I have drawn them out.<sup>170</sup>

More clearly still he repeats the same when saying: "There is an assent which is not virtual certitude, and is lost in the attempt to make it certitude."<sup>171</sup>

So all material certitude is simple assent, but all simple assent is not material certitude. There is more required for material certitude than for simple assent: simple assent must be certitude "in potentia" if it is to be called material or virtual certitude.

169. *Ibid.*, p. 210.

170. *Ibid.*, pp. 211-212.

171. *Ibid.*, p. 213.

Secondly, as regards this objection, it should be observed that although the religious faith of very many Catholics does not rise higher than simple assent, this faith has its natural basis in implicit reasonings; so it is rational on account of the illative sense. Their faith is therefore justifiable indeed even if it does not rest on verbal argumentation and logical proofs. That is what Newman wants to assert.

### *7. Moral Certitude; Physical and Metaphysical Certitude; Practical Certitude.*

It has been remarked before that Newman is not fond of the term "moral certitude." He must have met the word very often in treatises on Moral Theology, so he sometimes adopts it himself though in very rare cases. At one time he even observes that he designedly avoids the term on account of its vagueness.<sup>172</sup> This moral certitude is the highest possible certitude we are able to attain in most departments, not only in the department of ethics and religion, but even as regards many sciences, *viz.*, in those cases in which concrete conclusions cannot be justified by abstract demonstration.

It often happens that proofs which cannot be considered scientifical-  
ly satisfactory, are however sufficient to reach assent and certitude. Even if the grounds we can adduce for a proposition are but probabilities, our mind may be certain of their value and of the absolute reasonableness of their conclusion. In concrete matters this is the usual thing. Logic has not been put aside but the subtle working of the illative sense completes the insufficiency of logic.<sup>173</sup> It is the accumulation of probabilities, all pointing to the same conclusion, and causing the firm conviction that the conclusion is not probable but certain.

From this it appears that Newman comprises much more under the term "moral certitude" than is usually done, because he gives this name even to physical and metaphysical certitudes whenever he does not find strictly demonstrative proofs—demonstrative in the Newmanian sense—for an abstract conclusion. He practically classifies all concrete conclusions received as truths after reflection among moral certitudes. An adequate division of his terms would be: moral certitude as the opposite of mathematical certitude, parallel to real assent and notional assent, which could be called moral assent and mathematical assent. We have never come across the term "mathematical certitude," but we find the term "moral proof" as the opposite of

172. *Ibid.*, p. 318.

173. *Ibid.*, pp. 316-317.

"mathematical proof,"<sup>174</sup> whereas in the *University Sermons* the term "legal proof" is used in contradistinction to "moral proof."<sup>175</sup>

The terms "physical certitude" and "metaphysical certitude" have never been used by Newman as far as we know.<sup>176</sup> Nor can we point to any terms in Newman's works which bear their meanings. Newman deals with certitude in his own personal way as this chapter clearly goes to show.

In a rare case we find the term "practical certitude"<sup>177</sup> denoting a state of mind which excludes doubt but only on the strength of a conclusion which rests on an accumulation of probabilities and which is useful and safe to act on so that it must be accepted as a duty. This practical certitude appears to be identical with moral certitude.<sup>178</sup>

### *8. Certitude and Certainty, Certitude and Truth.*

Newman not only uses the term "certitude" but also "certainty." He explains the distinction in several places: certitude is a state of mind, certainty a quality of propositions.<sup>179a</sup> Generally he is consistent in the use of these terms but now and again we find the word "certainty" for a state of mind where we should expect the word "certitude."<sup>179b</sup>

The contents of the word "certainty" will be best expressed by the word "truth." When Newman explains reflex assent he says literally: "Let the proposition to which the assent is given be as absolutely true as the reflex act pronounces it to be, that is, objectively true as well as subjectively:—then the assent may be called a *perception*, the conviction a *certitude*, the proposition or truth a *certainty*, or thing known, or a matter of *knowledge*, and to assent to it is to *know*." So certainty is a true proposition, a logical truth.<sup>180</sup>

174. J. H. Newman, *Sermons Preached Before the University of Oxford*, (Standard edition; Longmans, Green and Co., London), pp. 274-275; cf. *Essay on Dev.*, pp. 112, 116; Ward, *Life I*, p. 168, where he contrasts probable proof with demonstrative, and p. 172 moral proof with demonstrative proof. See also Newman's letter quoted by Fr. H. Tristram in *Gregorianum*, XVIII (1937), 241.

175. p. 274.

176. In the *Grammar*, p. 412, he quotes Amort, speaking about physical and meta-

177. *Gramm.*, pp. 325-326.

physical certitude.

178. *Ibid.*, pp. 324 ff., 328-329. Cf. also J. H. Newman, *Discussions and Arguments*, (Standard edition; Longmans, Green and Co., London), pp. 391, 392, where he uses the term "practical certitude" in the sense of Moral Theology, viz., as a probable opinion, sufficient to act on but not sufficient for certitude in the Newmanian sense.

179a. *Gramm.* pp. 344, 196. *Apol.*, p. 20.

179b. "Certitude" is used as a synonym of "certainty" in the *Apol.*, pp. 129, 164, 225, *Univ. Serm.*, p. 215. This is done by Newman himself. In the *Grammar*, p. 326, he introduces a judge who does the same.

180. *Gramm.*, pp. 195-196.

The word "certainty" occurs comparatively seldom, evidently because Newman prefers the common word "truth" to "certainty." Very often, however, we come across the adjective "certain," which refers either to the state of mind or to the quality of a proposition, in other words, it is the adjective of certitude as well as of certainty.<sup>181</sup>

We find in the *Grammar* a text about certitude and certainty which may be easily misunderstood and misinterpreted. "The certainty of a proposition," says Newman, "does properly consist in the certitude of the mind which contemplates it."<sup>182</sup> This passage seems to imply that Newman wants to do away with the objectivity of human thinking at one blow; the truth of a judgment seems to depend on the human mind and not on things themselves.

It would be a great mistake to tear these words from their surroundings. Newman speaks about certitude given to us by the illative sense after considering a series of probabilities. These probabilities may be so various and numerous, and every person's mind is so very differently constituted from that of his neighbor, that there must unavoidably be a great difference in the estimation of those probabilities. Consequently, what is a proof for one is not always a proof for another, so that, if we wish to put it in a strong way, we might say: the certainty of this proposition virtually depends on the state of mind of the person considering it.

If Newman meant anything more than this he would be contradicting himself in a very flagrant manner.<sup>183</sup> From the words following this text, it appears that this explanation must be correct: "This of course

181. E.g., Newman says in his *Grammar*, p. 344: "Those propositions I call certain which are such that I am certain of them." But he is not always consistent, cf., e.g., Ward, *Life II*, p. 587: "We differ in our sense and our use of the word 'certain.' I use it of minds, you of propositions." This, however, refers to a special case, viz., a difference of opinion with W. Froude.

182. Gramm., p. 293. See, e.g., the misleading quotation of these words in the *Oxford Companion to English Literature*, I, V. In his *Newman on the Psychology of Faith in the Individual* (London, 1928), S. P. Juergens inserts the word "not" before "properly," which entirely solves the difficulty. I have not been able to discover by what authority he is justified in doing so. Not a single edition of the *Grammar* which I have seen — the earliest included — has the word "not." When the author was defending his dissertation before Nijmegen University, Professor Pompen, a well-known Dutch Newmanologist remarked in favor of Juergens' interpolation, that the use of the auxiliary "does" in this sentence pointed to the omission of "not." But the *Grammar* abounds in examples in which "to do" is used without "not," for the sake of emphasis. See, e.g., p. 61 fourth line from bottom, p. 63 third line from top, p. 71 middle, page 82 fifth l.f.t., p. 111 ninth line from bottom, p. 153 eighth l.f.b., p. 223 middle, p. 350 tenth l.f.t., p. 385 tenth and twelfth lines f.t., etc.

183. It would mean that he rejected the main things said in *Franc. Stud. X* (1950), 232-240, 418-440.

may be said without prejudice to the objective truth or falsehood of propositions"; in other words, the objectivity remains intact, and a proposition is true or not, independent of the mental attitude of the person who accepts it.

### 9. Doubt Referred to Certitude.

Doubt, according to Newman, is "a suspense of mind"<sup>184</sup> or "a suspense of assent."<sup>185</sup> He observes that "the word is often taken to mean the deliberate recognition of a thesis as being uncertain" but in this sense doubt is "an assent to a proposition at variance with the thesis."<sup>186</sup>

He emphasizes the fact that we should not mix up doubt with objections or difficulties. Certitude and assent exclude doubt but leave room for objections and difficulties. "Ten thousand objections as little make one doubt, as ten thousand ponies make one horse."<sup>187</sup> Many people are very sensitive as regards difficulties in religious matters. Newman was one of them. This, however, is not a reason to indulge in fostering doubts. After his conversion he did not doubt any more of the Catholicity of his adopted Church and of the truths she taught him notwithstanding some difficulties which he retained. Though the objections may be clearly before one's mind, though their strength may increase ever so much, this need not be a reason to doubt the truths of the propositions concerned at all, as little as he who cannot solve a mathematical problem need therefore doubt the existence of an answer.<sup>188</sup> According to Newman; certitude and assent are incompatible with doubt because the one as well as the other is an unconditional acceptance of a proposition as true.

All this does not imply that Newman has not known the psychological phenomena of incertitude and intellectual anxiety which may surround our assent and certitude. His descriptions of these *quasi* doubts are masterful.

It is something very human to see our assent attended by flitting misgivings which do not touch our inner soul nor damage the act of assent itself.<sup>189</sup> Such anxieties, however, are merely emotions and feelings, caused by the imagination and the fancy, and have no relation with our intellect. Newman compares them to that beating of the heart and that trembling which even the bravest soldiers experience when

184. *Gramm.*, p. 7.

185. *Ibid.*, pp. 190, cf. 194.

186. *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

187. Ward, *Life II*, p. 250.

188. *Apol.*, p. 239.

189. *Gramm.*, pp. 183-184.

expecting an immediate attack from the enemy. This trouble of mind may beset a firm believer who fears that he believes not strongly enough.<sup>190</sup> Many more examples of *quasi* doubts are given by Newman, doubts which do not damage our certitude and which the moralists call "dubia imprudentia."<sup>191</sup>

If, then, the essence of doubt consists in the suspense of mind or the suspense of assent, it follows that the transition of simple assent to reflex assent need not at all involve doubt. The examination into the grounds of our assent does not necessarily take place because we are afraid that there are no grounds. An attempt to prove what we accept is not a suspense of assent.

If we wish to give a name to the attitude of mind connected with this transition we might perhaps best call it methodical doubt. The intellectual assents, says Newman, in which we have been instructed from our youths, have to be tested, realized, and developed by the exercise of our mature judgment.<sup>192</sup> But methodical doubt has nothing to do with real doubt.

This methodical doubt also widely differs from formal or theological doubt,<sup>193</sup> a strange term, expressing what Newman defines as "the deliberate recognition of a thesis as being uncertain" either in matters of religion or in profane matters. As an example he quotes the proposition: "*That 'Great Britain is an island' is uncertain*" is true.<sup>194</sup>

As to universal doubt, we have observed<sup>195</sup> that Newman emphatically rejects its lawfulness as a contradiction in terms,<sup>196</sup> although he confesses that the state of mind caused by this universal doubt may yield a specific satisfaction: "After high aspirations, after renewed endeavours, after bootless toil, after long wanderings, after hope, effort, weariness, failure, painfully alternating and recurring, it is an immense relief to the exhausted mind to be able to say: At length I know that I can know nothing about anything." The assent to this proposition is false certitude resulting in the repose of scepticism. But this tranquillity of mind has no permanence because it is unnatural.<sup>197</sup>

## 10. *Truth and Probability.*

Truth, or certainty, or thing known, as Newman calls it<sup>198</sup>—is the proper object of the intellect.<sup>199</sup> If our intellect does not reach truth

190. *Ibid.*, pp. 202-203.

191. *Ibid.*, pp. 217-220.

192. *Ibid.*, p. 192.

193. *Ibid.*, p. 195.

194. *Ibid.*, pp. 7, 195.

195. *Franc. Stud.* (1950), p. 235ff.

196. *Gramm.*, p. 377.

197. *Ibid.*, pp. 208-209.

198. *Ibid.*, p. 196.

199. *Ibid.*, p. 172. *Apol.* p. 243.

but untruth, either the premisses are false or the reasoning itself is faulty.<sup>200</sup>

But when reading other statements written down by Newman we cannot help getting the impression that as regards concrete matters he thinks probability and not truth the real object of the intellect; e.g., he asserts that the proposition "I shall die" at the highest can only be proved to be "truth-like," not true; in other words it is a probability as far as proofs are concerned.<sup>201</sup> More than once he says that probability is the guide of life,<sup>202</sup> a doctrine which has influenced all his works and has gained for him "many hard names."<sup>203</sup> The object of assent is a truth, he says, but the object of an inference is a probability;<sup>204</sup> in other words, logic results only in probabilities. "Our dearest interests, our personal welfare, our property, our health, our reputation, we freely hazard, not on proof, but on a single probability, which is sufficient for our conviction, because prudence dictates to us so to take it."<sup>205</sup>

From the foregoing pages it will be clear how all these statements are to be reconciled with each other.

First we should remember Newman's peculiar terminology. Probability is to be considered as the opposite of what has been demonstrated. Demonstration, however, as we have seen, implies objective irresistibility, in other words, demonstrative proof is a syllogism which is objectively irresistible.<sup>206</sup> Now all that approaches demonstration but cannot be called objectively irresistible, is probable only, according to Newman.

But all this does not imply that our certitudes are but probabilities after all, or, in other words, that we give assent to probable propositions or feel convinced of the truth of probabilities. This would be a contradiction in terms: we should call a proposition probable and certain at the same time. Nor must we infer that Newman's certitude ultimately rests in a series of probabilities. When in 1907 the thesis was condemned saying: "Assensus fidei ultimo innititur in congerie probabilitatum," i.e., the assent of faith has its ultimate basis in an accumulation of probabilities, the modernist George Tyrrel thought

200. *Apol.*, p. 243.

201. *Gramm.*, pp. 157-158.

202. *Apol.*, pp. 19, 199; *Gramm.*, p. 237; *Essay on Dev.*, p. 12.

203. *Apol.*, p. 19.

204. *Gramm.*, p. 259.

205. *Essay on Dev.*, p. 115.

206. See this chapter, section II, p. 4, b.

that this dealt a blow to Newman. But Pope Pius X declared explicitly that the condemnation did not concern Newman's doctrine.<sup>207</sup>

And rightly. We have been showing that Newman's probabilities refer to concrete matters only and that they are the material from which our intellect reads the truth, the full, pure, unadulterated truth, which cannot be demonstrated by irrefragable logic but which appears from the probabilities by the subtle workings of the illative faculty of our mind.

Certitude, arising in this way, is the result of two factors, a material factor, viz., probabilities, and a formal factor, the influence of the illative sense.

We intend to say something more about the relation between these factors when proving the existence of the illative sense.

### 11. *Faith and Certitude.*

Although this study does not pretend to deal with the psychology of faith according to Newman—this has been done by several authors, especially by Sylvester P. Juergens, S. M.<sup>208</sup>—it will be instructive to consider Newman's notion of certitude in the light of his notion of faith.

As an introductory remark it may be observed that Newman often uses the word "belief" for any assent, sometimes for notional assent,<sup>209</sup> more often, however, for real assent,<sup>210</sup> either simple or reflex.<sup>211</sup> The context shows which assent is meant.

Since the acceptance of a proposition on authority is assent to that proposition, the word "belief" is used for such assent,<sup>212</sup> but we find the word "faith" more frequently,<sup>213</sup> especially if a proposition is received on the authority of God himself.

207. See E. I. O'Dwyer, *Cardinal Newman and the Encyclical Pascendi Dominici Gregis. An Essay* (London, 1907). The same may be proved from Fr. Tristram's article in the *Gregorianum* XVIII (1937), 241 ff. where Newman's meaning is explained very clearly and decisively.

For a good understanding of Newman's meaning we should read what he wrote about the subjectivity of our faith in the Latin Preface to the *University Sermons* as published in *Gregorianum* XVIII (1937), 250 ff.. *De logica methodo fidei*.

208. See *Newman on the Psychology of Faith*, (London, 1928).

209. E.g., *Gramm.*, p. 167, where he classifies cases of credence or opinion under belief.

210. *Ibid.*, pp. 87, 82, 99 last lines.

211. Simple: *Gramm.*, p. 200, p. 254; reflex: *Ibid.*, p. 215, p. 242 last line, p.

212. *Ibid.*, p. 242, p. 243.

213. Cf. *Univ. Serm.*, pp. 188, 190, where he calls faith: reliance on the word of another, acceptance of a divine message.

Now, this is the faith we speak of, when dealing with faith and certitude in Newman's terminology.

For Newman has original thoughts on this subject, and writes them down in an original way, so much so that they might at first sight even appear suspect. As his works intend to defend the certitude of faith, we must not omit considering this aspect of Newman's doctrine.

Especially in his *University Sermons* we come across paradoxical expressions. Although these sermons were written in his Anglican period, it does not imply that he afterwards changed his views. They have been developed and clarified, but on the whole we may say that he did not withdraw anything when he prepared a new edition of them after the publication of the *Grammar of Assent*.<sup>214</sup>

Thus Newman states that faith does not require as strong a proof "as is necessary for what is called a rational conviction" because faith is mainly guided by antecedent considerations, received principles, prepossessions and prejudices (in a good sense of the word), and further by its own hopes, fears and existing opinions. Faith is a principle of action, and action cannot afford a minute investigation.<sup>215</sup> Our inclinations strongly act upon our faith: "persons believe what they wish to be true." Hence, while reason wants strict proofs, faith will put up with vague and incomplete evidence.<sup>216</sup> Therefore Newman cannot agree with the analysis of faith of his time, and he says:<sup>217</sup>

It is usual at this day to speak as if Faith were simply of a moral nature, and depended and followed upon a distinct act of Reason beforehand—Reason warranting, on the ground of evidence, both ample and carefully examined, that the Gospel comes from God, and *then* Faith embracing it. On the other hand, the more Scriptural representation seems to be this, which is obviously more agreeable to facts also, that, instead of there being really any such united process of reasoning first, and then believing, the act of Faith is sole and elementary, and complete in itself, and depends on no process of mind previous to it: and this doctrine is borne out by the common opinion of men, who, though they contrast Faith and Reason, yet rather consider Faith to be weak Reason, than a moral quality or act following upon Reason. The Word of Life is offered to man; and, on its being offered, he has Faith in it. Why? On these two grounds—the word of its human messenger and the likelihood of the message. And why does he feel the message to be probable? Because he has a love for it, his love being strong, though the testimony is weak. He has a keen sense of the intrinsic excellence of the message, of its desirableness, of its likeness to what it seems to Him Divine Goodness would vouchsafe did He vouchsafe any, of the need of a Revelation, and its probability. Thus Faith is the reasoning of a religious mind, or of what Scripture calls a right or renewed heart, which acts upon presumptions rather than evidence, which speculates and ventures on the future when it cannot make sure of it.

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214. Here we use the 1871 edition. The prefact summarizes his doctrine on faith: it was evidently written in the same year.

215. *Univ. Serm.*, pp. 187-188.

216. *Ibid.*, p. 190.

217. *Ibid.*, pp. 202-203.

Then Newman proceeds to prove this from the manner in which St. Paul preached at Athens. If faith depended on clear and cautious reasoning, says Newman, St. Paul would have better worked a miracle first, instead of connecting weak evidence with an appeal to presumptions and the inner state of his hearers.<sup>218</sup>

In another sermon Newman maintains that the safeguard of faith is not reason, but the right state of the heart, i.e., love, the "pia affectio" or "voluntas credendi."<sup>219</sup>

A serious difficulty against this doctrine presents itself just as soon as it is stated; Newman will be the first to formulate it:<sup>220</sup>

Such a view may be made an excuse for all manner of prejudice and bigotry, and leads directly to credulity and superstition; and, on the other hand, in the case of unbelief . . . it affords a sort of excuse for impenetrable obduracy. Antecedent probabilities may be equally available for what is true, and what pretends to be true, for a Revelation and its counterfeit, for Paganism, or Mahometanism, or Christianity.

It will be easy to prove Newman's orthodoxy as regards those statements and to clear him from the charge of subjectivism. For this end we should try to understand what he means and not put our own interpretation on his words.

First we wish to draw the reader's attention to the fact that even the simple assent in matters of faith shown by the martyrs was virtual certitude. This implies that, if necessary, reflection would evince its implicit grounds. In other words, there exists a rational basis which may be made conscious and reflex. As a matter of fact, Newman requires a rational basis for any certitude.<sup>221</sup>

More clearly still appears Newman's orthodoxy from his *Idea of a University*, in which he complains about the subjectivism of Protestants in England.<sup>222</sup> Nowadays, he says, it is no longer maintained that faith consists in knowledge, but in feeling or sentiment. The old idea, still lingering in the Established Church, came to this: faith is an act of the intellect, its object is a truth, and its result is knowledge. Look at the Prayer Book: it gives "credenda et agenda," things to be believed and things to be done. Owing to Lutheranism, however, people began to view faith not as the acceptance of a revealed doctrine, not as an act of the intellect, but as a feeling, an affection, an appetency. As this conception of faith became more and more prevalent,

218. *Ibid.*, pp. 203-204.

219. *Ibid.*, pp. 234, 236.

220. *Ibid.*, p. 232.

221. *Franc. Stud.* XI (1951), 67-73.

222. *Idea*, pp. 27-29, 31.

the relation between faith and certitude or knowledge was more and more forgotten or denied. At length this so-called religion of the heart was identified with the virtue of faith. Some people disapproved of this pietism indeed, others admired it. But both parties agreed that religious feeling was the essence of religion, that religion was not based on reasoning but on taste and sentiment, that no religion whatever contained objective truth. According to these men, religion consisted in something outside the sphere of the intellect, *viz.*, in the affections, in the imagination, in inward persuasions, in pleasurable feelings, sudden changes and sublime fancies. Religion was only the fulfillment of wishes and desires of the human heart, but not an external fact, and a work of God. There was a demand for religion and therefore there was a supply. Human nature could as little live without religion as without bread. Consequently, religion was something useful, something venerable, something beautiful, the sanction of the moral order, the support of governments, the curb of waywardness and selfishness, where laws could not effect all this. But if somebody would ask what was the basis of religion, the answer would be that this question is too delicate to put, but if the truth must be spoken, the long and the short of the matter was this, that "Religion was based on custom, on prejudice, on law, on education, on habit, on loyalty, on feudalism, on enlightened expedience, on many, many things, but not at all on reason."

The entire chapter from which this vivid description of religious subjectivism has been taken,—and we may even say, the first four discourses of the *Idea of a University*—constitute a strong protest against this doctrine and argue for Newman's orthodoxy.

Nevertheless, a further proof might be desirable in view of strongly-worded expressions Newman has used and the wrong interpretation given by many, the more so since these expressions were put down during his Anglican period. It will be useful to point to statements which date from the same period and which clarify his meaning in an unambiguous way.

Without mentioning the word Newman explains his paradoxical propositions by referring to the illative sense, and this as early as the time of the *University Sermons*: "Though the evidence *with* which Faith is content is apparently inadequate to its purpose, yet this is no proof of real weakness or imperfection in its reasoning. It seems to be contrary to Reason, yet it is not; it is both independent of and distinct from what are called philosophical inquiries, intellectual systems,

courses of argument and the like.”<sup>223</sup> Then he proceeds to explain that when believing or when producing other intellectual acts we advance on grounds which we are not always able to show, and even if we are able to show them, we cannot always prove them to be true.<sup>224</sup> It is an implicit acceptance of propositions. Here, too, Newman uses the word instinct for this phenomenon<sup>225</sup> and shows that in other cases, too, we act in the same way: we trust our memory, we rely on our senses, although they have led us astray before. The reasons which convince us of their trustworthiness are instinctive,<sup>226</sup> in other words, the explanation of our certitude is the illative sense. He expresses himself more emphatically still when stating: “Faith cannot exist without grounds or without an object; but it does not follow that all who have faith should recognize, and be able to state what they believe and why.”<sup>227</sup> If you assert that dogmas or evidences have nothing at all to do with faith you would disjoin religion from theology; but if you maintain that true faith is impossible unless you draw up a series of dogmas first, preceded by their evidences, then you demand that every child and every peasant should be a theologian.<sup>228</sup> Moreover, Newman blames authors like Tillotson, Paley and Douglas, who want everyone to show an argumentative basis for his creed, and who do not make a distinction between arguing and reasoning, i.e., between explicit grounds and implicit grounds. To believe is a rational act, but this rationality does not necessarily imply investigation, argumentation, proofs. These processes are but the explicit form of thinking and reasoning as found in some minds. Of course it does not follow that we should reject explicit grounds, although we may easily understand how some people have drawn this conclusion. Considering the effects and the concomitant phenomena of arguing about the creed, e.g., the disagreements and conflicts caused by debating, the proud self-confidence of learned theological authors, the laxity of opinion of men who study the evidences, the tepidity, worldly-mindedness and formality of those who defend dogmas with all their might—we spontaneously begin to wonder: what has this learned array of logical proofs to do with true religion of heart? And we even find a kind of confirmation in those Scripture words which point out that religion is a divine life, seated in the affections and displaying itself in spiritual wonders of grace. But, of course, this is an extreme and manifestly false opinion.<sup>229</sup>

223. *Univ. Serm.*, p. 212.

224. *Ibid.*, pp. 212-213.

225. *Ibid.*, p. 213.

226. *Ibid.*, pp. 213-214.

227. *Ibid.*, p. 254.

228. *Ibid.*, pp. 253-254.

229. *Ibid.*, pp. 260-263.

In a later sermon Newman clearly states his doctrine: At the beginning and at the end of our spiritual, supernatural life we find two gifts: both refer to the intellect and both have been bestowed on us by God. The one is faith, an act of reason, but so spontaneous, so unconscious, so unargumentative, that we seem to look at an act of the will. The other is wisdom, the orderly and mature development of thinking, called in earthly language: science and philosophy.<sup>230</sup>

From all this it will be evident that Newman considers faith as an act of reason, which, however, cannot be performed except under the influence of the will.<sup>231</sup>

This thesis is already implied in Newman's doctrine that the whole man reasons and not reason only. We have explained what Newman means by this. For we must not and cannot deny the influence of the will when we accept propositions as true which are not evident by intuition nor by strict demonstration. He explained this most clearly as regards the act of faith in a letter to Mrs. Froude:<sup>232</sup>

I wish you would consider whether you have a right notion how to gain faith. It is, we know, the Gift of God, but I am speaking of it as a human process and attained by human means.<sup>233</sup> Faith then is not a conclusion from premisses, but the result of an act of the will, following upon a conviction that to believe is a duty. The simple question you have to ask yourself is "Have I a conviction that I ought to accept the (Roman) Catholic Faith as God's word?" if not, at least, "do I tend to such a conviction?" or "am I near upon it?" For directly you have a conviction that you ought to believe, reason has done its part, and what is wanted for faith is, not proof, but will . . .

I have never come across a more accurate and distinct summary of Newman's doctrine on religious faith than in these few sentences, directed to the wife of his unbelieving friend William Froude. Here he emphasizes the fact that he is not speaking about the element of grace in the act of faith, which he deals with in other books. He is enlarging on human cooperation with grace: the activities of intellect, reason and will. The part of intellect and reason comes to this: they have to procure certitude about the so-called "motiva credibilitatis:" God exists, God has revealed a number of truths, God wants us to accept those truths. This certitude is the result of the workings of the illative sense, aided by logic. Then the will comes in: it has to force the intellect to assent, i.e., to accept the revealed teachings unconditionally as true. Closely related is Newman's doctrine about the preparation

230. *Ibid.*, p. 279.

231. E. Przywara, S. J., proves the same by using quotations from Newman's Journals; see *Stimmen der Leit*, Band p. 112 (1927), pp. 432-437.

232. Ward, *Life* I, 242; see also *Ibid.*, II, 591-592.

233. This proviso holds good for the whole of this chapter: Newman is enlarging on the natural element only of the act of faith and not on the part played in it by grace. See also *Gregorianum XVIII* (1937), p. 245.

to the act of faith, consisting in a state of mind which must be permanent, lest we should be in danger of losing faith. This is love, the "pia affectio," or the wish to believe.<sup>234</sup>

(*To be continued*)

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234. See also Ward, *Life* I, 644ff. about relation between grace reason and will, in the act of faith; *Univ. Serm.* pp. 189, 193, 239 about the influence of our inclinations, feelings and affections on the act of faith; *Essay on Dev.*, p. 327 about the act of faith and the illative sense, here called "prudent judgement"; *Ibid.*, pp. 328-330 about the faith of the simple-minded; *Discussions and Arguments*, pp. 391-392, about the absolute certitude of the assent of faith; *Occasional Sermons*, 60ff. about the dispositions for faith but only as far as human cooperation is concerned; *Call.*, pp. 291-294, an illustration of the psychology of faith in the individual; *Disc. and Arg.* 251, where in a footnote he corrects Keble's view of love as the preliminary of faith given in the *Apologia*, pp. 19, 20. The most elaborate and clear exposition of Newman's doctrine about the relations between faith, reason and the will is to be found in his *Theses de Fide*, published and introduced by Fr. Henry Tristram in *Gregorianum*, XVIII (1937), 219-241, and the Latin Preface to the *University Sermons*, *ibid.*, pp. 248-260.

\*See *Franciscan Studies*, XI (1951), 194-212.

## COMMENTARY

### PROFESSOR RENOIRTE'S COSMOLOGY

Another in the series of courses published by the Institute Supérieur de Philosophie of the University of Louvain and translated into English, the present volume by Professor Renoirte, trained not only in philosophy but in the physical and mathematical sciences, might be expected to answer the crying need for a good cosmology text. Even a hasty glance at the contents, however, soon convinces the reader that the principal title **Cosmology** is misleading. It is the more modest subtitle that indicates the actual content and scope of the work. In fact, one wonders whether Professor Renoirte himself would approve of the translator's addition of **Cosmology** to the original title, *Eléments de critique des sciences et de cosmologie*, particularly in view of the learned author's remark in his Preface to the second French edition: "Les notes de cours que nous présentons dans ces pages, n'ont pas la prétention de poser ni résoudre tous les problèmes que soulève l'étude philosophique du monde matériel." And the fact that he entitled his work *Eléments* makes it clear that he did not intend to raise or resolve even all the principal problems.

As a matter of fact, the author is concerned with but one basic problem in the whole work - a problem, incidentally, that seems to be as perennial as the "cosmology" of the *philosophia perennis* - the relation of philosophy and the sciences. Those familiar with Renoirte's writings will recognize that this problem has always been one of his principal concerns. In the present work, he uses the problem of the constitution of bodies to clarify in concrete fashion his own view of the matter. Instituting a critique of both physics and cosmology, the author determines the limits of their respective contributions to man's knowledge of the material universe by pointing out the precise type of question each discipline is qualified to raise and to answer.

The work falls into three parts, the length of each being inversely proportional to its philosophic importance. The first and longest is entitled "A critical study of some questions in positive science." The questions discussed are restricted to the sciences of physics and chemistry and, even within these fields, their discussion is purposely kept on a rather elementary level lest it exceed the grasp of one who has had nothing more than a normal highschool student's acquaintance with either of the sciences involved. As a result most of the really vital questions of the empirical sciences that would or should interest the cosmologist are not even touched upon. This limitation, of course, is understandable in view of the author's conception of the role of Cosmology and perfectly justified in view of his immediate objective, which is to illustrate by a few well-chosen examples how the physicist progresses towards an ever increasing precision of scientific concept.

The second part, entitled "Elements of a critique of the sciences," constitutes the best part of the work, even though Dr. Renoirte claims it is not the philosopher's, but the physicist's task, that he undertakes in this section (p.197). Undoubtedly this point will be questioned by some, particularly when even such anti-metaphysicians as the members of the "Vienna circle" have finally entrusted it to the philosopher of science. (cf. e.g. P.G. Frank, *Modern Science and Its Philosophy*, (Harvard Univ. Press, 1949), p.277.) Nevertheless, the fact remains that the general lines of the author's critique were sketched already by that theoretical physicist, Pierre Duhem (*La théorie physique, son object et sa structure*. Paris, 1906). This second part is broken down into three chapters which deal with "Things and Facts," "Laws," and "Theories." In the first chapter,

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Fernand Renoirte, Sc. D., Ph. D. (Transl. James F. Coffey, Ph. D., S.T.D.) *Cosmology. Elements of a Critique of the Sciences and of Cosmology.* (The Philosophical Series of the Higher Institute of Philosophy. University of Louvain, Belgium) New York City: Joseph F. Wagner, Inc.; London: B. Herder, 1950. Pp. xv+240 + Topical Index and Index to Proper Names. \$3.50.

the author defends the thesis: "Physical properties have for their definition nothing but the description of their measuring instruments (p.104). Incidentally, the English translation "description of their measuring instruments" does not do justice to the French original "la description de leur procédé de mesure," for this conception which P.W. Bridgman has expanded into his well-known "operationalism," makes the concept of a physical property "synonymous with the corresponding set of operations" (*Logic of Modern Physics*). In other words, it involves not merely a description of the instruments used to measure the property in question, but includes the description of the exact manner and actual conditions under which these instruments were used. Following his mentor, the author points out that laws, for the physicist, simply express the numerical relations that exist between the measurements of properties and are of a provisional nature because they are approximate and schematic. Theories are not true "explanations," but are merely more general or universal laws or syntheses from which the particular laws can be logically deduced. Thus the burden of this second section is to establish the general thesis that Duhem insisted upon so strongly, *viz.* that physics and the physical sciences cannot give us an explanation of the material universe, but merely a provisional description of how it acts. Thus, the way is paved for the introduction of an additional science of the material universe, cosmology.

The third part is entitled "Elements of cosmology." It is the only strictly philosophical part, according to the author, and the weakest of the three according to the reviewer. One would expect the author in this section to undertake a philosophical explanation to supplement the description of the physical sciences. His statement that "cosmology asks what is necessarily implied and supposed by every system of postulates made by the physical sciences," would lead one to think that this is what he was about to do. But "every system of postulates" (*tout système*) is taken collectively. In other words, he restricts the cosmologist's task to determining the necessary conditions for what is common to all systems of postulates, and hence the cosmologist need not be concerned with the individual physical theories. "The theses of cosmology are independent of physical theories" (p.179). "Physics does not ask cosmology to explain why there are different natures, since physics itself knows only of differences of degrees. The explanation of these differences is not a philosophical problem, it is a physical problem. It is resolved by the theory of the structure of the atoms." (pp. 210-11). His claim is that if cosmology were to build upon or attempt to complement the physical theories or to build upon anything more than the most general properties of material things, *viz.* their materiality or spatio-temporally it would still remain within the realm of physics or become simply a glorified general science or what the logical empiricist would prefer to call a "scientific world conception." In consequence, its theoretical explanations would be even more tenuous and less certain than those of physics proper.

Of the two poles of thought characteristic of contemporary Thomistic cosmology according to N. Luyten, O.P., Professor Renoirte evidently would champion the thesis that toute idée de continuité entre la science et la philosophie doit être abandonnée; la différenciation est plus profonde et plus essentielle qu'une simple division du travail. Nous sommes en présence de deux types de savoir différents, qui ne sont nullement ordonnés l'uno ni à l'autre. Aussi à l'encontre de la première position, on estime que la cosmologie n'a pas à consulter la science pour savoir ce qu'elle doit faire, mais plutôt pour savoir ce qu'elle ne doit pas faire. D'aucuns vont même jusqu'à définir la philosophie de la nature en fonction de ce que la science ne fait pas." ("Cosmologie", *Rev. phil. de Louvain*, XLIX (1951) p.687.)

To illustrate this function of cosmology in a concrete manner the author turns to the problem of the constitution of bodies. "In this field," the translator informs us, he defends the traditional doctrine of hylomorphism" (p.iv). Any one familiar with the "tradition" will undoubtedly find Professor Renoirte's treatment of hylomorphism interesting, but will probably question the translator's evaluation of it. For the author's "defense" in its own way is a rather devastating critique of what most cosmology textbooks propound as "traditional

hylomorphism." It is refreshing to have someone point out the logical inconclusiveness of the usual arguments for a "theory" which too many have elevated to the status of a metaphysical dogma — even if it be under the pretense of establishing the doctrine on firmer grounds. For Renoirte's defense represents a retreat from what he clearly regards to be an indefensible position. The hylomorphic theory is no explanation for the differences between bodies. As he makes clear in the text quoted above, this "is a physical problem. It is resolved by the theory of the structure of the atoms." And his critique makes it amply clear that the hylomorphic theory is likewise no explanation if the changes of one kind of body into another — at least on an organic level. These changes are likewise "explained" in terms of physical and chemical laws. Thus he completely abandons the field of battle where so many of his neo-scholastic contemporaries are still in the thick of the fight.

Professor Renoirte, perhaps, does not present his basic position as bluntly as we have put it. It is revealed only gradually and with a certain reluctance. One would almost get the impression that the author was attempting to cover his retreat lest his companions discover he had abandoned them for a battlestation on higher ground. For he creates the illusion that even for a man of science like himself, the traditional arguments for the theory still have some demonstrative value in explaining bodily changes, though he himself is concerned only with "the minimum necessary for the proof of the hylomorphic theory" (p.299).

It is with his new position, however, that we are chiefly concerned. If not "traditional" in the narrow sense of being found in Aristotle or St. Thomas, it does contain traditional elements. The author finds the minimum prerequisite for demonstrating hylomorphism in that which makes a thing material, viz. its spatio-temporal character. "We shall insist therefore that the hylomorphic theory be established by using as a starting point what is required in order to be able to say that something is material. We reach the conclusion, therefore, that in order to be material it is necessary and sufficient for an object to be spatiotemporal" (p.233). The spatial aspect, which could be important in a Thomistic system, however, is actually ignored and it is the temporal character that becomes the exclusive basis for his argument. "In other words, that which makes a being material is that which also makes this being temporal" (p.236). (The logician, of course, will be quick to point out that even if we concede this statement, we cannot argue: Because a thing is temporal, therefore it is material. But Renoirte's whole reasoning process makes it clear that in order to be material it is necessary and sufficient for it to be temporal, and it is in this sense that we should understand his statement). Whatever is temporal is constantly becoming, that is to say, it is "in a continual flux of mutually exclusive moments." This "becoming" or change is not taken in the usual sense of substantial or accidental change. In fact, if we exclude the realm of living creatures with which he is not concerned, even such radical changes as are involved in the transmutation of elements cannot be established as substantial in the philosophic sense (p.223). "Therefore, it is necessary to make a careful distinction between change in the strict sense and the duration of material beings. A body has a temperature, a color, a speed and so forth; and it can change its temperature, its speed or its color and still remain the same body. These changes are changes in the strict sense, accidental modifications of a material being. But even if a body keeps all its determinations at the same degree, and hence remains as immobile and as unchanged as possible, yet all its determinations exist at different moments. For example, a body which keeps the same temperature, which from the heat point of view, therefore, does not change, remains warm from noon to half-past twelve. The determination, 'to be warm at noon' is not identical with the determination, 'to be warm at half-past twelve,' since these two determinations exclude one another. Hence this being has a successive duration without undergoing any changes" (p.236).

"But in order to explain the change of a material substance which remains the same, which keeps the same accidental determinations, an external physical cause is not to be sought for, because this substance does not change; it

remains in the same state. It is the essence, the very nature of the material being which imposes on it this very inferior manner of being, namely, its inability to exist except by becoming, that is, by passing through continuously successive instants. Hence our question is not 'Why does a material being change?' but 'What is the nature of a being which has its duration by passing through mutually exclusive instants . . .' It is therefore necessary to ask why a material being which exists becomes, even without changing. It is necessary to ask what is a substance which becomes" (p.237). "A substance which can only exist by continuously becoming cannot be simple...The essence of a material being must include two principles of being, a principle of determination and a principle of determinability... The principle of determination is called the substantial form, and the principle of determinability is called prime matter in material substances" (p.238).

There are three crucial steps in this proof: (1) In order to be material it is necessary and sufficient to be temporal. Such a material object is in constant change, not in the ordinary sense of either substantial or accidental change (since the author cannot find sufficient grounds on the material level to distinguish between the two), but in the sense that it is constantly becoming, that is, passing through mutually exclusive instants. (2) A body that is successively becoming cannot be essentially simple. (3) Hence, it is hylomorphically composed. Or to sum it up in his own words, "substantial form and prime matter are the realities necessarily implied in the possibility of a material being, that is of a temporal substance, a substance which remains the same and is in continuous change, of a substance that is essentially one and not simple, for everything that is successive is not simple" (p.239).

Let us consider these three steps individually. First of all, Renoirte argues that things are material because they are temporal. The very fact that a material being endures, even if to all appearances it is unchanged, it is constantly becoming. Why? Because it is "passing through mutually exclusive instants." To be warm at noon is not the same as to be warm at 12:30, for what was warm at noon could be cold at 12:30. Now it is interesting to recall that William Ockham used substantially the same argument against Giles of Rome to prove that an angel could also be said to be in time. "Si dicas quod substantia corporalis subjacet motui, et ideo mensuratur tempore, ita dico quod substantia angeli subjacet diversis affirmationibus et negationibus, et per consequens mensuratur tempore" (*Sent.* II, q. 13).

It is true that this is not a Thomistic opinion, for the angels for St. Thomas enjoy a unique type of duration in a "created eternity" or "aevum," but the point remains to be seen whether this distinction is as radical as it seems and whether it would hold up under Ockham's thoroughgoing criticism. But even apart from this, the question remains whether there is any substantial difference between the angelic substances, which even for St. Thomas required time as the measure of their accidental changes, and Renoirte's material substances, which apparently are not involved in substantial changes either—at least substantial change is not made the basis of successive duration as it was for the scholastics.

There is another way in which Renoirte's successive moments could be understood, though his example of the body temperature does not illustrate it, namely, that the angel is incorruptible, whereas a material substance is not. Ockham anticipates this objection also. "Si dicas quod angeli ex se semper manent, sed corporales substantiae non, quia corruptiuntur per causas intrinsecas, contra: illud est contra fidem, quia quod esse alicujus effectus desinat, hoc est per subtractionem alicujus causae conservantis. Nunc autem tam angeli quam substantiae corporales dependent a Deo sicut a causa conservante; ergo per subtractionem divinae conservationis ab angelo corruptiuntur sicut substantiae corporalis corruptiuntur per subtractionem suae causae conservantis, sicut lux corruptiuntur per subtractionem solis. Ergo non plus determinat angelus sibi ex se esse perpetuum quam substantia corporalis, quia ita bene deus posset conservare in perpetuum unum asinum si sibi placeret sicut unum angelum. Sed differentia est in hoc, quia angeli possunt creari et annihilari sive corrupti a solo Deo et non ab agentibus creatis; sed substantiae generabiles possunt causari et corrupti ab agente creato, saltem partialiter. Ex his tunc sic arguo:

*substantia generabilis non mensuratur aevo quia est generabilis et corruptibilis, ergo nec substantia angeli quia est creabilis et annihilabilis*" (*ibid.*).

What is sometimes overlooked is that *aeviternity* represents a pagan notion that was only partially digested by Christian philosophers. This is apparent if we consider the definition found in the *Summa fratris Alexandri*: "Aevum est duratio rei habentis esse post non esse, sed non vertibilis in non esse ut in perpetuis" (I,1, tr. 2, ed. Quaracchi, t.I,100). Aristotle's angels or "intelligences" were neither created nor annihilated. Obviously the scholastics could not accept this notion, which Ockham tells us bluntly is "contra fidem." Still the essential difference between the corruptible and incorruptible substances played such a part in Aristotle's conception of the universe that the scholastics were loath to reject it entirely. They compromised by attributing to the angels a "created eternity". They were indeed created, received *esse post non esse*. But once created, they could not return to nothingness (*non vertibilis in non esse*). It is not a question of whether or not the angels are "immortal" because *de facto* God will not annihilate them. The real problem is this. Do they enjoy some intrinsic necessity or are they, like all other creatures, radically contingent. Ockham, like St. Bonaventure before him, saw the implications involved in the Christian notions of creation and conservation more clearly than some of his more illustrious predecessors. "Quod angelus sit aeternus vel perpetuus, hoc habet a conservatione divina et eodem modo posset equus habere si placaret Deo" (*ibid.*).

And even apart from what one may hold regarding an angel's continued existence, the point must be conceded that no angel needed to be created at the moment that God *de facto* created it. For that reason it is just as true to say that "Gabriel exists at noon today" and "Gabriel exists at 12:30" are not identical statements, and one proposition could be true and the other false without contradiction. The angelic substance as well as the corporeal substance is constantly changing or becoming in the sense of passing through mutually exclusive moments. This is something characteristic of every creature not because it is material but because it is a creature. As Ockham nicely puts it: "Quando dicit quod aliqua creatura habet esse necessario, dico quod nulla creatura magis necessario habet esse quam alia nisi forte quia una potest corrumpi a pluribus causis et alia a paucioribus, quia una potest corrumpi ab agente creato et in-creato, et alia ab increato solum, et illud non ponit majorem vel minorem necessitatem essendi habere" (*ibid.*).

To this reviewer, it seems that if Professor Renoirte's argument for hylomorphism is valid at all, he has put back the matter which St. Thomas removed from the angels almost seven centuries earlier. And his reason for doing it, seems very close to that of St. Bonaventure, who attributed "matter" to the angels because he believed that, if they were created, some principle of receptivity and contingency was required in the form of a potential principle. While this is no serious objection to Renoirte's position it is important to recall that St. Bonaventure's "matter" as a constituent principle of spiritual creatures was no more like the matter that is characteristic of material substances than the soul is like the body. And for the same reason, we believe that Renoirte's "prime matter," like his hylomorphism, is a far cry from what the translator assures us in the "traditional doctrine." In fact, we wonder whether Aquinas would care to give his paternal blessing to this use of the term.

Be that as it may, Ockham—while adopting the same basic criticism of the *aevum* as St. Bonaventure—did not subscribe to the hylomorphic composition of the angels, though he did raise Renoirte's question: "What is the nature of a being which has its duration by passing through mutually exclusive instants?" And we believe that Ockham's discussion of this matter deserves the careful study of anyone interested in Renoirte's interpretation of hylomorphism.

And this brings us to the second and third step in the author's argument *viz.* that what is continuously becoming cannot be simple but must be hylomorphically composed. Now if we understand a true change as one in which some subject loses or acquires some positive absolute entity, and not merely a new relation, then we can admit that whatever undergoes true change cannot be simple. However, can we say that the temporal change of which Renoirte speaks is change in

the true sense of the word? It is quite true that each moment of a creature's existence can be really distinguished from every other moment. But it is also true to say that there is no true "subject" that passes from one moment to the next, in the sense that Aristotle's material principle underwent a change in form. There is precisely the same "subject" that is successively becoming in a temporal sense as passes from nothingness to being in the case of creation, or from being to nothingness in the case of annihilation. For that reason, conservation is spoken of as a "continued creation."

Consequently, we find difficulty in translating the hylomorphic theory into this new setting. The author himself gives us no help in the matter beyond pointing out that a temporal being is not pure determination, but must consist of a principle of determination and determinability. Such a being is not pure determination in the sense that it does not possess the whole of its being simultaneously but successively. This too, of course, is a metaphorical way of speaking, and is to be interpreted in the same manner as the "tota simul et perfecta possessio" of the Boethian formula for eternity. Now we should like to point out that while this different manner of duration between a necessary and contingent being is rooted to some extent in what each being is, at the same time it would be more correct to speak of necessity and contingency as existential attributes, because they are concerned not so much with what a thing is as with its existence. This is particularly evident when we stress the point that the author makes, that a temporal being is successively becoming even when it remains otherwise unchanged. In other words, we can give the same answer to the question "What is it?" at 12:30 as we can at noon. In the example used, the answer would be "It is a warm body." With something that is necessary, and in consequence immutable, everything that it has or is at one moment, it has or is at any other moment. Consequently, Boethius could say that it possesses the whole of its life, as it were, at one moment. Or to put it more precisely, where an essential or intrinsic perfection is concerned, if it is contradictory to affirm something about an eternal being at one moment, it is always contradictory to do so. But with a temporal being, any two moments of its existence can be distinguished, because it is not contradictory for it to be non-existent at any moment other than the moment in which it actually is. Its actuality consists in what it is at the moment; its potentiality is what it can be at any other moment. Unlike the eternal or necessary being, its potentiality is not equivalent to its actuality.

For this reason, we believe that it would be more correct to speak of a temporal being as existentially, rather than essentially, composed. And the change that a temporal being undergoes could accordingly be called an existential, rather than an essential, change. This would make the analogue of the form the actual existing reality at the present moment. But what is the analogue of the matter? What is the "subject" that is subject to the different forms? The obvious answer would seem to be that it is that which accounts for the continuity, the individual identity that remains despite the succession of different moments. But if our concept of the contingency of creatures and the nature of the divine conservation is correct, this "matter" is not a principle really distinct from the existing reality or "form" at that given moment. And we understand "really distinct," in the sense that St. Thomas attributed a real distinction to things that are physically separable, e.g. prime matter and substantial form, and not in the sense that he spoke of the soul and its faculties as being really distinct even though the omnipotence of God himself could not separate, let us say, the intellect from the substance of the soul. Consequently, Renoirte's "matter," if we have interpreted his mind correctly, would seem to be no more a real principle of change than the "thing" which passes from nothingness to being in creation.

It is interesting to recall in this connection that some philosophers have claimed that Aristotle's prime matter was indeed a substitute for the divine conservation. And as a matter of fact, if we were to take away the *continuata creatio*, we might indeed find room for some primary material principle. But then we should no longer have that fluid succession of forms that makes temporal existence a continuous becoming, unless, of course we were to reintroduce the possibility of true substantial change in a sense that Renoirte does not seem to

care to admit. And so "prime matter" in his system seems to be in truth a principle of the purest potency, as real as the *nihilum* from which the creature is educed. And yet perhaps this, in the last analysis, is the most intelligible interpretation we can give to a philosophical entity that is unintelligible on principle.

For that reason, we fail to see eye to eye with the translator when he claims that Renoirte defends traditional hylomorphism. In fact, so far as the author's hylomorphism is "traditional," it is far closer to St. Bonaventure than to St. Thomas. And even here, it represents but one of the many heads of the hydra of hylomorphism. And should we add, a minor head — one which St. Thomas himself cut off in Herculean fashion. Renoirte's position, consequently, seems to be tantamount to conceding the failure of the theory to explain what it was primarily intended to explain, *viz.* what Renoirte calls change in the strict sense of the word.

And this brings us to our final point of criticism. We are beginning to wonder how far the author's attempt to save this mythical monster for posterity has colored his own conception of the nature and object of cosmology. For this seems to be a failing all too common in discussions of this problem. Those who believe that hylomorphism in one of its several forms can be defended simply by substituting modern physical notions for the antiquated theories of Aristotle's day, would attempt to restore the continuity of philosophy and the sciences. Others, failing to see how hylomorphism as a physical theory can be reconciled with scientific conclusions, stress the essential discontinuity and independence of cosmology.

It is not our intention to discuss the relative merits of these two fundamental positions, for after all *scientia* as such, is a work of man and there is an arbitrary element in every discipline regarding the precise object to be studied and the method to be employed in investigating this object. But what we should like to point out is that the discontinuity theory as Renoirte conceives it leaves a gap in our total knowledge—a kind of a no-man's land between physics and cosmology, where—if we have understood Renoirte's position correctly—neither discipline has the right to enter.

Since Renoirte has chosen the problem of the constitution of bodies to illustrate his conception of the scope of each discipline, let us take an example from this field to clarify our point.

We are all familiar with the development of the quantum-theory, justly regarded as the greatest single achievement in the realm of physical theory during the past fifty years. It was born when the dual aspect of elementary physical entities was discovered. Corresponding to the "wave and/or particle" aspect of radiant energy, we have the "particle and/or wave" properties of the electron, proton, etc. Two apparently independent and opposite theories were developed to deal with the problem, the one known as "wave-mechanics," the other as "matrix-mechanics." The former treated these fundamental entities as if they were waves; the latter, as if they were particles. In the final stage of development, the basic equivalence factors between the two methods were discovered and a unified quantum-theory was achieved. From the viewpoint of the physicist, who seeks as an "explanation" only a unified theory that can be expressed in a mathematical equation and from which he can "deduce" the various "properties" of bodies and predict their behavior, the quantum-theory represents a task completed. He is satisfied and content. His mission is accomplished.

As to the problem that troubled the mechanically minded "model-physicists," who like Lord Kelvin could understand nothing they could not make a model of, why it was really no problem at all. "Are these elementary entities waves or particles?" is a perfectly meaningless question. Bohr's complementarity principle, which put the final touch to the quantum-theory, quietly closed the door on all such futile speculation. Any experiment that the physicist might devise to decide between the two, falls in the realm of the physically unobservable. What lies in the shadow of ambiguity cast by Plank's constant is, from the standpoint of physics, something that will remain forever unknown and unknowable. In fact the physicist, as such, is not even permitted to suggest a theoreti-

cal answer, for any theory that cannot be "verified" empirically is not a part of physics.

But, we might ask, cannot the philosopher suggest or construct a theory or theories that might throw some light in the zone of darkness forever inaccessible to physical methods? Are all problems that are meaningless to the physicist, also meaningless to the philosopher of nature?

According to Renoirte, the cosmologist establishes his theses independently of the theories of physics, and hence, in the present instance, independently of the quantum-theory. (We assume, of course, that what he says of theses holds also for theories, for there are few, if any theses of cosmology that can claim to be anything more than theories from the strictly logical point of view.) The philosopher should be concerned only with the necessary conditions for what is common to all systems of postulates and hence, he is not to bother with what is necessarily implied or presupposed specifically by the quantum-theory. That is, if we understand the author correctly, the cosmologist should make no attempt to determine the specific ontological conditions that might account for a nature that functions according to the laws of quantum-mechanics. And in regard to the specific question of the constitution of bodies, he should be content with the knowledge that the universe as a whole is passing successively through mutually exclusive moments and therefore is hylomorphically composed. Thus, coupled with the "*docta ignorantia*" he acquires from the physicist, should put his mind at rest. Strictly speaking, he has no further right to wonder. Any further questions about the ultimate nature of matter and material bodies are meaningless. Neither discipline has the right to suggest even a probable answer.

But the fact remains that man being what he is, the philosopher in him will continue to wonder and to speculate no matter where one arbitrarily declares the out-of-bounds to be for cosmology. Even the physicist is a man with a mind, and a man with a mind cannot be a pure physicist. No matter how much his critical reason may assure him of the limitations of his physical method, as Duhem nicely puts it, the theoretical physicist will have an invincible and unshakable conviction that "*l'ordre logique dans lequel elle range les lois expérimentales est le reflet d'un ordre ontologique . . . Ainsi l'analyse des méthodes par lesquelles s'édifient les théories physiques nous prouve, avec une entière évidence, que ces théories ne sauraient se poser en explication des lois expérimentales; et, d'autres part, un acte de foi que cette analyse est incapable de justifier, comme elle est impuissante à le réfréner. nous assure que ces théories ne sont pas un système purement artificiel, mais une classification naturelle*" (*La théorie physique*, Paris, 1914. pp. 35-36).

Whether the physicist realize it or not, his "act of faith" is in reality a profession of faith in the validity of philosophical speculation. His conviction is the result of a mind that is seeking true wisdom, and will not be content with pure descriptions of how nature acts, but pushes on for true causal explanations. Very often, it is true, a physicist-turned-philosopher may go astray. Classical is the example of the late Sir James Jeans, who believed that the conclusions of modern physics warranted the resurrection of Bishop Berkeley's idealism. Renoirte, in all probability, would permit the cosmologist to criticize such conclusions that physics, as such has become less "materialistic" or more "idealistic," even as P. G. Frank and others have done. But what we should like to know is this: Must the cosmologist be limited to the negative task of disproving the philosophic conclusions of such individuals, or is he permitted to attempt a positive explanation in terms of such philosophic concepts as "substance," "nature," "operation," "act," "potency," etc?

It may be objected that the philosopher can add little to what the physicist says, and that his "theoretical explanations" are merely physical theories translated into philosophical language. But if Renoirte's critique of the method of physics is correct, even if he adds but one iota of knowledge to what the physicist tells us, he does so not by continuing the method of the physicist, as Renoirte claims, but as a philosopher. In fact it is only the philosopher who can translate a physical theory into a philosophical theory. Renoirte himself gives us an interesting example of such a translation when he claims that the philosopher need not be concerned about explaining the differences between natures,

since physics recognizes only differences in degrees, and these can be "explained" in terms of the structure of atoms. That physics knows merely differences in degrees may be true. But to declare that there are no differences in natures or that there are no substantial changes is to make a philosophical judgment by introducing the notions of nature and substance. Even mechanism, which Renoirte seems to reduce to a purely physical theory (p.199), both in its crudest form or as developed by Descartes, introduced truly philosophical concepts such as the reality and substantiality of the ultimate particles. Aristotle's criticism was not that it was not philosophical, but that it was incomplete.

This gap between the empiriological sciences and a philosophy of nature is more acute in the case of physics and cosmology, for the physicist through a process of self-criticism has come to realize, the limitations of his science and determined its method more precisely. He recognizes that he can give no true explanation, but only a description of how nature functions, and even this description is to a large extent symbolical and schematic. But so long as physics remains the ideal of an "exact science," even in such sciences as biology, geology, sociology, and psychology, where "explanations" and "causal factors" in the Aristotelian sense of the term still play a large role, the difficulty is still present. For the "causes" employed in such theoretical explanations, contain explicitly or implicitly some physical factor or element and hence we can justly question whether they are true explanations or not. For that reason, we believe that the more the empiricist insists on the purely descriptive character of his laws and theories, the more need there is for a theoretical science that supplements this description of nature in terms of a causal explanation. Such a science, it seems, should grow naturally out of what we know from physics, chemistry, etc. And in so doing, if Renoirte's analysis of the methodology of physics is correct, it is not simply developing a physical theory, unless we take physics in the Aristotelian sense of the term, as a philosophy of nature. Physical theories, like relativity, quantum-mechanics, etc, have made us cognizant of some peculiarities in the behavior of physical bodies. They have raised questions that cannot be answered in terms of a mathematical formula, or explained in terms of "causes" that Mach, Poincare, or Duhem assure us are merely thinly disguised descriptions of how nature acts. But so long as the acceptance of hylomorphism is regarded as a shibboleth of philosophical orthodoxy, the danger will always remain that the obvious answer to the question of the ultimate constitution of bodies will be stigmatized as purely physical and non-philosophical. The very question itself will be declared to be a problem for the physicist. But for all that, the curiosity that prompts it bears an unusual likeness to that wonder of which Aristotle speaks in the first chapter of his *Metaphysics*, the wonder of which philosophy is born.

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# AN INTRODUCTION TO THE *QUAESTIONES THEOLOGICAE* OF STEPHEN LANGTON

**A**bout the time of the seventh centenary of the death of Stephen Langton in 1928, there was a new surge of interest in this great figure of medieval history. At the same time authors began paying more attention to Langton's scholastic achievements. This fervor lasted about ten years, and then there was a lull. It is true that Langton's theological works have been referred to increasingly in doctrinal studies, but the publication of studies dealing with the scholastic documents as such has been on the wane.

The purpose of this present study is to make a survey of what has gone before and to present a convenient, synthetic introduction to the *quaestiones theologicae* of our author. For this purpose, a brief biography and review of the works of Langton in general will form a fitting background. Then the problems relating to the *quaestiones* in particular can be treated more at length, preceded by a brief description of the eight manuscripts which contain the collected questions. We regret the fact that we have not been able as yet to study the questions which lie scattered in some of Langton's commentaries, but the present article forms a sufficient unit in itself.

## LIFE OF STEPHEN LANGTON

We can conveniently divide the life of Stephen Langton into two periods separated from one another by his elevation to the cardinalate in 1206. That date marks the turning point between what we may term the scholastic and the ecclesiastico-political phases of his life.

As it usually happens in dealing with great men of the Middle Ages, particularly the great scholars, we must confess our ignorance concerning the dates of Langton's birth and of the early events of his life. Though we know that he was the son of Henry of Langton by Wragby in Lincolnshire, and brother of Walter and Simon,<sup>1</sup> we must content ourselves

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<sup>1</sup> F. M. Powicke, *Stephen Langton*, (Oxford, 1928), p. 6.

with mere conjectures concerning the date of his birth, of his entry into scholastic circles at Paris, and of the beginning of his work as a teacher of theology. Basing their calculations on chronological indications found in certain works of Langton, some authors believe that we can estimate with real probability that Langton was *Magister in sacra pagina*, teacher of theology, already about 1180 or shortly thereafter.<sup>2</sup> If this calculation be correct, and granted that he went through the normal course of pre-theological studies, we should have to place Langton's coming to Paris at about 1170 and the date of his birth about 1155, or even earlier.<sup>3</sup>

We have no more information concerning the Masters of Langton than we have for his chronology. It was once supposed that he was the pupil of Petrus Cantor<sup>4</sup> or of Petrus Manducator (Comestor),<sup>5</sup> but none of the arguments advanced proved sufficiently solid.<sup>6</sup> However, we do know something of some of his pupils. One of them, Master Guerin of Corbeil, was condemned for heresy in 1210.<sup>7</sup> Another, Richard Poore, became bishop of Salisbury and Durham, and Thomas of Marlborough became abbot of Evesham.<sup>8</sup> Perhaps the most important of his pupils from the scholastic standpoint is Godfrey of Poitiers, who, if he was not Stephen's *baccalaureus*,<sup>9</sup> at least shows a very marked literary dependence on his *magister*.

<sup>2</sup> For the basic indications, cf. G. Lacombe and B. Smalley, "Studies on the Commentaries of Cardinal Stephen Langton," in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, V (1930), 19-23, 165-166. The argument is constructed by G. Lacombe, "The Authenticity of the Summa of Cardinal Stephen Langton," in *The New Scholasticism*, IV (1930), 100-108. He is followed in this opinion by F. M. Powicke, "Bibliographical Note on Recent Work upon Stephen Langton," in *English Historical Review*, XLVIII (1933), 554. The same is to be said for B. Smalley, "Some Thirteenth-Century Commentaries on the Sapiential Books," in *Dominican Studies*, II (1949), 321, n.9. For earlier opinions, cf. F. M. Powicke, *Stephen Langton*, pp. 8, 10 (Birth: 1165; Paris: 1180), and H. Thurston, "Notes on Familiar Prayers," in *The Month*, CXXI (1913 Jan.-June), 611 (Birth: 1160; Paris: before 1180).

<sup>3</sup> F. M. Powicke, "Bibliographical Note," pp. 554-555.

<sup>4</sup> F. M. Powicke, *Stephen Langton*, p. 30.

<sup>5</sup> G. Lacombe and B. Smalley, "Studies on the Commentaries," p. 19.

<sup>6</sup> Concerning Peter the Chanter, cf. Lottin's review of F. M. Powicke, *Stephen Langton*, in *BTAM*, I (1929-32), n. 130. See also F. M. Powicke, "Bibliographical Note," p. 554. The opinion in favor of Peter Comestor is based on a reference in *Bamberg ms. 136*, now proved non-Langtonian.

<sup>7</sup> F. M. Powicke, *Stephen Langton*, p. 30.

<sup>8</sup> F. M. Powicke, "Bibliographical Note," p. 555.

<sup>9</sup> G. Lacombe and A. Landgraf, "The Questiones of Cardinal Stephen Langton (III)," in *The New Scholasticism*, IV (1930), 127-128; F. M. Powicke, "Bibliographical Note," pp. 556-557.

There are indications that during the time of his teaching, Stephen was canon of York and of Notre-Dame in Paris as well. The date of the acquisition of these titles, however, is not known.<sup>10</sup> It has at times been thought that he was chancellor of the University of Paris, but there is no evidence in favor of this opinion.<sup>11</sup>

We now come to the turning point in Langton's career. Once he became a member of the hierarchy, we find his name appearing more frequently in public documents.<sup>12</sup> To relate all the known facts of this new phase of his activity would lead us too far away from the scope of the present study of Langton the scholar. Hence, we shall limit ourselves to the most general outlines.

Langton's teaching career came to a close when he was called to Rome by his friend, Pope Innocent III, and created cardinal priest of the title of St. Chrysogonus, June 22, 1206.<sup>13</sup> Shortly thereafter, at the suggestion of Pope Innocent, the monks of Canterbury, present in Rome at the time, elected him archbishop of Canterbury in December, 1206.<sup>14</sup> The following June 17, the Pope himself consecrated him at Viterbo and conferred on him the pallium.<sup>15</sup> However, since Stephen was a *persona non grata* to King John of England, he could not enter his archdiocese. Otto of St. Blaise tersely describes the situation: "Hic ergo expulsus a rege Iohanne venit in Franciam, et apud Pontiniacum secum habitavit, ubi multa scripsit."<sup>16</sup> Precisely what he wrote while in exile at Pontigny is not

<sup>10</sup> F. M. Powicke, *Stephen Langton*, p. 31.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 30-31. Cf. the list of chancellors between 1164 and 1284 in H. Denifle, *Chartularium universitatis parisiensis*, I (Paris, 1889), p. XIX, n. 3.

<sup>12</sup> For special studies of the documents of this period, cf. K. Major, "The 'Familia' of Archbishop Stephen Langton," in *English Historical Review*, XLVIII (1933), 529-553; K. Major, *Acta Stephani Langton, Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi, A.D. 1207-1228*, (Canterbury and York Society, fasc. 118, for 1945-46) (Oxford, 1950).

There are also several chronicles of the period which treat of Langton, but they must be used with care, as has been proven repeatedly in recent years by confronting their data with that of official documents. Cf., for example, C. R. Cheney, "The Alleged Deposition of King John," in *Studies in Medieval History Presented to Frederick Maurice Powicke*, (Oxford, 1948), pp. 100-116.

<sup>13</sup> H. Denifle, "Die Handschriften der Bibel-Correctorien des XIII Jahrhunderts," in *Archiv für Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters*, VII (1888), 281; P. Feret, *La faculté de théologie de Paris et ses docteurs les plus célèbres*, I (Paris, 1894), 276.

<sup>14</sup> For a complete explanation of the conflict in the elections which led to the choice of Langton, cf. M. D. Knowles, "The Canterbury Election of 1205-6," in *English Historical Review*, LIII (1938), 211-220.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 220.

<sup>16</sup> G. Lacombe and B. Smalley, "Studies on the Commentaries," p. 14, n. 1.

known,<sup>17</sup> though Powicke suggests that he may have written some devotional and historical works then.<sup>18</sup>

After several years of exile, Stephen returned to England and absolved the King from excommunication on July 20, 1213.<sup>19</sup> The King had finally repented after many threats from the Pope, and had on May 15 surrendered his kingdom to the Sovereign Pontiff, to become his vassal.<sup>20</sup> On the occasion of the absolution, Stephen preached a famous sermon to the dignitaries and the people assembled for the event at St. Paul's in London.<sup>21</sup> It was probably in connexion with this gathering that he made his first contact with the English barons on the subject of demanding their liberties from the king,—a move which finally led to the signing of the *Magna Carta* at Runnymede on June 15, 1215.<sup>22</sup> Due to his misunderstanding of the settlement between the King and the barons, the Pope suspended Stephen just before the latter left for Rome to attend the fourth Council of the Lateran in 1215.<sup>23</sup> In Rome, after hearing the case, Innocent nevertheless confirmed the suspension, which remained in force two years. During this time, Langton resided in Rome.<sup>24</sup>

In 1218, after the deaths of King John and Pope Innocent III, the prelate returned to England to reassume the government of his archdiocese.<sup>25</sup> During his administration, he held a noteworthy provincial council at Oxford (Oxonii) in April, 1222, in which he applied the recent Lateran decrees to English church law.<sup>26</sup> After a long and eventful episcopate, Stephen died on the 9th of July, 1228.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>17</sup> There is a hint that he may have worked on a revision of his questions. Cf. A. Gregory, "The Cambridge Manuscript of the *Quaestiones* of Stephen Langton," in *The New Scholasticism*, IV (1930), 172, 198-199. Based on Langton's oft-repeated example of "pater aegrotans" as a possible reference to his own father's last illness (died probably c. 1210), this is no more than a hypothesis, as pointed out by Lottin in his review of A. Gregory, "The Cambridge Manuscript," in *BTAM*, I (1929-32), n. 482.

<sup>18</sup> F. M. Powicke, *Stephen Langton*, p. 45.

<sup>19</sup> G. Lacombe, "An Unpublished Document on the Great Interdict (1207-1213)," in *The Catholic Historical Review*, XV (New Series IX) (1929-30), 409.

<sup>20</sup> C. R. Cheney, "The Alleged Deposition," pp. 110-112.

<sup>21</sup> G. Lacombe, "An Unpublished Document," p. 409.

<sup>22</sup> F. M. Powicke, *Stephen Langton*, pp. 102-128.

<sup>23</sup> F. M. Powicke, "The Bull 'Miramur plurimum' and a Letter to Archbishop Stephen Langton, 5 September, 1215," in *English Historical Review*, XLIV (1929), 87-93.

<sup>24</sup> *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, XIII (Chicago-London-Toronto, 1946), 695 (Article: "Langton, Stephen").

<sup>25</sup> F. M. Powicke, *Stephen Langton*, p. 134.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 151.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 160, n. 3.

## WORKS OF LANGTON IN GENERAL

By far the greatest and most important part of Stephen Langton's literary output is in the field of Holy Scripture. As attested by chroniclers and by extant manuscripts of his commentaries, he commented on the whole Bible.<sup>28</sup> Moreover, it is most probably he who was responsible for the division of the Bible into the present day chapters,<sup>29</sup> or at least he had a great influence in the introduction and adoption of the new division.<sup>30</sup> Likewise, it is very probable that he arranged the books into nearly the order in which we find them in the Bible today, grouping together the historical books, the sapiential books, the prophetic books.<sup>31</sup>

However, Langton's works are by no means limited to the Scriptural field. He is also author of a *Glossa* on the *Historia Scholastica* of Peter Comestor.<sup>31a</sup> Closely related to his Biblical studies, particularly to his commentary on Peter Lombard's *Magna Glossatura* on the Pauline Epistles, are the *quaestiones theologicae*. The exact relation between the class lecture on Holy Scripture and the disputation on questions of theological interest has been the object of much study recently. Upon the determination of this relation depends the solution of many problems not only regarding doctrinal interpretation but touching upon the authenticity and chronology of works as well. Apparently, already in Langton's time, the written questions were the fruit of what may be called a *disputatio in*

<sup>28</sup> For an extensive study of this point, cf. G. Lacombe and B. Smalley, "Studies on the Commentaries," pp. 5-182. Besides his commentaries on the scriptures, there is also attributed to him what may be styled as a commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard. Landgraf has edited a text of this commentary: A. Landgraf, *Der Sentenzenkommentar des Kardinals Stephan Langton*, (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, XXXVII/1) (Münster Westf., 1952).

<sup>29</sup> H. Denifle, "Die Handschriften der Bibel-Correctorien," pp. 281, 290-291; S. Berger, *Histoire de la vulgate pendant les premiers siècles du moyen âge*, (Paris, 1893), p. 304; F. M. Powicke, *Stephen Langton*, pp. 35-36.

<sup>30</sup> A. Landgraf, "Die Schriftzitate in der Scholastik um die Wende des 12. zum 13. Jahrhundert," in *Biblica*, XVIII (1937), 76, 87-90; B. Smalley, *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages*, (Oxford, 1941), pp. 181-182. The date of the division is not yet determined, though it is known to have existed already in 1203. B. Smalley, *loc. cit.* The use of the new division was not widespread before 1225, cf. A. Landgraf, *op. cit.*, pp. 88, 90.

<sup>31</sup> S. Berger, *Histoire de la vulgate pendant les premiers siècles*, p. 304; F. M. Powicke, *Stephen Langton*, pp. 37-38.

<sup>31a</sup> Cf. G. Lacombe and B. Smalley, "Studies on the Commentaries," pp. 18-51, for a detailed study. Landgraf has discovered a new manuscript besides the three given by Lacombe: A. Landgraf, *Der Sentenzenkommentar des Kardinals Stephan Langton* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, XXXVII/1) (Münster Westf., 1952), pp. XV-XVI. The *Historia Scholastica* is a textbook of Bible history.

*scholis.*<sup>32</sup> This disputation at times formed a complementary part of the lecture on Holy Scripture,<sup>33</sup> as seems to be the case in Langton's commentaries on the Pauline Epistles<sup>34</sup> and on the "Canonical" Epistles,<sup>35</sup> where questions are interspersed in the text. At times it was conducted as a separate exercise.<sup>36</sup> This may explain the presence of Stephen's theological questions not only in his commentaries on Scripture, which correspond to the class lecture, but also in separate collections.

That our author's questions were considered important may be gathered from the influence they exercised on his successors: Alexander Nequam, Godfrey of Poitiers, Robert of Courson, Guy of Orchelles, William of Auxerre, Hugh of St. Cher, Roland of Cremona.<sup>37</sup>

Though it was his main occupation, teaching did not keep Stephen out of the pulpit. Already in 1230, Lacombe could tell us of more than 500 sermons attributed to our author, adding some new discoveries to those of Powicke.<sup>38</sup> Quite recently Landgraf further increased the number by adding several other manuscripts to the list.<sup>39</sup> Another type of literary activity in which Langton engaged at times was verse. His *psalterium* in

<sup>32</sup> A. G. Little and F. Pelster, *Oxford Theology and Theologians c. A.D. 1282-1302*, (Oxford Historical Society, XCVI) (Oxford, 1934), p. 29. In confirmation of this we read in the *Cambridge, St. John's College, ms. 57*, on f. 311a: "Dicimus absque disputacione" before a passage which gives a group of conclusions without the usual discussion.

<sup>33</sup> J. De Ghellinck, " 'Pagina' et 'Sacra Pagina'. Histoire d'un mot et transformation de l'objet primitivement désigné," in *Mélanges Auguste Pelzer*, (Louvain, 1947), p. 55; G. Lacombe and A. Landgraf, "The *Quaestiones* (III)," pp. 130-164. Not only in scriptural commentaries do we find questions, but Langton introduced them into his "commentary" on Peter Lombard's *Books of the Sentences* as well. Cf. A. Landgraf, "The First Sentence Commentary of Early Scholasticism," in *The New Scholasticism*, XIII (1939), 127-132. See also A. Landgraf, "Ein neuer Fund zur Kommentierung des Paulinenkommentares des Petrus Lombardus," in *Biblica*, XXV (1944), 61. Landgraf says that Stephen was the first to write what may be styled as a sentence commentary by introducing into it the form of *quaestiones*.

<sup>34</sup> F. M. Powicke, "Bibliographical Note," p. 556.

<sup>35</sup> G. Lacombe and B. Smalley, "Studies on the Commentaries," p. 50.

<sup>36</sup> A. Landgraf, "Quelques collections de 'quaestiones' de la seconde moitié du XIIe siècle," in *RTAM*, VII (1935), 124-126; B. Smalley, *The Study of the Bible*, pp. 169-171; A. Landgraf, "Zur Technik und Überlieferung der Disputation," in *Collectanea Franciscana*, XXII (1950), 177.

<sup>37</sup> O. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XIle et XIIIle siècles*, III, (Louvain, 1949), 698.

<sup>38</sup> G. Lacombe and B. Smalley, "Studies on the Commentaries," p. 6. Cf. F. M. Powicke, *Stephen Langton*, Appendix II, pp. 168-176. For an edited Langton sermon, cf. G. Lacombe, "An Unpublished Document," pp. 408-420.

<sup>39</sup> A. Landgraf, *Einführung in die Geschichte der theologischen Literatur der Frühscholastik*, (Regensburg, 1948), pp. 126-127.

honor of our Lady, edited by Dreves,<sup>40</sup> and the *Veni Sancte Spiritus*, the "golden sequence" of the mass for Pentecost,<sup>41</sup> are products of his pen. Other works of lesser importance are likewise ascribed to him.<sup>42</sup>

The question of the chronological relation of these works to one another is of vast proportions. Hence we shall touch the problem only in relation to our main interest, the *quaestiones theologicae* of Stephen Langton as found in eight manuscripts.<sup>43</sup> For the rest, suffice it to say that most probably Langton wrote most if not all of his theological and Biblical works while teaching at Paris, before 1206.<sup>44</sup>

### THE QUAESTIONES THEOLOGICAE IN PARTICULAR

As yet, there is no critical edition of the questions, though preliminary steps have been taken by more than one competent scholar.<sup>45</sup> It will be no easy task, since the manuscript tradition is quite complicated. Alys Gregory has been specializing in the most important of the manuscripts while not neglecting the others.<sup>46</sup> This manuscript (*Cambridge, St. John's College, 57*) is best suited as the basis of a critical edition.<sup>47</sup> Powicke made a comparative study of the Cambridge manuscript with another preserved in Paris.<sup>48</sup> Building up on Powicke's work, Lacombe and Landgraf have studied two additional manuscripts in their relation to the two already

<sup>40</sup> G. M. Dreves, "Psalteria rythmica." *Gereimte Psalterien des Mittelalters*, (Analecta hymnica medii aevi, XXXV) (Leipzig, 1900), pp. 153-171.

<sup>41</sup> H. Thurston, "Notes on Familiar Prayers," pp. 605-616; A. Wilmart, *Auteurs spirituels et textes dévots du moyen âge latin*, (Études et documents pour servir à l'histoire du sentiment religieux, 3) (Paris, 1932), pp. 39-40; F. M. Powicke, *Stephen Langton*, pp. 47-48. For these and other poetic works of Langton, cf. M. Dulong, "Étienne Langton versificateur," in *Mélanges Mandonnet*, II (Bibliothèque thomiste, 14) (Paris, 1930), pp. 183-190.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. G. Lacombe and B. Smalley, "Studies on the Commentaries," pp. 8-13.

<sup>43</sup> This excludes the questions in the commentaries, which we hope to study at some future date.

<sup>44</sup> For the chronology of Langton's works, cf. G. Lacombe and B. Smalley, "Studies on the Commentaries," pp. 19-23, 61-63, 160-166.

<sup>45</sup> The edition of Langton's works is expected to be made in the *Publications in Medieval Studies* of Notre Dame University (Notre Dame, Indiana). A. Landgraf, *Einführung*, p. 127.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. A. Gregory, "The Cambridge Manuscript of the Questions of Stephen Langton," in *The New Scholasticism*, IV (1930), 165-226; A. Gregory, "Indices of Rubrics and Incipits of the Principal Manuscripts of the Questions of Stephen Langton," in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, V (1930), 221-266. The symbols or letters we shall use to designate the various manuscripts are those found in Gregory's article.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. A. Gregory, "The Cambridge Manuscript," pp. 225-226.

<sup>48</sup> F. M. Powicke, *Stephen Langton*, Appendix III, pp. 180-204. A list of the *corrigena* in Powicke's tables may be found in A. Gregory, "The Cambridge Manuscript," p. 166, n. 5.

examined.<sup>49</sup> Still, as Lottin points out,<sup>50</sup> these studies leave much to be desired, since there are other manuscripts containing the questions, which are as yet untouched. Besides, there are questions in the commentaries on the *Magna Glossatura* (Pauline), on the "Canonical" Epistles, and on the *Books of the Sentences*. All these must be studied for a complete understanding of the collections of questions.

During the course of preliminary studies, much light has been thrown on works formerly classified with Langton's questions. Some have been found spurious; others have proved to be of a different nature than the questions. Thus, the *Summa in Bamberg ms. Patr. 136* is now universally recognized as "Pseudo-Langtonian," though it probably came into being while Langton was teaching at Paris.<sup>51</sup> Then, the two groups of questions in the *Erlangen ms. 260* (353) and related manuscripts are not Langton's, though they have the flavor of his school.<sup>52</sup> The *Summa de vitiis et virtutibus* is his, but has nothing in common with the questions.<sup>53</sup> The same is true of the *Summa de diversis*, which is rather a *florilegium* than a series of theological discussions.<sup>54</sup> There is one or the other Langtonian ques-

<sup>49</sup> G. Lacombe and A. Landgraf, "The Questiones of Cardinal Stephen Langton (II)," in *The New Scholasticism*, III (1929), 131-153.

<sup>50</sup> O. Lottin, review of G. Lacombe and A. Landgraf, "The Questiones of Cardinal Stephen Langton (II)," in *BTAM*, I (1929-32), n. 176.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. D. Van den Eynde, "Précisions chronologiques sur quelques ouvrages théologiques du XIIe siècle," in *Antonianum*, XXVI (1951), 246. He puts the date of the Pseudo-Langtonian *Summa* at 1195-1210.

<sup>52</sup> The first group is found in *Erlangen Universitätsbibliothek ms. 260* (353), ff. 57-64v, and in *Paris Nat. Lat. ms. 14526*, ff. 147c-160c. Cf. A. Landgraf, "Handschriftenfund aus der Frühscholastik," in *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie*, LIII (1929), 101-102, for the *incipits* of the questions. The second group is found in *Erlangen Universitätsbibliothek ms. 260* (353), ff. 65-103v. Cf. A. Landgraf, "Die Echtheitsfragen bei Stephan von Langton," in *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*, XL (1927), 317-318; G. Lacombe, "The Questiones of Cardinal Stephen Langton (I)," in *The New Scholasticism*, III (1929), 7-8; A. Landgraf, "Werke aus der engeren Schule des Petrus Cantor," in *Gregorianum*, XXI (1940), 38-39; A. Landgraf, *Einführung*, p. 124. Of this second group, only the last three questions (ff. 100d-103c) are textually of Langton.

<sup>53</sup> It exists in *Laon ms. 133*. Cf. G. Lacombe, "The Questiones (I)," pp. 12-14. Lacombe describes the manuscript, though he had not examined it personally. Lottin, in a review of Lacombe's work, declares after personal examination that the manuscript contains an authentic work of Langton, but has nothing in common with Stephen's questions. O. Lottin, review of G. Lacombe, "The Questiones (I)," in *BTAM*, I (1929-32), n. 131.

<sup>54</sup> The following manuscripts contain the *Summa de diversis*: *Douai ms. 434 III*, ff. 28a-61d; *Rouen 657*; *Milan, Brera A F. XIII—36*; *Paris Bibl. Nat. Lat. 2295, 3236B*, 10727, 14526, 18189; *Charleville 93*; *Amiens 272*. Cf. G. Lacombe, "The Questiones (I)," pp. 14-17. Landgraf suggests that the *Summa de diversis* as well as the *Summa de vitiis et virtutibus* may be compilations made from Langton's writings by someone other than Langton, cf. A. Landgraf, *Einführung*, p. 127.

tion inserted here and there in other manuscripts,<sup>55</sup> but they are of very slight importance for the present study.

By excluding the above-mentioned items, we are brought down to the eight manuscripts which contain the collected *quaestiones theologicae* of Stephen Langton.<sup>56</sup> After giving a slight description of each of our manuscripts, we shall treat briefly of the authenticity of the questions, of the time of their composition and of the time of their compilation into the existing collections.

#### DESCRIPTION OF THE MANUSCRIPTS

In this description, we intend to give the modern title and the paleographic date of each manuscript together with the symbol we shall use to designate each one in this article. Then will follow a brief summary of recent studies made of the respective manuscripts. We shall also consider the more important structural peculiarities of each one, if there be any. From these observations, we can arrive at certain conclusions, particularly about the grouping of the manuscripts into families. In conclusion, we shall enumerate some of the problems which remain unsolved.

First, let us consider the most important of all the manuscripts, the *Cambridge, St. John's College ms. 57 (c. 7)* (to be designated as "C"). The script employed places it in the thirteenth century. Professor Powicke brought C to the attention of Langton scholars with his extensive description and study of it in his book, *Stephen Langton*.<sup>57</sup> Later, Alys Gregory wrote a learned article on it, suggesting this manuscript as the basis of a critical edition of the questions.<sup>58</sup> Since that time, authors have been utilizing

<sup>55</sup> We have already mentioned the last three questions of *Erlangen ms. 260* (353). Other questions are in *Paris Nat. Lat. 14526*, ff. 141d-143b. Cf. G. Lacombe and A. Landgraf, "The Questiones (II)," pp. 118-120. The question in *Paris Nat. Lat. 14526*, f. 142, has the same *incipit* as the one in *Erlangen ms. 260* (353), f. 100v. Cf. A. Landgraf, "Handschriftenfunde," pp. 102-103; A. Landgraf, *Einführung*, p. 124. In *Douai ms. 434 II*, there is a block of anonymous questions (ff. 13c-41c), some of which certainly belong to Stephen Langton. Cf. O. Lottin, "Textes inédits relatifs aux dons du Saint-Esprit," in *RTAM*, I (1929), 62-64; O. Lottin, "Quatre 'Quaestiones' de Godefroid de Poitiers," in *RTAM*, XVIII (1951), 147-148. We have had occasion to examine the questions that deal with the sacraments, and have found them to differ from Langton's questions on the same subjects.

<sup>56</sup> Lacombe mentions a lost manuscript which was listed in one of the old catalogues of the library of Christ Church at Canterbury as No. 1228. The first item in this manuscript was the *Summa Stephani Archiepiscopi*. Cf. G. Lacombe and B. Smalley, "Studies on the Commentaries," pp. 10-11.

<sup>57</sup> F. M. Powicke, *Stephen Langton*, pp. 63-74, 180-204.

<sup>58</sup> A. Gregory, "The Cambridge Manuscript of the Questiones of Stephen Langton," in *The New Scholasticism*, IV (1930), 165-226.

ing it in special studies, but no further investigations of the manuscript as such have been published.

Powicke discovered that the manuscript falls into five sections, preceded by a small *summa*.<sup>59</sup> Following the lead of Alys Gregory, we shall refer to these respective sections as Ca, Cb, Cc, Cd, and Ce, and to the *Summa* simply as "summa."<sup>60</sup> The questions are followed by an index which is comprised of two parts. The first part is a series of 114 titles arranged systematically according to the traditional order of subjects found in Peter Lombard's *Books of the Sentences*. Lacombe discovered that these are not titles of lost questions,<sup>61</sup> as had been supposed by Powicke,<sup>62</sup> but form a systematic list according to which a new collection of selected questions was to be made. In fact, Gregory goes on to show how the material found in the "summa" joined to that of sections Cc, Cd, and Ce runs parallel to the list of 114 titles.<sup>63</sup> Certain questions not found in those sections were seemingly to be supplied from the remaining sections, Ca and Cb.<sup>64</sup> The new compilation was under the direction of a certain Magister H.,<sup>65</sup> and was known as the *Liber Arnuldi*,<sup>66</sup>—facts gleaned from marginal notes and indications in the index of questions, together with the rubric of a certain question on the Eucharist. The identity of Magister H.<sup>67</sup> and Arnuldus,<sup>68</sup> however, is not known.

Following this first list of questions is another list which gives us the actual contents of the five sections, Ca-Ce. Section Cd really belongs at

<sup>59</sup> F. M. Powicke, *Stephen Langton*, pp. 64-65.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. A. Gregory, "Indices of the Rubrics," p. 222, n. 1.

<sup>61</sup> G. Lacombe, "The *Quaestiones* (I)," pp. 11-12.

<sup>62</sup> F. M. Powicke, *Stephen Langton*, pp. 63-64.

<sup>63</sup> A. Gregory, "The Cambridge Manuscript," pp. 219-225. Landgraf regards this little *summa* as a separate work of Langton, cf. A. Landgraf, *Einführung*, p. 125.

<sup>64</sup> A. Gregory, "The Cambridge Manuscript," pp. 214-218.

<sup>65</sup> For a complete treatment of the various correctors, cf. A. Gregory, *op.cit.*, pp. 173-190.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 218.

<sup>67</sup> A. G. Little had suggested Henry of Sanford as a possible candidate. Cf. A. Gregory, "The Cambridge Manuscript," p. 177, n. 46.

<sup>68</sup> A possible candidate seems to be Arnaldus Amalrici, Cistercian, Archbishop of Narbonne (1212-1225), mentioned by Landgraf in a citation taken from the *Notule* of *Cod. Vat. Reg. Lat. 411*, f. 93v: "Hoc dicit magister Alardus et Ernaldus et m(agister) Stephanus Cantuariensis Archiepiscopus." Cf. A. Landgraf, "Sentenzen-glossen des beginnenden 13. Jahrhunderts," in *RTAM*, X (1938), 40-42. Whether or not Arnaldus Amalrici is identical with the Arnaldus in question, it is of interest to note that Langton is cited in company with an Arnaldus as holding the same doctrine. There are also other places in the *Notule* where the doctrine ascribed to Magister Ernaldus is in harmony with Stephen's doctrine, for example the doctrine about the character in the sacrament of baptism. Hence we believe it quite probable that the Arnold after whom the Cambridge collection of questions is named is the same person as the unidentified Eernaldus of the *Notule*.

the end of the book, since it has to do with the subject matter of the Fourth Book of Sentences. To explain the inversion of Cd and Ce, we may say that the first error was made by a scribe who wrote the index titles at the end of the parchment used for Ce. Rather than have the titles in the body of the book, they bound Ce in at the end, and the scribe indicated the change with lines drawn in the index.<sup>69</sup>

Paging on past the indices, we find a group of 9 questions which were added later. Some of them can be found in other Langton manuscripts, others not.<sup>70</sup>

The nature of the Cambridge manuscript is unique. It cannot be put in a class with any of the others, though it unites in itself many elements of the other families. In fact, C itself is not homogeneous, differing as it does from section to section.<sup>71</sup> The "summa" is written in the style of a systematic treatise rather than of disputed questions. Section Ca contains full-length questions which have been gone over and corrected several times by contemporaries of Langton, though after Langton's teaching term, with the result that Ca presents a better text than any of the other sections. Moreover, according to Gregory, because of the critical notes in the margin, "Hoc interpositum est," "Hoc superadditum est," etc., it probably contains a testimony of the earliest text as well as of a final revision by Langton. The questions in this section are in no particular logical order.

Cb, containing 99 questions usually of sub-normal length, has very few corrections, and is in general of a poorer literary quality. Judging from some cases of cross-references from one question to another, we find that Cb seems to have preserved the original order of questions, whereas the order has been changed in other manuscripts and even in other parts of C itself where the same questions occur. However, we still cannot speak of a logical arrangement in Cb. It is to be noted that the last questions of Cb have been added by a later hand.

The last three sections, of a better quality and quite extensively corrected, may be styled as "selected questions" arranged in a specific order. These three sections seem to form a unit together with the "summa," in such wise that the whole ensemble represents an arrangement of material according to the order in the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, as mentioned

<sup>69</sup> Cf. A. Gregory, "The Cambridge Manuscript," pp. 181-182.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 170. Some of these questions seem to have a relation with the last two attached to the end of Section Ca.

<sup>71</sup> The following data is compiled from A. Gregory, "The Cambridge Manuscript," pp. 190-213, where the manuscript is described by sections.

above. Specifically, the “summa” with questions 156-167 of section Ce (according to the numbering of Powicke) corresponds to the first book, the remaining questions of Cc to the second, Ce to the third, and Cd to the fourth.

Closely related to some parts of C is *Paris Nat. Lat. ms. 14556*, a thirteenth century manuscript, formerly of the library of the Canons Regular of St. Victor, Paris. We shall refer to this manuscript as “V”, following the lead of Powicke.<sup>72</sup> V has been studied and compared with C by Powicke,<sup>73</sup> with other manuscripts by Lacombe and Landgraf,<sup>74</sup> and especially by Alys Gregory.<sup>75</sup> It is explicitly attributed to Langton by the scribe, and has been considered by Lacombe as a copy of Godfrey of Poitiers’ original *reportationes* of the *disputationes* and *determinationes* of Langton, since it is so closely in agreement with what Godfrey writes in his *Summa*.<sup>76</sup> The text of this manuscript likewise agrees closely with Langton’s commentary on the *Magna Glossatura* of Peter Lombard when the two coincide.<sup>77</sup> Unfortunately, the manuscript is a poor exemplar, written by a scribe who understood little Latin and perhaps less theology, or who had an inferior text from which to copy. Though many parts of the manuscript are not intelligible, on certain occasions it is of assistance in reconstructing the text.

Another manuscript has recently reappeared on the scene. Powicke mentioned that in April, 1713, the Maurists had seen a Langton manuscript in the Cistercian abbey at Royaumont in France.<sup>78</sup> This same manuscript was traced by Lacombe to a certain English book-dealer, who would not tell to whom he had sold it.<sup>79</sup> Lately, Mr. Lyell bequeathed his private collection of manuscripts to the Bodleian Library of Oxford, and in the list of titles published in the “Bodleian Library Record,” we find the notice of the missing manuscript, *Phillipps MS 775*, of the thirteenth

<sup>72</sup> F. M. Powicke, *Stephen Langton*, p. 177. In this case, as also in others, we shall use the symbols commonly adopted, not the ones used by P. Anciaux, *La théologie du sacrement de pénitence au XIIe siècle*, (Louvain, 1949).

<sup>73</sup> F. M. Powicke, *Stephen Langton*, pp. 180-204.

<sup>74</sup> G. Lacombe and A. Landgraf, “The Questiones (II).”

<sup>75</sup> A. Gregory, “Indices of the Rubrics,” pp. 222-266; A. Gregory, “The Cambridge Manuscript,” pp. 69-70, 208, 221.

<sup>76</sup> G. Lacombe and A. Landgraf, “The Questiones (III),” pp. 121-122, 127, 162-163. Cf. *Ibidem*, p. 162, n. 65, where Landgraf asserts that he considers this a mere “possibility.”

<sup>77</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 123, 131-158.

<sup>78</sup> F. M. Powicke, *Stephen Langton*, p. 180. Cf. *Voyage littéraire de deux bénédictins de la congrégation de Saint Maur*, I (Paris, 1717), p. 153.

<sup>79</sup> G. Lacombe and A. Landgraf, “The Questiones (II),” p. 113, n. 2.

century.<sup>80</sup> In the future it is to be indicated as *Lyell ms. 42*, being the 42nd on the list of the Lyell manuscripts.<sup>81</sup> We shall use the letter "L" when speaking of it. It is another copy of V, and as far as we have been able to examine it, the text is of as poor a quality as that of V.

Closely related to L and V is the anonymous *Chartres ms. 430* (to be designated as "CH"), discovered by Landgraf.<sup>82</sup> Unfortunately, this manuscript was destroyed by fire during the second World War. However, Dom Lottin very kindly permitted us to use his photostatic copy. The CH manuscript is peculiar in this, that it is composed of two distinct sections. The first section is written in single columns, while the second part, beginning with f.74r, is written two columns to the page. It has been suggested that we have here a combination of what was originally two distinct and separate manuscripts.<sup>83</sup> If this were the case, it would be difficult to understand the very small number of repetitions of questions between one part and the other, and the great similarity between the entire contents of CH and the whole of V and of L. We believe that the matter deserves more study before final judgment can be passed.

As a rule, the questions found in V and L will be found in CH, and no one of the three manuscripts carries a great number of questions which the others do not have. Hence we are justified in classing these three manuscripts, L, V, and CH, in one family,<sup>84</sup> even though the order of the questions in CH is almost completely different from that of the other two. Of this group, CH is undoubtedly the best representative.

Now we come to four other manuscripts, which constitute a strict family, having a common archetype. The first of these is *Avranches ms. 230*, of the thirteenth century. We shall refer to it as "A." It is the best manuscript of the family, and the most complete.<sup>85</sup> Another member of the family is *Arras ms. 394* (formerly 965) of the fourteenth century, to be referred to as "AR." This manuscript is in very poor condition, many of its quires being ripped out and lost.<sup>86</sup> For this reason, it is not too

<sup>80</sup> R. W. Hunt, "The Lyell Bequest," in *The Bodleian Library Record*, III (1950), 76.

<sup>81</sup> We have consulted the librarian of the Bodleian Library concerning the mode of designation.

<sup>82</sup> Cf. A. Landgraf, "Handschriftenfunde," p. 101.

<sup>83</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>84</sup> Landgraf puts CH and V into two different classes, cf. A. Landgraf, *Einführung*, p. 124.

<sup>85</sup> A. Gregory, "The Cambridge Manuscript," p. 168, n. 10; O. Lottin, review of G. Lacombe and A. Landgraf, "The Questions (II)."

<sup>86</sup> For exact details, cf. O. Lottin, *loc. cit.*

helpful in establishing the text. A third is *Vatican Lat. ms. 4297* of the thirteenth century, to be known as "R." At first, this manuscript gave scholars difficulty, since they interpreted the rubric of attribution as "B. de Lang."<sup>87</sup> Upon closer investigation, Landgraf found that it was really "S. de Lang (ton)," and belonged to the present group of manuscripts.<sup>88</sup> The value of this manuscript is not too great either, since the text is of a poor quality and the handwriting is hard to read. Finally, there is the *Paris Nat. Lat. ms. 16385*, of the 13th century, which belonged to the Sorbonne library already in the 14th century.<sup>89</sup> We shall call it "S." The text is good, and in general comes very close to A.

A peculiarity of this whole family is that the attribution is always made to "Stephanus de Langton," and not to "Stephanus Cantuariensis Archiepiscopus" as is the case in C, V, and L. Another noteworthy feature is the difference between the first part of these manuscripts and the second. The first part contains full-length questions, which are to be found in the other families, whereas the second part has inferior quality questions, very few of which can be found in the other families.<sup>90</sup>

To give some idea of the relation of the families to one another, we shall give a few of the statistics arrived at by Alys Gregory in her comparative study of the manuscripts.<sup>91</sup> We shall consider the manuscripts C, CH, V, and A, which are representative.

1) A little over half of the "summa" of C is found in V (ff. 200d-208a) and in CH (ff. 93v-103), but not in A.

- 2) Of the 60 questions of Ca, 38 are in V, 36 in CH, 42 in A.
- 3) Of the 99 questions of Cb, 38 are in V, 42 in CH, 23 in A.
- 4) Of the 32 questions of Cc, 28 are in V, 24 in CH, 7 in A.
- 5) Of the 25 questions of Cd, 15 are in V, 16 in CH, 8 in A.
- 6) Of the 37 questions of Ce, 37 are in V, 35 in CH, 17 in A.
- 7) Of 171 questions in V, 158 are in CH, 159 in C, 67 in A.
- 8) Of 194 questions in CH, 158 are in V, 160 in C, ?? in A.

<sup>87</sup> Cf. M. Grabmann, *Geschichte der scholastischen Methode*, II (Freiburg in Breisgau, 1911), p. 500, n. 4.

<sup>88</sup> A. Landgraf, *Das Wesen der lässlichen Sünde in der Scholastik bis Thomas von Aquin*, (Bamberg, 1923), p. XIII, n. 2; A. Landgraf, "Eine ungedruckte liturgische Abhandlung des Kardinals Stephan von Langton," in *Theologie und Glaube*, XV (1923), 267, n. 4; O. Lotrin, "Les premiers linéaments du traité de la syndérèse au moyen âge," in *Revue néo-scolastique de philosophie*, XXVIII (1926), 430, n. 3.

<sup>89</sup> F. M. Powicke, *Stephen Langton*, p. 177, n. 1.

<sup>90</sup> A. Gregory, "The Cambridge Manuscript," p. 169.

<sup>91</sup> All these statistics are taken from Gregory's article, either directly by transcription, or indirectly by mathematical computation: cf. A. Gregory, "The Cambridge Manuscript."

- 9) Of the 45 questions of the first part of A, 38 are in Ca.  
 10) Of the 122 questions of the second part of A, 21 are *verbatim* in other manuscripts, 33 are similar to questions in other manuscripts.

From the examination and comparison of the various manuscripts, we can now draw some general conclusions:

- 1) There are three families of manuscripts:
  - a) C, which represents the most complete collection;
  - b) L, V, and CH, which have the same material in general, though the order of the questions is different in CH;
  - c) A, AR, R, and S, whose second part is unique.
- 2) The order of the questions differs from family to family, though at times small groups of questions retain the same order.
- 3) There are questions common to two or three families, which are either literally or substantially identical.
- 4) The substantially identical questions contain notable textual variants.
- 5) Each family, and in fact each manuscript, has some questions which cannot be found elsewhere.

Growing out of this examination are a series of problems:

- 1) Concerning the nature of Cb,
- 2) concerning the apparent split into two sections in CH,
- 3) concerning the nature of the second half of family A.

These problems will demand further study by competent scholars.

### *Authenticity of the Questions*

There are two phases to the question of the authenticity of Stephen Langton's collected questions. The first has to do with the authenticity of the questions in general. In other words, the problem may be formulated: Does the bulk of the questions in each manuscript belong to Langton? The second phase has to do with the authenticity of individual questions or with sections of the manuscripts. Then, there is, of course, the further problem, whether the individual questions were written by Langton himself or merely represent the *reportationes* of students, whether examined or not examined by the Master.

Regarding the first problem, the authenticity of the bulk of the questions in each manuscript, there has been some doubt concerning one or the other manuscript. Lottin once doubted the authenticity of V,<sup>92</sup> but later retracted his statements.<sup>93</sup> A difficulty regarding the attribution of R

<sup>92</sup> O. Lottin, "Les premiers linéaments," pp. 437-441.

<sup>93</sup> Cf. O. Lottin, review of G. Lacombe, "The Questiones (I)."

was solved by Landgraf and Lottin in favor of Langton, as mentioned above.

Whatever may have been said to the contrary, we cannot doubt the general authenticity of the questions in our eight manuscripts. Of the eight, seven are explicitly attributed to Langton; only CH is anonymous. From the abundance of material common to the various families, we can safely say that we are dealing with Langton questions in each of the manuscripts.

This is confirmed by the references we find to the questions in other works, be they of Langton or of other authors. Thus, Langton himself in his commentary on the *Magna Glossatura* of Peter Lombard refers to his own questions, and the references can be verified. The same is true of the references he makes from the questions to his commentary on the *Magna Glossatura*.<sup>94</sup> Moreover, Guy of Orchelles cites Cantuariensis three times, and the doctrine is found in Stephen's questions.<sup>95</sup> Roland of Cremona likewise refers to a doctrine found in the questions.<sup>96</sup> Especially in Godfrey of Poitiers do we find a heavy dependence on the questions of Langton. He often quotes his Magister, who is none other than Stephen.<sup>97</sup> However, we must be a little careful with his works, because he borrows heavily from other authors as well.

There are some special arguments in favor of the authenticity of the contents of one or the other manuscript. In C, for example, there is written across the top of each folio "Ste" on the reverse side and "phani" on the right side. Moreover, the great care taken in the correction and arrangement of most of the questions in the C manuscript is a good indication that the compiler was conversant with Langton material and was making a good compilation. Regarding manuscript V, Lacombe and Landgraf have found Godfrey of Portiers' citations of Langton to be so close to it that they have suggested at least the possibility that V represents his *reportationes* of the lectures and disputations in Langton's classes.

Thus, we have established the general authenticity of the questions.

<sup>94</sup> Cf. G. Lacombe and A. Landgraf, "The Questiones (III)," pp. 129-164; A. Landgraf, *Einführung*, 125-126.

<sup>95</sup> Cf. O. Lottin, review of G. Lacombe, "The Questiones (I)." Landgraf found the doctrine cited by Guy in Stephen's commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. A. Landgraf, "Die Wirkung der Taufe im 'Fictus' und im 'Contritus' nach der Lehre der Frühscholastik," in *Acta Pont. Academiae Romanae*, VIII (new series) (1943), 343-344.

<sup>96</sup> O. Lottin, "Les premiers linéaments," p. 430, n.3.

<sup>97</sup> Cf. G. Lacombe and A. Landgraf, "The Questiones (III)," pp. 116-122.

Now the new problem arises concerning the individual questions. Are all of them Langtonian in origin?

First, let us explain the reason why this question can be asked. It would seem as though the questions do not represent a series of lectures given by Langton in any specific order. They betray rather the nature of *disputationes* or the *determinationes* thereof. As explained earlier in this article, the disputations took place at times as a complementary part of the class lecture, at times separately from the lecture. From these discussions most probably came the written questions which we find either inserted into commentaries or collected separately. Judging from the disorder in the various collections of questions which have been found, we may say that just as the discussions were never intended to form a coherent course in theology, so were they never intended to be compiled into an orderly book. Most probably the questions first circulated singly or at times in blocks or series of a few questions, and only in the course of time were they put together into collections.<sup>98</sup> This being the case, we can easily see how some foreign matter may have crept into the collections, making it necessary for us to ask whether each single question is Langton's or not. Up till now, this problem has been brought up more than once,<sup>99</sup> but no adequate attempt has been made to disentangle what is strictly Langton's from the other matter in the manuscripts.

In answer to the problem, we may say that it is safe to assert that if any single question is present in all eight manuscripts it is Langton's. Regarding those found in only one or the other manuscript, we need not reject them absolutely, though they must be handled more carefully and confirmed from other sources. We can apply to them the criteria used above for the authenticity of the questions in general, particularly the criterion of citations by Langton and other authors. If there is no confirmation from those sources, we can have recourse to style, doctrine, formulas, and similar indications, remembering always that these rarely yield more than a high degree of probability.

At times, however, we have positive indications which make us doubt the authenticity of certain questions. Thus, it happens often that at the end of a quire of parchment, the first *amanuensis* left some blank columns. These have been filled in later by other hands. There are examples of this

<sup>98</sup> G. Lacombe and A. Landgraf, "The Questiones (II)," pp. 155-156; A. Landgraf, "Quelques collections," p. 115.

<sup>99</sup> For example, by Landgraf, who answers by affirming that there are beyond a doubt *reportationes* in the collections of Stephen's questions. A. Landgraf, *Einführung*, p. 124.

at the end of Ca and of Cb, and again after the table of contents at the end of C. The questions in these sections must be treated with caution. Sometimes they can be found in other Langton manuscripts, but not always. For example, question 155 (ff. 279v-281v) in C, which is the last of the section Cb, and is found nowhere else in the eight manuscripts has recently been definitely declared unauthentic.<sup>100</sup>

Closely related to the problem of authenticity is that of the composition by the author himself as opposed to the *reportatio* by the students. In our case, do we have to do with Langton's own *determinationes* as worked out by himself, or are we dealing only with *reportationes*? A solution of this problem has never been published. For anyone who attempts it, it would seem well to give special attention to the doubtful second section of the family A, beginning with question 46, and also section Cb, since they are of a different nature than the other questions generally.

A singular case is found in Cd, where the questions 189-196 are not found in any other manuscript. Each of these questions has a peculiar little introduction and they are arranged systematically. We are inclined to believe with Gregory that these questions may have been at least partially rewritten by the compiler of Cc-Ce.<sup>101</sup> This view is strengthened by the fact that once the introduction is finished, we seem to find the usual Langton style, especially in the later questions of the group, and the doctrine is in accord with what Langton has to say elsewhere.

### *Time of Composition*

A clear distinction must be drawn between the time when the questions were written and the time they were put into collections, as is evident from the mode in which the questions came into being and were circulated, as described above. The text itself offers some indications as to the date the questions were written, while the marginal notes are an aid in establishing the date of compilation, particularly of manuscript C.

The time of composition of the questions is, to all appearances, the latter part of the teaching career of our author, that is from about the turn of the century till 1206, when he became cardinal and left Paris. There is no solid reason for putting the questions after the time of his teaching,<sup>102</sup>

<sup>100</sup> F. M. Henquinet, "Les questions inédites d'Alexandre de Halès sur les fins dernières," in *RTAM*, X (1938), 61, n.24, 275.

<sup>101</sup> A. Gregory, "The Cambridge Manuscript," p. 212.

<sup>102</sup> The citation of Stephanus Cancellarius (Stephen of Rheims—chancellor 1214-1218) in the commentary on Romans does not militate against our statement, because, as Landgraf states, the only solid conclusion possible is that the particular

and indeed, if they represent school exercises, as seems to be the case, we have a positive reason for putting them before 1206. This date is further confirmed by the fact that Godfrey of Poitiers used Stephen's questions in some of his own questions which he wrote before his own *Summa* (1213-1215).<sup>103</sup> Another confirmation exists in this, that several vestiges of Stephen's questions appear in the *Summa* of Robert of Courson, which was written between 1204 and 1208.<sup>104</sup>

There are, moreover, several indications which lead us to the approximate establishment of the *terminus post quem* of the writing of the questions. The first of these is found in Ca (f. 195d), where Stephen says: "De bonis Ecclesiae subveniendum est regi, sicut quando ecclesia anglicana redemit Richardum regem Anglorum."<sup>105</sup> Since the ransom spoken of took place in 1193, it is clear that the question with the above statement was written at least some time after that year.<sup>106</sup>

In Cd (f. 313d) we read: "Videtur quod scandalum faciat cum sit occultus peccator, et ita peccat, licet multi coram Domino Fulcone ita facerent."<sup>107</sup> Here is an allusion to a certain Fulk (died 1202), a curate of Neuilly near Paris, who achieved great fame by his apostolic labors between 1195 and 1197, and who began preaching the crusade in 1197.<sup>108</sup> We can conclude from this that this question was written at least after 1195-96.<sup>109</sup>

An argument for a still later date is found in the citation by name of Peter of Corbeil. This is found in Ca (f. 204c), where Stephen writes: "Alii dicunt, de quorum opinione fuit Corboliensis," referring to an opinion concerning the increase of guilt by the commission of an outward act. This same question with the identical words is found in L (f. 49b) and V (f. 220b) and in A (f. 246d) and the rest of its family (AR, f. 100c; R, f. 43b; S, f. 48c). It is significant that in the A family, the question occurs in the first part, before the dubious second section. We have here

manuscript in which the citation is found came into existence after the time of Stephanus Rhemensis, not that the work itself was first written then. At best, we can admit that Stephen Langton retouched his work at that late period, cf. A. Landgraf, "Zur Chronologie der Werke Stephen Langtons," in *RTAM*, III (1931), 68-69; A. Landgraf, *Einführung*, p. 126.

<sup>103</sup> O. Lottin, "Quatre 'Quaestiones,'" p. 150.

<sup>104</sup> A. Landgraf, "Die Schriftzitate," p. 87.

<sup>105</sup> Cf. A. Gregory, "The Cambridge Manuscript," p. 171.

<sup>106</sup> The same text occurs in L (f. 82b-c), V (f. 249c), and CH (f. 18r).

<sup>107</sup> Cf. A. Gregory, *loc.cit.*

<sup>108</sup> M. and Ch. Dickson, "Le cardinal Robert de Courson, sa vie," in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, IX (1934), 66.

<sup>109</sup> The same text is found in L (f. 76d), V (f. 126d), and CH (f. 244d).

a constant testimony of all the manuscripts except one, CH, which does not have exactly the same treatment of this question. Now, it has been observed that although some authors of this period cite living people by name in their works, they never name anyone who is actually teaching. Applying this principle to the case in point, we would expect to place these citations after the time when Peter of Corbeil became bishop, that is after 1199 when he was elevated to the see of Cambrai.<sup>110</sup>

This date is further corroborated by the cross-references from the questions to Langton's own Pauline commentary, that is, his commentary on the *Magna Glossatura* of Peter Lombard. Let us illustrate by one text which occurs in a question pertaining to the sacraments. Stephen makes a reference to his commentary on Timothy: "ut plenius diximus super primam ad Timotheum." This same text occurs in all the manuscripts: in Ca, f. 206c; in CH, f. 37v; in L, f. 30d; in V, f. 198d; in A, f. 245a; in AR, f. 98a; in R, f. 41c; in S, f. 46c. Now, according to the reckonings of Lacombe, we are to put the Pauline commentaries between 1200-1203.<sup>111</sup> If we grant that the questions and the commentaries grew out of two complementary school exercises, the lecture and the disputation, during the same period of time, we have here another argument for putting the *terminus post quem* of the questions at about 1200.

The general impression, then, that we get from all these indications is that the questions are to be placed at the turn of the century, more exactly ca. 1200-1206. This holds for at least some of the questions in each of the manuscripts which we possess. Whether it is to be applied to the second part of the A family or to Cb depends on the answer given to the question of the Langtonian nature of the questions they contain.

Thus far, we have treated the chronology of the questions without taking into account the opinion that there are different series of questions and different redactions of Langton's Pauline commentary.<sup>112</sup> It happens often enough within the eight manuscripts that there are differences of doctrine between one question and another treating of the same matter.<sup>113</sup> Moreover, just as there are cross-references from the questions to the com-

<sup>110</sup> Cf. F. M. Powicke, *Stephen Langton*, p. 70; U. Chevalier, *Répertoire des sources historiques du moyen âge*, Bio-bibliographie, II (ed. 2, Paris, 1907), col. 370.

<sup>111</sup> G. Lacombe and B. Smalley, "Studies on the Commentaries," pp. 61-63.

<sup>112</sup> G. Lacombe and A. Landgraf, "The Questiones (III)," pp. 159-164. Landgraf later (1948) says that the different redactions of this commentary have not yet been sufficiently investigated. A. Landgraf, *Einführung*, p. 125.

<sup>113</sup> G. Lacombe and A. Landgraf, "The Questiones (III)," pp. 163-164.

mentary, so are there cross-references from the commentary to the questions.<sup>114</sup> From this combination, several problems arise:

- 1) Which questions belong to one series, which to the other? 2) Do the different "series" of questions represent different redactions by Langton, or are they merely different *reportationes* of the same lecture or disputation? 3) If they are different redactions, which of them was written earlier? 4) When was the first one written? when the second?

The first problem, which is of prime importance, is perhaps the most difficult to solve, and to date, nobody has published a solution of it. It will require a thorough study of the doctrine as well as of the cross-references from the questions to other works and vice versa.

To the second question, Lacombe and Landgraf have answered in favor of different redactions, rather than in favor of different *reportationes* of the same school exercise, saying that the *reportationes* theory would not sufficiently explain the textual identity which occurs at times between two versions of the same question.<sup>115</sup>

The answer to the third problem depends on the first problem, and hence we can give no solution.

The fourth problem has received a tentative answer placing the first redaction as early as 1180-1190.<sup>116</sup> This is based on a phrase in Langton's commentary on Genesis, dated by Lacombe between 1180 and 1185: "Ut patet in quaestione de Trinitate."<sup>117</sup> However, the word, *quaestio*, in this text does not necessarily indicate a literary work, but should rather be understood in the sense of a doctrinal problem or the theological treatment of the Trinity. This argument aside, we do not think it is necessary to go back so far before 1200. In fact, both redactions could be placed between 1200 and 1206, still leaving Langton time enough to go through his course on the Pauline epistles and the related questions twice. However, we do not wish to make any final assertion concerning the first "series" of questions, because we believe that before one series of questions will have been sifted from the other, the solutions of the other problems will necessarily be merely tentative. Nonetheless, until further investigations shall have been made, we believe that our conclusion may be accepted, namely that the bulk of the questions were written ca. 1200-1206.

We may also note in conclusion that we do not believe the theory of

<sup>114</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 129-164.

<sup>115</sup> G. Lacombe and A. Landgraf, "The Questiones (II)," p. 158.

<sup>116</sup> F. M. Powicke, "Bibliographical Note," p. 556.

<sup>117</sup> Cf. G. Lacombe and B. Smalley, "Studies on the Commentaries," p. 63.

two redactions is necessary to explain the multiple cross-references between the commentaries and the questions, because we can think of the scriptural commentary and the questions as coming into being simultaneously and parallel to each other. Hence, a cross-reference in either one to the earlier part of the other would be a very natural phenomenon without demanding a double redaction of both works. This observation, of course, is purely theoretical, and would have to stand the test of a thorough examination of all the documents involved before it could be adopted securely.

### *Date of Compilation*

After treating the date of composition of the questions, we shall now consider the dates of the compilation of the archetypes of the various collections. As was mentioned above, the general impression given by the manuscripts is that the questions were circulated singly or in small groups, and were never intended by the author to form a systematic body of doctrine.

The question now arises: When were the different compilations made? We cannot give an answer for each of the compilations. However, regarding the A family, we have a very slight indication that it was made before Stephen became archbishop of Canterbury, in that the rubrical attribution in all four manuscripts of this family consistently speaks of "Stephanus de Longuetona," never mentioning "Cantuariensis Archiepiscopus." However, this argument is of little positive value, since it is merely an argument *ex silentio*. We would need other indications from marginal notes, etc., before asserting a date for the archetype of this family. Then, too, it would be difficult to determine whether this date should refer to both the first and the second sections of these manuscripts.

The manuscripts, L, V, and C, are all rubricated with "Stephanus Cantuariensis Archiepiscopus." This would lead us to believe that their compilation has as its *terminus post quem* the date of Stephen's elevation to the see of Canterbury.

In ms. C, there are added chronological indications in the marginal notes of the successive correctors. According to the opinion of Alys Gregory, they would put the completion of the compilation of C somewhere within the first fifteen years of the thirteenth century.<sup>118</sup> There are two main arguments upon which she bases her calculations. The last corrector of the manuscript wrote in the margin on f. 317r: "Audivi Magis-

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<sup>118</sup> A. Gregory, "The Cambridge Manuscript," p. 172.

trum Stephanum Rhemensen." Now Stephen of Rheims, dean of the chapter of Paris, died in 1221. Hence, Gregory concludes, the corrector was in Paris before the date of the death of Stephen and had heard him preaching.<sup>119</sup> Again, the last corrector writes on f. 314v: "In qua opinione est Cantor Londiniensis." This is a reference to Benedict of Sansetun, the Precentor of St. Paul's who became bishop of Rochester in December, 1214. Since the corrector would hardly call him *Cantor Londiniensis* after his elevation to the episcopate, Gregory concludes that the last corrector probably finished his work before that date.<sup>120</sup>

We are inclined to believe that the date of the compilation of C is not quite as early as the arguments above seem to indicate, since they give 1214 as a probable *terminus ante quem*. We should prefer to reverse Gregory's procedure and investigate the problem from the point of view of the "*terminus post quem*." For there are several chronological indications which serve this purpose well. In fact, even Gregory's arguments do not stand in the way of a later date.

1) Magister H., the director of the compilation and principal corrector of ms. C, writing in pencil at the bottom of folio 330v, says: "Nota quod Cantuariensis dicebat." This statement must certainly be put after Stephen's elevation to the see of Canterbury in December, 1206.

2) Magister H. directed the scribe to write a correction on f. 192d, which contains the name of Praepositinus. Part of the long correction reads: ". . . unam opinionem ex opinione Prepositini et Petri Corboliensis faciunt." V and S, though they have the same context, omit the words quoted above. Granted that Praepositinus died February 25, 1210, as chancellor of the University of Paris,<sup>121</sup> and granted that active Masters were not cited by name, this correction of Magister H. is to be placed after February 1210.

3) *Cantor Londiniensis* became bishop of Rochester in 1214. According to Gregory, he had been a prominent judge up till that time.<sup>122</sup> The argument she uses to set the date of the completion of the compilation before 1214 is that the corrector would not have called him "*Cantor Londiniensis*" after he had become bishop.<sup>123</sup> This argument is not conclusive, however,

<sup>119</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 172, 188-189.

<sup>120</sup> *Loc.cit.*

<sup>121</sup> G. Lacombe, *La vie et les œuvres de Prévostin*, (Bibliothèque thomiste, 11) (Kain, 1927), p. 46.

<sup>122</sup> A. Gregory, "The Cambridge Manuscript," p. 189. He was "first precentor" from 1203 to 1214, *ibidem*, p. 189, n.105.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 189.

since there is more than one case in which a man was called by his former name even after he had received a bishopric, probably because he had become famous under his former name. Not knowing the facts of the scholastic career of the Cantor, we will not attempt to apply the rule about not citing a man while he is in the schools. However, we can say this, that the present citation of the Cantor does not stand in the way of a date later than 1214 for the completion, or even for the beginning of the compilation of manuscript C.

4) In another place, Magister H. refers to "Dominus Innocentius Tertius" (f. 184d): "Audivi Dominum Innocentium Tertium dicentem . . ." It would seem odd to give the name of the Pope if he were still reigning. We might expect to read simply: "Audivi Dominum Papam." We may, therefore, doubt whether Magister H. wrote this remark before the death of Innocent III, July 16, 1216.

5) The chronology of Stephen of Rheims is rather baffling. Alys Gregory merely mentions that he died in 1221 and that he preached in Paris as dean of the chapter. If it was in Stephen's preaching that our corrector heard the opinion he quotes, and if the preaching took place after Stephen had become dean of the Chapter at Paris as Gregory seems to imply, then we have an argument for placing the compilation *not before* 1215, as she would have it, but rather *after* 1216, because it was in 1216 that he became dean.

On the other hand, Glorieux tells us that Master Stephen of Rheims succeeded John de Candelis as chancellor of the University in 1214, and kept this position till 1218.<sup>124</sup> He says nothing of Stephen's being dean of the chapter, mentioning only that he was a canon of Notre Dame. He says also that according to *Gallia Christiana* Stephen was dean of Rheims from 1226-1239. This certainly conflicts with the date of death given by Gregory.<sup>125</sup> In the light of these things, we believe that Glorieux rightly speaks of the possibility of the existence of a second Stephen of Rheims.

If the corrector refers to this second Stephen, who was chancellor from 1214-1218, applying our principle of not quoting anyone active in the schools, we would expect to put the citation after 1218, when he quitted his position as chancellor. It may be noted that here we would not be dealing with the quotation of a sermon. If he refers to a Stephen who was Dean of the Chapter of Paris from 1216 to 1221, when he died, we would

<sup>124</sup> P. Glorieux, *Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle*, (*Études de philosophie médiévale*, 17) (Paris, 1933), n.112.

<sup>125</sup> Following *Histoire littéraire de la France*, XVII, 230-233.

be led to put the date of the citation after 1216, and possibly even after 1221.

After considering all these chronological leads, we should like to put the *terminus post quem* for the completion of the compilation of C at about 1214-1216. As far as we can see, there is no solid positive indication regarding the time it was finished. It would not be absurd to suggest that the work was completed before the death of Langton in 1228. If only we knew the identity of Magister H. or of his collaborating correctors, we could get a clue from the date of their death for the *terminus ante quem*. As things stand, however, any argument adduced seems to take on the nature of an argument *ex silentio* and forms an unsteady basis for the computation of the date before which the compilation of the manuscript *Cambridge, St. John's College, 57*, was finished.

Having examined these basic problems concerning the life and works of Langton, particularly concerning the eight manuscripts which contain collections of the theological questions, we believe that we have a solid enough basis on which to conduct further research in the field of Langton's questions, be it of a doctrinal or historico-critical nature. We hope in the future to continue work in this field. For the present, we trust that this article has shown that the bulk of the material contained in the eight manuscripts of collected questions is Langtonian and represents, in the main, the ideas of our author. Further, we believe it has been established that the major part of the questions was written during Langton's teaching term, more specifically between 1200-1206, and that the Cambridge manuscript was compiled at a later date, and finished sometime after 1214-1216.

In order to arrive at a more specific determination of chronology and of doctrinal development, it remains necessary to make a tabulation of the material contained in all these manuscripts and to make a comparative study between these questions and the others contained in some of the commentaries of our author. All this, it is hoped, will eventually lead to a critical edition of the *quaestiones*.

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# THE LITURGICAL LEGISLATION OF THE FRANCISCAN RULES

THE MENDICANT Movement gave rise to a grave disciplinary problem in the Church.<sup>1</sup> In the ecclesiastical organization there was no place for gospel-preaching, free lance laymen and clerics. Until the end of the twelfth century the popes consistently frowned upon them. Innocent III, recognizing the signs of the time, changed the official policy of his predecessors. His protection of the orthodox fraternities opened the way for development; yet, it was a winding path, blocked with obstacles numerous and complicated.

The ideal of the Poor Man of Assisi, at first only related to the Movement, soon became its finest expression. In a few years a whole world stood behind Francis and his first companions. Clerics and laymen, learned and ignorant, lived according to the gospel. "They gave a wonderful example of humility, going barefoot in their long, ample, grey, hooded habits, patched and girded with a cord. On Sundays and festivals they went forth from their dwellings and preached in the parish churches and other places where people came together . . . carrying their *bibliothecae*<sup>2</sup> in satchels hung from their shoulder. Eventually they built schools, then houses and friaries and, finally, with the aid of wealthy citizens, spacious and lofty churches and offices. From the Sovereign Pontiff they obtained privileges and permission (*indulgentiae*) for building chapels in the towns, so that they might say Mass and hear confession, because many were less willing to confess to their own priests and were in spiritual danger. Then they set up schools of theology in their own houses. Lecturing and disputing and preaching to the people, they reaped no small harvest for the barns of Christ . . ." It was Matthew Paris<sup>3</sup> who in these lines sketched the history of little more than twenty-five years. Still, it is

<sup>1</sup> H. Grundmann, *Religiöse Bewegungen im Mittelalter* in *Historische Studien* . . . Heft 267, Berlin 1935, 59 ff., 70 ff., 91, 97 ff.

<sup>2</sup> That is their bibles; see Ducange, *Glossarium* s.v.—E. Clop, *St. François et la liturgie de la chapelle papale* in *Arch. Franc. Hist.* xix, 1926, 758, V. D. Scudder, *The Franciscan adventure*, London s.a. (1931), 126, note 7, and M. Righetti, *Storia liturgica* ii, Milan 1946, 462, give it unduly the wider meaning of Office books and breviaries.

<sup>3</sup> *Historia Anglorum. Chronica minor*, London 1866, 109 (Rolls Series).

the view of an outsider—and a jealous one too. The outline is too smooth. It lacks the force and the tormented conflict, the struggle for an ideal which spread at such a speed that it endangered the common sense of proportion.<sup>4</sup> The old life of Rivo Torto was an ideal and a reality; both of them soon became impossible. Many, even those of good will, missed the necessary direction and changed it into homeless wandering and doing odd jobs. They were the always-happy, who have no problems, never see danger and ignore the need for discussion. But clerics and scholars clamoured for education, security of work, fixed abodes, a regular life. They wanted organization. The latter was not the strongest point in Francis' character.

When, in 1220, Francis returned to Italy from a missionary journey to the Holy Land, he found his brotherhood confused, bewildered and distressed.<sup>5</sup> It had reached the painful crisis out of which the Order had to be born. While maintaining some characteristics of its own, it took its place in the Church according to the then prevailing concept of religious life.<sup>6</sup> The dangerous stage of the internal crisis lies between the years 1220 and 1223 in which legend is difficult to separate from history.<sup>7</sup> Francis worked out three Rules: the first one, generally called the Rule of 1221, was mostly a compilation of what previously had been concluded; the second, made at Fonte Colombo, was either lost or destroyed; the third, a second edition of this project, was given official papal confirmation by Honorius III in the bull *Solet annuere* of 29 November 1223.<sup>8</sup> Ever since it has been the foundation stone of the Franciscan Order.

It is in this Rule that we first meet the liturgical ordinance which is the cause of the interest of the Friars Minor in the liturgy of the papal court. But the history of the Franciscan breviary does not begin in 1223 nor does the final Rule explain the significance of liturgy in this new mode of life. What is more, both from a liturgical and juridical point of view it results in a break with the past. Various reasons have so far prevented historians from guessing at the intricacy of this problem. Yet, the early Franciscan liturgy is definitely to be distinguished into two sharply con-

<sup>4</sup> See the interpolation in a letter of James of Vitry in G. Golubovich, *Biblioteca bio-bibliografica della Terra Santa*, i, Quaracchi . . . , 7, n. 1.

<sup>5</sup> Gratien, *Histoire de la fondation et de l'évolution de l'Ordre des Frères Mineurs au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle*, Paris 1928, 15.

<sup>6</sup> Gratien, op. cit. 69, 75, 107, 120, 156ff., 173ff., etc.

<sup>7</sup> J. R. H. Moorman, *The Sources for the life of St. Francis of Assisi*, Manchester 1940, 30ff.

<sup>8</sup> *Opuscula sancti Patris Francisci Assisiensis*, in *Bibliotheca Franciscana ascetica Mediæ Aevi*, i Quaracchi 1904, 63ff.

trasting periods: the first lies between the oral confirmation of the brotherhood in 1210 by Innocent III and the solemn promulgation of the final Rule in 1223, the second begins in 1223 and ends with the correction of Haymo of Faversham in 1243-4. The first period is of vital importance for the general history of the portable breviary, the second for our knowledge of the Office of the papal court.

### *Liturgical practice and legislation before 1223*

When Francis and his first companions returned from Rome in 1210, they were all clerics. Innocent III, convinced in a dream that Francis was to sustain the Lateran which threatened to fall into ruins, had approved the guiding principles of their life: a strip of parchment with a few sentences of the gospel, mostly words of Christ himself. The pope had given them the 'small tonsure'<sup>9</sup> which regularized their position as preachers but did not oblige them to any special duty, such as the recitation of the Divine Office. For a short time then they lived near the Rivo Torto and assisted the sick in the leper house of San Lazzaro dell'Arce.<sup>10</sup> Soon they went about in the valleys, preaching and giving good example, working if need be, for their sustenance. With other fervent Christians they went to the cathedral of San Rufino or to St. George's in Assisi to assist at Mass and the Canonical Hours; during their apostolic journeys they went to the parish church, some chapel or nearby monastery.<sup>11</sup> If there was no such opportunity, they said the Our Father, some prayers or psalms at the time that Office was said in church.<sup>12</sup> Except for Sylvester, a priest of Assisi, and Peter Catani, formerly canon of the cathedral, they did not know how to say the Office,<sup>13</sup> nor did they have any books.<sup>14</sup> When occasionally they got one, Francis gave it to the poor.<sup>15</sup>

Then Francis saw the number of his brethren growing and, after his visit to Spain, he thought of a fixed abode and a suitable place where they

<sup>9</sup> St. Bonaventure, *Legenda maior*, cap. 3, n. 10 in *Opera omnia* viii, ed. Quaracchi, 512<sup>b</sup>; ed. *Analecta Franciscana* x, ed. Quaracchi, 571: *Facit (Innocentius) coronas parvulas fieri, ut verbum Dei libere praedicarent.*

<sup>10</sup> See A. Fortini, *I documenti degli archivi assisani e alcuni punti controversi della vita di san Francesco* in *Arch. Franc. Hist.* xliii, 1950, 23ff.

<sup>11</sup> See Angelus of Chiarino, *Expositio Regulae*; ed. L. Olinger, Quaracchi 1921, 82, and the anecdote of the provincial chapter of Worms in 1222, in Jordan of Giano, *Chronica in Anal. Franc.* i, 10, n. 26.

<sup>12</sup> Thomas of Celano, *Legenda prima*, pars i, cap. 18; *Anal. Franc.* x, 37, n. 47; *Actus beati Francisci*, cap. 8; ed. P. Sabatier, Paris 1902, 27f.

<sup>13</sup> I Celano, pars i, cap. 17; *Anal. Franc.* x, 35, n. 45.

<sup>14</sup> St. Bonaventure, op. cit., cap. 3; *Opera omnia* viii, 511; *Anal. Franc.* x, 572; II Celano, pars 2, cap. 58, *Anal. Franc.* x, 184, n. 91.

<sup>15</sup> *Speculum perfectionis*, cap. 38; ed. P. Sabatier, Paris 1898, 69; II Celano, loc. cit.

could say their prayers. He asked for and obtained from the Benedictines of Monte Subasio the chapel of St. Mary of the Angels, right in the middle of the valley.<sup>16</sup> They settled there, gathered in their own chapel and life became somewhat more stable.<sup>17</sup> The unlettered said their prayers as before: the Our Father with Francis' paraphrase and the *Adoramus te*.<sup>18</sup> Others knew the psalter, the Offices of the Virgin and the Dead, some hymns and traditional prayers. At home they said their psalms together. Francis himself was ordained deacon;<sup>19</sup> henceforth he had to say public prayers like priests and clerics in Holy Orders.<sup>20</sup> Up to the death of Peter Catani (1221) Office books and even psalters were very scarce<sup>21</sup> and a luxury which they happily renounced for the love of poverty. So regular performance of the Office, whether chant or recitation, was out of the question, as also because, except for the chapel of Portiuncola, the friars had no oratories or chantries until the end of 1224.<sup>22</sup>

But priests and clerics, who joined the brotherhood, wanted to say some Office. The general rule 'No breviary no Office' was all right for Francis, who loved poverty more than anything else; others preferred to have books in order to continue what they used to do before. They reminded Francis that extreme poverty with no books, no roof, no chapel, was not just a virtue but also an obstacle to many things equally good and praiseworthy: one of these was the daily recitation of the Divine Office. Some of them agreed with the saint that, because of poverty, they should not have choirs and choir breviaries like the monks. But then, at least, he should allow them to have a psalter or a portable breviary. The monks, indeed, did not need these. The few occasions when they went on a journey were a sufficient excuse for saying other prayers instead of the Office. Moreover, in every monastery where they stopped, there were plenty of choir books from which one could make up what was still to be said.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>16</sup> *Speculum perfect.*, cap. 55; ed. cit., 96f.

<sup>17</sup> *Actus b. Francisci*, loc. cit.

<sup>18</sup> I *Celano*, pars 1, cap. 17; *Anal. Franc.* x, 35, n. 45.

<sup>19</sup> A. Callebaut, *St. François levite*, in *Arch. Franc. Hist.* xx, 1927, 193ff.

<sup>20</sup> The history of the canonical obligation will be studied elsewhere.

<sup>21</sup> *Speculum perfect.*, loc. cit.; Bartholomew of Pisa, *Liber de conformitate vitac b. Francisci ad vitam domini Ihesu*, lib. 2, fruct. 4, in *Anal. Franc.* v, 110.

<sup>22</sup> J. H. Sbaralea, *Bullarium Franciscanum* i, Rome 1750, 20, n. 17.—The lack of places in which to say the Office is revealed once more in a bull of March 1222, loc. cit., g., when Honorius III gave them permission to celebrate in their churches during an interdict, "if you come to have any."

<sup>23</sup> Elsewhere it will be shown in detail that portable breviaries were hardly known before the beginning of the 13th century. So far I have found 86 breviaries and 15 fragments of breviaries which date from the 11th and 12th centuries. Of these 73 are of monastic and 28 of secular origin. What is more, 83 of them were intended for

But the friars were always on the road and never found books in their own places. Their work was steadily handicapped if they had to fall back on assisting at the Office in the churches. And did voluntary poverty relieve those in Holy Orders from the canonical obligation, if the Office had to be replaced continuously by other prayers? Others knew that portable breviaries were mostly incomplete and, therefore, no solution of the problem. More inclined to monastic observances, they wanted choirs, the only places where the Office was really safeguarded. Perhaps Francis should augment the number of Offices, as the monks had done.<sup>24</sup> And what kind of Office had to be said: that of the clergy, the *cursus saecularis*, or that of the monks, the *cursus monasticus*? Still others had never been able to say the Office or the psalter. In renouncing the world, they wanted to know more of religious life, including the Office. They were looking for a psalter and somebody who would teach them to read. These and similar questions of public prayer came up for discussion and were proposed to the General Chapters in the years immediately preceding 1221. When Francis wrote the project of his first Rule,<sup>25</sup> he collected the latest conclusions in the third chapter, where the liturgical ordinance runs in this way:<sup>26</sup>

Dicit dominus: *Hoc genus demoniorum non potest exire nisi in ieunio et oratione*, et iterum: *Cum ieunatis, nolite fieri sicut hypocrite tristes*. Propter hoc omnes fratres, sive clerici sive laici, faciant divinum officium, laudes et orationes secundum quod debent facere:

Clerici faciant officium et dicant pro vivis et pro mortuis secundum consuetudinem clericorum. Pro defectu autem et negligentia fratrum dicant omni die *Miserere mei deus cum Pater noster*; pro fratribus defunctis dicant *De profundis cum Pater noster*. Et libros tantum necessarios ad implendum eorum officium possint habere.

Et laicis etiam scientibus legere psalterium liceat eis illud habere. Aliis vero nescientibus litteras librum habere non liceat.

use in choir (they are noted or plain choir breviaries) and only 17 are portable books. Of the latter, however, not yet 10 can be said to be real Office books. The others are just collections of votive Offices or a Common of the Saints with a ritual and private prayers.

<sup>24</sup> Van Dijk, *Historical liturgy and liturgical history in Dominican Studies* ii, Oxford 1949, 168ff.

<sup>25</sup> I agree with A. Quaglia, *Origine e sviluppo della Regola francescana*, Naples 1948, 81ff., in so far as he regards the Rule of 1221 as being written purposely as a new revision, to be approved by the pope. Needless to say, it was based on the previous collection of statutes, added to the primitive Rule.

<sup>26</sup> *Opuscula*; ed. cit., 27f.; see Cuthbert, *The Life of St. Francis of Assisi*, London 1912, 397.

Laici vero dicant *Credo in deum et viginti quatuor Pater noster cum Gloria patri* pro matutino, pro laudibus . . . Pro mortuis septem *Pater noster cum Requiem eternam et defectu et negligentia fratrum tria Pater noster quolibet die.*

However much the result of previous discussions, it is clear that this ordinance is a project for the future rather than a reflection of the past. Since up to the twenties Office books were very scarce, the first step towards organization of public worship in the Order was made either shortly before or in 1221. Moreover, though the discussions had their origin in the development of the simple brotherhood into an Order, their solution must have been inspired mainly by the customary practices outside the Order. On the other hand, the actual codification is, before and above all, Francis' personal answer to the suggestions made and, therefore, cannot be separated either from his personality or ideals. Hence in the following pages an attempt has first been made to find Francis' character in the few lines of his liturgical legislation and then to compare it with the customs and attitude of his contemporaries.

Francis' legislation is broken up into four sections, namely a general rule and three particular ones, viz. for clerics, for laybrothers, for educated and unlettered. First, on the basis of Mark 9, 28, it is stated that spiritual perfection cannot be obtained without prayer and fasting. Hence all the friars, clerics as well as laics, have to say some prayers according to each one's state. Then, the obligation of their state is worked out in greater detail in the subsequent text, where the prayers, in fact, appear to be public: Francis styled them *divinum officium* and *laudes et orationes*.

Clear as is the term 'Divine Office', the words 'lauds and prayers' are vague and uncertain. Luke Wadding<sup>27</sup> took them as synonymous with the preceding Divine Office, an explanation which, for obvious reasons, had practically no adherents. The current opinion is that Francis prescribed some of his own compositions, the spiritual songs and prayers, which he continually recommended to his brothers and which he himself added to his daily prayers. The most usual were the paraphrase of the Our Father, *Sanctissime Pater noster*, and the lauda *Sanctus, sanctus* (a compilation of texts of the Apocalypse with the refrains of the canticles of Daniel 3, 52 and 57), followed by a collect *Omnipotens sanctissime*.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>27</sup> Beati patris Francisci Assisiatis opuscula nunc primum collecta tribus tomis distincta notis et commentariis asceticis illustrata, Antwerp 1623, 156.

<sup>28</sup> Opuscula, ed. Quaracchi, 11g-23.

Both the rubrics in the Office of the Passion, another composition of the saint, and passages in the writings of his companions leave no doubt that the terms *laudes* and *oratio* more often than not refer to the two pieces mentioned. No tradition could, apparently, be better founded than the one based on testimonies like these:

Incipiunt laudes quas ordinavit beatissimus pater noster Franciscus et dicebat ipsas ad omnes horas diei et noctis et ante officium beatae Mariae virginis sic incipiens *Sanctissime Pater noster* . . . Deinde dicantur laudes *Sanctus, sanctus, etc.*<sup>29</sup>

. . . sic dicebat istud officium [passionis] beatus Franciscus: primo dicebat orationem quam docuit nos dominus et magister: *Sanctissimus Pater noster* etc. cum laudibus, scilicet *Sanctus, sanctus, sanctus*. Finitis laudibus cum oratione, incipiebat hanc antiphonam, scilicet *Sancta Maria*. Psalmos dicebat primo de sancta Maria.<sup>30</sup>

In spite of all this, one cannot escape the impression that the *laudes et orationes* in the project of 1221 do not have the same meaning. If at the beginning Francis may have urged his own *laudes* and *orationes* to be said as public, non-liturgical prayers, as time went on he became more experienced and moderate in his claims for perfection. There is a long-winded and far-fetched constitution which he is said to have made against useless words,<sup>31</sup> where the term *Laudes dei* is frequently used in connection not with the paraphrase of the Our Father but with the Lord's Prayer itself. And yet, the expression was also the official name of the lauda '*Tu es sanctus*,' which Francis gave to Leo on La Verna.<sup>32</sup> Thus it seems that all such terms have a generic meaning, while the prayers actually prescribed became less numerous and complicated. Now, in 1221, Francis used the favorite words precisely for the three praises and four prayers of the Our Father, just as he wrote in a letter to all faithful:<sup>33</sup> "Let us say *laudes* and *orationes* day and night, in this way *Pater noster qui es in coelis*, because we must pray always." Francis not only disliked legal distinctions, he also lacked the ability to compose a legal document. This

<sup>29</sup> *Opuscula*; ed. cit., 119.

<sup>30</sup> *Opuscula*, ed. cit., 126.

<sup>31</sup> *Speculum perfect.*, cap. 82; ed. cit., 161 f. See *Arch. Franc. Hist.* xv, 1922, 312, n. 102.

<sup>32</sup> *Opuscula*, ed. cit., 124. Sabatier, *Speculum*, 162f., note, identifies the *Laudes dei* with the *Sanctus* praise, a conclusion which is little justified by the texts. Nor were the *Laudes dei* connected with Francis' paraphrase. One may compare *Speculum*, cap. 82, loc. cit. with II. *Celano*, pars 2, cap. 119 in *Anal. Franc.* x, 223, n. 160.

<sup>33</sup> *Opuscula*, ed. cit., 90.

is only the first example which explains why the liturgical provision of 1221 was far from clear.

"The Almighty has revealed to me that I must live according to the manner of the holy gospel," Francis said,<sup>34</sup> and when from 1217 onwards the future of his Order was discussed, he would not submit to the decree of the Lateran Council and give up his own Rule for any other existing monastic Rule, whether St Augustine's or St Benedict's. This fully conscious refusal was the negative side of his conviction that what was most needed was not hiding away behind the walls of a monastery. He wanted something simple, something directly based on the teaching of Christ, who preached glad tidings for everybody. He wanted to be perfect in the midst of the world, among his fellow men on the market as well as in the open field. This mentality was not entirely new. It was a sign of the time, of awaking economic and social consciousness, of expanding towns overcrowded with people, poor and rich, faithful yet cruel in their bitter conflicts and fights for existence and power, of relics and processions. It was prepared in the movement and unrest of the Gothic mind, when every castle had its chapel but many a cathedral was a stronghold. Yet, it was new. When, at the beginning of the twelfth century, Norbert of Gennep's attempt to restore the ancient liturgy of the Rule of St Augustine had failed,<sup>35</sup> tradition forced him to fall back on monasticism, then just in reform. Hence in the apostolic life of Prémontré we find an amalgam of secular liturgy oversaturated with monastic usages of Cluny, Citeaux and Chartreux, in short, an Office 'according to the use of the other regular brethren'.<sup>36</sup> A century later Francis of Assisi, aspiring after the radicalism of the gospel, did not want to hear any more of those 'regular brethren.' Whether cleric or laymen, those who followed him were to be no more and no less than perfect Christians, just as they could be found in every church and chapel along the road. And just because the people made no distinction between liturgy and devotion, there was no substantial difference between the liturgical obligations of the *fratres minores*, who joined the religious brotherhood (First Order), and the *fratres* and *sorores de penitentia*, who followed the ideal in their status of laymen in the world (Third Order). Both the Rule of 1221 and that of the Third Order, approved in the same year, are nothing but an explicit codification of what was regarded as an example of Christian perfection:

<sup>34</sup> Testament, in *Opuscula*, ed. cit., 79.

<sup>35</sup> G. Dereine, *Le premier Ordre de Prémontré* in *Revue bénédictine* lviii, 1948, 88.

<sup>36</sup> Loc. cit., 90.

*First Order*<sup>37</sup>

The clerics are to say the Office, namely for the living and the dead, according to the use of the clergy . . . They may have only the books necessary for carrying out their duty.

And the laybrothers able to read the psalter may have one. The others who cannot read the psalter are not allowed to have books.

*Third Order*<sup>38</sup>

All (lettered) are to say the seven canonical Hours: the clerics according to the use of the clergy,

those who know the psalter . . . the psalms of the Hours with the *Gloria patri*. When they do not go to church (at matins), they are to say the matins psalms recited by the Church, or any other eighteen psalms, or at least the

Our Fathers, like the unlettered do at all Hours.

Uniformity, Francis knew too well, did not exist. In every country and diocese, not seldom from church to church, priests and people had their own Office, their own feasts and devotions. But the main part, the psalms, was the same: God's praise was everywhere. How could he, poor pilgrim under God's eye and sky, have a preference for a particular rite? Any breviary or psalter, given for the love of God by the liberality of his fellow men, would do.<sup>39</sup> Liturgy, as a part of everyday life, was not typical of St. Francis and his first companions. It was the prevailing devotion of every good Christian. The characteristic of his Order was that its public worship was not bound by the walls of a choir. The ideal was no longer the *cursus monasticus* with all the splendour which consumed the monks and left the people cold, but the *cursus saecularis*, the 'use of the clergy'<sup>40</sup>

<sup>37</sup> Translation of the text, quoted above, p. 180.

<sup>38</sup> Ed. B. Bugatti in *Arch. Franc. Hist.* xiv, 1921, 116, n. 2; Burchard of Wolfen-schiessen in *Tertius Ordo* v, 1944, 6: Omnes dicant cotidie canonicas horas, videlicet matutinum, primam, tertiam, sextam, nonam, vesperas, completorium; clerici secundum ordinem clericorum; scientes psalterium dicant pro prima Deus in nomine tuo et Beati immaculati usque ad Legem pone, et alios psalmos horarum cum Gloria patri dicant. Sed cum ad ecclesiam non vadunt, dicant pro matutino psalmos quod dicit Ecclesia vel alios quoscumque xviii psalmos vel saltim Pater noster ut illitterati in omnibus horis. The revision of Nicholas IV, *Tertius Ordo*, loc. cit. 95, is somewhat different. In the last sentence one reads: Cum vero ad ecclesiam non accedant pro matutino, psalmos dicere studeant quos dicunt clerici vel ecclesia cathedralis. Unlike the edition quoted, I put a comma after matutino instead of after accedant.—See the 15th-cent. English translation edited by W. W. Seton, *Two fifteenth century Franciscan Rules*, in *Early English Text Society, Original Series* 148, London, Oxford 1914, 51. A French translation has been edited by the same in *Revue d'Histoire franciscaine* iii, 1926, 262ff.

<sup>39</sup> Hence the 13th-cent. explanation of the Rule of the Third Order explained Francis' words (psalmos quos dicit ecclesia) in this way: psalmos secundum ordinem alicuius ecclesie credimus eis sufficere; ed. L. Oligar in *Arch. Franc. Hist.*, xiv, 1921, 128.

<sup>40</sup> See the letter of Frederick Barbarossa to the abbot of Tegernsee in 1152-5, G. Becker, *Catalogi bibliothecarum antiqui*, Bonn 1885, 207, n. 91. On this occasion he asked for epistle and gospel books 'secundum ordinem clericorum'.

in the parish church, brought to the perfection of what Christian society, both laity and clergy, could do for the glory of God and the spiritual need of the man in the street. Francis was not liturgically-minded like the monks for whom liturgy was synonymous with choir, and prayer with cult. He was like his fellow men, whose prayer was liturgical but not formal.

But for many 'the use of the clergy' was something more than devotion: it was a duty too, prescribed by Canon Law and recognized tradition. And who should be bound, and what about the others? "The clerics are to say the Office," Francis wrote in his project of the Rule. Once more, he did not write what he thought and what he thought was so self-evident that there would have been no need for codification, had poverty not asked for it.

Canon Law, apparently so simple and clear, was based on and made for the one recognized form of public worship in choir. Private recitation was making up for absence from choir, an exception which was left to circumstances of means and devotion. In the apostolic life of the friars it was no longer a making up; it became a rule which asked for attention and authoritative explanation. Francis had to make up his mind how far he wanted his brethren to follow law and tradition. The former connected the obligation with prebends and benefices, neither of which had the interest of the friars. Tradition had brought peacefully together both monks and canons under the name of 'religious',<sup>41</sup> whose ancient Rules obliged them to say the Canonical Hours in choir.<sup>42</sup> But the friars were neither canons nor monks. What is more, from a liturgical point of view they were not even equal to the secular clergy. Before 1223, they had neither choirs, nor books, nor even a Rule that obliged them to choral duties. They were clerics and laymen living in community, religious men but nothing more. Their founder had not the slightest intention to change this. If he had wanted to, he should have provided for a uniform liturgy, so that Office could be said in choir whenever they came together from their wandering for Christ. Yet, he did not bother either about the kind of Office or the way in which it was said.

Moreover, not all religious were bound to say Office. They all said public prayers but there were plenty of good religious who never said the Canonical Hours at all. A great number of clerics, secular and regular,

<sup>41</sup> See above, p. 179, n. 20.

<sup>42</sup> F. Suarez, *De horis canoniceis et laude Dei per cantum et psalmodiam* in J. P. Migne, *Theologiae cursus completus* xviii, Paris 1841, cap. 10 and 16ff.

were unlettered. Unless they were in Holy Orders or prebendaries, they had no obligation whatsoever to instruct themselves. And even though Canon Law assumed that ordained clerics were able to read the psalter, many of them were not.<sup>43</sup> *Clericus* was no longer identical with *litteratus* and *psalteratus*, nor *laicus* with *illitteratus* and *idiota*, although the terms were still used interchangeably, at least in England.<sup>44</sup> Therefore, the constitutions of the Servites mentioned explicitly that "clerics who did not know the Canonical Hours, were to say the Our Father in the same way as it was laid down for the laics."<sup>45</sup> The same rule was observed among the Austin Friars, not only by the unlettered but also by those who were old and sick.<sup>46</sup> The ancient Rules of the Carmelites, approved by Honorius III and Innocent IV do not even consider the canonical distinction between clerics and laics. The basis of their liturgical ordinance was simply the literacy:<sup>47</sup>

Hi qui litteras neverunt et legere  
psalmos, per singulas horas eos dicant  
qui ex institutione sanctorum Patrum  
et ecclesiae approbata consuetudine  
ad horas singulas sunt deputati. [Qui  
vero litteras non neverunt viginti  
quinque vicibus dicant *Pater* in noc-  
turnis vigiliis . . .]

Hii qui horas canonicas cum cleri-  
cis dicere neverunt eas dicant secun-  
dum constitutionem sanctorum  
Patrum et ecclesiae approbatam con-  
suetudinem. [Qui eas non neverint  
viginti quinque vicibus *Pater noster*  
dicant in . . .]

And, if we have to believe John of Braido, the Humiliates kept to the same principle:<sup>48</sup>

. . . regulam Innocentii tertii acceperunt; ipsi devote qui litteras sciebant,  
licet non essent clericci, psallebant horas canonicas iuxta regulam.

<sup>43</sup> Interesting cases of ignorance are quoted by U. Berlière, *Le recrutement dans les monastères bénédictins au XIII<sup>e</sup> et XIV<sup>e</sup> siècles*, in *Mémoires de l'Academie de Belgique*. Classe des Lettres et des Sciences morales et politiques. Collection in 8°. Deuxième série xviii, Brussels 1924, 10, note 2.

<sup>44</sup> See Ducange, *Glossarium* vi, 551 and 553; Matthew Paris, *Historia*, ed. cit., ii, 90, ad 1201: Magister Symon de Thurnay . . . factus est subito mutus et adeo laicus, ut nec alphabetum legere sciret, nec dominicam orationem pronuntiare.

<sup>45</sup> *Monumenta Ordinis Servorum S. Mariae*, Rome 1897, 31.

<sup>46</sup> Jordan of Saxony, *Liber vitasfratrum*; ed. R. Arbesmann-W. Humfner in *Cassiciacum. Studies in St. Augustine and the Augustinian Order* i (American Series), New York 1943, 184.

<sup>47</sup> Cap. 6 in *Bullarium Romanum* iii, Turin 1858, 416, and *Monumenta historica Carmelitana* i, Lerins 1907, 13f.

<sup>48</sup> Quoted in G. Tiraboschi, *Vetera Humiliatorum monumenta* i, Milan 1761, 88. See also op. cit., iii, 106 (14th-cent. constitutions): Laici namque litteras nescientes, dicant *Pater noster* . . .

In so far as the Franciscans are concerned: though<sup>49</sup>

Iam fiunt baccalaurii  
Pro munere denarii,

did not apply to them, it was true that

Quamplures idiotae,  
In artibus ab aliis  
Egregiis scientiis,  
Sunt bestiae promotae.

Or to speak in the plainer language of Roger Bacon<sup>50</sup>: Thousands of friars came to Paris to follow lectures in theology and yet had no notion of reading (the psalter) and the grammar of Donatus, and this after St. Bonaventure had ordered that no cleric should be admitted to the Order unless he knew at least grammer and logic.<sup>51</sup> The early brotherhood now belonged to history. In the sixties, in fact, many regarded Francis' standpoint out of date, and of course, by that time, it was, and to some extent they had made it so. Paris was more learned than Assisi; Bologna too was full of scholars; and Rome had the knowledge of Paris and Bologna together and a prudence all its own, whereby it had planned for the future.

At bottom, his liturgical ordinance of 1221 is not much different from those of the Austin Friars, Carmelites, and Servites, all of whom followed the general practice of the secular clergy, but its wording is awkward, and represents a deposit of problems to which the Saint was unequal, rather than an adequate and well-balanced law. "The clerics are to say the Office, namely (*et dicant*) for the living and the dead, according to the use of the clergy," means—as the revised Rule of the Third Order states<sup>52</sup>—that the clerics, who are able to read Latin, had to follow the legal tradition of the Church. Canon Law obliged those in Holy Orders to the seven Canonical Hours to which a tradition of about two centuries had added prayers "for the living" i.e. the Gradual and Penitential Psalms, and the Office of the dead.<sup>53</sup> They were the inheritance of the monks which the Poor Man of Assisi accepted because they had become the customary duty of honor and gratitude towards benefactors living and deceased. Had not the mouthful of water he needed and took from the

<sup>49</sup> E. du Méril, *Poesies populaires du Moyen-âge*, Paris 1847, 153.

<sup>50</sup> *Compendium studii philosophiae*; ed. J. S. Brewer, Fr. R. Bacon, *Opera quaedam hactenus inedita i*, London 1859, 426 (Rolls Series).

<sup>51</sup> Constitutions of Narbonne (1260), in Bonaventure, *Opera omnia viii*, ed. cit., 450; *Arch. Franc. Hist.* xxxiv, 1941, 39, n. 3.

<sup>52</sup> See, above, p. 184.

<sup>53</sup> See the texts quoted above, p. 180.

spring belonging to another? The ‘use of the clergy’ also included the Lady Office. There is reason for supposing that the educated friars conformed to this tradition from the very beginning. To the best of my knowledge there is no contemporary record of it. But the evidence brought forward in the time of St Bonaventure<sup>54</sup> seems trustworthy enough.

Strictly speaking, unordained clerics were not bound by Canon Law, unless they had prebends and benefices connected with choral duties. Educated clerics in Minor Orders living in non-monastic religious houses had no benefices and, consequently, no canonical obligation. Yet, since secular clerics generally possessed benefices and religious communities easily adopted monastic customs, it had become the ‘use of the clerics’ that every educated cleric said Office in choir. It is for this reason that the Carmelite and Servite constitutions did not exclude them. Because of his claim for poverty, Francis may have had difficulty over this point. It may have prevented him from making a clear distinction between literacy and the state of being a cleric. He yielded probably to what was customary. But the project of his Rule is ambiguous. As a matter of fact, since there were no choirs, there was no need for troubling about choir duties. Unordained and unlettered clerics were free from the Office and said Our Fathers like the laics. Francis’ intention here can hardly be doubted, as will be seen presently.

“They may have only the books necessary for carrying out their duty.” There was plenty of reason why Francis could not see the liturgical legislation of his First Order as simply as that of the Third Order or even that of the Carmelites. The dilemma: poverty or duty, or if one prefers, virtue or devotion, obsessed him from the moment that his brotherhood had been growing into an Order. To him the insistence of those who wanted a breviary or psalter seemed an attack on the ideal of absolute poverty, a contempt of the early, blithe simplicity, rather than zeal for ecclesiastical obligations and public worship. When clerics in Holy Orders claimed an Office book, he could not deny their duty nor their right to have one. But the infringement of the deviation from poverty and simplicity went to his heart. The best thing he could say about those books was that they were a necessary evil. If portable breviaries had been the common attribute of every cleric, no question would have arisen. But Francis and his ideal belonged to the time in which private recitation was still a case of emergency; the ‘necessary books,’ i.e. portable breviaries, were a curiosum

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<sup>54</sup> See Batiffol, *Histoire du breviaire romain*, 3rd ed., Paris 1911, 242, note 2, who erroneously concluded that the Rule of 1221 did not oblige to these prayers.

of devout but wealthy clerics and laymen. The case, in fact, was tragic. After having renounced everything for the love of God, he now had to resort to more sensational and expensive means in order to meet the love of men and their human organization. Therefore, the problem troubled others too. Brother Leo had a vision from which he understood that the breviary which he had just finished was an obstacle to his perfection and Francis told him quite frankly that in writing it he had acted against the Rule. When unordained but lettered clerics and even lettered laics wanted an Office book, Francis simply could not understand why they sacrificed both poverty and humility, even though he had yielded officially. Thus it happened, when that novice—it is not said that he was a laybrother—wanted a psalter.<sup>55</sup> He knew *legere psalterium*, though not very well, and he liked to do so. His minister had agreed. Yet, he wanted Francis' permission too. The first time he asked the saint, he got a sermon about idle glory. Waiting for another occasion, he asked again and received the answer: "When you have a psalter, you will want a breviary. When you have a breviary, you will sit on a chair like a great prelate and say to your brother: 'Bring me my breviary'." The saint then took a handful of ashes and, acting as if to wash his hands, started mumbling to himself over and over again: "A breviary for me, a breviary for me." When the poor novice was astonished and perhaps scared, Francis said to him that he too had been tempted to have books; that only by the grace of God and consulting the gospel he had been able to resist. The novice slunk off once more. But he was good-natured and after a few months he accosted the saint again about his psalter. Francis yielded, but no sooner had the novice turned his back than Francis regretted what he had said. He ran after him: "Wait, wait, brother; come back to the place where I said that you could have a psalter according to your Minister's permission." And when they were back on the spot, he knelt before the novice and begged his pardon, "because anyone who wants to be a Friar Minor does not have anything but a tunic and drawers, as the Rule permits."

Not all clerics were so anxious to have Francis' personal permission. He had given in officially, and several priests and educated clerics tried to lay hands on a portos. Maybe at the beginning such books were kept for common use. Soon it became evident that each friar needed his own, just as he did the implements for manual labour.<sup>56</sup> To say 'his portos' or

<sup>55</sup> *Speculum perfect.*, cap. 4; ed. cit., 10 ff. See also Brother Leo, *Intentio Regulae*; ed. L. Lemmens in *Documenta antiqua Franciscana*, pars i, Quaracchi 1901, nn. 7, 10-2, p. 88ff.

<sup>56</sup> *Regula* 1221, cap. 7; *Opuscula*, ed. cit., 33.

portable breviary and not 'his books' is to go against the opinion which sees a real development behind the wording of the Rule of 1221 (*et libros tantum necessarios*) and that of the Rule of 1223 (*habere poterunt breviaria*). The origin of this idea is based on the discussions about the relation of the two Rules. As though the differences between them were not yet numerous enough, the change of terminology is said to imply that before 1223 the friars were not acquainted with breviaries but rather with the ancient collection of choir books.<sup>57</sup> Hence the development would point to a further deviation from the original idea of poverty.<sup>58</sup> The opinion would not have been defended, had the history of the Office books as such been better known to those who made these suggestions. Moreover, how the friars walked around with these choir books and how they used them without choirs or churches<sup>59</sup> are questions which can be solved without a knowledge of history by simple common sense. As a matter of fact, the 'necessary books' were some sort of primitive portable breviaries or psalters. The expression is only a more general word for two technical terms: *breviarium* and *psalterium*.

"And the laybrothers too, if they are able to read (the psalter) may have one." Thus even the lettered laics saw their insistence rewarded. What they were asking for was nothing exceptional. Educated people were accustomed to say the psalter. It was the Office of the laity, the shortened version of the Canonical Hours, a version so often used by the clergy for private recitation, that 'to read the psalter' or 'the psalms' was synonymous with 'to say Office' or 'the Hours'.<sup>60</sup> Hence the 'office' of the lettered laics was the accepted middle path between that of the clergy and the Our Fathers of the unlettered.

Francis must have gone through a lot of trouble, before he actually decided upon this line of his Rule and sacrificed poverty to literacy. He realized, of course, that these laics were not entirely inspired by devotion. Their number had been steadily growing. It caused a burning problem: that of their relation to the few priests and ordained clerics, whom they

<sup>57</sup> Clop, loc. cit., 759; Octave d'Angers, *Les Franciscains et le chant liturgique*, Stencilled study, pro manuscrito, Rome 1926-8, 79, 85; D. Mandic, *De legislatione antiqua Ordinis Fratrum Minorum*, Mostar 1924, 93, note 4.

<sup>58</sup> V. Kybal, *Die Ordensregel des hlg. Franz von Assisi und die ursprüngliche Verfassung des Minoritenordens*, Leipzig 1915, 157, recently repeated by Moorman, op. cit., 34.

<sup>59</sup> See above, p. 178.

<sup>60</sup> Witness the Carmelite Rule, above p. 186, and the rubrics of Francis' Office of the Passion, p. 182.

tried to overshadow.<sup>61</sup> Perhaps they wanted breviaries like the latter. Francis did not want to encourage them, nor to jeopardize poverty. But they argued and pestered him so much that, finally, he realized how little they understood each other. So he permitted the sufficiently educated a psalter, not because it was a useful meditation book but because the psalms were to be their share in the Divine Worship, as were the Our Fathers for those who could not read.

"The others who cannot read are not allowed to have books," is a disposition inspired by the ideal of poverty as well as by fear of heresy and predominance of the lay element. Francis barred the way to study on the part of the unlettered, because the simple man is always wiser than the sophistical pedant for whom the great remedy was: the fewer books the better.<sup>62</sup>

In taking Francis' expression *secundum consuetudinem clericorum* in the sense of a juridical obligation concerning the secular Office, as opposed to that of the monks, and rejecting any other implication of 'a liturgical rite', as not borne out by the history of those years, one defends a point of view which, if we are not mistaken, contradicts the current opinions about the early Franciscan liturgy. It is for this reason that we could not avoid delaying the discussion till after the exegesis of the whole liturgical ordinance. Needless to say, every Office book, either secular or monastic, always represents one or another local rite. This, however, was accidental, disregarded by the Rule, and of no importance to the friar who had just been able to lay hands on a Italian or French breviary and tomorrow was on his way to the Holy Land. In fact, there is no evidence whatsoever that "Francis undertook to say the Divine Office according to the custom of his ecclesiastical province, that is to say, according to the *cursus* of Assisi,"<sup>63</sup> nor, as is accepted more commonly,<sup>64</sup> that he codified

<sup>61</sup> H. Felder, *Histoire des études dans l'Ordre de S. François*, Paris 1908, 78, note 2, and 79.

<sup>62</sup> See the Dominican Constitutions, dist. 2, cap. 15; ed. J. R. Galbraith, in *Publications of the University of Manchester*, Manchester 1925, 253: Psalteria non habeant nec alios libros. See also H. Denifle in *Archiv für Literatur und Kirchengeschichte* i, 1885, 227: Conversi qui nunc habent psalteria tantum duobus annis liceat retinere, ab inde et ipsis aliis psalteria inhibemus; loc. cit., Ut nullus conversus fiat canonicus nec in libris causa studendi se audeat occupare; and the prov. council of Toulouse (1229), cap. 14, Mansi, *Concilia*, xxiii, 197.

<sup>63</sup> Octave d'Angers, loc. cit., 120.

<sup>64</sup> Clop, loc. cit., 756; Le Carou, *L'Office divin chez les Frères Mineurs au xiii<sup>e</sup> siècle*, Paris 1928, p. xxxiii; H. Felder, *The Ideals of St. Francis of Assisi*, London 1925, 401, 403, comes to a contradiction; H. Workman, *Liturgy and the Franciscan Order* in *The Franciscan Educational Conference* xxi, Washington 1939, 12. An

a custom of previous years and urged upon all clerics in the Order the Office of the secular clergy according to the rite of the dioceses and churches where they were living.

The second opinion, moreover, brings us back to the beginning of this study, where it has been mentioned why the liturgical ordinance of 1221 was a project for the future rather than a confirmation of the past. This, of course, does not mean that, in believing so, one has to imagine that the legislation dropped out of the sky as a novelty unheard of. However, only disregard of the contemporary history has made it possible that again and again the question was put forward when Francis and his companions actually began to say the Office<sup>65</sup> and whether the primitive Rule, confirmed by Innocent III in 1209 or 1210, had any regulation concerning the Office.<sup>66</sup> Obviously, they said Office right from the beginning. They did so, not because they were clerics, nor because there was a positive injunction in their first Rule. Francis and his companions were children of a time when every devout layman and cleric said either some Hours, the psalter or prayers according to what daily occupation and financial position allowed. The early friars continued what they had done before their 'conversion' but they did so with poorer means. In the course of time, those who did not know Latin became familiar with the psalter and the Office because of their life of prayer. They were eager to learn and actually succeeded, even Brother Masseo, whose devout cooing made every cleric laugh.<sup>67</sup> Francis recalls all this simplicity in the few words of his testament:<sup>68</sup> "When the Lord gave me some brothers, we clerics said the Office like other clerics, the laics said the Our Father, and we remained in the churches willingly enough. We were simple men (*idiotae*) and subject to all." Of course, they said the Office; but one must not ask what it was compared with the Canonical Hours said in church with the aid of books.

One day Francis and Leo arrived at a hermitage where they had no breviary. When it was time for matins, Francis proposed that he would be the first choir and Leo the second, responding to what the saint said. Then he started: "Brother Francis, you have committed so many sins in your life that, undoubtedly, you deserve to go to hell." Leo answered:

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other conclusion entirely mistaken, in J. Lenhart, *Franciscan libraries of the Middle Ages in The Franciscan Educational Conference* xxvii, 1947, 344f.

<sup>65</sup> K. Esser, *Das Testament des hl. Franziskus von Assisi*, Münster i. Westf. 1949, 168.

<sup>66</sup> Mandic, op. cit., 92f.

<sup>67</sup> *Actus b. Francisci*, cap. 41; ed. cit., 134, n. 11f.

<sup>68</sup> *Opuscula*, ed. cit., 79.

"And now you have done so much good that most certainly you will go to heaven." "What is that," Francis said, "Not at all, pecorello of God. You must repeat my words without change." And the answer was: "Willingly, father, in the name of God let us try again." Then the saint: "Brother Francis, the iniquities of which you are guilty before the Lord of heaven and earth are so great that you deserve to be damned for ever." But Leo answered: "And, thanks to God, you will make such progress in virtue that you will be blessed among the blessed."

Finally, Francis grew gently angry but after a renewed attempt both had to yield to the truth. For Francis did not have the satisfaction of hearing himself humiliated and Leo could never say otherwise than he had done, "because the Lord obliged me to speak as it pleased Him."

It is true that the author of the *Fioretti*<sup>69</sup> was never very particular about the details of his stories. Yet, he could not have given a more trustworthy account of what those, who knew enough psalms to fulfill their obligation, thought of their duty of saying Office privately. Francis may have been the most poetical man of the later Middle Ages; he knew quite well that poetry and Canon Law had little in common. Brother Leo sometimes interrupted his Mass to savor his happiness, but one day Francis warned him by saying,<sup>70</sup> "My son, I beg you to conform to the use of the other priests. If God sends you his grace, wait till after Mass and go into your cell to taste the divine consolation. Otherwise, the devil may profit of it by taking away your merit, not to speak of the assistants at your Mass, who may become weary of waiting for you."

Had Francis said in his Testament: "The clerics among us prayed as best they could," it would have been more adapted to our ears but no argument against those, who at the end of his life did not bother about the Office, when they had to. But this is yet another story.<sup>71</sup> What Francis did not pretend to say is that they performed the Office regularly like monks. Any modern 'reconstruction' in this sense is based on the assumption that all clerics were to say the Office and actually did so, because they were allowed to have the necessary books. This conclusion contains two errors due to the fact that the primitive legislation has been viewed in the light of the Rule of 1223 and modern practice. It is a mere anachronism, not always devoid of a tendency to make the Franciscans *ab ovo* into non-monastic

<sup>69</sup> Chapter. 8.

<sup>70</sup> *Liber exemplorum fratrum minorum*, saec. xiii; ed. L. Olinger in *Antonianum* ii, 1927, 203-76.

<sup>71</sup> The reaction against the liturgical legislation contained in the Rule of 1223 will be the object of a special study.

monks, a contradiction, of course, but possible at a time when the Order has undergone six centuries of monastic influence and liturgists are showing an astonishing ignorance of the social problem which medieval liturgy actually was.<sup>72</sup> Thus when we read that "the thousands of friars, gathered at St Mary's of the Angels for the general chapters of 1217 and 1219, all had their own breviaries of the dioceses of origin," that, therefore, "they could not say Office in choir," and that "Francis was worried about this,"<sup>73</sup> it is difficult to see why, nevertheless, no steps were taken to improve upon these problems, and why these circumstances were left as they were, and were even codified a few years later in a project of a Rule. No doubt, every tale has its teller. Shortly before the middle of the fourteenth century, Angelus of Clareno concocted a story which is not recorded in previous legends or chronicles. No doubt, Angelus had access to documents which since then may have been lost. But Angelus certainly touched them up so as to suit his apologetical purposes. This time he tried to prove that Francis' opposition to private ownership included the Office books as well. At first, he said,<sup>74</sup> when breviaries were still lacking, i.e. up to 1221, the Office was said "according to the use of the churches or the clerics with whom the friars were living." Later, when they got breviaries, they had them only in common use. Thus it happened during Francis' life time at one of the chapters in Assisi. "There were about five thousand friars, who put their Office books in a long wooden cupboard: *in armario seu tinello ligneo*. After the chapter, when they went home, none of them had the breviary which he had deposited." Everyone had taken just what was at hand: the poorer the book was, the better he liked it.

The story in itself can prove anything. In the light of the facts explained its outlines become extremely vague. Angelus' remark concerning the days when breviaries were scarce admits accurate interpretation; this is all that can be said. The chapter in question is clearly the Chapter of Mats, about which Jordan of Giano gives the more trustworthy figure of three thousand friars.<sup>75</sup> The date is not certain. At any rate the chapter

<sup>72</sup> Here it is not relevant to enter into the question of the place of the liturgy in the Franciscan spirituality, discussed by A. de Sérent in *Arch. Franc. Hist.* viii, 1915, 448ff., after the publication of U. d'Alençon, *L'Ame franciscaine* in *Revue de philosophie* xii, 1912, 257ff. However, it may be noted that de Sérent's thesis, loc. cit., 454, "que l'Ordre . . . au moyen-âge n'a rien diminué la splendeur du culte liturgique" shows the above mentioned characteristics.

<sup>73</sup> Clop, loc. cit., 757.

<sup>74</sup> *Expositio Regulae*; ed. cit., 82.

<sup>75</sup> *Chronica in Anal. Franc.*, i, 6, n. 16.—Not even the *Fioresetti*, cap. 17, mentions anything about these Office Books.

was at the beginning of the crisis which Francis tried to forestall with a new project of the Rule, i.e. in or before 1221. The crisis was caused by the educated, but clerics were still in the minority and, once more, Office books were scarce. In fact, where could those poor friars have found the means for this miraculous multiplication of portos, if the secular clergy of France seems to have possessed only a few hundreds of them throughout the twelfth century.<sup>76</sup> And if they had been able to work this miracle, where may all those breviaries have gone? Destroyed or not yet unearthed from under the dust of unknown libraries? And none of these 'local' breviaries would have been copied afterwards? The proportions of Angelus' cupboard can be reduced to a very reasonable size. It may have contained thirty, perhaps fifty, books which, if they were really Office books and not psalters, were an extraordinary high number for that time. Even so, they could not guarantee a regular performance of the Divine Office as this is understood in modern times. The project of Francis' Rule of 1221 clearly indicates that such a practice was not even intended by the legislator.

In conclusion: the liturgical ordinance of the Franciscan Order before 1223 is not really the result of a tradition. It was meant as a project for the future, based on the general custom of the secular clergy and bound up with problems intimately connected with the ideals of its author and the evolution of his Order. The historical background—too complicated for St. Francis—obscured the meaning of his law, the wording of which is unfitted for a legal document. Comparison with contemporary provisions shows that no rite or uniformity of worship was being considered but the legal obligation of the *cursus saecularis*. Among the friars, then, the educated clerics, whether in Holy Orders or not, had to say the Canonical Hours and the additional Offices, fixed by Canon Law and general tradition. Uneducated clerics and laybrothers said the Our Father, while the educated laymen said the psalms assigned for the Office of the day.

Both the poverty of the friars and their wandering life signified a turning-point in the history of the breviary as such, which from a choir book was becoming a portable one. Though the project of this Rule was short-lived, it led to an increase of secular portos and their consequent development.

(*To be continued*)

S. J. P. van Dijk, O. F. M.

<sup>76</sup> See, above, p. 179, note 23.

# SYNTHESIS: THE EXISTENCE OF THE ILLATIVE SENSE

THE METHOD, hitherto followed in these articles on Newman's illative sense, has been but that of a minute analysis of his terms and principles. The object, however, in view, was to prepare the way to proving that the kernel of the *Grammar of Assent* lies in the statement: 'We possess an illative faculty.' Having finished the analysis of at least the more important Newman terms, we can now give a synthesis showing how Newman wrote this whole book just to prove this one statement, and to explain the nature of this illative sense.

## 1. *Introduction: Newman's Method of Proof*

Before considering the evidence which Newman puts forward for the existence of the illative sense it would be instructive to study his method of proof.\* This method might be summarized in a principle which from his early Anglican period he repeats time and again and applies to all the circumstances of his life: "We ought to take things as they are."<sup>1</sup>

Newman then asks himself: What is actually the constitution of the human mind? What is the process which takes place when we argue from the known to the unknown? He is convinced that in these matters we must not follow preconceived theories or assumptions, but we should simply accept the promptings of our nature. He evidently gives a prominent place to the method of induction, which finally makes him reach this conclusion: Logic is overrated in our day since the ordinary means by which we attain assent and certitude is the right use of our illative sense.

"Non in dialectica complacuit Deo salvum facere populum suum"

\*The writings of John Henry Cardinal Newman referred to in the following footnotes are those found in the standard edition of his works by Longmans, Green and Co., London, viz., *Fifteen Sermons Preached before the University of Oxford* (1871) (= *Univ. Serm.*); *The Idea of a University* (1912) (= *Idea*); *Loss and Gain, The Story of a Convert* (1903) (= *Loss*); *Callista. A Tale of the Third Century* (1890) (= *Call.*); *Discussions and Arguments on Various Subjects* (1891) (= *Disc. and Arg.*); *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent* (1891) (= *Gramm.*); *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine* (1890) (= *Ess. on Dev.*); *Apologia pro Vita Sua* (1890) (= *Apol.*); Wilfrid Ward, *The Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman*, vols. I and II (New impression; London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1913) is quoted as Ward, *Life*. The present periodical is referred to as *Franc. Stud.*

<sup>1</sup>Cf. *Univ. Serm.* 110, 143, 153, 231; *Idea* 7, 232; *Loss* 161; *Call.* 117; *Disc. and Arg.* 141; *Gramm.* 306, 348, etc. etc.

has been printed on the title-page of the *Grammar of Assent*, and by this motto—‘It has not pleased God to save his people by means of logic’—Newman meant to convey to his readers that he was not going to defend his thesis on the strength of clear-cut syllogisms. He was sure that human beings could not be reached by means of logic.

Although he highly extols the value of logic in some of his pages,<sup>2</sup> he prefers to transform a truth into a reality by depicting it in an infinite variety of aspects so that it lives before his readers’ eyes. He turns it into images, taken in the Newman sense, i.e. living experiences, apprehended as something real and concrete. By various means, he says, the practiced and experienced mind is able to anticipate the inevitability of any conclusion. “It is by the strength, variety, or multiplicity of premisses, which are only probable, not by invincible syllogisms, by objections overcome, by adverse theories neutralized, by difficulties gradually clearing up, by exceptions proving the rule, by unlooked-for correlations found with received truths, by suspense and delay in the process issuing in triumphant reactions—”<sup>3</sup> this is how he describes his method. He compares it to the method of proof used by Newton in the beginning of his *Principia*. When we inscribe a regular polygon in a circle and continually diminish its sides, the polygon tends to become that circle, as its limit. But the polygon vanishes before it coincides with the circle “so that its tendency to be the circle, though ever nearer fulfilment, never in facts gets beyond a tendency.” In the same way a conclusion is foreseen and foretold rather than actually arrived at. The number and trend of the accumulated premisses, all converging towards it, enable us to forestall it. Although these do not reach it logically, they approach it in such a way that there is no assignable difference left between the result of the probability of the premisses and the certitude of the conclusion. But the nature of the subject-matter and the subtle and implicit character of the previous course of reasoning prevent us from an adequate syllogistical expression of them.<sup>4</sup>

Again and again he insists that an accumulation of probabilities issues in certitude in this way.<sup>5</sup>

Now this is the method applied by Newman when he adduces evidence for the existence of the illative sense, and it proves very effective. The

<sup>2</sup> See e. g. *Gramm.* 285-287; *Idea* 332; *Essay on Dev.* 189-191.

<sup>3</sup> *Gramm.* 321.

<sup>4</sup> *Gramm.* 320-321. See also his notes “On Probability” in *Gregorianum* XVIII (1937), 246, note 4.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* 327, 427-428, 445; *Univ. Serm.* 15; *Essay on Dev.* 108-109; *Ward Life* II, 589.

reader is carried away by the impressiveness of true eloquence, which, however, makes it exceedingly difficult to reveal the structure of the argument. Here Newman adopts the same processes as those through which the illative sense functions and throws syllogisms overboard. Therefore if any reader of the *Grammar of Assent* wishes to judge the reasonableness of Newman's theories by reducing all his reasoning to syllogisms, he would sigh with Perrone: "Omnia permiscet atque confundit."<sup>6</sup>

Newman illustrated his method by the striking similes of a cable and a ruins.

A cable consists of a number of separate threads, each of which is weak and fragile. Yet together, the threads are as strong as an iron rod. Now the iron rod represents mathematical or strict demonstration, whereas the cable is moral demonstration, which consists of an accumulation of probabilities. Any of these probabilities is insufficient for certitude when taken by itself, but all together they are irrefragable. He who, in certain instances, is not content with such a cable but demands an iron rod, is being unreasonable. "So too is a man who says I must have a rigid demonstration, not a moral demonstration, of religious truth."<sup>7</sup>

When talking with his biographer Wilfred Ward, Newman quoted Butler, who compares the insufficiency of some arguments to the imperfection of a ruined castle. Just as the structure of a castle can be as clearly determined from its ruins as if it were intact, so a verbal argument may well be sufficient to indicate the trend and character of a proof despite the imperfection of its details.<sup>8</sup> And therefore it is unreasonable to demand that arguments should always be worked out and formulated in minutest detail, since that is well-nigh impossible.

The converging probabilities do not, however, immediately disclose their force. This leads us to a third aspect of Newman's method of proof. His motto was: "Cor ad cor loquitur," i.e. I should be given a sympathetic hearing, my hearer should try to enter into my words, I should do my utmost to speak to the whole, real, concrete man, senses, feeling, imagination, will, reason, intellect. Then and then only can I make myself understood in such a way that I shall gain assent. This does not discard logic, as logic addresses reason, but it says logic is not the main thing nor are we in need of hard and fast syllogisms. This aspect was expressed very clearly by Fr. Ryder when he wrote in his notes on Newman:

<sup>6</sup> See Perrone *Praelectiones Theologicae*, Paris 1897, IV, 135, quoted by Henry Tristram, in *Gregorianum*, XVIII (1937), 220.

<sup>7</sup> Ward *Life* II, 43.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid. 495.

Instead of presenting his readers with a logical formula which says equivalently ‘Accept my position on pain of being convicted of an absurdity’—a treatment for which most Englishmen in the region of metaphysic have not sufficient logical nerve,—he would seem to say, ‘take pains to understand my language, stand where I stand and see if you do not feel as I am feeling.’ Not that his treatment is not full of logic, but it is logic in solution where the reader finds himself pursuing an argument almost unconsciously. He does not care to project himself along a single line or many single lines of logical thought along which at best the mere logical *simulacrum* of his reader, not the whole concrete man, will follow him; but he would fain make a wide pathway wherein a traveller may move rejoicing, carrying with him all that is his. He sometimes seems to shrink from abstractions as from attenuated truths and endeavors to frame his argument from concrete to concrete. His exercise of formal logic in practice is often wonderfully dexterous and subtle, but it is rather used as a sword for defence or attack than as his implement for building the walls of Jerusalem. He is impatient of conventional forms of thought as of armour not made for him without any derogation from its absolute value. “Dixitque David ad Saul, Non possum sic incedere, quia non usum habeo. Et depositus ea.”<sup>9</sup>

In writing to a friend after his conversion, he expressed the same thoughts differently: “Moral proofs are grown into, not learnt by heart.”<sup>10</sup> That is what he had in mind when he wished to prove the existence of the illative sense. He wants us to grow into his arguments, to absorb his proofs gradually, and not merely to glance through his reasoning. For that matter, to attempt such a thing would be altogether impossible and would result in a denial of Newman or in sneering at him as Carlyle did, who asserted that Newman had “the intellect of a moderate-sized rabbit.”<sup>11</sup>

If we wish to follow the processes of the illative sense in other people’s minds, we need a preparation of mind ourselves. Newman considers this preparation as a *conditio sine qua non*. This demand holds good, too, if we wish to understand the *Grammar of Assent* and its arguments, and it has marked this book with a stamp of its own. The necessary preparation of mind then consists of many factors, which may be summarized in this one principle: we should sympathize with him who wants us to accept his conclusions; in other words, we should as far as possible repeat and live through the whole inner process which made him reach them; our thinking should be stimulated by the same causes and influences as the

<sup>9</sup> Quoted by Ward, *Life* II, 357-358.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.* I, 122.

<sup>11</sup> *Thomas Carlyle’s Life in London*, by J. A. Froude, II, 247, quoted by Wilfrid Ward *Last Lectures* (London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1918), 2.

author had experienced.<sup>12</sup> For to think is a personal act, an individual process, connected with the whole man, and therefore it leads to different conclusions unless it takes place in the same circumstances. Newman expresses this by saying that we should try to form the same "images" in the minds of those whom we want to convince, so that they may proceed from the same real apprehension to the same real assent.<sup>13</sup>

As regards merely abstract sciences, this special moral preparation is not imperative, but in any concrete field of knowledge we cannot do without it. In order to prove this statement Newman quotes passages from Aristotle. When speaking about the variations in the logical perfection of proof this philosopher observes:

A well-educated man will expect exactness in every class of subject, according as the nature of the thing admits; for it is much the same mistake to put up with a mathematician using probabilities, and to require demonstration of an orator. Each man judges skilfully in those things about which he is well-informed; it is of these that he is a good judge; *viz.* he, in each subject-matter, is a judge, who is well-educated in that subject-matter, and he is in an absolute sense a judge, who is in all of them well-educated.<sup>14</sup>

And in another passage of the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle says:

Young men come to be mathematicians and the like, but they cannot possess practical judgement; for this talent is employed upon individual facts, and these are learned only by experience; and a youth has not experience, for experience is only gained by a course of years. And so, again, it would appear that a boy may be a mathematician, but not a philosopher, or learned in physics, and for this reason,—because the one study deals with abstraction, while the other studies gain their principles from experience, and in the latter subjects youths do not give assent, but make assertions, but in the former they know what it is that they are handling.<sup>15</sup>

Newman's arguments are concrete and personal, not abstract nor general. He was not a man of mere speculations, hunting after abstractions and notions, but first and foremost he tried to get acquainted with the real and the concrete and to avail himself of it. "Life is for action," was his principle.<sup>16</sup> Hence his abstract thinking was directed to action as its end. Thinking merely for thinking's sake he believed to be waste of time: practical life should be the incentive to thinking. Consequently he keeps insisting that man always tends towards the real and the concrete; that our craving for knowledge has the real as its object; that the notional and

<sup>12</sup> Gramm. 342.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. 301-316.

<sup>14</sup> Gramm. 414.

<sup>15</sup> Gramm, 414-415.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid. 95.

the abstract should be turned into the real and the concrete. This idea had become with him a kind of key to life or 'ethos', which affected all his actions and thoughts. He observed, for example, that the Son of God had become man in order to change our vague, abstract notion of God into a concrete, real idea.<sup>17</sup> He points out how the Church impresses on our minds the great value of meditating on spiritual truths because in this way our notions about God and religion are turned into realities.<sup>18</sup> What Newman had said about his most intimate friend Richard Hurrell Froude may be applied to himself as well: "He had a keen insight into abstract truth; but he was an Englishman to the backbone in his severe adherence to the real and the concrete."<sup>19</sup>

No wonder that Newman's *Grammar* is full of the real and the concrete, of examples and facts. He reviews the aspects of our thinking processes in succession: apprehension, assent, inference, certitude, certainty, the way in which we attain to assent and certitude. He does not argue from abstract starting-points, from general rules or hypotheses, but from facts. Without the apparatus of a logical scheme or a transparent structure of reasonings, he shows concrete reality so clearly and straightforwardly that we cannot but admire his genius.

We should like to clarify his method by the following considerations. We are living in a concrete world; the whole of our surroundings is concrete and real. Hence our contact with the external world must necessarily be a concrete contact. At the same time this contact is human, i.e. the contact of a being that thinks, wills, feels. We are in search for truth when making this contact, we desire or hate the objects of this contact, we experience feelings, affections, emotions, passions, during this contact. For the average man the concrete surroundings represent reality. Certainly, we perceive and experience much more than only our surroundings; there exist ideal or notional objects which have a claim on us and may engross us. But if they actually arrest our attention, they are generally no mere abstractions. They have become living realities, parts of a concrete, though spiritual, world. Otherwise they could not impress us, they could not influence us as they do. We are little attracted by mere abstractions; we are not moved by them; we feel no affection for them. Thus mere notions, ideas, abstractions do not contradict Newman's thesis that we, concrete, real men, live for the concrete and the real, are moved by the concrete and the real, and are convinced only by the concrete and the real.

<sup>17</sup> See the wonderful pages in the *Univ. Serm.* 25-28 on this subject.

<sup>18</sup> *Gramm.* 79.      <sup>19</sup> *Apol.* 24.

This explains why he devotes the first part of the *Grammar* to the holding, apprehending and accepting of the concrete as concrete, to real apprehension and real assent. This explains, too, why he emphasizes the fact that we generally reason from known concrete reality to unknown concrete reality. When he wants to show how intimately the abstract is bound up with the concrete and how—notwithstanding our faculties of abstraction—we ourselves are imprisoned, so to speak, in the concrete, we must not infer that he takes exception to the Scholastic theory of abstraction. He maintains that our illative sense avails itself of the concrete as its material. For the illative sense is the power of the mind to reach a new concrete truth by means of a series of concrete data, living in the mind, and this new truth is closely related to life and has little of an abstraction. The mere abstract, being the province of logic, is not the province of the illative sense.

This personal, concrete element in Newman's method of proof appears prominently in the first principles and assumptions<sup>20</sup> which emerge and make their influence felt in the course of our reasonings. It is impossible to reason without first principles and assumptions.<sup>20a</sup> If we were to demand proofs for all first principles and assumptions on which our reasoning is based, life would be too short.<sup>21</sup> Now when we argue with others, much depends on those previous assents to first principles and received propositions. On them we agree or disagree, and that is the end of it; we cannot alter this fact by using inferential proofs, because those pre-existing views are intimately connected with our personal peculiarities and our concrete individuality,<sup>22</sup> and many of them could not be proved even if we wished.<sup>23</sup> So it is obvious that Newman makes a point of starting from right first principles when he tries to convince us of the existence of the illative sense, and to make his readers assent to them. If he fails in this attempt, his work will be useless: "The only thing to be done is to rest the whole on certain first principles, and to say if you can't take my first principles, I can't help it."<sup>23a</sup>

Since those first principles are closely bound up with our moral and intellectual state of mind, we may be prevented from accepting the right and true first principles, or at least be hindered and hampered in accepting them, by the "allurements of sense and the supremacy of self"; whereas we may be helped in assenting to them "by aspirations after the super-

<sup>20</sup> See *Franc. Stud.*, vol. 10 (1950), 431ff.

<sup>20a</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>21</sup> Cf. *Gramm.* 95.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.* 277.

<sup>23</sup> Confer note 20.

<sup>23a</sup> Ward *Life II*, 249.

natural."<sup>24</sup> Here again we see the necessity of a certain preparation of mind if we want to follow Newman's method of proof.

Summarizing the foregoing considerations we may establish the following principles: *a)* Newman starts from facts and investigates how we actually reason; he does not start from preconceived theories nor does he use syllogisms. *b)* Those facts lead him to a great number of probable propositions, all pointing to the same conclusion. He illustrates this method of accumulating probabilities by referring to Newton's mathematical principle regarding the polygon inscribed in a circle. *c)* In order to understand and to accept those propositions we should let them influence us gradually. Newman attempts to reach this end by making the facts speak to the whole man. *d)* The reason for this lies in the fact that his arguments and proofs are personal and concrete, and should be approached "really" or in the concrete, not notionally or in the abstract. *e)* They are closely bound up with first principles and assumptions, which vary as widely as men themselves.

It does not seem feasible to summarize Newman's proofs for the existence of the illative sense or attempt to give them in a nutshell. As his method consists in throwing light on all possible aspects of his thesis, a concise survey would miss the mark. Hence, we intend to quote certain passages literally and to recount other of his illustrations more or less extensively.

Some proofs resemble others, one being complementary to another as it reveals some new aspect. Thus, for instance, the first proof is but the fourth in embryo, the function of the former being to prepare the latter. The same may be said about the second and the fifth. Since Newman proves by stating facts, several proofs are virtually an accumulation of instances; and almost every proof abounds in instances. Lastly, every proof is either a negative argument revealing the inadequacy of logic, or a positive investigation of the function of the illative sense; or a combination of both.

On comparing the proofs, we notice a kind of similarity between them which enables us to embody them in a scheme or synthesis. First, we distinguish a series of negative arguments, i.e. arguments which by negation infer the existence of an illative sense. They deny the necessity of strict demonstration in concrete matters, the necessity of proofs before certitude is gained, the necessity of a complicated scientific method and the suf-

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<sup>24</sup> Gramm. 311, 415-418.

ficiency of logic. The only alternative is the existence of a faculty of our minds which gives certitude without strict demonstration, without previous proof and without logic. Then follow positive arguments which deal with the facts, showing firstly that certitude may rise from an accumulation of probabilities, and secondly how personal is the way which leads to certitude, so that we rely on a personal faculty, i.e. the illative sense. Next Newman proves the existence of the illative sense from "the language in common use," from experience and from God's sanction of our methods of reasoning. These proofs are corroborated by a double series of confirmatory arguments, the first taken from a comparison of parallel faculties, the second from a minute consideration of the beginning and the course of a proof. Lastly, the long conclusion of the *Grammar*, consisting of more than a fifth of the whole book, explains how Newman's doctrine is applied to religion. It shows how the illative sense furnishes certitude in religious matters.

## II The Negative Way

### 1. Strict Demonstration Not Necessary

When dealing with simple assent in the beginning of the second part of the *Grammar*, Newman advances considerations which virtually form a proof of the existence of the illative sense. He argues as follows:<sup>25</sup> There are many truths which receive our assent without the slightest hesitation and for which we would be ready to die, even though we do not perceive them by intuition or find them capable of demonstration.<sup>26</sup> We have already mentioned some of these.<sup>27</sup> They not only comprise moral truths: "A mother loves her child," and, "Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo," but also physical and metaphysical truths which we are unable to prove with mathematical cogency.<sup>28</sup>

In other words these truths may receive our unconditional, absolute assent; we may be perfectly sure about them, without intuition or demonstrative arguments.

This perfect certitude is recognized by the majority of men as a rational act. If we exclude philosophers like Locke, we shall not find many people who object to this kind of certitude and call it irrational or unjustified. Clear thinkers, too, are familiar with this road to certitude. From all this Newman draws the conclusion that this act—the unconditional acceptance

<sup>25</sup> *Gramm.* 176-181.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. *Fran. Studies* 12 (1952), 104ff.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.* p. 113ff.

<sup>28</sup> *Gramm.* 151-152.

of a truth on grounds which are not cogent—must be rational and not a failing, weakness or freak of the human mind.

Those who do not agree with this statement must infer that man is unreasonable by nature and naturally acts unreasonably. But, says Newman, this act appears so natural and human that we may include it among the basic laws of human nature.

In advancing these considerations, Newman puts forward his best argument for the existence of the illative sense in embryo. There must be something different from logic or strict demonstration to justify our natural certitudes. Of course, there is an inherent connection, he says, between a logical conclusion and assent, but well-formulated arguments do not inevitably result in constituting inner certitude. Our convictions are formed by the illative sense, although he does not yet mention that word in that part of his *Grammar*. Even those who demand demonstration for legitimate certitude and threaten to ignore all truths which have not been strictly demonstrated are obliged to drop the matter with a protest. They do not for a moment doubt that Great Britain is an island. But they insist that we should never forget the insufficiency of the evidence on which that finding is based for fear of joining those who do not love truth for truth's sake. We should withhold our assent to this fact, be the room for doubt infinitesimal. After stating this, they accept absolute certitude about Great Britain's insularity like every one else.<sup>29</sup>

### *2. Proofs After Certitude, Not Before.*

There is no denying that we often look for proofs after we have become certain of a proposition. Without suspending our assent, without the least hesitation about the certainty of the proposition, without any fear of the results, we proceed to explore the grounds of the thesis. Our education, our social position may demand it.

It is clear that we do not speak here about self-evident propositions, but about propositions which really require proving. Now, antecedent certitude would be irrational if our mind had not already accepted those propositions in a legitimate, though implicit and subconscious way. This way of reaching certitude without using logic is nothing but the function of our illative faculty.<sup>30</sup>

### *3. No Complicated Apparatus Necessary.*

In another part of the *Grammar* Newman explains how "it comes to pass that a conditional act leads to an unconditional." To put it in another

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<sup>29</sup> *Gramm.* 176-181.

<sup>30</sup> *Gramm.* 190-191.

way: An inference is conditional because it depends on premisses; but, as soon as we assent to that inference, all conditionality has disappeared because we do not think of it any more. This leads Newman to the problem: Are we justified in doing so; how can we account for this leap?<sup>31</sup>

After having put the question, Newman traces the process of reasoning in every day life. He does so by way of introduction. He states the facts and infers that this actual process must be rational because it is universally adopted.

The road we take to proceed from the known to the unknown does not present itself to our minds as a series of acts. We apprehend the premisses and then the conclusion without explicitly recognizing the connexion or reflecting on it. It seems an immediate association of the first thought with the second, it resembles an instinctive perception of premisses and conclusion, "not as if the faculty were one and the same to all men in strength and quality . . . , but because ordinarily, or at least often, it acts by a spontaneous impulse, as prompt and inevitable as the exercise of sense and memory." No special effort, no preconceived scheme, no reflection is required.

We find this method of reasoning not only with the unlearned and uncultivated, but with all men. It is even the ordinary means of reaching the unknown by way of the known. And we cannot produce a reason, says Newman, which shows that this method must not be trusted. This does not imply that we cannot reach the same conclusions in a scientific way. As our world, the universe, forms a system, a whole, there must be a possibility to trace the details in the system. But in every day life we generally do not think according to this scientific method.<sup>32</sup>

Now if Newman reasons rightly and if his facts are correctly interpreted, we have found another proof for the existence of the illative sense. For this faculty is nothing but the power of our minds to draw conclusions without applying the complicated scientific logical methods, i.e. without giving explicit proofs before giving assent.

#### *4. The Insufficiency of Logic*

In a special negative way Newman defends the legitimacy and value of implicit thinking or the existence of an illative sense by observing that logic, either formal or virtual, does not sufficiently account for all our rational certitudes.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>31</sup> Ibid. 259.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid. 259-261.

<sup>33</sup> Gramm. 259ff.

It is but natural that we should wish to have an instrument which could procure us truth in an approved, infallible way. We wish for a key which opens for us the treasure-house of truth and which is the unfailing means for understanding and interpreting the material and spiritual world.<sup>34</sup> We wish to obtain automatically by a "far-reaching and infallible rule" what "gifted or practised intellects" have reached by their own personal vigour and talents.<sup>35</sup> We should like to discard anything vague and arbitrary from these implicit workings of our minds.<sup>36</sup> Every day we experience disagreements: "the conclusions of one man are not the conclusions of another; those of the same man do not always agree together; those of ever so many who agree together may differ from the facts themselves which those conclusions are intended to ascertain."<sup>36a</sup> Hence we are in search of "a method which may act as a common measure between mind and mind, as a means of joint investigation and a recognized intellectual standard—a standard which will secure us against hopeless mistakes and emancipate us from the capricious *ipse dixit* of authority."<sup>36b</sup>

Now logic claims to fulfill all these functions, but Newman emphatically states that it sadly fails to do so.

First of all, a great objection against logic in the Newman sense is found in the fact that we cannot possibly express our ideas about concrete matters adequately in words; our thoughts are too numerous, too subtle, too complicated.<sup>37</sup> Therefore, if we want to be sure that certain words express certain notions exactly, fully and exclusively, we have to circumscribe and restrict their meaning as much as possible. We have to make them the representatives of notions which are wholly in our control so that we apprehend them not with real but with notional apprehension, not as concrete realities but as mental abstractions.<sup>38</sup> If, however, we think them the adequate expression of objective things and treat them as such, they "may run away with us." They may make us go astray and lose our way and involve us in innumerable puzzling complications. Hence we must make abstraction and strip the things denoted by words of all connatural senses and associations, "which constitute their poetry, their rhetoric, and their historical life." We must "starve them down" till each term has become "the ghost of itself, and everywhere one and the same ghost," a mere abstract notion, a generalization, a definition.<sup>39</sup> This is the duty of a logician. But this abstraction, so necessary

<sup>34</sup> Ibid. 262.

<sup>36b</sup> Cf. n. 34.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid. 261, 263.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid. 264.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid. 261.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid. 265.

<sup>36a</sup> Cf. n. 34.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid. 267.

and indispensable, can only lead to abstract conclusions. And what we want, is the concrete: we wish to know objective concrete reality. Even scientists want to know realities, the physical concrete facts of the material world.<sup>40</sup> Therefore, if logic cannot supply our want, we have to look for something else.

On this insufficiency of logic Newman enlarges in the following way.

i. First, in concrete matters logic cannot definitely prove anything because the conclusion is always dependent on assumptions and first principles. Therefore logic leads to probabilities only.

In every reasoning conducted by logic, we find premisses which require proving. To secure those premisses we need new syllogisms, but the premisses of these new syllogisms have to be proved in their turn. At last a number of propositions present themselves to us which turn out to be first principles. First principles, however, cannot be proved by logic. An interminable controversy rages about them. Some people accept them, others reject them, Those who accept them call them self-evident and will not and cannot produce arguments.

Now all these considerations help to show that it is impossible to prove concrete matters with absolute, irresistible cogency by means of logic. Even when we are able to go on straight-forwardly in our arguments, as e.g. in mathematics, we experience this difficulty. But many more first principles are involved when concrete matters are concerned—first principles, “accompanying the course of reasoning, step by step, and traceable to the sentiments of the age, country, religion, social habits and ideas.” And to these must be added the first principles “which are made from the necessity of the case, in consequence of the prolixity and elaborateness of any argument which should faithfully note down all the propositions which go to make it up.”<sup>41</sup> And then follows Newman’s summarized conclusion:

“Logic then does not really prove; it enables us to join issue with others; it suggests ideas; it opens views; it maps out for us the lines of thought; it verifies negatively; it determines when differences of opinion are hopeless; and when and how far conclusions are probable; but for genuine proof in concrete matter we require an *organon* more delicate, versatile, and elastic than verbal argumentation.”<sup>42</sup>

When Newman had finished this passage he wished to illustrate it by a clear example. He looked round his room and took the first book which

<sup>40</sup> Ibid. 268.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid. 269-271.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid. 271.

caught his eye. It was a volume of a very well-known magazine. He opened it at random and found an article on a text from Shakespeare. This would do.<sup>42a</sup> He tells us these particulars apparently to show how extensive is the province of the illative sense.

This article, then, dealt with one line from *Henry V*. In Act ii, Scene 3, we read about Falstaff who is dying: "His nose was as sharp as a pen, and 'a babbled of green fields.'" This was a correction made by Theobald in the eighteenth century as the Folio text of 1623 had something nonsensical, *viz.* "His nose was as sharp as a pen and a table of green fields." About the year 1850, however, an annotated copy was found of the 1632 edition, containing some twenty thousand corrections, among which a plausible emendation of this text, although not so acceptable as the one by Theobald: "His nose was as sharp as a pen on a table of green frieze." Let us suppose, says Newman, that the lately discovered copy and the annotations are genuine.<sup>43</sup>

Now, the author of the article wishes to keep to Theobald's text and to exclude the line of 1623 and the correction in the discovered copy of 1632 because the former text is corrupt, the latter anonymous. To this Newman observes that in this way many large questions are opened; that many hidden and untractable principles have to be settled and that logic will be unable to cope with them.<sup>44</sup>

The first position is: The 1623 text is corrupt, so we should correct it. But are we to grant this without proof? The 1623 text was published by well-known persons, six years after Shakespeare's death, apparently according to original manuscripts and with his own emendations. Authority cannot sanction nonsense, but authority may prevent critics from experimenting on a text. Consequently the corrupt Folio text should be published as corrupt.

Nowadays the best editors of the Greek tragedians would never be so impertinent as to insert their own conjectures into their texts. But is Shakespeare not a classic? He is read for recreation, it is said, so this excuses experimenting. But then we ought to ask ourselves what is the advantage of reading Shakespeare for amusement, without "the care and pains which a classic demands." This leads us to problems about cultivation of mind and the education of the masses. And further, is it possible to change Shakespeare into light reading by correcting the text in an uncritical way?<sup>45</sup>

<sup>42a</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid. 271-272.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid. 272.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid. 272-273.

When these questions and others, connected with them, have been settled, so that we feel justified in discarding the 1623 text, the second problem arises whether the newly discovered 1632 reading has not more authority than Theobald's. The annotator's authority carries weight. Was not he Shakespeare's contemporary? And if so, are his corrections his own conjectures or are they traditions? This requires a close examination of the two thousand corrections. But it is obvious that one cannot discuss some two thousand corrections. First a careful study should be made, involving classification, discrimination, selection. Since this can only be done in the human mind, it will result in an accumulation of arguments *pro et contra*, which cannot be put down in full, so that only the starting-points and the conclusions may appear on paper. But then we fall back on problems about literary criticism and taste, with their recondite premisses, so open to controversy, and their deductions, so difficult to follow. What is the use here of a logical dispute? Because the entire discussion does not admit a full description,<sup>46</sup> it should be photographed on the sensitive plate of the mind of those whom one wanted to convince.

The third position is the maintenance of Theobald's text. Those who defend it, do so on the grounds of a kind of prescription. It has been there more than a hundred years, so it has a legitimate claim to be maintained. Moreover this reading has become part of the English mind so much so that in a sense it is Shakespeare's and that it would be a dangerous innovation to alter it. Newman is amazed at these statements, made by the author of the article.<sup>47</sup>

In order to do justice to these problems we should first discuss the value of legends and fables, of pious frauds and many other things, which would lead us into a labyrinth of complicated first principles and elementary phenomena. These statements as regards the duty of tampering with classics conjure up before us a long list of sceptical questions, which affect the rights, the gifts and even the existence of the great poet. Is Shakespeare after all but a collection of Theobalds? Perhaps he is one of the many artists who wrote the works in common. How else can we explain that these works resemble each other so little? Has any man ever lived who has written so impersonally? We know very little about his life. What is Shakespeare more than a name?<sup>48</sup>

Of course, Newman himself does not support scepticism like this, but these questions go far to show what is required for a really valid argu-

<sup>46</sup> Ibid. 273-275.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid. 275.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid. 275-277.

ment, and how the logic of good sense, i.e. the illative faculty, knows a much shorter and easier way. Little depends on verbal reasonings, but much on those convictions and beliefs which we possess beforehand as something personal deeply hidden in our nature and in which men either agree or hopelessly differ.<sup>49</sup>

2. There is a second reason why logical conclusions, i.e. inferences, do not result in absolute certitude but only in probabilities.<sup>50</sup>

"In this world of sense we have to do with things, far more than with notions," says Newman. We do not live by ourselves, but are surrounded by other beings. Our words and utterances are directed to the concrete. We reason to enlarge our knowledge of the concrete world. But our mind is for the most part occupied with notions and reaches the concrete only indirectly and partially. In other words, arguments, which naturally consist of abstractions, cannot reach concrete facts as such. They point to them, with a certain degree of probability. So they only reach the probable.<sup>51</sup>

This explains how it came to pass that the discovery of the planet Neptune was hailed with such enthusiasm. It was a concrete fact. Abstract reasoning had pointed to its existence. If, however, the conclusion had been proved with absolute certitude, this triumphant joy would have been meaningless. It proved fear of being mistaken and mistrust of the legitimacy of the conclusion, which was only taken away by the event, the concrete fact.<sup>52</sup>

Now the movements of stars and planets are almost mathematically precise. Newman, however, could point out many intricate and difficult questions to which mathematics are applied, but which require the living mind to complete the process of investigation because reasoning by rule is utterly insufficient for the purpose. A navigator or an engineer does not go far with his abstract knowledge; what they have to do is to carry the scientifically gained conclusions from the province of the abstract and the notional into the field of the concrete and the real. Whence the great mistrust as regards the theorists? It is because they cannot complete their logic and are able to reach abstract truths only, i.e. probabilities in the abstract, whereas we aim at truth and certitude in the concrete?<sup>53</sup>

This holds good also in the case of matters which are based on other than mathematical reasonings. Here, too, arguments do not reach a defi-

<sup>49</sup> Ibid. 277.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid. 277-287.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid. 277-278.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid. 278.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid. 278-279.

nite, practical conclusion unless the living mind, by means of its illative sense, enhances their intrinsic value.<sup>54</sup>

This leads Newman to the "so-called universals." As we have explained in a foregoing chapter he does not distinguish the general—which admits exceptions—from the universal. He remonstrates against the over-estimation of universal propositions, which actually do not exist according to his views.<sup>55</sup> They are nothing but generalizations and no inviolable laws. They give probability but not certitude in individual cases. When we say: man is mortal, we mean to say: man as such is mortal, or the typical man is mortal, but, in our concrete world, no man can be called man as such, or the typical man. Every concrete man is something more. Now, in what he is more may lie a cause or a reason why he does not die. As a matter of fact, concerning Elias it was a personal privilege, a miraculous intervention, which prevented his death.<sup>56</sup>

The same holds good, says Newman, for human rationality. According to logic, rationality is the *differentia specifica*, the specific difference between man and brute. In reality, however, man does not only differ from brutes as to rationality but in all he is, in his whole self, his bones, his limbs, his make, his life, his intellect, his moral feeling, his immortality. Even between two concrete men there is only an abstract similarity; in reality they have nothing in common. Their bodies are so different from other bodies in their special constitution, their vitality, their pathological history and changes; and their mind is so different in disposition, faculties and habits, that we should say: they differ in all they are, in identity, in incommunicability, in personality.<sup>57</sup>

A concrete being cannot be analysed by logic into all the possible general notions contained in it, and consequently we cannot reconstruct such a being from those notions. We recognize aspects and attribute them to the being. Logic registers them and makes inferences from them. But this does not mean that we see through them and know them entirely. In a sense they participate in God's incomprehensibleness.<sup>58</sup>

These considerations apply to all kinds of argument as expressed in language: deduction, induction, analogy, etc. They result in probable conclusions only because they use general notions which lead to certitudes in the abstract, which are but probabilities in the concrete.<sup>59</sup>

<sup>54</sup> Ibid. 279.

<sup>55</sup> See *Franc. Stud.*, 10 (1950), 418ff.; *Gramm.* 279-280.

<sup>56</sup> *Gramm.* 280-281.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid. 281-282.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid. 282-283.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid. 283-284.

Newman draws attention to the fact that this statement is readily acknowledged by those who use them most. Philosophers, experimentalists, lawyers are very hard of belief, according to the common opinion of men. They know the value of logical arguments and how disputable the conclusions from them are. Even if they are certain in their heart of hearts, they point to the deficiencies in the proofs and the possibility of mistakes. For they speak according to logic but they think and judge and infer by means of their illative sense.<sup>60</sup>

(*To be continued*)

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<sup>60</sup> Ibid. 285.

# OSSERVAZIONI CRITICO-LETTERARIE E DOTTRINALI SUL FAMOSO TESTO: "PROPRIUM NEMO DICAT..." E TESTI CONNESSI

TRA i testi patristici falsamente attribuiti nel *Decretum* di Graziano<sup>1</sup> oltre il famoso "*Pasce fame morientem . . .*", di cui abbiamo altrove rintracciata la fonte,<sup>2</sup> troviamo il "*Proprium nemo dicat . . .*" ed altri testi a questo connessi, anch'essi famosi e falsamente attribuiti a S. Ambrogio, come vedremo nel corso di questo breve studio.

Vogliamo anzitutto enunziare schematicamente i quattro testi connessi di cui tratteremo:

- [1] "*Proprium nemo dicat . . .*".
- [2] "*Neque enim est maioris criminis . . .*".
- [3] "*Esurientium panis est quem tu detines . . .*".
- [4] "*Tantorum te ergo scias invadere bona . . .*".

Anche se il primo di tali testi, per polemiche dottrinali e letterarie, che suscitò e suscita, avrà nella nostra trattazione un'attenzione particolare, tuttavia per comprendere bene l'occasione e lo svolgimento delle osservazioni nei riguardi di tutti e quattro i surriferiti testi crediamo opportuno premettere in primo luogo delle osservazioni di carattere generale.

## 1.—Osservazioni preliminari

Avvertiamo in primo luogo che l'occasione di ripensare sul primo testo ci fu data dal fatto che nelle moderne edizioni critiche delle opere degli Scolastici mai, per quanto sappiamo, ne fu rivelata la vera fonte. Inoltre modernamente anche se qualche autore ne scoprì la vera fonte, tuttavia oltre che tale fonte rimane celata agli editori critici, come abbiamo detto, non ci sembra che ancora si sia stabilito apoditticamente l'autore non solo letterale, ma anche dottrinale del "*Proprium nemo dicat . . .*" come vedremo meglio a suo luogo.

<sup>1</sup> Per una parziale visione dei testi patristici falsamente attribuiti da Graziano e riportati dalla *Summa fr. Alexandri* cf. V. Doucet, O.F.M., in *Prolegomena* al t. IV della stessa opera, ed. Quaracchi, 1948, CXXI ss.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. E. Lio, O.F.M., *Finalmente rintracciata la fonte del famoso testo patristico: 'Pasce fame morientem . . .', Antonianum* 27 (1952), 349-366.

L'occasione e la ragione di trattare anche degli altri tre testi, susseguiti a quel primo, ci fu data non solo dal fatto che essi pure ordinariamente non siano stati identificati nelle moderne edizioni critiche, salvo qualche eccezione come vedremo; ma anche perché nessuno dei moderni editori, per quanto sappiamo, ha notato che tutti quei testi, anche se citati separatamente, e per questo noi pure li abbiamo annunziati distinti, in realtà, nella predetta forma, non sono che quattro membri, compreso il primo, d'un sol brano, che li contiene tutti strettamente connessi e che si trova, giova subito dirlo, in un sermone che Rufino d'Aquileia tradusse a suo modo da una omelia in greco attribuita a S. Basilio, come vogliamo subito dimostrare, riportando anche il contesto di tutti e quattro i nostri testi:

Sed dicis: Quid injustum est, si cum aliena non invadam, propria diligentius servo? O impudens dictum! Propria dicis? Quae ex quibus reconditis in hunc mundum detulisti? Quando hanc ingressus es lucem, quando de ventre matris existi, quibus, quaeso, facultatibus, quibusque subsidiis stipatus ingressus es? . . . Terra communiter omnibus hominibus data est: [1] *proprium nemo dicat, quod e communi plus quam sufficeret sumptum et violenter obtentum est* . . . Numquid iniquus est Deus, ut nobis non aequaliter distribuat vitae subsidia, ut tu quidem esesses affluens et abundans, aliis vero deesset, et egerent? An idcirco magis quia et tibi voluit benignitatis suae documenta conferre, et alium per virtutem patientiae coronare? Quis enim tam injustus, tam invidus (*al. avidus*), tam avarus, quam qui multorum alimenta suum non jam usum, sed abundantiam et delicias facit? [2] *Neque enim majoris est criminis habenti tollere, quam, cum possis et abundes, indigentibus denegare*. [3] *Esurientum panis est quem tu detines, nudorum vestimentum est quod tu recludis, miserorum redemptio est et absolutio pecunia quam tu in terram defodis*. [4] *Tantorum te ergo scias invadere bona, quantis possis praestare, si velis.*<sup>3</sup>

Avvertiamo anche che i nostri quattro testi nella tradizione vennero riportati non di rado con qualche variante letterale dalla forma che essi hanno nel surriferito brano rufiniano.

Inoltre osserviamo, che nella tradizione i nostri testi, eccetto il primo, vengono citati anche in un'altra forma letteraria latina, che corrisponde perfettamente ad un'altra traduzione latina della stessa celebre omelia di S. Basilio, che si trova nella stessa PG, 31, 262-278 e che è dissimile letterariamente da quella di Rufino.

Per questo può avvenire che qualcuno dei nostri testi, eccetto sempre il primo, venga riportato nelle due forme letterarie diverse, ma in luoghi

<sup>3</sup> *Homiliae Sancti Basillii Caes. Ep. quas transtulit Rufinus de graeco in latinum.—Homilia III. De eo quod scriptum est in Evangelio: 'Cujusdam divitis fructus uberes ager attulit' . . . , n. 7 (PG 31, 1751 s.)*

diversi e con attribuzioni diverse, e cioè: con l'attribuzione a S. Ambrogio per influsso di Graziano, come vedremo, se qualcuno dei nostri testi viene trascritto nella forma letteraria della traduzione di Rufino; ma con l'attribuzione anche esplicita a S. Basilio se lo stesso testo viene trascritto nell'altra forma letteraria latina che non è quella di Rufino; senza che qualcuno degli autori medievali ed anche posteriori avvertisse, per quanto ci consta, questa contraddizione nell'attribuzione. Così accade per es. in S. Tommaso nella sua *Summa theologica* in relazione al terzo dei nostri testi:

S. Tommaso  
II-II, q. 66, a. 7, in Resp.  
(Ed. Leonina IX, 92b)

Unde *Ambrosius* dicit, et habetur in Decretis dist. XLVII: Esurientum panis est quem tu detines; nudorum indumentum est quod tu recludis; miserorum redemptio et absolutio est pecunia quam tu in terra defodis.

S. Tommaso  
II-II, q. 118, a. 4, ob. 2  
(Ed. Leonina IX, 458b)

(Cf. anche *De malo*, q. 13, a. 2)  
Dicit . . . *Basilius*: Est panis famelici,  
quem tu tenes, nudi tunica quam con-  
servas, indigentis argentum quod pos-  
sides . . .

Come si vede il testo della q.66 concorda con la traduzione di Rufino (PG, 31, 1752C), mentre il testo della q.118 letteralmente con l'altra traduzione latina (PG, 31, 278A) della medesima omelia di S. Basilio. E S. Tommaso, che pure altrove avvertì essere la stessa dottrina che insegnerebbero ugualmente S. Basilio e S. Ambrogio,<sup>4</sup> non poté però avvertire, che ivi si trattava in sostanza di uno stesso testo greco di S. Basilio in una duplice traduzione latina, in cui S. Ambrogio non c'entra, come dimostreremo più avanti.

Le premesse osservazioni pertanto meritano essere tenute presenti nel corso di questo breve studio.

## 2.—*Breve storia delle citazioni dei quattro testi, attribuiti preva-* *lentemente, ma non esclusivamente, a S. Ambrogio*

Nel sec. XII anche questa volta Graziano fu la causa, se tutti i nostri testi nella premessa forma rufiniana venissero in seguito attribuiti prevalentemente a S. Ambrogio. Infatti Graziano nel c.8 della dist. XLVII del *Decretum* trascrive, ma con l'attribuzione ad Ambrogio, non solo i

<sup>4</sup> Cf. per es. *Summa Theologica*, II-II, q. 32, a. 6 (Ed. Leonina VIII, 254b): Unde *Basilius* dicit: . . . Est panis famelici . . . Et hoc idem dicit *Ambrosius*, in *Decret.*, dist. XLVII".

nostri testi, ma anche altri passi dell'omelia di S. Basilio secondo la traduzione di Rufino, come vogliamo brevemente dimostrare:

## Graziano

*Decretum*, c. 8, dist. XLVII  
(Ed. Friedberg I, 171)

Item *Ambrosius* [Serm. LXXXI] de eo, quod scriptum est: 'Hominis cuiusdam divitis fructus agere (sic) attulit'.

Sicut hi, qui per insaniam mente translati sunt . . .

*Et post pauca & 1:* Interdum etiam usurae . . .

*Et infra & 2:* Sed ait: Quid injustum . . .

*Et post pauca & 3:* *Proprium nemo dicat* . . .

*Et infra & 4:* Numquid iniquus est Deus . . .

*Neque est minus criminis* . . .

*Esurientium est panis* . . .

*Tot ergo te scias* . . .

## S. Basilio

Trad. di Rufino d'Aquileia  
(PG, 31, 1744 Css)

[1744C]: Homilia III: De eo quod scriptum est in Evangelio: 'Cuiusdam divitis fructus uberes ager attulit'.

[1749B]: Sicut enim ii qui per insaniam mente translati sunt . . .

Interdum etiam usurae . . .

[1751D]: Sed dicis: Quid injustum . . .

[1752A]: . . . *Proprium nemo dicat* . . .

[1752B]: Numquid iniquus est Deus . . .

*Neque est majoris criminis* . . .

*Esurientium panis est* . . .

*Tantorum te ergo scias* . . .

Quale fu la causa di questa attribuzione ad Ambrogio in Graziano? Noi non lo sappiamo: può essere che anche qui Graziano si sia servito di una fonte, in cui quel testo era attribuito ad Ambrogio. Ma sappiamo che in seguito vi furono quelli che attribuirono il testo ad Ambrogio ed a S. Basilio sotto diverso rispetto;<sup>4a</sup> e sappiamo inoltre che non solo nel Friedberg, ma anche nelle precedenti edizioni del *Decretum* si rimanda ad un sermone che in alcune edizioni delle opere di S. Ambrogio viene riferito tra i sermoni autentici di questo santo Dottore,<sup>5</sup> ma a torto, come vedremo.

Nel sec. XIII e seguenti troviamo i nostri testi prevalentemente con

<sup>4<sup>a</sup></sup> Così in *Corpus Juris Canonici*, ed. Ae. Friedberg, I: *Decretum*, c. 8, dist. XLVII, 171, nota 72 leggiamo: "Abjudicant canonem Ambrosio Edd. Maurini; sed Berer. III, 41 et Ambrosii et Basilii esse jure contendit, quorum prior Basili homil. ad ev. Lubae (c. XII, v. 16) in latinum sermonem transtulit".

<sup>5</sup> Nella vecchia edizione del *Decretum*, Lugduni 1559, p. 153b troviamo: "Item *Ambrosius* de eo quod scriptum est in Evangelio, Hominis cuiusdam divitis . . .". E nel margine ivi si annota: "Attulit. In tertia parte operum, Sermone 82 (sic) colu. V. cum seq. unde ego huius cap. textum (qui corruptissimus erat) renovavi . . .". L'edizione del Friedberg, l.c. lo attribuisce anche ad Ambrogio, come vedremo più avanti.

l'attribuzione a S. Ambrogio, evidentemente per influsso di Graziano.<sup>6</sup> Però non mancò chi attribuisse qualcuno dei nostri testi, eccetto il primo, a qualche altro autore: così Ugo di St. Cher riporta i due testi *"Non est minus criminis . . ."* e l'altro *"Tantorum te ergo scias . . ."* con l'attribuzione al Beda.<sup>7</sup> Ma questa può considerarsi come una vera eccezione. Per convincersene basta dare uno sguardo furtivo alla tradizione e si troverà evidente l'influsso di Graziano: per es. in Riccardo da Mediavilla,<sup>8</sup> nell'Astesano.<sup>9</sup> Il Carusi riporta i nostri testi, che ritiene parimenti di Ambrogio, nella sua opera sui detti del santo Dottore.<sup>10</sup> Per brevità omettiamo di elencare altri autori che confermano l'attribuzione predetta e rivelano l'influsso del famoso Canonista.<sup>11</sup>

Ma più interessante per noi è sapere che cosa abbiano notato i moderni cultori di edizioni critiche nei riguardi dei nostri testi. Già il Friedberg

<sup>6</sup> Anzitutto è chiaro che i Commentatori di Graziano riferiscono e commentano tutti i nostri testi come li riferisce il *Decretum* nel c. 8 della dist. XLVII: così cf. Raimondo de Penafort, *Summa de poenitentia*, Romae 1603, lib. II & 10, p. 224b: "Dist. 47. Sicut ij ubi Ambrosius inter alia dicit: *proprium nemo dicat, quod commune est*". Guido de Baisio, *Rosarium*, Venetiis apud Juntas 1577, in dist. 47, f. 61c. I Teologi medievali ordinariamente citano i nostri quattro testi separati e disgiunti tra di loro: così per il [1] cf. *Summa fr. Alexandri*, t. IV, ed. Quaracchi 1948, p. 559a, n. 373, ob. 2: "... Dicit Ambrosius: *'Nemo dicat proprium quod commune est . . .'*"; similmente *ivi* a p. 567b, n. 381, in c.; ed a p. 910a, n. 584, in Resp.; S. Tommaso, *Summa theologica*, II-II, q. 66, a. 2: "... Ambrosius dicit et habetur in Decretis dist. XLVII, can. Sicut hi: *Proprium nemo dicat quod est commune*"; e similmente in molti altri luoghi e Teologi, che per brevità omettiamo. Per il [2] cf. per es. lo stesso S. Tommaso, *op. cit.*, q. 66, a. 3, ob. 2: "... Ambrosius dicit, et habetur in Decretis, dist. XLVII: *'Neque minus est criminis habenti tollere . . .'*". Per il [3] cf. lo stesso S. Tommaso, *op. cit.*, q. 66, a. 7, in Resp., riportato poco sopra "in corpore" della nostra esposizione. Per il [4] cf. per es. la *Summa fr. Alexandri*, t. IV, ed. *cit.*, p. 567b, n. 381, in b., dove si trovano uniti tutti i tre ultimi nostri testi con l'attribuzione ad Ambrogio.

<sup>7</sup> Ugo di St. Cher, *Commentarius in Lucam*, 12, [15] (Ed. Lugduni 1669, VI, 208b).

<sup>8</sup> Riccardo di Mediavilla, In *IV Sent.*, d. 15, q. 2, ad lum (Ed. Venetiis 1509, f. 68d): "... Dicit *Decretum* dist. 47 sic: *Esurientium . . .*".

<sup>9</sup> *Summa Astensis*, II, Romae 1730, lib. 5, tit. 26, art. 3, p. 67b cita il nostro "*Esurientium . . .*" con la sola riferenza al *Decretum*, e un pò più avanti, p. 71b, art. 6 cita l'altro "*Neque est minoris criminis . . .*".

<sup>10</sup> Bartolomeus Urbinas, *Divi Ambrosii Milleloquium*, Lugduni 1556, col. 1457-1462: "Contra (nel margine: Ser. ord. 81 tom. III) tenacitatem volentis largiri, diffuse loquitur in sermone quodam de eo quod scriptum, *Hominis cujusdam divitis . . .*" e quindi riporta brani di questo sermone, ma come si trova nella traduzione, che Rufino fece dal greco sermone di S. Basilio. Per questo alla col. 1461 del predetto *Milleloquium* vengono trascritti anche i nostri quattro testi.

<sup>11</sup> Oltre gli Scolastici, come si può vedere nelle note precedenti ed anche in quelle che seguiranno, abbiamo notato che per es. parte di quel preteso sermone di S. Ambrogio con qualcuno dei nostri testi viene riportata anche dallo Sporer, *Theologia Moralis Decalogalis et Sacramentalis*, I, ed. I Bierbaum, Paderbornae 1897, tr. 3, c. 5, s. 2, p. 843, n. 752: "*D. Ambros. serm. 18 (sic): Sed ais quid injustum est . . . Non minus est criminis habenti tollere . . .*".

nella sua edizione critica del *Decretum* non seppe altro indicarci al proposito che il sermone 81 di S. Ambrogio dell'edizione romana.<sup>12</sup> Né qualche cosa di meglio ci hanno detto gli editori leonini della *Summa theologica* di S. Tommaso.<sup>13</sup> Anche Dionisio Cartusiano cita a senso i due ultimi nostri testi con l'attribuzione a S. Basilio ed a S. Ambrogio ugualmente; ma gli ultimi editori certosini nulla hanno annotato al riguardo.<sup>14</sup> E. nulla di importante abbiamo trovato annotato nei modernissimi editori del Caietano<sup>15</sup> o del Fray Domingo de Soto.<sup>16</sup>

Qualche cosa di meglio invece abbiamo trovato nelle edizioni critiche del benemerito Collegio di S. Bonaventura a Quaracchi. Infatti anche se in queste edizioni il primo dei nostri testi neppure fù identificato nella sua vera fonte,<sup>17</sup> tuttavia un progresso critico sia pure fuggevole, e forse non valutato, fu fatto nei riguardi degli altri nostri testi. Gli editori del terzo volume della *Summa fr. Alexandri de Hales* riguardo al secondo dei nostri testi "... Dicit Ambrosius: 'Non minus est criminis' ..." hanno

<sup>12</sup> *Corpus Juris Canonici*, ed. Ae. Friedberg, I, 171, al c. 8 della dist. XLVII.

<sup>13</sup> S. Tommaso, per quanto abbiamo cercato, non riferisce mai interamente tutto il brano del Graziano, ma separatamente riporta quà e là tutti i nostri testi. Ma gli editori leonini riguardo al *primo* dei nostri testi ci hanno solo annotato in margine della II-II, q. 66, a. 2, ob. 3 (Ed. Leonina IX, 85a): "Serm. XLIV, al. LXXXI, de Temp.—Inter opp. Ambr.; ex Basil. loc. cit.". Riguardo al *secondo* dei nostri testi (*Ibid.*, a. 3, ob. 2; *ed. cit.* IX, 86a) e per il *terzo* (*Ibid.*, a. 7, in Resp.; *ed. cit.* IX, 92b) gli editori leonini rimandano a quella prima annotazione (IX, 85a), senza aggiungere niente di nuovo.

<sup>14</sup> S. Dionysius Cartusianus, *Enarrationes piae et eruditae in quatuor Evangelistas* — *Enarratio in Lucam*, c. 3, a. 8 (Ed. Monstrilii 1900, XI, 448b): "Ambrosius quoque et Basilius asserunt vestem, pecuniam, calceamentum et alimentum, quae tibi superfluent, nec tamen pauperibus tribuuntur, injuste, et velut furto aut vi ablata possideri, nec possessoris esse, sed egenorum". Come si vede Dionisio dovette avere davanti i nostri famosi testi; ma l'edizione citata nulla ha annotato al riguardo.

<sup>15</sup> Anche il Caietano infatti riferisce più volte il primo dei nostri testi attribuendolo ad Ambrogio, ma il P. Zammit, O.P. che nel 1934 fece una nuova edizione degli *Opuscula oeconomico-socialia* del predetto Card. Vio de Caietano, a p. 208, nota 3 non ci dà altro che la trascrizione del testo, come si trova nel *Decretum* di Graziano secondo l'edizione del Friedberg.

<sup>16</sup> J. A. Garin, *El precepto de la limosna en un comentario inédito del Maestro Fray Domingo de Soto sobre la cuestión 32 de la II-II de Santo Tomás*, Santiago de Chile 1949, p. 30, nota 40, dove si annota soltanto che il "Proprium nemo dicat . . ." è falsamente attribuito ad Ambrogio, ma senza dirci di chi sia la traduzione di quel sermone di S. Basilio.

<sup>17</sup> In tutti i luoghi della *Summa fr. Alex.*, t. IV, ed. Quaracchi 1948, p. 559a, n. 373-3, nota 4; p. 567b, n. 381. c., nota 6; p. 910a, n. 584 in Resp., nota 3, dove il "Nemo dicat proprium . . ." viene annotato, gli editori non mettono altro che "Cf. *De Nabuthe*, c. 1, n. 2 . . ."; ma in quest'opera autentica di S. Ambrogio non si trova il nostro testo.

<sup>18</sup> *Summa fr. Alex.*, t. III, ed. Quaracchi 1930, p. 572b, n. 584. NB. Questo testo "Neque est minoris criminis . . ." si trova citato con l'attribuzione ad Ambrogio e con il rimando al *Decretum* anche nella parte IV di quella *Summa* (Ed. Venetiis 1575, f. 457a) che, come si sa, fu composta dopo la morte di Alessandro di Hales.

annotato, e giustamente: "Rectius Basilius M., *Hom. in Luc.* 12, 16 (PG 31, 275), verbotenus Rufini interpretatio, *Hom. in Luc.* 12, 16 (PG 31, 1752); ap. Gratian., *Decretum*, dist. 47, c. 8 (I, 172), Ambrosio adscribitur."<sup>19</sup> Questa annotazione poteva essere preziosa per rettificare l'attribuzione anche degli altri testi, compreso il primo, invece rimase trascurata anche dagli stessi editori del volume quarto della medesima *Summa fr. Alex.*<sup>20</sup> Recentemente anche gli editori dei primi due volumi delle opere di S. Bernardino furono precisi nell'identificare il terzo e quarto dei nostri testi,<sup>21</sup> ma essi sono necessariamente laconici ed il lettore non può dedurne le relazioni critiche e dottrinali, che i nostri quattro testi hanno connesse tra di loro. Tuttavia rimane certo per noi che le edizioni critiche di Quaracchi furono più precise che le altre edizioni nei riguardi critici dei nostri testi, eccetto però il primo, che perciò merita una breve, ma particolare trattazione.

### 3.—*Breve storia critico-dottrinale del "Proprium nemo dicat . . ."*

I cultori di edizioni critiche, come abbiamo visto, mai, per quanto è a nostra conoscenza, hanno identificato la fonte letteraria, anche rufiniana, del primo e più famoso dei quattro nostri testi.

Ma i cultori di dottrine sociali patristiche già avevano dato accenni, che potevano incitare ad una chiarificazione nei riguardi dell'autore di quel testo. Infatti già nel 1923 M.—B. Schwalm nel suo articolo "*Communisme*" del *Dictionnaire de Théologie catholique*, t. III, col. 583, a proposito del nostro testo scriveva:

Rufin, le traducteur latin de ces homélies de saint Basile, fit circuler sous le nomme de ce Père un texte où il est dit: *Terra communiter omnibus hominibus data est: proprium nemo dicat . . .* *Cette phrase n'existe pas dans le texte grec.*

<sup>19</sup> *Summa fr. Alex.*, t. III, ed. cit., p. 572a, nota 1.

<sup>20</sup> Infatti i testi "*Non est minoris criminis . . .*" come l'altro "*Esurientium . . .*" e l'ultimo "*Tot ergo . . .*" vengono citati uniti t. IV, p. 567b, n. 381 della stessa *Summa fr. Alex.*; e nella nota 5 gli editori di quel volume dissero soltanto che invece di Ambrogio "*Cf. potius Basil., hom. in Illud Destruam horrea n. 7 (PG 31, 278) . . .*", perché, osservano più avanti (*ed. cit.*, p. 910, nota 2), è il *Decretum* di Graziano "*ubi falso adscribitur*"; ma non dissero, come parzialmente gli editori del III volume, che tutti quei testi si trovano letteralmente nella traduzione latina di Rufino. Né il P. Doucet, *Prolegomena*, CXXII, [12], si avvantaggiò delle annotazioni degli editori del terzo volume.

<sup>21</sup> S. Bernardinus Senensis, *Quadragesimale de Christiana Religione*, II, Quaracchi 1950, Sermo 54, c. 1, p. 48, lin. 29ss.: "*Unde 47 dist. cap. Sicut, in fine, Ambrosius ait: 'Nudorum indumentum est quod tu recludis . . . Tantorum te ergo scias invadere bona . . .*" e nella nota 5 gli editori annotano giustamente: ". . . De hoc canone, a Maurinis Ambrosio abiudicato, videoas Friedberg notam in h. 1. Textum invenimus in homilia Basilii, quas transtulit Rufinus de greco in latinum, Homilia 3, n. 7 (PG 31, 1752)".

*Rufin la substitue de son cru a la comparaison du théâtre.* Il est coutumier de ces remainiens . . . *Rufin d'ailleurs, ne prêche, lui aussi, le communisme que par yperbole oratoire et réaction de moraliste:* plus loin, il définit la richesse ‘un bienfait du créateur’ et non un état de péché; il réduit l’iniquité du riche à l’exclusive jouissance d’un superflu dont beaucoup d’autres feraient leur nécessaire, n. 7, col. 1751 (nella PG, 31). Quant à la parole: ‘le riche est un larron,’ citée comme de saint Basile par E. de Laveleye et d’autres économistes de marque, je ne l’ai trouvée ni dans ce Père, ni dans la traduction de Rufin; elle contradit d’ailleurs la doctrine de l’un et de l’autre.

Abbiamo voluto riferire “in extenso” il precedente testo per dedurne delle conclusioni: infatti, se dovessimo credere allo Schwalm, seguirebbe che: a) Rufino e non S. Basilio dovrebbe dirsi l'autore non solo letterale ma anche dottrinale del nostro testo; b) In quel testo viene predicato il comunismo, ma “par yperbole oratoire et réaction de moraliste”; c) L'espressione “il ricco é un ladro” non si trova, secondo lo stesso Schwalm, né in S. Basilio né in Rufino, e d'altra parte quell'espressione contraddice alla dottrina dell'uno e dell'altro.

Altri in seguito hanno citato quel nostro testo famoso: o per propugnare il preteso comunismo nella dottrina dei Padri o per spiegare il predetto testo in senso cattolico.<sup>22</sup> E tra questi merita una menzione speciale Stanislao Giet.

Infatti il Giet pubblicò dapprima uno studio ben fatto su S. Basilio dal titolo, *Les idées et l'action sociales de saint Basile* (Paris, 1941). Ivi, al c. IV esamina il problema della ricchezza in S. Basilio. E precisamente a p. 97ss. contro il Courtone ed altri dimostra che in nessun modo né considerando l'originale greco, né considerando la traduzione letterale latina (ma non cita la traduzione latina di Rufino) si può dedurre che S. Basilio abbia negato il diritto di proprietà.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Così lo Schwalm nel citato articolo.

<sup>23</sup> Giet, *Les idées et l'action sociales de saint Basile*, p. 99 “La richesse est confiée aux hommes pour qu'il en soient les fidèles administrateurs . . . La faute du riche est de considérer sa richesse comme son bien propre, c'est à dire de la détourner à son usage exclusif et non d'en garder la propriété personnelle. Ce serait une autre confusion de croire qu'en déniant à l'homme tout souverain domaine sur les créatures, Basile attaque le droit /p.100/legal de propriété . . . Voici donc comment il s'impose à notre avis, d'interpréter cette page: Tu prétends ne faire tort à personne en gardant ce qui t'appartient. Mais rien t'appartient d'une manière absolue et indépendante. Tu es, par la volonté de Dieu, le premier occupant: c'est ce qui fond ton droit de propriété. Mais si tu veux profiter de cet avantage pour revendiquer l'usage exclusif des biens, tu oublies qu'ils ont reçu une destination commune, et tu commets une injustice. Si chacun prenait, sur son revenu, ce qui lui est nécessaire, et qu'il laissât aux autres le superflu, il n'y aurait plus ni riches ni pauvres: non que la propriété ait disparu; mais elle existerait sans les abus et les désordres dont elle est le prétexte. N'oublie pas que Dieu t'a confié des biens pour que tu te sanctifies par une adminis-

Ma lo stesso Giet, forse per influsso dello Schwalm e certamente per combattere un libro del Walther sull'origine del Comunismo,<sup>24</sup> nel 1948 scrive un interessante articolo dove "ex professo" esamina e spiega il famoso nostro testo "*Proprium nemo dicat . . .*", che, come sappiamo, si trova nella sola traduzione latina di Rufino. Le conclusioni del Giet, che ci interessano, possono essere riassunte nel seguente modo: *a)* Il testo "*Proprium nemo dicat . . .*" è stato interpolato dal Rufino nella traduzione, che questi fece dal sermone greco di S. Basilio. Così che S. Basilio sarebbe dottrinalmente irresponsabile di quel testo;<sup>25</sup> *b)* Il responsabile dottrinale del testo interpolato dal Rufino è però S. Ambrogio;<sup>26</sup> *c)* Ci sembra poi che lo stesso Giet, anche se ne dà le ragioni e le occasioni storiche, ammetta implicitamente che il nostro testo sia di solido fondamento per la cosiddetta illegittimità del diritto di proprietà. Infatti egli così scrive:

Voilà donc un courant de tradition sur l'illégitimité de l'appropriation originelle des biens, solidement fondé sur les à peu près de saint Ambroise, sur une interpolation de Rufin (allude al nostro testo), et sur une falsification du pseudo-Isidore: le tout recevant la consécration du Décret . . .<sup>27</sup>

Pertanto dopo queste brevi note sulla storia dei nostri quattro testi prima di passare all'aspetto più positivo di questo breve studio, vogliamo sintetizzare quanto segue: *a)* Gli editori critici mai, a nostra conoscenza, hanno identificato il primo dei nostri testi. Gli altri tre sono stati qualche volta identificati nella loro vera fonte, ma non da tutti, né forse con la consapevolezza che tutti i nostri quattro testi, compreso il primo, nella forma in cui li abbiamo riferiti, sono membri d'un sol brano della

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tration sage et disintéressée: le soin jaloux avec tu les gardes, frustre le prochain; et à ce titre (car les deux fautes se résolvent en la même injustice) *tu es un avare et un voleur*". Abbiamo voluto riferire "in extenso" questa interpretazione del Giet, perché più avanti dimostreremo che queste stesse idee sono incluse anche nella traduzione di Rufino, compreso il famoso "*Proprium nemo dicat . . .*", dove pure, come vedremo, non si nega in alcun modo il diritto di proprietà, ma si parla degli obblighi del ricco in relazione al suo superfluo.

<sup>24</sup> G. Walter, *Les Origines du Communisme, judaïques, chrétiennes, grecques, latines*. Paris, Bibliothèque historique, 1931; questa citazione l'abbiamo presa dallo stesso S. Giet, *La doctrine de l'appropriation des Biens chez quelques-uns des Pères* (e per sottotitolo: *Peut-on parler de Communisme?*) in *Recherches de Science Religieuse* 35 (1948) 55, nota 1.

<sup>25</sup> Giet, *La doctrine de l'appropriation . . .*, p. 69: "Le Décret de Gratien présente en effet un texte qui est donné pour être de saint Ambroise: Sermo 81, De eo quod scriptum est in Evangelio: Hominis cujusdam divitis fructus uberes ager attulit. Or il s'agit en réalité de l'homélie Vle de saint Basile: in illud Lucae: Destruam. Mais le passage de l'homélie est donné dans la traduction de Rufin avec précisément la phrase interpolé: '*Proprium nemo dicat quod est commune . . .*'".

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*: "Le responsable est bien saint Ambroise!".

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 70.

traduzione rufiniana dell'omelia greca di S. Basilio. *b)* Gli autori di storia di dottrine economico-sociali hanno "ex professo" esaminato non di rado il primo dei nostri testi, come quello che comprometterebbe la legittimità del diritto di proprietà. Gli autori cattolici (Schwalm, Giet) si sono sforzati di interpretarlo iperbolicamente (Schwalm) oppure con responsabilità singola individuale e storicamente spiegata (Giet).

Dopo questo ci sembra opportuno continuare nelle nostre osservazioni critico-letterarie ed anche dottrinali.

#### 4.—*L'attribuzione letterale dei nostri testi a S. Ambrogio non può sostenersi*

Per dimostrare che nessuno dei nostri testi si possa attribuire a S. Ambrogio, basta considerare che tra tutti i sermoni autentici attribuiti dai critici moderni al Vescovo di Milano non se ne trova uno solo, che riferisca letteralmente i nostri testi, anche se nelle sue opere, si trovano dottrine simili.<sup>28</sup> Ma dottrine simili si trovano anche in altri Padri,<sup>29</sup> e per questo non si può dedurre che essi possano dirsi autori anche dei nostri testi.

Sappiamo che nelle vecchie edizioni dei sermoni di S. Ambrogio, come in quella romana, si trova il sermone 81,<sup>30</sup> che contiene letteralmente tutti i nostri testi. Lo stesso sermone in altre edizioni è il 64 della enumerazione.<sup>31</sup> In tutte queste edizioni, che lo attribuiscono ad Ambrogio, il predetto sermone viene classificato nella Domenica VIII dopo la Pentecoste.<sup>32</sup> Esso ha ivi una breve introduzione adattata al Vangelo del giorno e comincia nel seguente modo: "*Non omnia, fratres charissimi, quae villico . . .*"<sup>33</sup>. Però subito dopo seguono le parole "*Duplex est autem tentationum species . . .*" con le quali precisamente si comincia a trascrivere il sermone di S. Basilio nella nota traduzione di Rufino, che, come abbiamo visto, contiene letteralmente tutti i nostri testi.<sup>34</sup> Noi non sappiamo chi abbia fatto questo plagio dal Rufino e il predetto adattamento alla

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Giet, *La doctrine de l'appropriation . . .*, 64.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. i principali testi patristici sulla proprietà in F. M. Palacio, *Concetto cristiano della proprietà*, Milano 1938; altre referenze puoi trovare in H. Lio, *Determinatio superflui in doctrina Alexandri Halensis ciusque Scholae (iuxta fontes praesertim ineditos et autographos)*, in *Antonianum* 27 (1952) 94 ss.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. PL 17, 613-14; cf. poi il testo di tutto il sermone nelle vecchie edizioni delle opere di S. Ambrogio, come in quella di Parigi 1603, t. V, Sermo LIII, col. 87; qui vi i nostri testi si trovano alle coll. 92L-93B.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. per es. la citata edizione di Parigi nella nota precedente; ed anche PL, *l.c.*

<sup>32</sup> Cf. *ibid.*

<sup>33</sup> Cf. la citata edizione di Parigi, col. 87.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 87M ss. e PG 31, 1744C ss.

Domenica VIII dopo Pentecoste, secondo le predette edizioni, ma sappiamo certamente che quel sermone non può dirsi di Ambrogio, perché, come abbiamo detto, non è che una copiatura del sermone basiliano nella forma latina di Rufino, eccetto la breve introduzione. Infatti già i fratelli Ballerini<sup>35</sup> ed il Migne<sup>36</sup> avevano escluso apoditticamente la paternità ambrosiana di quel sermone 81 (altrove 64) delle vecchie edizioni.<sup>37</sup> Tuttavia ci meraviglia che il Migne, pur rigettando la paternità ambrosiana di quel sermone dell'ottava Domenica dopo la Pentecoste, non sappia chi ne sia l'autore letterale, ossia il traduttore dal greco.<sup>38</sup> Se invece si fosse ricordato che nell'appendice del t. 31 della sua PG aveva trascritto l'omelia di S. Basilio nella traduzione latina di Rufino,<sup>39</sup> avrebbe visto che la stessa omelia, nella predetta forma rufiniana, era tutta contenuta, e letteralmente, nel preteso sermone 81 (=64) di S. Ambrogio.

Poiché dunque tra le attuali opere autentiche di S. Ambrogio non si trovano i nostri testi, e poiché il sermone una volta attribuito a lui, ed al quale si rimanda nel *Decretum* di Graziano,<sup>40</sup> non può essere di S. Ambrogio, perché non è che una copiatura del sermone di S. Basilio tradotto dal Rufino, rimane che in nessun modo S. Ambrogio può dirsi l'autore dei nostri testi, non solo dei tre ultimi, ma anche del primo, che però, per le suesposte considerazioni dello Schwalm e dello Giet, merita anche nostre particolari osservazioni.

#### *5.—Il testo "proprium nemo dicat . . ." non compromette in alcun modo la legittimità del diritto di proprietà*

Come abbiamo visto, anche qualche autore cattolico teme che il nostro famoso testo comprometta in qualche modo la legittimità del diritto di

<sup>35</sup> Cf. M. Carpaneto, *Le opere oratorie di S. Ambrogio*, in *Didaskaleion* 9 (1930) 35-156.

<sup>36</sup> PL 17, 607: "Sermo sexagesimus quartus (in altre edizioni 81 ed è il sermone citato nelle edizioni del *Decretum* di Graziano, cf. *supra*) nihil aliud est quam Basilii homilia in dictum illud ex Evangelio secundum Lucam: Destruam horrea mea etc., nonnullis tamen partim additis, partim recisis. Quinimo si contendantur cum hoc sermone quae in eodem libro ex illa homilia imitatus est sanctus Ambrosius, illico cognoscetur Doctorem nostrum Basilii sententias multo nobiliori ratione esse interpretatum, quam translatorem huius sermonis quippe qui verba ex verbis serviliter reddens, tota elocutione, ac potissimum in iis laciniis, quas identidem de suo intexit ab Ambroso abest quam longissime".

<sup>37</sup> I moderni critici sono orientati ad ammettere l'origine oratoria di vari trattati ambrosiani (cf. Carpaneto, *op. cit.*, 35 ss.), ma né tra questi trattati né tra i sermoni propriamente detti ed autentici abbiamo trovato menzionato presso gli stessi moderni critici come di Ambrogio il preteso sermone 81 citato dalle edizioni del *Decretum* di Graziano.

<sup>38</sup> Così almeno appare dal testo del Migne che abbiamo riportato nella penultima nota.

<sup>39</sup> PG 31, 1744-1753.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. *supra*.

proprietà, e per questo si è sforzato di interpretarlo, e magari spiegarlo, con quella scappatoia usata per altri testi patristici: che cioè il testo è oratorio, e quindi iperbolico ed alquanto esagerato ed ecco per conseguenza non bisogna prenderlo proprio alla lettera.<sup>41</sup> In verità invece a noi sembra che il nostro testo, anche preso alla lettera non comprometta o neghi in alcun modo la legittimità del diritto di proprietà, ma significhi qualche altra cosa, come vediamo subito.

Anzitutto giova notare, che esso è citato non solo dal *Decretum* di Graziano,<sup>42</sup> ma anche dai più grandi Scolastici, compreso S. Tommaso.<sup>43</sup> E nessuno di questi dice che il nostro testo dev'essere considerato iperbolicamente, che anzi lo citano nelle loro opere teologiche frequentemente, senza che mai essi ritengano che quel testo comprometta in alcun modo la legittimità della proprietà privata.<sup>44</sup>

Il testo quindi non deve facilmente considerarsi iperbolico. D'altra parte, letteralmente considerato, ci dice soltanto che nessuno può riguardare proprio, anche quanto all'uso, ciò che ritiene di superfluo: che è ben altra cosa, ma che vogliamo meglio spiegare per non essere fraintesi.

Nel diritto di proprietà sulle cose infatti bisogna distinguere l'acquisto, il possesso anche temporaneo, e l'uso.<sup>45</sup> La tradizione ha conosciuto e

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Schwalm, *art. cit.* in *Dictionnaire de Théol. cath.*, III, col. 583 (cf. *supra*). Giet, *La doctrine de l'appropriation* . . . , p. 65: "La raison par laquelle saint Ambroise condamne l'appropriation de la terre apporte un élément de solution: 'C'est, dit-il, parce que l'on ne peut dire qu'il y ait chose à nous appartenir en propre, quand rien n'est perpétuel' (nella nota 4: 'Nam nec proprium quidquam est, ubi perpetuum nihil est'). Ici l'erreur est manifeste; car, de ce que rien n'est perpétuel, il s'ensuit en bonne logique que l'homme n'a pas sur ses biens un souverain domaine, non qu'il ne puisse revendiquer, à l'égard d'autrui, ce que l'on est convenu d'appeler entre humains un droit de propriété". Qualunque sia la fondatezza o meno di questa spiegazione nei riguardi di S. Ambrogio, a noi preme per il momento dimostrare che tale spiegazione non è necessaria nei riguardi di Rufino ed anche nei riguardi del nostro famoso testo "*Proprium nemo dicat . . .*", che si può spiegare bene, come vedremo, anche prendendolo alla lettera nel testo e contesto.

<sup>42</sup> *Decretum*, c. 8, dist. XLVII (Ed. Friedberg I, 171).

<sup>43</sup> Cf. *supra* le note sulle opere scolastiche.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. per es. *Summa fr. Alexandri*, t. IV, ed. Quaracchi 1948, p. 507, n. 381, ed anche p. 910a, n. 584 dove sempre viene riferito il nostro testo in relazione agli obblighi del ricco, cioè di colui che ha il superfluo e che deve soccorrere il povero. Anche S. Tommaso, *Summa theologiae*, II-II, q. 66, a. 2 nelle obbiezioni cita il nostro testo e poi così lo spiega: "Ad tertium dicendum, quod cum dicit Ambrosius: 'Nemo proprium dicat, quod est commune', loquitur de proprietate quantum ad usum: unde subdit: plusquam sufficeret sumptui, violenter obtentum est." Importante poi è notare che anche giuristi, commentatori del Graziano, l'hanno inteso nel nostro senso: cf. per es. l'Archidiaconus (= Guido de Baisio), *Rosarium*, Venetiis 1577, dist. 47, f. 61c: "Sicut hi. Sumptui. tam in victu quam in vestitu scilicet . . . quod est superfluum illud quidem non solum male sed etiam violenter . . .".

<sup>45</sup> Cf. H. Lio, *Determinatio superflui* . . . , p. 134.

distinto questi diversi aspetti, distinguendone specialmente il dominium radicale di una cosa dal "dominium d'uso."<sup>46</sup> Queste distinzioni ci possono fare meglio comprendere come nella stessa tradizione scolastica si distinguano le cose *proprie* dalle cose *aliene*: e tra queste alcune vengano considerate *aliene* sotto tutti gli aspetti, altre sono *aliene solo quanto all'uso*: e queste ultime sono le cose superflue.<sup>47</sup> Per questo nella stessa Patristica viene sovente detto che il superfluo è *alieno*, secondo l'espressione famosa: "*Aliena possidentur cum superflua possidentur.*"<sup>48</sup>

Pertanto non è questione del diritto di proprietà, che comprende anche le cose necessarie, nel nostro testo che asserisce soltanto il superfluo non potersi riguardare come proprio quanto all'uso, perché l'uso del superfluo spetta non a noi che lo possediamo, ma ai poveri.

Per questo viene anche detto nella Patristica che il necessario del povero si trova nel superfluo del ricco.<sup>49</sup>

Tale dottrina si desume chiarissima ed esclusiva anche dal testo e contesto del famoso "*Proprium nemo dicat . . .*".

Infatti il testo, anche considerando le sue varianti più importanti con cui viene riferito nella tradizione, non ammette che questa spiegazione. Ci si permetta di dimostrarlo riferendo quelle varianti:

Rufino	Graziano	<i>Summa fr. Alex.</i>
Proprium nemo dicat, quod <i>e communi plusquam sufficeret sumptum, et violenter obtentum est.</i> <sup>50</sup>	Proprium nemo dicat quod <i>est commune, quod plusquam sufficeret sumptum etiam violenter obtentum est.</i> <sup>51</sup>	Nemo proprium dicat quod <i>commune est; plusquam sufficit ad sumptus, violenter obtentum est.</i> <sup>52</sup>

Da questo breve cospetto si può anzitutto vedere, come in un così breve testo ci siano tante varianti, e noi abbiamo notato solo tre fonti, ma non è escluso, anzi sappiamo positivamente, che in altre fonti ci sono altre varianti, che per brevità omettiamo.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 135.

<sup>48</sup> Cf. S. Augustinus, *Enarratio in psalmum CXLVII* (PL 37, 1922): "Res alienae possidentur cum superflua possidentur". *Regula monachorum ex scriptis hieronymi per Lupum de Olmeto collecta*, c. IV (PL 30, 344B): "Nam aliena rapere convincitur, qui ultra necessaria sibi retinere conatur". Cf. H. Lio, *op. cit.*, p. 94 ss.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. S. Augustinus, *op. cit.* (PL 37, 1922); Lio, *l.c.*

<sup>50</sup> PG 31, 1752A.

<sup>51</sup> *Decretum*, c. 8, dist. XLVII (Ed. Friedberg I, 171).

<sup>52</sup> Ed. Quaracchi 1948, t. IV, p. 559, n. 372, ob. 2; p. 567b, n. 381, in c.; p. 910a, n. 584, in Resp.

A noi però preme sapere, se con tutte le varianti si possa costruire un unico senso dottrinale. Al che noi rispondiamo affermativamente ed il senso unico è quello già annunziato: nessuno può dire proprio, cioè usare per se, il superfluo alle proprie necessità (=plusquam sufficeret). Certamente considerando le tre lezioni che abbiamo riferito si deve dire che le particolarità per es. "quod e communi" di Rufino, "etiam violenter" di Graziano e "plusquam sufficit ad sumptus" della *Summa fr. Alex.* possono influire sui diversi aspetti del problema del superfluo. Ma, lo ripetiamo, l'idea fondamentale rimane uguale, nonostante quelle varianti, ed è che nessuno può chiamare suo *anche quanto all'uso* il superfluo.

Anche il contesto infatti non parla che degli obblighi dei ricchi, cioè di coloro che hanno il superfluo, verso i poveri. E tale senso viene continuato anche negli altri tre testi, che abbiamo proposto in questo nostro breve studio, come apparirà anche poco appresso. Per questo anche noi pensiamo che tutti e quattro i testi sono connessi tra di loro e che anche il primo dottrinalmente è congiunto cogli altri. Perciò infine crediamo, che come non è compromessa la legittimità del diritto di proprietà negli ultimi tre, così no lo è nel primo dei nostri testi.

Tuttavia rimane ancora la questione dell'autenticità, sulla quale proponiamo subito anche le seguenti osservazioni.

#### 6.—*S. Basilio responsabile autorè dottrinale dei quattro testi e Rufino autore letterale*

Noi ci proponiamo di dimostrare che il responsabile diretto della dottrina dei nostri testi, compreso il primo è lo stesso S. Basilio e che Rufino è l'autore della loro forma latina. Questo, crediamo, rimarrà provato, se riusciremo a dimostrare, che Rufino, traducendo dal greco, sia pure in forma libera, non si sia allontanato dalla dottrina basiliana, che viene tutta riprodotta in una nuova forma latina. Ed allora rimarrà anche comprovato che non c'è bisogno di ricorrere all'influsso di S. Ambrogio, se per es. anche la dottrina del primo testo si trova nel corrispondente testo greco di Basilio.

A dimostrare ciò da una parte mettiamo la traduzione latina letterale e fedele dell'omelia di S. Basilio e dall'altra parte la traduzione libera del Rufino, dove, come sappiamo, si trovano i nostri quattro testi nella forma in cui li abbiamo studiati.

S. Basilio

Testo greco in PG 31, 276, 7

*Τίνα, φησὶν, ἀδικῶ συνέχων τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ; Ποῖα, εἰπέ μοι, σαντοῦ; πόθεν λαβὼν εἰς τὸν βίον εἰσήνεγκας; "Ωσπερ ἂν εἴ τις, ἐν Θεάτρῳ Θέαν καταλαβὼν, εἴτα ἔξειργοι τοὺς ἐπεισιόντας, ἵδιον ἑαυτοῦ κρίνων τὸ κουγῶς πᾶσι κατὰ τὴν χρῆσιν προκεύμενον. τοιοῦτον εἴσι καὶ οἱ πλούσιοι. Τὰ γάρ κοινὰ προκατασχόντες, ἵδια ποιοῦνται διὰ τὴν πρόληψιν. 'Επει ἐλ τὸ πρὸς παραμυθίαν τῆς ἑαυτοῦ χρέας ἔκαστος κομιζόμενος, τὸ περιττὸν ἡφει τῷ δεομένῳ, οὐδεὶς μὲν ἄν τὴν πλούσιος, οὐδεὶς δὲ ἐνδεής . . .*

Σὺ δὲ, πάντα τοὺς ἀπληρώτοις τῆς πλεονέξιας κολποῖς περιλαβὼν, οὐδένα οἶει ἀδικεῖν τοσούτους ἀποστερῶν; Τίς ἐστιν ὁ πλεονέκτης; 'Ο μὴ ἐμμένων τῇ αὐταρκείᾳ. Τίς δὲ ἐστιν δὲ ἀποστερητής; 'Ο αφαιρούμενος τὰ ἑκάστου. Σὺ δὲ οὐκ ἀποδτερητής; ἢ πρὸς οἰκονομίαν ἐδέξω, ταῦτα ἵδια σεαυτοῦ ποιοῦμενος; "Η δὲ μὲν ἐνδεδυμένον ἀπογυμνῶν λωποδύτης ὄνομασθησεται. δὲ τον γυμνὸν μὴ ενδυν, δυνάμενος τοῦτο ποιεῖν, ἄλλης τινός ἐστι προσηγορίας ἄξιος; Τοῦ πεινῶντός ἐστιν δὲ ἄρτος, δην σὺ κατέχεις. τοῦ γυμνητεύοντος τὸ ἴματιον, δὲν φυλάσσεις ἐν ἀποθήκαις. τοῦ ἀνυποδέτου τὸ δὲ πόδημα, δὲ παρὰ σοὶ κατασήπεται. τοῦ χρήζοντος το αργύριον, δὲ κατορύκεις ἔχεις. "Ωστε τοσούτους ἀδικεῖς, δοσις παρέχειν ἐδίνασο.

S. Basilio

Traduzione lat. in PG 31, 275, 7:

Cui, inquit, injuriam facio, dum retineo  
mea atque conservo? Quae, dic mihi, tua  
sunt? Unde accepta in vitam intulisti? Velut  
si quis, loco in theatro ad spectandum occu-  
pato, deinde ingredientes arceat, id sui ipsius  
*proprium ratus, quod ad communem usum*  
*proponitur: tales ejusmodi quoque divites*  
sunt. Nam *communia* praeoccupantes, ea ob  
praeoccupationem sibi assumunt. *Quod si*  
*suae quisque necessitati sublevandae in modo*  
*quod satis est caperet, egenti vero relinqueret*  
*quod superfluum est, nemo esset dives,*  
*pauper nemo . . .*

Tu vero inexplilibus avaritiae sinibus omnia complexus, atque his tam multos privans,  
nemini ullam injuriam facere te existimas?  
Quis avarus est? Quis (Leggi: Qui) rebus  
quae satis sunt, contentus non est. Quis  
spoliator? Qui cujusque res aufert. Non  
avarus es tu? non spoliator es tu? Qui  
scilicet quae dispensanda recepisti, ea  
tibimetipsi propria facias. Furne vocabi-  
tur qui ueste indutum denudari, qui vero  
nudum non induerit, id si agere potest, alia  
quadam appellatione dignus est?

Esurientis est panis, quem tu detines: nudi  
est pallium, quod tu in arca servas: discal-  
ceati calceus, qui apud te putrescit: indigentis  
argentum, quod defossum habes. Quare  
quot hominibus dare potes, tot infers  
injuriam.

S. Basilio

Traduzione di Rufino in PG 31, 1572A-C:

Terra communiter omnibus hominibus data  
est:

[1] *Proprium nemo dicat, quod e communi*  
*plusquam sufficeret sumptum, et violenter*  
*obtentum est . . .*

[2] Neque enim majoris est criminis ha-  
benti tollere, quam, cum possis et habundes,  
indigentibus denegare.

[3] Esurientum panis est quem tu detines,  
nudorum vestimentum est quod tu recludis,  
miserorum redemptio est absolutio pecunia  
quam tu in terra defodis.

[4] Tantorum te ergo scias invadere bona,  
quantis possis praestare si velis.

Da questo raffronto risulta chiaro quanto segue:

a) L'omelia greca di S. Basilio, che si trova nella PG nelle due traduzioni latine riferite, viene anche intitolata "*De avaritia*"<sup>53</sup> E già da questo si può arguire che lo scopo del santo non fù di negare il diritto di proprietà in sé, ma di combattere l'avarizia.

b) Non solo riguardo al primo testo, ma anche quanto al *secondo*, la traduzione di Rufino è molto libera e varia quanto alla forma dall'altra traduzione latina; ma non per questo si dovrebbe considerare interpolato anche il *secondo testo*. Infatti la dottrina è comune non solo con la fonte greca ma anche nelle due traduzioni latine, come brevemente vogliamo dimostrare.

c) Il primo testo "*Proprium nemo dicat . . .*" di Rufino si trova dottrinalmente uguale anche nell'altra fonte, dove si parla appunto dei ricchi: ossia di quelli che posseggono il superfluo; e si asserisce che essi non possono dire proprio il superfluo (= *id sui ipsius proprium ratus, quod ad communem usum proponitur*). Ora, come abbiamo visto sopra, questo e non altro viene asserito anche nel testo di Rufino.

d) Anche il secondo testo: "*Non est majoris criminis . . .*" pur con le varianti "*Non est minus . . .*" oppure "*Non est minoris . . .*" di alcune fonti si trova dottrinalmente identico in Basilio, che stima doversi chiamare ladro non solo chi sveste un altro (= *habenti tollere* di Rufino), ma anche colui che non veste l'ignudo, potendolo ed avendo il superfluo (= *cum possis et habundes indigentibus denegare* di Rufino).<sup>54</sup>

e) Il terzo poi dei nostri testi: "*Esurientium panis est . . .*" concorda non di rado anche letteralmente con la fonte basiliana, come si può vedere.

f) L'ultimo testo infine: "*Tantorum te ergo . . .*" si trova dottrinalmente espresso anche in Basilio, che ammonisce il ricco di ricordarsi che commetterà tante ingiurie (= *Tantorum te scias invadere bona* di Rufino) quanti sono i poveri che poteva aiutare col suo superfluo (= *quantis possis praestare si velis* di Rufino).

<sup>53</sup> PG 31, 262: "In illud dictum Evangelii secundum Lucam: 'Destruam horrea mea . . .' Itemque de avaritia".

<sup>54</sup> A questo proposito vogliamo qui ricordare che l'espressione "il ricco (cioé colui che ha il superfluo e non lo dà al povero) è un ladro" troverebbe risonanza nel detto di Basilio (PG 31, 278A): "Furne vocabitur qui veste indutum denudarit, *qui vero nudum non induerit, id si agere potest, alia quadam appellatione dignus?*" Ci siamo permessi di notare ciò per rispondere allo Schwalm, *Communisme*, in *Dictionnaire de Théol. cath.*, III, col. 583 (cf. testo *supra*). Certamente invece erronea è l'espressione di Proudon "*La proprietà* (che non è da identificarsi con la ricchezza) *è un furto*": affermare questo è vero errore secondo la dottrina cattolica e non semplicemente una esagerazione, come si esprime E. Taviani, *La proprietà*, Roma editrice Studium 1946, p. 97.

Dopo questa breve analisi ci sembra che veramente Basilio possa e debba dirsi il vero e diretto autore dottrinale responsabile di tutti e quattro i nostri testi; e Rufino soltanto il responsabile delle formule letterarie latine, che meritarono, a preferenze di altre, di essere tramandate di generazione in generazione.

Qualcuno però a questo punto potrebbe domandarci perché mai allora Rufino tradusse tanto liberamente e non letteralmente il testo di Basilio? Rispondiamo che la ricerca di ciò ci porterebbe fuori di questo breve lavoro, e poi non mancano studi anche recenti su Rufino come traduttore.<sup>55</sup>

Intanto sappiamo che lo stesso Rufino ci ha edotto sui suoi modi di tradurre.<sup>56</sup> Ed il Migne nei riguardi delle traduzioni rufiniane riporta quanto segue: "... Intelligere licebit, *quantum licentiae* in vertendis Graecorum scriptis sibi sumeret is, quem dixi, *antiquissimus interpres Rufinus*".<sup>57</sup>

Nessuna meraviglia pertanto se anche nel tradurre dal greco il nostro sermone usi quelle licenze, che gli erano tanto abituali, ma che, almeno nel nostro caso, non furono causa di divergenze dottrinali dalla fonte tradotta.

Tuttavia se infine sarà gradita una nostra osservazione sul modo di tradurre di Rufino, diremo che nei testi esaminati abbiamo notato una tendenza di lui a voler ridurre in forma generica di sentenza ciò che nella fonte appare piuttosto in forma descrittiva. Così per es. alla descrizione dell'uomo che occupa per primo i posti del teatro Rufino con le stesse idee di Basilio costruisce il famoso "*Proprium nemo dicat...*" come principio universale.

### CONCLUSIONI

Dopo quello che abbiamo esposto ci sembra pregiò dell'opera riassumere le seguenti conclusioni:

1) Sotto l'aspetto critico-letterario consta che tutti i nostri quattro testi, compresi il primo, sono membri d'un sol brano della traduzione latina, che Rufino fece della celebre omelia di S. Basilio "De eo quod scriptum est in Evangelio: 'Cujusdam divitis fructus uberes ager attulit,'" (PG 31, 1744

<sup>55</sup> Cf. H. Hoppe, *Rufin als übersetzer*, in *Studi dedicati alla memoria di Paolo Ubaldi*, Milano 1937, 133-150; M. M. Wagner, *Rufinus the translator*, Washington 1945 (*Patristic Studies* 73); F. Murphy, *Rufinus of Aquileia (345-411) His Life and Works*, Washington 1945, 115-117.

<sup>56</sup> Rufinus, *Apologia adv. Hieron.*, I, 25 (PL 21, 563C): "Unde et nos propter paupertatem linguae et rerum novitatem, et sicut quidam ait, quod graecorum et sermo latior et lingua felicior sit, *conabimur non tam verbum ex verbo transferre, quod impossibile est, quam vim verbi quodam explicare circuitu*".

<sup>57</sup> PG 31, 156A.

ss.), che da altri traduttori è intitolata: "In illud dictum Evangelii secundum Lucam: 'Destruam horrea mea, et majora aedificabo:' itemque de avaritia" (PG 31, 262 ss.).

2) Pertanto l'attribuzione a S. Ambrogio consacrata nel *Decretum* di Graziano non può sostenersi criticamente.

3) Pensiamo che nell'auspicata nuova edizione del *Decretum*<sup>58</sup> nel-l'apparato delle fonti al c. 8 della dist. XLVII (Ed. Friedberg I, 171) possa e debba rimandarsi non al preteso sermone 81 (= 64) di S. Ambrogio, ma alla predetta omelia di S. Basilio, nella traduzione latina di Rufino, come alla vera fonte dottrinale e letterale.

4) Sotto l'aspetto dottrinale anche se dai nostri testi, da non interpretarsi iperbolicamente, se ne possa avvantaggiare la sentenza che afferma dovere il ricco per obbligo di giustizia dare il suo superfluo al povero; tuttavia ci sembra doversi considerare superata la preoccupazione che in essi, e specialmente nel primo, sia in alcun modo compromessa la legittimità del diritto di proprietà. Infatti da tutto il testo e contesto risulta chiaro che S. Basilio e Rufino non vogliono negare la legittimità del diritto di proprietà, ma si preoccupano di mostrare gli obblighi gravi del ricco nell'uso del suo superfluo.

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<sup>58</sup> Cf. S. Kuttner, *De gratiani opere edendo*, in *Apollinaris* 21 (1948) 118-128.

## BOOK REVIEWS

*Commentarium in Codicem Iuris Canonici*, by Heribert Jone, O.F.M. Cap. Vol. I (Canons 1-726). (Paderborn, F. Schoeningh, 1950. Pp. 627. 24 marks (cloth); 20 marks (paper).)

Ever since 1918 the Catholic world has been surfeited with commentaries on the Code of Canon Law. Some of these works have already been consigned to an early and deserved oblivion. Others are still being weighed in the balance. The latest commentary to appear, however, exhibits more enduring qualities. It is the *Commentarium in Codicem Iuris Canonici*, by Heribert Jone, the German Capuchin, whose *Moral Theology* has secured world-wide acceptance during the past two decades.

Fr. Jone's *Commentarium* is not entirely new. It was originally published in three volumes in 1939-1940 as *Gesetzbuch des Kanonischen Rechtes*. This German edition displayed a number of superior qualities. Its text followed the order of the Code, and presented the law in a paraphrastic rather than a literal translation, often a boon to clarity. The commentary and the discussion which accompanied the law were compact, but adequate. The law, the commentary and the discussion were differentiated from each other by methodical divisions of the work, and by varying sizes of neat typography. Reference work was most simple. Finally, the opinions of the author on disputed points manifested a healthy conservatism together with a determined opposition to opinions of others when reason or authority so demanded. The work was well-documented, but was not overburdened with technical apparatus.

The Latin edition retains all the good qualities of the German edition and displays several more. The 1950 volume is less a latinization than a complete redaction of the 1939 edition. A goodly part of the text, it is true, remains unchanged—a tribute to its canonical soundness. But a comparison between the two editions shows that intervening decrees and decisions of the Holy See, as well as respective developments in canonical literature have been embodied in the 1950 volume. These additions are not merely interpolated into the text, or into the footnotes, as so often occurs in "new editions of other commentators," but are assimilated into the text itself. Despite the fact that much recent material has been thus incorporated, the bulk of the two editions remains almost identical.

Fr. Jone is particularly adept in his treatment of the law concerning religious. But his outstanding characteristic is his over-all ability to form opinion on disputed points. He has covered opinions expressed in recent canonical literature (books and periodicals), and usually takes a stand of his own. Due to the scope of the commentary, it was impossible for Fr. Jone to elaborate his position on every issue, but when he does, it is well founded. One who disagrees with Fr. Jone's opinions will find that they cannot be dismissed lightly. It was this characteristic that helped make Fr. Jone's *Moral Theology* so valuable, and bids fair to make his *Commentarium* equally well-received.

One real defect in the volume is the disregard of canonical literature in English, due, no doubt, to the inability to acquire books during the war. Just as no English author may disregard continental canonical literature, so, at the present state of development, no continental commentator can claim to have covered the field until he takes cognizance of developments of equal merit in the English language. It is good to know that Fr. Jone is making attempts to procure English works.

Seminarians will find this volume most convenient for study, for it is admirably designed to suit their needs. However, they will be handicapped by the lack of a general introduction to canon law (history, sources, etc.), and, regrettably, by the lack of an index. Priests will welcome this work because of its fine treatment of the more practical problems of the ministry. Canonists will welcome it, for, despite the fact that this first volume does not contain a bibliography, they will find in it a commentary that is marked by exceptional clarity, compactness and soundness—so much so as to make it rank among the best in its field.

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*"Dominus autem Spiritus est" (II Cor. 3, 17a), O DE KYRIOS TO PNEUMA ESTIN—Studium Exegeticum.* By Bernardinus Schneider, O.F.M. (Romae: Officium Libri Catholici, 1951. Pp. viii-216.)

A knotty and much discussed half-verse from II Cor. is the subject of this dissertation, which Fr. Bernardine wrote in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the doctorate in sacred theology.

After a rapid glance at the context, both proximate and remote (Ex. 34, 29-35), the author establishes the critical text, which, as he notes, presents no particular difficulty. The terms *kyrios* and *pneuma*, especially as employed by St. Paul, are examined quite thoroughly, and the various interpretations of this text through the ages are classified. A long, though not exhaustive, list is appended of the writers who subscribed to them.

Returning then to the proximate context, the author submits it to a close exegetical scrutiny, the better to elicit and understand the meaning of St. Paul in this passage. In particular he feels that in *v. 16* Paul presents a typical interpretation of Ex. 34,34.

Needless to say, the text in question is then quite completely examined under every aspect. One of the main problems encountered is to determine which word is the subject of the sentence, *kyrios* or *pneuma*. With sound reasons the author advances the view that it is the former, which refers back to the *kyrios* of the preceding verse. Thus Paul would say in effect: The Lord of whom we have been speaking is the Holy Spirit. Accordingly, since *v. 16* clearly reproduces Ex. 34,34a and *v. 17* elucidates *v. 16*, one would have to conclude that Paul identifies the spirit of Ex., at least typically, with the Holy Spirit.

To a certain degree the author finds confirmation of his interpretation in Patristic thought. True, generally for doctrinal reasons, the Fathers were more concerned with proving the divinity of the Holy Spirit from this text, and so preferred to reconstruct Paul's meaning thus: The Holy Spirit is *kyrios* or God. Yet basically in doctrine both the author's interpretation and the Fathers' exegesis of this half-verse agree. To quote the author (p. 157), "Eorum doctrina a nostra interpretatione ope simplicis conversionis et illationis derivatur: Si hic Dominus, qui est certe divinus, est Spiritus Sanctus, ergo Spiritus Sanctus est divinus, seu Dominus."

The reviewer is of the opinion that the author has made out a good case for his interpretation, particularly for his construction of *kyrios* as the subject of *v. 17a*. He cannot fail to admire the painstaking efforts to examine all available writings that shed any light on the subject. Nor can he neglect to mention the objective approach

of the author, who has set as his purpose the true meaning of Paul and proceeds without bias towards that aim.

An impartial criticism of this work should also bring to light the following facts:

1. Because of the plan followed in developing the dissertation there are a number of repetitions which appear to be needless. The reviewer feels that the work could have been abridged without affecting the skein of thought or impairing the value of the work.

2. In view of his announced purpose not to give a history of the exegesis one may wonder why the author is so meticulous in rooting out all the opinions he can find through the ages. Had his interpretation coincided with that of all the Fathers, this solicitude could be understood. However, as indicated above, he departs from what may be considered the common Patristic interpretation and can only claim Athanasius in his favor—and doubtfully at that. Since he has accomplished so much work in this line, the reviewer would encourage him to produce the complete history of the exegesis of this text.

3. The Latin expression is in the main quite accurate. Yet there are some departures from Latin syntax which escaped the author's notice. It is, in addition, particularly disconcerting to note his inconsistency in incorporating Greek words into the Latin text. There is no discernible system, for at times he brings them into grammatical agreement with the Latin text, at times uses them absolutely.

Notwithstanding these observations the reviewer feels that the conclusions of Fr. Bernardine are on the whole acceptable. If he would sound any strong objection on this score, it would be that he is not convinced that Paul is resorting to a typical interpretation in v. 16. Could it not be that Paul, as so often elsewhere, here merely adapts the words of the sacred text, which he certainly has in mind, to his own purpose.

ANTONINE DEGUGLIELMO, O.F.M.

*Wappingers Falls, New York*

*An Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature.* Compiled by R. A. Kocourek. (St. Paul: North Central Publishing Co., 1948. Pp. iv-176. Paper.)

Recourse to original texts in translation has proved an apt means of introducing a student to a branch of philosophy. In the present slight volume, Dr. Kocourek has gathered together texts of the Angelic Doctor, together with a good introduction of his own, as a proemium to philosophical physics, the philosophy of nature. The chief texts in question are the *De principiis naturae* and Saint Thomas' commentary on the First and Second Books of the *Physics*, admittedly appropriate passages. These are followed by a general outline of the physical works of Aristotle. The translator's introduction aims to make the student aware of the difference between science and the philosophy of nature, and to awaken his interest in the problems involved, especially that of motion. However, as with every text, the anthology needs a good teacher to accompany it.

Comparison with the Latin original reveals that the translation is generally accurate, though sometimes too literal and again too loose. The footnote on p. 28 does not seem historically accurate. In the introduction (p. 5), one should read "dialectical syllogism" for "dialectical definition."

IGNATIUS BRADY, O.F.M.

*Duns Scotus College  
Detroit*

*St. Francis in Italian Painting.* By George Kaftal. (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., Ruskin House.)

This volume is a part of a series of publications the avowed purpose of which is "to place the chief ethical and religious masterpieces of the world, both Christian and non-Christian, within easy reach of the intelligent reader who is not an expert—the undergraduate, the ex-service man, the adult student, the intelligent public generally." It consists of two parts: An introduction which undertakes to give a short description of St. Francis' life and personality, a somewhat sketchy retrospect of medieval Italian art connected with the Saint and his legend, and, finally, an abridged survey of early Italian literature concerned with his biography; the second part consists of 39 reproductions of works of art representing St. Francis and stories from his life, each of them accompanied by a quotation from one of the literary sources. Some mistake happened in "scene" 4, where the editors inserted the wrong picture, a reproduction of the first instead of the second fresco of the series in the Upper Church of Assisi as obviously intended by the author. To this a bibliography and a topographical list of the most important cycles of scenes from the life of St. Francis in early Italian painting are added, both of which do not pretend to be in any way complete or comprehensive.

The choice of the illustrations aims "to illustrate the wealth and importance of the Franciscan cycles in Italian painting from the thirteenth to the fifteenth century." Attempting this the editors bring a group of illustrations from only one artistic monument of the thirteenth century, the well-known Berlinghieri altarpiece from Pescia; a larger group standing for the fourteenth century shows examples from Giotto's fresco series in Sta. Croce and from the series of Assisi; a few examples from the fifteenth century were chosen from the series by Gozzoli, Ghirlandaio, and Sassetta.

As the great cycles by Giotto and his school in Santa Croce and Assisi are, or at least should be, generally and intimately known not only by "experts" but by every educated person, inasmuch as reproductions of all these frescoes are easily available in numerous well-known publications, and since there are also many serious and conscientiously written works dealing with the phenomenon of St. Francis in practically every European language; and since, furthermore, at least one of the literary sources, the Fioretti, belongs to the treasures of world literature, educated people will profit little from a booklet like this. For one or the other person belonging rather to the "undergraduates" of school and life it might provide a glimpse into another and nobler orbit than his busy world of material success and failure.

HARRY B. GUTMAN

New York, N. Y.

*Modo de predicar y Modus concionandi. Estudio doctrinal y edición crítica.* By Pío Sagüés Azcona, O.F.M. (Madrid: Instituto Miguel de Cervantes, 1951. 2 Vols. Pp. xxxvi, 294; i, 480. 85 pesetas.)

In her account of the dedication of St. Teresa's second foundation at Salamanca, Venerable Ana de Jesus describes Fray Diego de Estella—preacher on the occasion at the request of the great Carmelite Reformer—as "one of the most famous preachers we have." As she reports, since he was preaching, the greater part of the city attended. Philip II also paid tribute to Fray Diego's greatness as a sacred orator by appointing him *predicador de corte*, and this at a time when such men as St. Thomas

of Villanova, Juan de Avila, St. Francis Borgia, Luis de León, St. John of the Cross and Luis de Grenada were preaching from the pulpits of Spain. Modern critics too have been generous in their praise of Padre Estella as a preacher and have highly recommended the *Modus concionandi*, his little book on the art of preaching. Professor Peers describes this work as "one of the most important works on sacred oratory published during the Golden Age in Spain." Menéndez y Pelayo likewise gives it his commendation.

Nevertheless, Diego de Estella is usually thought of as a literary figure or as an ascetical and mystical writer rather than as a master of sacred eloquence. His best-known works are: *Meditaciones del amor de Dios* and *Tratado de la vanidad del mundo*. The first of these, Ricardo León has called one of the most profound and delicately eloquent books in the Spanish language. The second has gone through more than one hundred editions and has been translated into ten languages.

The author of the present work certainly does not wish to detract from Fray Diego's well-merited fame. On the contrary, it is his desire further to enhance it, but under another aspect. Father Sagüés studies his subject in the role of preacher and master of preachers. He feels that this aspect of Estella's genius has been too long neglected and that such a neglect is dangerous. For without a knowledge and appreciation of Estella, the orator, the grandeur of his literary production, and the loftiness of his mystical doctrine can never be properly understood. In writing he never wandered far from the pulpit. As one critic has said: "He wrote from the pulpit." He seems to have always kept before his mind the practical needs of his fellow preachers who used his works as source books (as is proved by the fact that shortly after his death a topical index of his writings was published for their convenience).

In the introduction to the present work the author clearly states his purpose. It is to give an exposition of the theory of sacred oratory as developed by Padre Estella. This purpose is accomplished and the method employed is a very thorough one. Father Sagüés begins with a study of Fray Diego, the man. Next he analyzes his doctrine on sacred eloquence and the work in which it is contained—the *Modus concionandi*. Finally, after tracing the evolution of this work through its various revisions and amplifications, he presents the critical Latin text. He also reproduces the Spanish texts of the *Modo de predicar* and three related opuscules.

The first volume opens with an introductory essay on the Golden Age of Spanish eloquence in general and of Franciscan eloquence in particular. This is followed by a biography of Fray Diego which summarizes all previous research on the subject and presents many new facts unearthed by the author in the Archives of Navarre. Next Father Sagüés gives a complete bibliographical survey of the various editions of the *Modus concionandi*. Three chapters are then devoted to a doctrinal analysis of the work. The topics treated are: the person of the preacher, the matter of the sermon, and the composition and delivery of the sermon. In the final chapter of the first volume, Padre Estella's work is compared with other sixteenth-century treatises on sacred eloquence. Many of the chapters of this first volume have previously been published as articles in *Verdad y Vida*.

The second volume contains the critical texts of the *Modus concionandi*, the *Modo de predicar* and, as appendices, the three short tracts *Reglas y avisos para predicar*, *Avisos para predicadores*, and *Avisos para los que comienzan a predicar*. Father Sagüés employs the original Salamanca edition of 1576 as the basis of his text of the *Modus concionandi*. The *modo de predicar* and the three Spanish opuscules, all of which were discovered by the author in the Biblioteca Nacional in Madrid, are

here published for the first time. These texts are discussed at length in the introduction to this second volume.

Father Sagüés believes that the four Spanish texts antedate the *Modus concionandi*; that Fray Diego is author of all of them; that each represents a stage in the evolution of his theory of sacred eloquence; that the *Modus concionandi* embodies his final, fully developed ideas on the subject; and that this same work—with some additions and amplifications—is a Latin translation of the *Modo de predicar*. The arguments advanced in support of these assertions are well developed and appear to be based on sound scholarship.

The *Modus concionandi* itself needs no recommendation. In the past it often served as a seminary textbook and has long since earned for itself a place among the classics of its field. It has sometimes been published together with the *Rhetorica Ecclesiastica* of Luis de Granada with which it is often compared.

Padre Estella's little book on preaching is not a profound work. It was written for preachers, by a preacher who knew well the needs of preachers. Its forty short chapters contain no abstract considerations or theoretical digressions. The distinctive virtues of the *Modus concionandi* are its brevity, correctness and practicality.

Father Sagüés makes one regrettable omission in his otherwise complete work. He fails to include the *Explanatio super Psalmum CXXXVI*, which Fray Diego wrote as a companion work to the *Modus concionandi*. The *Explanatio* contains a series of sermons which take their theme from the verses of the Psalm, "Super flumina Babylonis, etc." These sermons were designed to exemplify the homiletic principles laid down in the *Modus*. Padre Estella intended that these two complementary works be published together in a single volume. The one is incomplete without the other. Another reason why the *Explanatio* deserves to be reproduced is that it contains the only extant examples of Fray Diego's preaching.

Each of Father Sagüés' two volumes is well indexed and the first contains an excellent bibliography of sacred oratory in Spain during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

CYPRIAN J. LYNCH, O.F.M.

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*Les Saints Apôtres Pierre et Paul d'Après Saint Antoine de Padoue.* Traduction et Adaptation De Sermons Où Le Docteur Évangélique Exalte La Saintité Sacerdotale Et L'Infallibilité Du Vicaire Du Christ. By P. Ferdinand Coiteux, O.F.M. (Montréal: Editions Franciscaines, 1951. Pp. xxiii-280.)

*S. Antoine de Padoue dans son Milieu et sa Mission Doctrinale.* By R. P. Ephrem Longpré, O.F.M. (Montréal: Editions Franciscaines, 1948. Pp. 46.)

Father Ferdinand Coiteux, O.F.M. is well-known to the literary world as a Franciscan scholar and radio orator due to his many contributions and studies on the doctrines of Saint Anthony of Padua, recently (1946) elevated to the rank of a Doctor of the Church. Among a few of his former radio talks were his *Praises of Mary* according to St. Anthony of Padua; his *Advent of Jesus to the Soul* also according to St. Anthony; his *Fostering of Vocations to the Priesthood*; his *Sanctity according to St. Francis of Assisi*, etc. Continuing his researches into the original sermons of St. Anthony of Padua, Father Coiteux has recently published his latest work on the holy Apostles, Sts. Peter and Paul in the doctrine of St. Anthony of Padua. The

book comprises twenty-eight addresses over the Canadian network given during the year 1950 and the beginning of 1951, on an average of two discourses a month. The author shows a deep knowledge of his matter and complements his assertions on the call, labor, prerogatives, martyrdom and glory of the two great Apostles of Rome with original texts from the Evangelical Doctor. The book is enhanced by an introduction from the pen of the Archbishop of Montreal, His Excellency, the Most Rev. Paul Émile Léger, S.S.; and by letters of appreciation from the Holy See, and dignitaries in the Franciscan Order. Father Coiteux' latest work measures up to the fame of his former contributions, and for that reason deserves wide publicity, especially for the originality of some of St. Anthony's assertions and doctrines faithfully translated into French and transmitted to his hearers and readers.

On the occasion of the elevation of St. Anthony of Padua to the rank of a Doctor of the Church Universal, Father Ephrem Longpré, O.F.M., who on account of his many scholarly contributions on *Franciscana* needs no introduction to Franciscan students, delivered a classical discourse on February 19, 1948 before a select audience at the Hall of St. Stanislaus, Montreal, in which he evaluated the life and times, literary productions and sermons of the great Franciscan thaumaturgist. On receipt of a printed copy of the discourse, His Excellency, Most Rev. Maurice Roy, Archbishop of Quebec, sent a complimentary letter to Father Ferdinand Coiteux, O.F.M., Guardian of the Convent of the Resurrection, Montreal, for the success of Canada's glorification of St. Anthony of Padua through the Canadian Franciscans, especially commending this excellent address of Father Longpré. The address is obtainable through the publication center of Franciscan texts viz. Editions Franciscaines, Montreal.

RAPHAEL M. HUBER, O.F.M.CONV.

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Washington, D. C.*

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# LITURGY OF THE FRANCISCAN RULES

(Continued)

WHEN Francis saw his project of 1221 rejected and another draft lost by well-planned carelessness, he once more had recourse to the protector of the Order, Cardinal Hugoline de'Conti. Hugoline had seen the struggle from its very beginning. He did not always agree with the idealistic ideas of the Saint. Yet, he was a real friend and counsellor. What is more, he was gifted with talents which the poet of Assisi lacked: a sure sense of reality, keen insight into the difficulties of the widely spread organization and, last but not least, a great authority in the Church. In November 1223 the new Rule and its approbation came as a peal of thunder in the heavily-laden atmosphere. In the third chapter it contains a liturgical ordinance which runs as follows:<sup>1</sup>

Clerici faciant divinum officium secundum ordinem sancte Romane ecclesie, excepto psalterio, ex quo habere poterunt breviaria.

Laici dicant viginti quatuor *Pater noster* pro matutino, pro laude quinque, pro prima, tertia, sexta, nona, pro qualibet istarum, septem, pro vesperis autem duodecim, pro completorio septem; et orent pro defunctis.

The aims of Hugoline were undoubtedly clear and grandiose, worthy of his *Decretals*. They are laid down in two radical changes: the introduction of a uniform liturgy and the clear-cut, canonical distinction between clerics and laics, whereby all clerics<sup>2</sup> were to say the Office and all laics the Our Father. The uniform liturgy, adapted from that of the papal court, is to be found in books which will be studied elsewhere. It was Hugoline's logical conclusion from what he had observed at court. Innocent III's pontifical was well received.<sup>3</sup> The liturgy of his chapel had been adopted by the Order of the Holy Ghost in 1213.<sup>4</sup> Shortly afterwards the Office had been reformed and, about 1220, the result laid down in a new Ordinary. The papal liturgists were eager to find a satisfactory type of Office book. It is difficult to prove whether, at this moment

1. *Opuscula*, ed. cit. 66.

2. Bartholomew of Pisa, *op. cit.*, fructus ix, pars 2, *Anal. Franc.* IV, 397: clerici fratres etsi non sint in sacris...

3. M. Andrieu, *Le pontifical romain ii*, in "Studi e testi", vol. 87 (Rome 1940).

4. 'Regula', cap. 27; PL 217, 1143: Clerici in diurnis et nocturnis officiis consuetudinem Romanæ curiæ obseruant.

of his career, Hugoline's plans for a wider diffusion of this Office were ripening. But he certainly had grasped the significance of the evolution. Some fifteen years later, now as Gregory IX and with the tenacity of old age, he showed what had been at the back of his mind, when Francis visited him in 1223:<sup>5</sup> "Brothers, if you will carry out the Church's Office... I will order all the religious in the Church, other than the Canons Regular and the monks of St Benedict, to say the same Office as you."

Wisely omitting to distinguish understanding from misinterpretation, one can easily regard the sweep of innovations, brought about since 1217, as the unescapable or even badly needed development. But the change is so drastic that it should be asked whether the new legislation really fitted into the ideal of St Francis, or perhaps was beside the point. Hugoline certainly was the man who tried to bridge over the differences between the saint's radicalism and the demands of common sense. But did the ordinance in question really do this? Did the Cardinal actually understand what Francis expected from the liturgical vocation of his Order? Hugoline's solution, indeed, is watertight. Yet, one feels that it answers his problem rather than that of Francis, which has been avoided rather than sifted. The new legislation preserves nothing of the troublesome past. It is the mitigation of the cardinal's ideas and of those clerics in the Order who determined evolution towards monastic observances, and not a shaping of Francis' ideals. It reflects the contemporary practice in the Church, which Hugoline knew so well, and brought the new Order, be it with the slight variation of a secular Office instead of a monastic one, into line with what 'ought to be done'.

During the preceding discussion, the Cardinal pointed out to Francis that sooner or later the evolution would imply uniformity of worship. And Francis could hardly have denied it. However, he had no argument strong enough to convince his counsellor that the man in the street, to whom his Order was to be sent, did not have nor need a uniform liturgy. For this was precisely what the Cardinal wanted to change. He may have argued that the vocation of the Order was safeguarded by the secular Office. But

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5. Angelus of Clarenco, *Expositio Regulae*, (ed. L. Oliger, Quaracchi, 1921), p. 87.

he failed to see that the extension of the Office to all clerics was another important step on the way to a more monastic and clerical organisation of the Order. And the development of monachism had shown that it was extremely difficult to maintain this and yet not lose the requirements of a worship in which the public had its full share. When Hugoline explained how the reformed liturgy of the papal court answered best the wandering life of the friars, Francis, because of his great veneration for the Roman Church,<sup>6</sup> agreed at once. Perhaps the cardinal told him that this Office ought to be 'the' Office of all clerics. But Francis did not see the lofty churches and choirs of which both his counsellor and many of his brethren dreamed. Once they had their 'monasteries', it made no difference whether a secular or a monastic Office was said. Francis probably saw it as a guarantee of more attention paid to liturgical life in the future. If so, it must have been no small consolation for him. But it was shortlived. With a variant on<sup>7</sup>

Paris et Orliens ce sont deux

the saying would soon be<sup>8</sup>

Mal vedemmo Parisci  
c'hane destrutto Ascisi  
con la lor lettoria.

The years following the promulgation of the Rule were a long but far from silent struggle in which Paris had to overcome the passive resistance of those clerics who, under the mask of Assisi's simplicity, were a serious obstacle to the spiritual force of the Order. But these tried to destroy both Paris and Assisi. There were others, however, who rightly saw that Bologna too was doing much harm to Francis' ideal with the new legislation.

After the promulgation of the Rule there was an immediate reaction. Francis took it so seriously that he threw himself into opposition: first in a letter directed to the chapter general of about 1224, and then in his Testament.

6. E. Clop, *St. François, et la liturgie de la chapelle papale* in *AFH*, XIX (1926), 758ff.

7. Opening words of 'La bataille des vii Ars' by Henry d'Andeli; ed., L. J. Paetow *Two medieval satires on the university of Paris* (Berkeley, 1927), p. 37.

8. Jacopone of Todi, lauda 31 (*Tale qual è tal è*); see M. Fioroni *Jacopone da Todi e i suoi canti* in "Biblioteca Umbra" ii (Todi s.a., 1928), p. 68. The saying is of Brother Giles see *Anal. Franc.* III, 86, and *Dicta beati Aegidii Assisiensis* (Quaracchi, 1905), p. 91.

The letter, a glorious document of the unsensational beauty which comes from thought, is entirely concerned with public worship and a striking apology for the essentials of liturgical devotion. It is Francis' personal view of what the daily performance of Mass and Office requires: the pure intention of honoring God and seeking nothing more. The first part of the letter is concerned with the Mass. Demanding from all his brethren every reverence and honor for the Blessed Sacrament,<sup>9</sup> Francis urged especially upon his priests to celebrate "with a holy and clean intention, neither for any earthly thing nor for fear or love of any man... Every will has to be directed to Him in desiring to please the High Lord himself alone... If anyone does otherwise, he becomes the traitor Judas".<sup>10</sup> The theme runs clearly through the subsequent passages<sup>11</sup> and the first part concludes with two exhortations: the Saint recommends that only one Mass a day be celebrated in his friaries<sup>12</sup> and points out that the clerical vocation is fulfilled not only by hearing and doing what God says but also — in order to impress upon ourselves his greatness and our subjection — by watching over the sacred vessels and service books<sup>13</sup> which contain His holy words.<sup>14</sup> Both points have always been regarded as typical of St. Francis. However, the blood of devotion has been thicker than the water of historical research. Francis here was only the child of his age. The Rule of the Beneventan congregation of Austin Hermits, founded by Gregory VIII in 1186, contains a similar regulation for the daily Mass.<sup>15</sup> The motive of St. Francis, indeed, was different for the daily easily explained. His devotion to the sacred *nomina* and *verba* may have been a personal interpretation of the 19th canon of the Lateran council,<sup>16</sup> but the expression itself was not new. It was current for

9. *Opuscula sancti Patris Francisci Assisiensis*, in *Biblioteca Franciscana ascetica Medii Aevi*, I (Quaracchi, 1904), p. 100. The address (Reverendis et multum diligendis...) and the introduction (Audite domini filii et fratres...) are followed by this part: Depreco itaque...

10. *Opuscula*, ed. cit., p. 101: Rogo etiam in domino...

11. *Opuscula*, ed. cit., p. 101ff.: Recordamini fratres... Audite fratres mei... Videte dignitatem vestram...

12. *Opuscula*, ed. cit., p. 104: Moneo propterea (preterea) et exhortor.

13. The Latin is: alia officialia. The term will be studied elsewhere.

14. *Opuscula*, ed. cit., p. 105f.: Et quia ex Deo est...

15. P. Kehr 'Papst Gregor VIII als Ordersgründer' in *Miscellanea F. Ehrle ii*, "Studi e testi", vol. 38, p. 272, n. 29; see H. Dausend, "Die Brüder dürfen in ihre Niederlassungen täglich nur eine hl Messe lesen" in *Franziskanische Studien* XIII (1926), 207ff.; Octave d'Angers in *Etudes franciscaines*, XLIX (1937), 475ff.

16. *Opuscula*, p. 23: Et scimus quia...

the words of the consecration<sup>17</sup> as well as for the whole missal.<sup>18</sup> The same double meaning, in fact, occurs in Francis' writings.<sup>19</sup> Perhaps in the case under discussion one might even give it the general sense of 'liturgical books'. All the same, what precisely made him insist on this point, unless one admits that his contemporaries were not too scrupulous in handling their missals?

The second part of the letter treats of the Office. The theme is the same, but Francis' approach to the subject is different. Unlike the celebration of Holy Mass, the Office was a matter which concerned him personally. Hence, after a general confession, he recognises his faults in regard to the Office and comes to the crux of the problem:<sup>20</sup>

... I have not observed the Rule which I promised to the Lord and I have not said the Office as prescribed by the Rule either by reason of my negligence or weakness, or because I am ignorant and simple.

Wherefore I beseech my lord the Minister general, in every way I can, to have the Rule inviolably observed by all. And let the clerics say Office with devotion before God, not attending to melody of voice but to harmony of mind, so that the voice may be in accord with the mind and the mind with God and they may please God by purity of mind and not tickle the ears of the people by flowery singing.

As for myself, I promise to keep these things strictly, as the Lord may give me grace, and I leave them to my brothers, who are with me, to be observed in the Office and other appointed regulations.<sup>21</sup> But whosoever of the brothers will not observe them I do not consider as Catholics or as my brothers, nor do I wish to see them or to speak to them, until they have done penance. I say this also of all the others who, setting aside the discipline of the Rule, go wandering about.

After this there is a final recommendation to the superiors to have the letter always with them, a blessing and a prayer, or rather a collect which sums up the reason of the whole writing:<sup>22</sup>

... da nobis... facere quod scimus te velle et semper velle quod

17. Council of Lombez near Albi in 1165 (not 1176), *Mansi Concilia XXII* 162f.

18. Cæsarius of Heisterbach 'Libri viii miraculorum', lib. i, cap. 22, ed. Al Meister in *Römische Quartalschrift, XIII (Suppl. Band.)* (Rome, 1901), 34f.

19. *Opuscula*, pp. 22f., 78, 105, 113f. See Esser, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

20. *Opuscula*, p. 105f.

21. The expression 'regularis constituta' may be the equivalent of rubrics; see *Legenda trium sociorum*, cap. 14, ed. *ASS. Oct. ii*, 738, n. 57 and the constitutions of Gregory ix for the Premonstratensians (1232), ed. Lefèvre, *Les statuts de Prémontré* (Louvain, 1946), p. 136.

22. *Opuscula*, p. 107.

tibi placeat, ut, interius mundati interius illuminati et igne sancti Spiritus accensi, sequi possimus vestigia Filii tui...

Those who are satisfied with the idea that the motive for this letter was abundance of heart and Francis' veneration for the Blessed Sacrament, are right. Yet, they have not grasped its full significance.<sup>23</sup> This plea for purity of mind and intention is nowhere to be found in Francis' writings. Criticism was not in his line. Both Francis' weakness and strength were in combatting vice by presenting virtue. Hence, one cannot be amiss, if one regards this letter as the reflection of his dread for what he saw around him, *viz.* desire for popularity and the many underhand attempts to procure all sorts of temporal contributions. The laborer is worthy of his hire and those who serve the altar may subsist on it. Yet, Francis saw too well that the interpretation of his day was often pretty wide.<sup>24</sup> The number of priests in the Order was growing steadily. The Rule had favoured those who pursued monastic usages; they were copying breviaries and organizing choir services. The saint felt the danger from outside.

The second part of this letter, moreover, reveals something else. It is quite different in tone. The contrast is sharp. As soon as the question of the Office comes up for discussion, Francis becomes the anxious victim of his own virtues. His anguish, easily read from the overstressed emphasis in the text just quoted, is only equalled by the most tormented passages of his testament.<sup>25</sup> Since the confirmation of the Rule, Francis had undergone a new and unpleasant experience. A new problem has arisen in which the proper performance of the Office was intimately connected with obedience to the Rule. He confesses that he was negligent himself, promises to be more observant and asks the same of those living with him. But why all this anxiety about a few defects which had nothing to do with his good intention? In the last few lines Francis betrays himself. Under his virtue there is a problem that worries him greatly. The letter was read publicly at the general chapter and everybody understood that Francis refused to argue about the

23. P. Robinson, *The Writings of Saint Francis of Assisi* (Philadelphia, 1906), p. 109; Felder, *The ideals*, p. 50ff.; Cuthbert, *The Life*, p. 371; Moorman, *op. cit.*, p. 22; Esser, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

24. E. Scot Davison *Forerunners of St. Francis and other studies*, (Boston, 1927), p. 25ff.; also Fortini, *Vita*, p. 120ff.: *Orgoglio e cupidigia*.

25. Esser, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

legislation of the Office, that he would not speak to those who held ideas different from his own, until they had done penance.

To suggest that a number of friars wanted to discuss the liturgical legislation may seem daring. Yet, one should remember that the Rule of 1223 was unfavourably received by many. Some had made known beforehand that they would not accept it.<sup>25a</sup> From Francis' Testament, moreover, one reads that the question was, indeed, acute. The Saint maintained vigorous opposition to those who, instead of paying attention to his letter, went their own way:<sup>26</sup>

Though I am simple and infirm, nevertheless, I desire always to have a cleric to read me the Office as laid down in the Rule. And all the other friars are thus to... say the Office according to the Rule.

And should any be found who are not saying Office according to the Rule and wishing to change it in some way, or who are not catholic, all the friars, wherever they may be, are bound by obedience... to bring him to the custos nearest to the place where they found him... until they can bring him before the lord [cardinal] of Ostia, who is the master, protector and corrector of the whole brotherhood.

Again, Francis begins with himself. But there is an interesting development of thought. In his letter he regarded his simplicity and illness as a sin against the obligation of the Office. His companions, however, had convinced him that this was exaggerated. Now he concedes implicitly that such defects exempt him and everybody else from the obligation. Yet, he does not want to give in. He sticks to strict observance but has found another way. Falling back on monastic customs,<sup>27</sup> he asks for the privilege<sup>28</sup> of having a cleric at his bedside. By setting such an example, he would overcome every excuse from whatsoever quarter it might come. Because of his lack of juridical sense and knowledge, he was unaware that this way out was again open to discussion. Canon Law did not require such a far-fetched solution nor did the Rule

25a. *Bullarium Franciscanum*, I, 19.

26. *Opuscula*, p. 80f. The next in Esser (*op. cit.*, p. 100ff.) is practically the same.

27. See E. Martène, *De antiquis ecclesiæ ritibus*, lib. I, cap. 7, art. 4; ed., Bassano, 1788, vol. I, 306a, 307b, 325b, 335a.

28. See A. Callebaut, "S. François et les priviléges" in *Arch. Franc. Hist.* XX (1927), 186.

to which he clung.<sup>29</sup> Moreover, canonists agreed that by merely listening to the Office one did not fulfill the obligation.<sup>30</sup>

Francis' attitude with respect to those who disagreed about the Office has changed too. Their opposition has hardened him and driven him to extremes. Although he had abdicated all authority, he launches a set of measures which no Inquisitor could have improved upon. But after all, what did they criticise: the regulation that the Office had to be said by all clerics or the Office itself. If the latter were the case, it is difficult to imagine what could have been the objection. Only since the Chapter of 1224 had the friars been informed about the change and, perhaps, about the new, uniform breviary to be adapted from that of the papal court. Except for a very small number of friars who were well up in the matter, nobody could possibly realise what this liturgy included. Some may have shrugged their shoulders; yet, none of them was sufficiently informed to produce more than gossip.

Moreover, in his Testament Francis did not envisage that the friars were just criticising the Office.<sup>31</sup> With all possible arguments, by his own example and severe punishment, he fought the reaction against the Rule. This is why he identified (the performance of) the Office with obedience and observance. The contrast between the ordinances of 1221 and 1223 shows what he defended and from which quarters the opposition came. As a matter of fact, it came from completely different sides. First there were the many unordained clerics. Hitherto exempt from the Office, they found themselves all of a sudden bound by a new obligation. There were the uneducated clerics. They had to acquire the necessary knowledge. Many could start at once with reading the psalter. A good number of copies came free, because the lettered lay-brothers had to

29. As did for instance the Carmelite constitutions of 1324: *Monumenta Carmelitana*, ed. cit., 32: Cum autem horas canonicas dicere non poterunt [infirmi] eis ab aliquo dicantur sub pena gravis culpe.

30. Eustace of Grandcourt, *Quodlibetum v*, n. 7, *Paris Bibl. Nation. lat.* 15850, fol. 40r: Utrum illi qui tenentur ad horas canonicas si faciant dicere coram eis et audiant utrum sint acquitati et sufficiat. Dixit quod non...; see P. Glorieux, *Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris xiii<sup>e</sup> siècle*, I (Paris 1933), 407.

31. See the erroneous opinion of Angelus of Chiarino in a letter of 1314-16 preserved in Florence (*Biblioteca nazionale*, Magliabec classe xxxix, 75, fol. 32v: Franciscus per spiritum sanctum hec mala in suo ordine futura prenoscens, contemporantes officium dicere secundum consuetudinem ecclesie et presumentes illud modo alio variare, cum hereticis sotiat et simili pene censura puniri nisi corrigantur mandat. See F. Ehrle in *Archiv für Literatur und Kirchengeschichte* i 1885, 533ff., 538.

renounce theirs. And among the latter several must have disliked this. They lost a good deal of their standing as educated men and, consequently, of their influence on the community life. Finally, the scarcity of portable breviaries had been an excuse so far even for the lettered clerics. Now they realised that the new legislation and the forthcoming breviary would soon eliminate this. All clerics had to say Office, but many of them did not care either for the breviary or for the Office.

In addition to the less fervent friars there also was a group of intellectuals who meant well. They were really concerned for the Order and its liturgy and yet, they too had serious criticism. Since they wanted to change the Office, that is, the liturgical legislation, Francis branded them as not catholic. They did not merit his vehemence. These friars saw that the new Rule was premature and against the vocation of the Order. Some fifteen years after Francis' death their problem was still unsettled. The so called Four Masters of Paris made no bones about it when they presented Haymo of Faversham, then Minister general, with a treatise which goes under the name of an explanation of the Rule.<sup>32</sup> They state quite frankly that, for various reasons, the *mutatio officii*<sup>33</sup> contained in the Rule (*constitutio regulæ*) was a matter of grave concern. It shows the thoughtlessness of the friars (read Hugoline), for the idea underlying the new liturgy was ill-judged; witness, among other things, the apathy with which it was received.<sup>34</sup> It may have been a pious wish but the legislators should have known that the many unlettered clerics, with their distaste for prayers, were better served by the previous practice whereby only priests and clerics in Holy Orders were obliged to say Office in accordance with Canon Law. To extend such a grave duty to a group of friars who were otherwise free appeared unjustifiable. If authority wanted a more intense liturgical life by extending the obligation, the Masters did not see why this was done regardless of the lettered laics who by

32. *Expositio Quatuor Magistrorum super Regulam Fratrum Minorum* (1241-2), ed. L. Olinger (Rome, 1950), p. 137ff.

33. *Loc. cit.*: "Item cum levitas sit in nobis maxime improbanda et fratres multi prioniores sint ad otium quam ad orationem... mutatio officii multos gravat." I disagree in the critical reconstruction of the text as given by Olinger. Another reading (based on the manuscripts consulted by Olinger) and a fuller explanation of the whole passage will be given in another study.

34. See also the letter of Adam Marsh to William of Nottingham, his provincial, in *Monumenta Franciscana I* (London, 1858), 361ff. (*Rolls Series*).

now were very numerous. Since previously they were allowed to have psalters, their aid in the daily performance of the Office should have been considered. The new ordinance, indeed, increased the number of clerics, but instead of bringing in the educated laics, it put under an obligation those who were either incapable of using a breviary or ill-disposed to do so. And those among the educated laics who wanted to have a psalter were now forbidden to have one. In short, the exclusion of the latter was of far more consequence than the desired but hypothetical presence of the clerics.

In the light of history and Hugoline's assistance in the revision of the Rule, the liturgical legislation, vague in itself because of the ambiguity of such terms as *ordo*, *Romana ecclesia*, *ex quo* and *breviarium*, presents a few difficulties.

"The clerics are to say the Office according to the use of the holy Roman Church". The clear-cut distinction between clerics and laics gave rise to a curious contradiction in the Rule of 1223. All the clerics had to say Office and those who could not read Latin had to acquire a sufficient knowledge of it. This may be the reason why Cardinal Hugoline suppressed the prohibition of the previous Rule against books for the unlettered friars.<sup>35</sup> It could have been changed into a more restrictive prohibition for the laics. But for some unknown reason it was not. Francis' veneration, however, for the primitive simplicity inspired him to an admonition which was added at the end of the tenth chapter, namely that "those who are ignorant of letters shall not be anxious to learn."<sup>36</sup> The principle is obviously so general that all unlettered friars, including the clerics, could appeal to it as a pretext against their obligation of study and saying the Divine Office.

*Ordo* in its generic meaning is synonymous with *consuetudo*<sup>37</sup> *forma*<sup>38</sup> *instituta*<sup>39</sup> *ius,mos*,<sup>40</sup> *rubrica(e)* and *statutum*.<sup>41</sup> At the

35. Cf. p. 241ff.

36. *Opuscula*, p. 72.

37. See the Rule of the Poor Clares cap. 3; John Pecham, *De perfectione evangelica*, cap. 10, ed. A. G. Little in *Tractatus tres de paupertate* in "British Society of Franciscan Studies", II (Aberdeen, 1910) 49.

38. Francis' letter to the General Chapter, *Opuscula*, p. 104; Bernard of Bess *Speculum discipline*, pars i, cap. 14, in St. Bonaventure, *Opera omnia* (ed. Quaracchi), VIII, 595.

39. Innocent III, *Regesta lib. viii*, n. 70 (PL 215, 637).

40. Gregory XI, *Constitutiones Lateranenses*, n. 1 (PL 78, 1394).

41. Benedict XII in Martene, *Thesaurus novus*, IV, 558.

same time it is the common and most ancient equivalent of *ordinale*, *ordinarium*, *breviarium*, *ceremoniale*, etc. Hence throughout the centuries the enharmonic scale of opinions, built on the double meaning of the term and the variety of its suggestions. Yet, none of the expositors seems to have realised that the confirmation of Haymo of Faversham's Ordinaries (after 1244) actually implied that the friars were not bound to the 'Ordinary of the Roman Church', i.e. the book entitled *Ordo Romanæ ecclesiæ curie*,<sup>42</sup> but to its liturgy. The history of the subsequent centuries shows that even this was taken with an abundant pinch of salt. In the thirteenth century, however, the difference of opinion was not merely a scholastic play on words. Just before Haymo accomplished his correction, the Four Masters of Paris envisaged the possibility of changes in the Franciscan breviary so long as they were in accordance with those introduced at court.<sup>43</sup> Thus they took *ordo* in the sense of custom. Hugh of Digne (d.1255-6) argued the opposite. If the Rule prescribes the Office according to the 'use' of the Church, the friars have to follow such changes. If they have to keep to the 'Ordinary', *viz.* to that of Innocent III, in principle no changes can be admitted. For Hugh *ordo* is synonymous with *breviarium* and *ordinarium*.<sup>44</sup> The untenability of his opinion results not only from the titles of the Franciscan books but also from the bull *Pio vestro collegio* of June 1241.<sup>45</sup> Here Hugoline, now as Pope Gregory IX, indicates the way to be followed: the Franciscan liturgy has to develop on the same lines as that of the papal chapel. If this principle had been kept to the letter, the history of the Roman liturgy would have been quite different.

The origin of the term *Romana ecclesia* as an alternative of *curia Romana* goes back at least to the reign of Eugene III. The history of this terminology will be explained elsewhere.<sup>46</sup> Here it may

42. *Paris Bibl. Nation lat.* 4162A. See van Dijk, "The Breviary of Saint Clare" in *Franciscan Studies* VIII (1948), 354f.

43. See p. 9 note 2.

44. *Expositio super Regulam*, cap. 3 in *Firmamentum trium Ordinum B.P.N. Francisci* (Paris, 1512), fol. 28v: *Debet officium fieri secundum ordinem, id est, secundum ordinarium sancte Romane ecclesie prout est in eius breviariis ordinatum. Non autem secundum variationes si quas dominus papa...*

46. See 'Il carattere', *loc. cit.*, 329f.

47. Cf. *Supra* pp. 178ff.

suffice to draw attention to the fact that the play upon the words *ecclesia* and *curia* by that bitter canon of Tongres, Ralph van der Beeke,<sup>48</sup> was unjustified, biassed and lacking historical truth. Yet, he managed to seduce innocent readers, even among the friars.<sup>49</sup>

The expression *ordo sancte Romane ecclesie* in the Franciscan Rule is undoubtedly an allusion to the title of Innocent III's *ordo Romane ecclesie curie*. However, the dropping of the word *curie* was far more than a mere simplification. Hugoline preferred the more simple and yet more impressive wording as a means of furthering his or Honorius III's liturgical project. In this respect it is noteworthy that the term 'Roman Church' gave way again to that of 'Roman court' after the death of Gregory. All the Franciscan liturgical books before Haymo of Faversham's correction have the former terminology,<sup>50</sup> even Haymo's ceremonial of the private and conventional Mass which dates from 1242-3. His *Ordo breviarii* and *Ordo missalis*, compiled immediately afterwards (1243-4),<sup>51</sup> and all the books dependent on these, keep to the latter.<sup>52</sup>

Finally, there is a difference between the Rules in regard to the additional Offices. Apart from the suppression of the non-liturgical prayers for the dead and the defects and negligences of the friars,<sup>53</sup> the Rule of 1223 does not specify that the Office should be said 'for the living and the deceased'. Only the laics are recommended "to pray for the dead." The difference, in fact, is one of form only. The Ordinary of Innocent III contains the entire

48. *De canonum observantia*, prop. 22, ed. cit. 313a.

49. For instance Gabr Ang da Vicenza, *La Regola dei Frati Minori esposta praticamente* (Quaracchi, 4th ed. 1891), P. 61: Furono intesi malamente, a mio credere, le parole della Regola da quei frati i quali non distinguendo la Corte Romana dalla Chiesa Romana, abandonarono il rito che si usava nelle chiese di Roma e si appigliarono a quello che era introdotto nella Corte.

50. Pre-Haymonian breviary: Ad honorem omnipotentis Dei et beatissime virginis Marie. Incipit breviarium ordinis minorum fratrum secundum consuetudinem sancte Romane ecclesie. Alleluia, alleluia, alleluia.

Pre-Haymonian ritual of the last Sacraments: Ordo minorum fratrum secundum consuetudinem Romane ecclesie ad visitandum infirmum.

Haymo's ceremonial of the Mass (*Indutus planeta*): Ordo agendorum et dicendorum a sacerdote in missa privata et feriali iuxta consuetudinem ecclesie Romane.

51. In nomine domini. Incipit ordo breviarii fratrum minorum secundum consuetudinem Romane curie.

Incipit ordo missalis fratrum minorum secundum consuetudinem Romane curie.

52. See van Dijk, "Il carattere", *loc. cit.*, p. 196f.

53. Cf. *Supra* p. 241.

general tradition of the non-canonical Offices<sup>54</sup> of Our Lady and the dead, as well as the Gradual and Penitential Psalms with the litany of the Saints.<sup>55</sup>

"Except for the psalter." The exception made for the psalter concerns the so-called Roman Psalter, a Latin translation — up to a few years ago mistaken for the first translation of St Jerome — used in the papal chapel. Outside Rome the Hexapla version was generally accepted, i.e. the revision made by St Jerome with the aid of the Hexapla of Origen, which is known under the misleading name of the Gallican Psalter.<sup>56</sup> The friars, and all those who adopted the liturgy of the court, conformed in this point to the general custom.

"Because they will be able to have breviaries." The words *ex quo*, here translated by 'because', have been a constant trouble for the expositors. Already the Masters of Paris implicitly asked the Minister general, Haymo of Faversham, to settle this obscure point.<sup>57</sup> An official answer was never given, so everybody knows what to think — and write — about possible explanations. The translation here defended for the first time is, to the best of my knowledge, in no way related to any of the usual ones, and, in many respects, offers the most satisfactory solution.

The Four Masters suggested that it might have been an indication of time: *ex quo scilicet tempore*: from which time. However, they seem to give a statement on the occasion of the text rather than a translation. Probably they meant to point out that the friars have to say the Office of the Court and 'since that time', i.e. the years 1223, are allowed to have breviaries. The reserve with which they proposed their opinion was soon forgotten. Peter Olivi is still prudently silent; but from the middle of the fourteenth

54. According to F. Cabrol (*Dictionnaire d'archéologie*, XII, 2015) the friars had suppressed the Office of Our Lady. Possibly he exaggerated an uncalled for remark of Ralph of Tongres, *De Canonum observantia*, prop. 20. See John Pecham "Quotlibetales de moribus" in *Antonianum*, VIII (1933), 318, n. 17: *Fratres Minores tenentur ad officium virginis et ad officium defunctorum quia in ordinario sancte ecclesie Romiane continentur*

55. See van Dijk, "The litany of the Saints in the breviary of the Roman Curia and the Friars Minor before Haymo of Faversham" in *Franciscan Studies* VII (1947), 426ff.

56. V. Leroquais, *Les psautiers manuscrits latins des bibliothèques publiques de France*, I (Paris, 1940), xxvii ff.; G.D. Schlegel in the *Irish Ecclesiastical Review* LXIX (1947), 199ff.

57. Ed. cit. Super hoc vestrum est discutere si hoc vel aliquid aliud sit dicendum.

century many expositors seem to have lost even the gift for doubting. Bartholomew of Pisa<sup>58</sup> and Angelus of Chiarino<sup>59</sup> translated *ex quo* as *quando*. In the following centuries,<sup>60</sup> especially since Wadding's edition of the writings of St Francis,<sup>61</sup> the original suggestion was made into a translation with the meaning 'as soon as' the friars can obtain breviaries.<sup>62</sup> Since the Order was growing rapidly, one argues,<sup>63</sup> and breviaries were not available in sufficient number, Francis (read Hugoline) added the clause that the obligation would take effect 'as soon as' the necessary books were ready. Grammatically there is no objection to this exegesis. *Ex quo* often had this meaning, for instance:<sup>64</sup>

nec sedeat [in Officio] aliquis, ex quo incipitur *Deus in adiutorium meum* usque post hymnum...<sup>65</sup>

neecdum tres menses elapsi sunt, ex quo ad me, in Gamugni videlicet eremo diversantem, duo adolescentes monachi venerunt...<sup>66</sup>

quidquid oblationis subtus vel desuper altare ceciderit, ex quo processio incepta fuerit... nostrum est...<sup>67</sup>

nullatenus pretermittendum quod si forte, ex quo toallea exponitur a cappellanis super altare, aliquid oblatum fuerit pape, ipsorum cappellano-rum est...<sup>68</sup>

Sane dici potest non esse coniugium et mulierem excusari de crimine per ignorantiam, virum autem adulterium admississe; ex quo ad primam

58. *Liber de conformitate*, lib. I, fruct. 9, cap. 3 (ed. cit IV, 397.)

59. *Expositio Regulae*, ed cit., p. 82.

60. See British Museum Add. 14096 (15th cent), fol. 3r: dopo che poterano havere li breviarij; Archives provinc. of the Capuchin Fathers, Paris 359 (15th Cent. Rule of the Poor Clares) fol. 5v : de puya quelles pourront avoir breviaires ; see U. d'Alençon *Catalogue des manuscrits de la bibl. franc. provinciale*, in *Archives franciscaines*, I (Paris, 1902), 32 n. 188.

61. *Opuscula*, ed.cit., II, 179.

62. Brandolini, *Esposizione della Regola de' Frati Minori* (Florence, 1593), 122; Gabr. Ang. da Vicenza, *op.cit.*, p. 63; U. d'Alençon *Les opuscules de S. François* (Paris, 1905), p. 84; H. Workman *Liturgy and the Franciscan Order*, loc.cit., p. 5.

63. E. Bruning, *De vrægere Misformulieren op de feesten van Sint Franciscus voor 1570*, in "Collectanea francicana Neerlandica", I, ('s Hertogenbosch 1927), 91; W. H. Frere "Early Franciscan influence on religious services," *Seton memorial lecture 1936* reprinted in the "Alcuin Club Collection", XXXV (Oxford: London, 1940) 199ff.

64. See also I Machab. 1, 12; Luke 7, 45; Mark 9, 20; Bede. *Historia ecclesiastica*, lib. iv, cap. 17; Office of the Visitation of the Virgin (2 July), 5th antiphon at lauds alluding to Luke 1, 44; Chevalier, *Repert. hymnol.*, n. 5621-9.

65. 'Consuetudines Ordinis Cisterciensis' cap. 68, ed. Guignard, *Les monuments primitifs de la Règle cistercienne* (Dijon, 1878), p. 163.

66. Peter Damien, *Vita ss. Rodulphi et Dominici Loricati*, cap. 11 (PL. 144, 1020).

67. *Ordo lateranensis*, ed. L. Fischer (München, 1916), 95f., n. 194.

68. Cencius Savelli, *Liber censum*, lvii, n. 66, ed. Fabre-Duchesne in "Bibliothèque des Ecoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome" (Paris, 1905-20) tom. I, 308.

[=eius uxorem] redire volens nec valens, cogitur ecclesie disciplina hanc tenere [et] incipit excusari per obedientiam et timorem. . .<sup>69</sup>

Ipse [Franciscus] ad litteram sanctum evangelium observavit a principio, ex quo fratres habere coepit usque in diem mortis suæ.<sup>70</sup>

[Franciscus], ex quo communi omnium Domino cœpit servire, communia facere semper amavit. . .<sup>71</sup>

Interpreted in this way, however, the clause is entirely superfluous from a juridical point of view. Everybody knows that no obligation ever exists, unless the means to fulfill it are at hand: *necessitas non habet legem.*<sup>72</sup> The explanation, moreover, is typical of the century in which it was conceived. The steadily increasing number of portos deeply influenced the clergy's attitude towards and its conscience about the canonical obligations. Private recitation, at first an exceptional substitute for choral performance, had become a recognised, self-evident form of Divine Office. The lack of a breviary could more easily be remedied than before. Those who occasionally had no books now felt themselves obliged not only to say other prayers instead but also to provide themselves the necessary means 'as soon as' possible. In the first quarter of the thirteenth century the latter conclusion did not impose itself. Historically seen, this explanation does no honor to Hugoline's foresight. Even in those days a well-planned provision of books could hardly take up more than a few years, a decade perhaps. After that, the clause would have lost its importance and sense. The Cardinal knew too well that such a disposition had no place in the Rule of an Order. Ralph of Tongres preferred the meaning of *ubi*,<sup>73</sup> whereby he may have understood *quando*. His interpretation can be classed with the one just discussed.

The more general translation of *ex quo*, and to the modern mind the most obvious one, is *propter quod, inde, unde, wherfore, pourça, percio*, etc.<sup>74</sup> It is based on a comparison between the

69. Questions on the decrees, pars II, causa 34, quæstio 91, cap. 1, in the copy of Haymo's Ordinaries, Mende, Bibl. municipale 1, fol. 178va. In the margin is the significant note: *Hoc non tenetur.*

70. Brother Leo, *Intentio Regulæ*, ed. cit., p. 88, n. 6.

71. II Celano, pars 1, cap. 9 (*Anal. Franc.* X, 139).

72. Honorius III in the Rule of the Carmelites, cap. 10, ed. cit. 416.

73. *De canonum observantia*, prop. 22, ed. cit. 313a.

74. Paris Bibl. nation. lat. 10896 (15th cent.) fol. 37v: *par quoy pourront avoir breviaire(s); Angelus of Chiarino, ed. cit., p. 83 var. a; Bernardo da Bologna, Lezioni sopra la Regola dei Frati Minori di san Francesco* (Modena, 1749), p. 73; H.

Rule of 1223 and that of 1221. In the latter the obligation to say Office is the reason why an exception was made to the vow of poverty. Likewise, one concludes, since 1223 the Roman Office is the motive for permitting breviaries. Far from denying the truth of this argument, one wonders whether it was really laid down in the Rule: in other words whether *ex quo* admits such a translation. Students of medieval philology may give the final answer, but among the more than a hundred cases in which I found *ex quo* used during the later Middle Ages there is not even one in which it has this consecutive meaning of *unde*, etc.<sup>75</sup>

The opinion seems to have its origin in a passage of the bull *Exiit qui seminat* of Nicholas III.<sup>76</sup> The pope, having quoted the clause *ex quo habere poterunt breviaria*, argues that 'therefore' the Rule admits some exception of absolute poverty. However, this is not a translation of *ex quo* but an argument built upon the last three words, i.e. on the concession of breviaries.

Some modern expositors<sup>77</sup> explain that, since the Rule of 1221 permitted only books *ad implendum officium* because of the vow of poverty, the final Rule for the same reason (therefore) gives permission to have breviaries. Thus, always according to this explanation, *ex quo* is roughly the equivalent of *ad implendum officium*. The mistake here is a misunderstanding of the wording of 1221. In the thirteenth century a *liber-necessarius-ad-implendum-officium* was nothing else than a breviary whether portable or otherwise. The terms are interchangeable: the Rule of 1221 could be read as: *Et breviaria tantum possunt habere*; that of 1223 as: *ex quo habere poterunt libros necessarios ad implendum officium*. The substitution of these words shows that neither of the phrases

Dausend, *Franziskanerorden*, loc. cit., p. 168; Felder, S. François, loc. cit., p. 493; Hilaire de Paris, op. cit., p. 76; Le Carou, op. cit. p. 54, note 1; Robinson, op. cit. p. 66; Albertus a Bulsano, *Expositio Regulæ FF. Minorum S. P. Francisci*, ed. no. (Rome, 1932), p. 220; Anonymous, *Regle et testament du seraphique Père saint François avec les constitutions des Frères Mineurs Capucins* (Paris, 1927) p. 10; A. Quaglia, *Origine*, ed. cit. p. 116, note 19.

75. Quaglia, *Origine*, loc. cit. quotes Forcellini, *Totius latinitatis lexicon* (quo. n. 11). He could have added a reference to the *Thesaurus linguae latinæ* vol. 52, col. 1106, n. 3. But in either case the examples are classical and Forcellini only treats of "quo" not "ex quo".

76. *Legislationis seraphicæ textus originales* (Quaracchi, 1897), p. 195.

77. See Quaglia loc. cit.

407. For the discussion of the authorship see F. Delorme "Notices et extraits d'un manuscrit franciscain" in *Collectanea franciscana* (Rome) XV (1945) 7ff.

contain any suggestion for the meaning of the newly introduced *ex quo*.

John Pecham,<sup>78</sup> inspired possibly by the identical text in the Rule of the Poor Clares, put *ex quo* in relation with the word Office: *ex quo scilicet officio*, an opinion which later on gave rise to the translation *whereof*<sup>79</sup> and *d'ou*.<sup>80</sup> More recently it has been repeated by Octave d'Angers,<sup>81</sup> who thinks that one should read: *ex quo ordine*, i.e. *ordinario*. Both ideas fit in with the historic fact that the early breviary of the friars was, indeed, extracted from that of the court and the Ordinary of Innocent III. Since the term *ordo*, undoubtedly, has to be taken in its generic sense of custom or rite, the clause would contain the permission to have such 'extracted' breviaries according to the papal chapel, in the same way as, previously, the Rule of 1221 permitted any kind of secular Office book.

However, no one less than Pecham himself proves that his exegesis is all but obvious. He does so unconsciously but with such surprising accuracy that there can be hardly any doubt about the historical and philological meaning of *ex quo* in this clause. Immediately after his interpretation, he poses the question why Francis actually obliged his friars to the heavy burden of the Divine Office:

Sed quare sanctus Franciscus, EX QUO volebat fratres suos in predicatione et studio per consequens exerceri, tam oneroso tamque prolixo officio oneravit?

The meaning of *ex quo* is clearly the equivalent of *ex eo quod, quia, because, since, parceque, poichè, omdat,* and in the later Middle Ages it had almost always this causal significance. The following list could easily be prolonged tenfold:

Omnis, ex quo sumus monachi, infirmos stomachos habemus et apostoli de utendo vino consilium non negligimus...<sup>82</sup>

78. Ps.—Bonaventure, *Expositio super Regulam* cap. 3, in *Opera omnia*, VIII,

79. Thus in the 15th-cent. Rule in the British Museum *Cotton. Faustina D. 4* fol. 13v-4r (ed. in *Monumenta Franciscana*, II) (London, 1882) 67 (Rolls Series).

80. Thus the translation of the Bull *Exitit in Seraphicæ legislationis textus*, p. 195, n. 4. See E. d'Alençon in *Analecta Ordinis Minorum Capuccinorum* XIV (1898), 175; A. de Sérent in *La vie spirituelle* LXXVII (1947), 275 note.

81. *Op. cit.* 121, note.

82. In a 12th-cent. polemic about the monastic reform of St. Bernard, ed. A. Wilmart in *Revue bénédictine* XLVI (1934), 322.

Ne autem monasterio in suo videamur iure deesse, moderatas expensas, ex quo Veronensem [episcopum] ipsum in possessionem induci decrevit, usque ad tempus satisfactionis. . . restituendas esse censemus. . .<sup>83</sup>

Ab observatione iuramenti predicti, ex quo tibi et regno tuo metuis grave periculum imminere, postulasti suppliciter a nobis absolvī.<sup>84</sup>

Servus Dei Franciscus. . . in sāculo degens portiunculam pro se et suis de mundo elegit, ex quo aliter Christo, nisi de mundo aliquid haberet, servire non potuit.<sup>85</sup>

Ait [maritus]: Domine presbiter, ego nihil mali tibi faciam, sed ex quo uxor mea vult sacerdotissa esse, coronabitur. Et accepit forcipes et [tonsura] coronavit eam.<sup>86</sup>

. . . mihi non reprehensio vilis

Competit, ex quo sum vir nobilis.<sup>87</sup>

Queritur utrum qui non cogitat de horis suis quando dicit eas, teneatur redicere sive iterare eas? Et videtur quod sic: ipse enim tenetur dicere totum quod in eis continetur; sed nescit utrum dixerit totum, ex quo non cogitavit. . .<sup>88</sup>

Oportet quod fieret aliquod opusculum pro instructione ignorantiam ideotarum in suis officiis, ex quo nesciunt scripturas.<sup>89</sup>

Clerici faciunt divinum officium. Ex quo est divinum, multam requirit devotionem; unde dicit Augustinus. . .<sup>90</sup>

Studentes parisius sequentur chorum infra sex ebdomadas una tantum, ex quo conventus ad numerum 140 fratrum reductus est.<sup>91</sup>

Si ab alio consilium confessionis velit habere, de licentia decani permittatur habere. . . ut videtur, ex quo constituit confessores.<sup>92</sup>

Potest aliquis habere licitum usum. . . si hunc usum consentiente domino in rem exerceat, absque omni tali dominio supradicto. Nam ex quo supponitur esse omnino in alterius dominio seu potestate vendicandi, certum est quod tale dominium non transfertur. . .<sup>93</sup>

As far as I can see, there is no serious objection to this meaning of *ex quo* in the clause under discussion. In the twentieth century it seems almost sheer nonsense to state that a friar is to say the

83. Innocent III, *Regesta*, lib. 1, n. 37 (PL 214, 31).

84. *Op. cit.*, lib. ii, n. 28 (PL 214, 558f).

85. II Celano, pars i, cap. 12 (*Anal. Franc.* X, 142).

86. Exempla under the name of James of Vitry Oxford Bodleian library Tanner 110 (S.C. 9935), fol. 218vb.

87. Michael of Cornwall, *Versus contra Henricum Abricensem* (1250-60), ed. in *Mittelalterliche Handschriften. Festschrift H. Degering* (Berlin, 1926), p. 125 (see 128, verse 127).

88. Odo Rigaldus "Quæstio de eo quod est psallere," ed. van Dijk in *Ephem. liturg.* LVI (1942), 34.

89. *De tractandis in concilio Lugdunensi*, cap. 6 (Martène-Durand *Amplissima collectio VII*, 197).

90. St. Bonaventure "Sermo super Regulam" in *Opera omnia*, VIII 440.

91. "Franciscan Chapter General of Strasbourg (1282)" in *Arch. Franc. Hist.* XXVI (1933), 138.

92. John of Schalby, *Registrum retus. Allegationes opponentium contra decanum*. in H. Bradshaw-Chr. Wordsworth, *Lincoln cathedral statutes II* (Cambridge, 1897) p. xcvi. They date from 1330.

93. Marcilius of Padua, *Defensor pacis*, dictio ii, cap. 13, ed. C.W. Previte-Orton (Cambridge, 1928) 227, n. 8.

Office 'because' he is allowed to have a breviary. Seven centuries ago when only a few portable breviaries were in circulation and the friars were discussing their absolute poverty, it was not. The clause states that in spite of the scarcity of portable books — for wandering clerics the great handicap to a regular saying of the Office — in spite also of the cost of such books — the possession of which was in flat contradiction with the ideal of the new Order — now the friars are, nevertheless, going to have theirs. They will be able to say the Office always and everywhere, in the choirs which they were going to have and on their journeys, 'because' all these obstacles, including the provision of proper Franciscan books, another costly enterprise, will be taken away.<sup>94</sup> This translation of *ex quo* is philologically the best founded and from an historical point of view the most satisfactory. It combines and eliminates the two opinions in favour of 'as soon as' and 'wherfore'.

Whatever the historical background of the words *ex quo* may be, they are not of direct importance for the juridical meaning of the clause.<sup>95</sup> It is, in a more technical form, the same grant as had been given in 1221, *viz.* the permission to have Office books which appeared so entirely incompatible with the poverty of the Franciscan life and, at the same time, so necessary for the apostolic wandering over the world.<sup>96</sup> The term *breviarium* here is not synonymous with *ordo-ordinarium* used for the collection of rubrics.<sup>97</sup> By tradition it has always been understood in its modern sense, i.e. as indicating the book which is still called by that name, even though the breviary published by virtue of the Rule was not a portos but a noted choir book. Starting from the plural *breviaria*, the Four Masters of Paris referred to the opinion of others who saw in this terminology the solution of a problem concerning a

94. See *Florence Bibl. Laurenziana Ashburn* 326 (15th cent.), fol. 2r: poy che possono havere i breviari. It is more difficult to give a correct translation of "da poi che poterano avere li breviari" found in *Padua Bibl. universit.* 471 (15th cent.), fol. 9v and 97v and the still vaguer version in the contemporary copy *Oxford Bodleian library Bodl.* 647 (S. C. 3072) fol. 71v: Do clerkes dyuine office after yo ordir of yo holy chircke of rome outaken yo sauter of whiche yei may have breuyaries.

95. Hence it is translated by "et ils pourront avoir des breviaires" in *Les opuscules de saint François*, trad. française de P. Bayart (Paris s.a., 1935), p. 89f.

96. Hugh of Digne, *De finibus paupertatis*, ed. Cl. Florovsky in *Arch. Franc. Hist.* V (1912), 289; J. Pecham, *De perfectione evangelica*, cap. 10, in *Tractatus tres*, ed. cit. p. 43.

97. See the erroneous opinion of Gabr.-Ang. da Vicenza, *op. cit.* p. 63.

Franciscan missal.<sup>98</sup> This point of view, mistaken and forced though it was and, therefore, rejected by Peter Olivi with ample display of scholastic apparatus, was, at the time, far from being a mere speculation. Explicitly the Rule only treats of the Office; but priests in the Order claimed missals. Some of them not only drew attention to this point; they also procured the verdict of the Schools.

To them even a missal in conformity with the, by then, existing breviary was juridically founded in the wording of the Rule itself: *breviaria*, that is, not only the nocturnal of the Office but also the diurnal of the Mass. The practical answer to their suggestion was the compilation of the pre-Haymonian missal,<sup>100</sup> Haymo's *Ordo* for the private and conventional Mass on ferial days,<sup>101</sup> and, finally, his correction of both breviary and missal. Their intellectual inheritance was less distinguished. At least up to the seventeenth century the question was seriously posed and answered, whether or not the friars were bound to the Roman missal in virtue of their Rule.<sup>102</sup>

The early history of the Order of St Francis is the story of a conflict between the idealism of a saint and the common sense of those who, within and without the Order, were determined to turn its power to practical use. The project of the Rule of 1221 and the Rule approved two years later are all important stages in this conflict. Inescapable though this may have been, it called for heroic sacrifices on the part of him who wanted to be 'a new fool'. To him the accepted standards of so-called common sense were little more than

insensata cura dei mortali  
chi dietro a iura e chi ad aforismi.<sup>103</sup>

He did not understand either of them. Francis' liturgical ordinances cannot be separated from the development of his Rules. The legislation of 1223 appears to be more than a perfection or

98. *Loc. cit.*: Unde volunt dicere quod utrumque breviarium scilicet diurnum quod est missale et nocturnum quod est horarum respicit quod dicitur.

100. So far only three copies of this missal have been discovered, *Assisi Bibl.*

101. Cf. p. 252.

comunale 601, *Naples Bibl. nazionale* VI G. 38, and *Rome Bibl. Corsiniana* 376.

102. For instance P. Marchant, *Expositio litteralis in Regulam S. Francisci* (Antwerp, 1631), p. 164, quæstio 3.

103. Dante Alighieri, *Divina commedia*, Paradiso XI, 1, 4.

clearer codification of a previous tradition or regulation.<sup>104</sup> The Rule of 1221 was a project and hardly put into practice. However much a concession to the growing brotherhood and the duties of some of its members, it was still an integral expression of Francis' ideal and his personal view of the liturgical vocation of his Order. To the ordinance of 1223 it was as the sublimity of a poem to the geniality of a discovery. It was the Divine Service of everybody everywhere, the unconscious solution of the medieval (and modern) liturgical problem, because it broke with a tradition of eight centuries in which monasticism had been the norm of public worship. It would have inspired a movement for popularising liturgy, had it not been regarded as vague, impracticable, and unorganised. The disposition of 1223 is a brilliant though not entirely original thought, a well-planned renaissance occasioned by the most obvious features of the Franciscan organisation. In itself the uniformity of worship was a constructive addition to the idea of St Francis, the choice of the Office of the papal chapel the keystone of his veneration for the Holy See. Both would have realised a glorious aspect of Franciscan spirituality and apostleship, had not the uncodified intentions underneath destroyed it. Thus the external organisation remained without its deeper significance, a splendid reality but foreign to what Francis saw as the ideal of Franciscan public worship. Both the prohibition of the use of psalters which brought all laybrothers, educated and unlettered, down to one level and the extension of the Office to all clerics, ordained and unordained, were signs of clerical and monastic tendencies rather than a simplifying of juridical matters. The secular office was saved, but, like so many things in the new Order, grafted on the monastic tradition.

Henceforth, the chant of the friars, like that of the monks, had to die where it was born: between the walls of their choirs. And this was precisely what Francis had feared from the very beginning. While he and his companions, laics as well as clerics, joined their fellow men in the churches, his Order retired into its choirs. The monks had estranged people from the monastic Office; the friars, because of their organisation, could not prevent those to whom they were sent from losing all understanding of public worship.

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104. See the opposite opinion in Dausend, *loc. cit.*, p. 167.

That this should have happened at the moment when the Rule of their Order rung in the last and definite stage of unification of the Western liturgy, is perhaps the most tragic point in the history of the late medieval Church.

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## THE ILLATIVE SENSE

### A. THE FACTS

1. *Certitude from an accumulation of experiences is a psychological fact:* From the foregoing sections it may already be more or less clear how we reach certitude in the concrete. Arguing according to logic is abstract and leads to abstract conclusions. Abstract conclusions, however, are only probabilities as regards concrete life. Now an accumulation of such probabilities, which do not depend on each other, supplies the material to our minds from which to draw by a subtle process a true and certain conclusion, commanding an unhesitating assent.<sup>1</sup>

Newman compares this with a sketch and a portrait. A sketch gives but the outlines, a portrait has all the details, shades and colors in a harmonious unity. Logic gives but the outlines, the framework, the sketch of the reasoning process; but the multiform and intricate workings of the illative sense resemble the portrait, because they comprise the harmonious complex of the indescribable details of human thinking, resulting in the unity of certitude.<sup>2</sup>

When writing by way of introduction to this thesis, Newman uses as an example the syllogism already quoted to convert an educated Anglican: "All Protestants are bound to join the Church; you are a Protestant; ergo."<sup>3</sup> The Protestant denies both premisses; the syllogism does not touch him. He may answer: *Distinguo:* Protestants are bound to join the Church in certain circumstances only; I am a Protestant, in a certain sense only. These distinctions and their proofs branch out into many other syllogisms, and these again into others, which should be considered minutely and defended carefully till at last he finds himself before a host of propositions and arguments. He would be rash if he did not consider them — since he is a concrete being — under many laws and subject to

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1. Cf. *Franciscan Studies*, 12 (1952), pp. 130 ff.

2. *Gramm.* 288.

3. *Ibid.*

many predicates. Consequently, it will be impossible for him to find his way through this labyrinth by means of a simple syllogism.<sup>4</sup>

Before affirming the major premiss he has to answer the long series of questions which involve innumerable complications: Are Protestants really bound to this, even if they are not conscious of an obligation? even if they feel safe in their own religion? even if they possess certitude regarding its truth? even if they have their doubts about the doctrines and the holiness of the Catholic Church? even if they are convinced that that Church is corrupt? even if their conscience instinctively rejects some of its doctrines? and so on and on. In this way an Anglican may come to the conclusion that he is not bound to change his religion. But then he puts himself the question: Can a Protestant be satisfied with his religion? Can he admit that Protestantism as a whole has been given by Heaven? How many of its doctrines really have come from God? And what comes from God, has it not come to him through the Catholic Church after all? Is not Protestantism by nature a negation? Did not the Catholic Church exist long before? Can he be sure that every doctrine of the Catholic Church does not come from God? Then he has to decide what corruption of doctrine means and how we can detect it. What does he mean by a religion? Is there any obligation to adhere to a religion? How can we distinguish truth from falsehood in religion? What are the special claims of the Catholic Church?<sup>5</sup>

As to the minor premiss he may answer that he is not a Protestant; that he is a Catholic, belonging to the early undivided Church; that he is a Catholic but not a Papist. This leads him to problems about division and schism; about visible unity, and what is necessary for it, what is desirable; about provisional states, about the adjustment of the claims of the Church and those of private judgment and responsibility; about the soul of the Church as contrasted with the body; about degrees of proof and the degree necessary for his conversion; it may lead him to problems about his present state determined by Providence, and the responsibility

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4. *Ibid.* 288-289.

5. *Ibid.* 289-290.

of change; about his sincere intention to follow God's<sup>6</sup> Will; about the power of his mind to investigate such problems.

None of these questions can be solved by means of a simple demonstrative syllogism, but each of them leads to a number of independent probable arguments which taken together may be sufficient to reach a reasonable conclusion. Let us suppose he infers from all this that he has a duty to conform to the Catholic Church and that he feels sure about his duty. Then this certitude will not be the result of a verbal enumeration of all his considerations, but of an intellectual insight into the upshot of all together with a mental comprehension of the whole, arrived at after many deliberations indeed, but nevertheless by a clear and rapid act of the intellect.<sup>7</sup>

In this example Newman discovers three characteristic peculiarities connected with our thinking about concrete matters. First, the illative sense does not discard logic, but is one with it. Its workings, however, are not purely abstract, but they are applied to the realities of life and deal with probabilities which correct or confirm each other and bring the reasoning to bear on the individual case. Secondly, this process is more or less implicit, i.e. it takes place without direct and fully conscious attention of the reason and intellect. The mind cannot analyse to the last all the motives which have brought him to that concrete conclusion. We know two brothers and can tell who is who, but we cannot express how we distinguish them; we had perhaps mixed them up when we saw them for the first time, but later on we did not see any likeness between them at all. Only an artist can tell which lines and shades make a face old or young, attractive, thoughtful, angry, or conceited. It is the same with this method of reasoning. Thirdly, reasoning like this is and remains dependent on premisses, and this implicitly. Therefore, the unconditional assent which follows it cannot have been effected merely by the demonstrative power of the several syllogisms, which, as a matter of fact, led only to probabilities.<sup>8</sup>

All this was but an introduction. Newman proceeds to give three

6. *Ibid.* 290-291,

7. *Ibid.* 291-292.

8. *Ibid.* 292-293.

instances of certitude and infers from them a law, *viz.* there is a close relation between implicit reasoning and certitude; in other words, our most reasonable certitudes depend on informal proofs which we cannot analyse nor reduce to logical rules.

1. The first instance is taken from the present. All of us are certain beyond any doubt that Great Britain is an island. He describes the overwhelming power of this certitude in clear, forcible language. Then he quotes our reasons for this thesis. They are not demonstrative proofs, but negative arguments, indications etc., which could be proved by a *reductio ad absurdum* if anybody would maintain that the opposite proposition is not evidently untenable.

Nevertheless, this is not the highest kind of proof, he says. Only those who have actually circumnavigated the whole of the island have a right to be really certain. Have we ever fallen in with anybody who has? And if you answer that everybody believes it and that everything implies it, the problem is, why am I certain myself? For a long course of centuries everybody was convinced that the earth was immovable and that the sun circled round it. Newman does not wish to say that we are not reasonable in our certitude, but only that we cannot analyse our proofs as scientists analyse the arguments for a mathematical conclusion, and further that we can find objections against such probabilities. The warrant of our certitude in this case is good sense, i.e. the healthy working of the illative sense.<sup>9</sup>

2. The second instance is Hardouin's thesis that Terentius' *Plays*, Virgil's *Aeneid*, Horace's *Odes*, and the *Histories* of Livy and Tacitus were written by the monks of the thirteenth century. Our good sense, however, is convinced of their genuineness without any hesitation or reserve, as strongly and unconditionally as when it has been proved by irresistible demonstrative arguments. But how is this possible? Why are we justified in neglecting and ignoring Hardouin's arguments? Many plausible objections could be brought against our proofs as to their authenticity. The mere fact that a scholar like Hardouin could contradict the current opinion proves the weakness of our arguments. All our knowledge of the classics is derived from medieval sources: we are absolutely dependent on the transcribers of those times. No oral traditions, no inscriptions,

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9. *Ibid.* 294-296.

no contemporary manuscripts bring us into direct contact with the authors. The numerous religious Orders with their many members had plenty of time and opportunity to produce in one century not only all the classics but even all the Fathers of the Church. The question is whether they had the talents for it. And about this matter we form arguments, says Newman, which are felt rather than convertible into syllogisms. We have criteria from classical times; we know what the Middle Ages could perform. We see at once how far the above-mentioned works differ from the medieval. An instinctive conviction that the Middle Ages had not the ability to write the classics, and a conviction about the value of testimony are the sufficient, though undeveloped, proof on which we base our certitude.<sup>10</sup>

3. The third example is taken from the future. I am as certain of my future death, says Newman, as I am of the fact that I now live. What grounds, however, can I produce? If I had to defend myself in a court of justice by means of such grounds, I should miserably fail. If I were to bear a cross-examination on them, I should give myself away. Unless God reveals the future, nobody can demonstrate a future event. We can only produce an antecedent probability for it. The law of death is no universal law, but a generalized fact. What power has the past over the future? What power has other people's history over mine? How often have I seen a man die? How many witnesses have imparted to me their experiences so that I may establish a law? But suppose there is a law of death. One law is hindered by another, as the centrifugal law sometimes hinders the centripetal. I am under a thousand laws. How do I know that none of them will hinder my law of death? We can frequently put off death by means of medical treatment; why must death come in all conceivable cases? Is the prospect of my death more than a high probability, if we weigh the logical evidence for it? The strongest proof producible is the *reductio ad absurdum*: we cannot point out anybody in history who lived for two hundred years. So previous generations must have died. Here we have considerable "surplusage" of certitude over proof, as Locke calls it.<sup>11</sup>

10. *Ibid.* 296-298.

11. *Ibid.* 298-301.

"But what logic cannot do, my own personal reasoning, my good sense, which is the healthy condition of such personal reasoning, but which cannot adequately express itself in words, does for me, and I am possessed with the most precise, absolute, masterful certitude of my dying some day or other.<sup>12</sup>

Of course, Newman grants that answers may be given to some of the above questions. But he maintains that our most obstinate and rational certitudes depend on informal and personal proofs, which we cannot analyse nor turn into syllogisms. If we must speak of law, says Newman, the relation between certitude and implicit proofs is a law of our minds; in other words, the illative sense is a psychological fact.<sup>13</sup>

*2. It is something personal which makes us reach certitude.* When we are certain about a fact we are often unable to give reasons for it which satisfy others. We may even feel that the reasons produce the wrong effect on those whom we wish to convince. From this appears the great distinction between the exercise of a living faculty in an individual mind and mere skill in argumentative science. It explains the popular prejudices against logic in sayings like: logic makes pedants, it never makes converts; it leads to rationalism; Englishmen are too practical to be logical; one ounce of common sense goes farther than cartloads of logic; Laputa is the land of logicians. These statements only imply that the processes of reasoning leading to assent, to action, and to certitude, are actually too multiform, subtle, omnigenous, and implicit to admit of being measured by rules. They are personal. Verbal argumentation is only useful as far as it is subordinate to a higher logic. That was what the judge meant who was consulted by a friend. This friend had just been called to important duties in which he had not been trained. The judge advised him to give his decisions bodily without showing his reasons, because his decisions were likely to be good but his reasons were sure to be unsatisfactory.<sup>14</sup>

After this introduction Newman illustrates in seven concrete instances how unsatisfactory the reasons very often are which we

12. *Ibid.* 300-301.

13. *Ibid.* 301.

14. *Ibid.* 302-303.

give as the grounds of our certitudes, and how important the moral and intellectual disposition and character of the reasoning person or of the person whom we wish to convince. It is the living faculty of the mind which leads to certitude and not the juxtaposition of propositions, however useful this may be to give direction to our thinking and to verify the conclusions. Logic is a helpful instrument indeed. But the living *organon* for reaching truth is a personal gift, the illative sense.

Some of these instances are quoted in the foregoing articles.<sup>15</sup> In order to make Newman's meaning understood we intend to give the other examples *in extenso*.

1. The first is a proposition which was up-to-date at the time: We must expect a European war because Greece is audaciously defying Turkey. Now what is the use of syllogisms here? If we wish to come to a scientific conclusion we should arrange our premisses and our conclusion as follows: "All audacious defiances against Turkey on the part of Greece must end in a European war. What Greece is doing at present, may be considered audacious defiances. *Ergo*." Here we avail ourselves of a universal proposition, and this major is more difficult to accept than the conclusion, and the proof becomes an *obscurum per obscurius*. We should reason from concrete facts to concrete facts. In order to defend my thesis, says Newman, I should combine many unwritten experiences floating in my mind, with many reflections, variously produced, felt rather than capable of being expressed. If I had not got such experiences and ideas, I should betake myself to people who had. And "I assent in consequence of some such complex act of judgment, or from faith in those who are capable of making it, and practically syllogism has no part, even verificatory, in the action of my mind." Only diplomatists, statesmen, and the like will be able to judge about the proposition in a syllogistic way, and use it from their experience, their knowledge of history, and the control of their self-interest.<sup>16</sup>

2. The second instance is a series of propositions from Coleridge's *Aids to Reflection* which Newman quotes in relation

15. See the instance of the dying factory-girl, and Samuel Clarke's argument in *Franc. Stud.* vol. 11 (1951), 54, 56-57.

16. *Gramm.* 303-304.

to the following statement by Leighton, the pious Bishop of Glasgow: "What a full confession do we make of our dissatisfaction with the objects of our bodily senses, that in our attempt to express what we conceive of the best of beings and the greatest of felicities to be, we describe by exact contraries of all that we experience here — the one as infinite, incomprehensible, immutable, etc.; the other as incorruptible, undefiled, and that passeth not away. At all events, this coincidence, say rather identity of attributes, is sufficient to apprise us that, to be inheritors of bliss, we must become the children of God." Coleridge observes that we could infer another truth from these considerations: "Another and more fruitful, perhaps more solid, inference from the facts would be, that there is something in the human mind which makes it know that in all finite quantity, there is an infinite, in all measures of time an eternal; that the latter are the basis, the substance, of the former; and that, as we truly are only as far as God is with us, so neither can we truly possess, that is, enjoy our being or any other real good, but by living in the sense of His holy presence."

How few there will be, says Newman, who can take in premisses and conclusion! And if we understand them, is there a royal road which leads us without difficulty to the unconditional acceptance of the wonderful conclusion: we cannot enjoy transitory things but with God? If we wish to profit by this passage we should try to realize its value by the personal action of our minds. Our preparation, leading to an understanding and a profitable use of the thesis, will consist in the "general state of our mental discipline and cultivation, our own experiences, our appreciation of religious ideas, the perspicacity and steadiness of our intellectual vision."<sup>17</sup> In other words it is only the illative sense, the personal power of mind to reach truths in the concrete, which will enable us to understand the thesis, to accept its truth with an unconditional assent and to make use of its worth.

3. Hume has presented his readers with a specious syllogism to prove that miracles cannot have taken place. "It is experience only which gives authority to human testimony," says he, "and it is the same experience which assures us of the laws of nature. Therefore, when two kinds of experience are contrary to each other, we are

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17. *Ibid.* 304-306.

bound to subtract the one from the other; and, in consequence, since we have no experience of a violation of natural laws, and much experience of the violation of truth, we may establish it as a maxim that no human testimony can have such force as to prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation for any such system of religion."

Newman accepts the general proposition and thinks it more likely that abstractly man should lie than that the order of nature should be infringed. But what is abstract reasoning if a concrete fact is under consideration? We should take things as they are, with all their circumstances. The question deals with definite miracles, attributed to a well-known Peter, James and John. Are they unlikely, supposing that there exists a Power, external to the world, who can cause them; — supposing that these are the only means to reveal Himself; — supposing that the miracles in question resemble His natural works; — supposing that after those miracles great effects followed, which are otherwise unaccountable; — supposing that great numbers of men accepted those miracles as true against their own natural interests; — supposing that this acceptance has left its mark on the world as no other event in its history has ever done; — supposing that their effects have raised mankind to moral heights which could never be attained by any other means? These considerations are parts of a complicated argument which to a certain extent can be expressed in propositions but which cannot be "imprisoned in a formula and packed into a nut-shell." It does not matter whether the conclusion is affirmative or negative. The question is whether a great problem about a fact can be solved philosophically by a logical antithesis which looks plausible on paper. No, we want the living action of our mind, with the assistance of all its powers and resources, in other words, we need an illative sense.<sup>18</sup>

4. In order to prove the truth of the Catholic Religion, Pascal has given us an argument which appeals to many: "Here is a religion contrary to our nature, which establishes itself in men's minds with so much mildness, as to use no external force; with so much energy, that no tortures could silence its martyrs and confessors; and consider the holiness, devotion, humility of its true disci-

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18. *Ibid.* 306-307.

ples; its sacred books, their superhuman grandeur, their admirable simplicity. Consider the character of its Founder; His associates and disciples, unlettered men, yet possessed of wisdom sufficient to confound the ablest philosopher; the astonishing succession of prophets, who heralded Him; the state at this day of the Jewish people who rejected Him and His religion; its perpetuity and its holiness; the light which its doctrines shed upon the contrarieties of our nature; — after considering these things, let any man judge if it be possible to doubt about its being the only true one.”<sup>19</sup>

Many have been converted, continues Newman, many have been confirmed in their faith by this argument. We are able to word it in powerful terms. Yet, it is only a statement meant as an aid to reflection and not an argument, convincing us by the logical cogency of its terms. When reading the passage it makes us think, we try to master it, we complement it from our own knowledge, in short, we study it. And if we wish to give an account of its results, we avail ourselves more of the drift and spirit of the passage than of the language or even of the thoughts. Language finds its place here indeed, but it is in order to stimulate thinking, to produce the same train of thought in others, so that the same result is obtained in an independent way and not by syllogistic compulsion.<sup>20</sup>

This argument is based on the assumption that the Catholic religion transcends human nature. What influence this assumption will exert depends on the appreciation of the natural human powers. This appreciation, however, depends on personal dispositions, opinions, experiences. Hence, many differences of opinion and its consequences. Many facts, taken separately, could be natural, but taken together as a whole they may be beyond the natural course of things. What these facts are and which number of facts is required, will be variously determined by various people. And every one is led on by implicit processes of the reasoning faculties and not by means of syllogisms forcing their way to an irresistible conclusion.<sup>21</sup>

5. Newman then refers to another passage from Pascal's *Thoughts*, *viz.* about scepticism and especially about the scepticism

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19. *Ibid.* 307-308.

20. *Ibid.* 309.

21. *Ibid.* 310.

defended by Montaigne. Pascal rejects scepticism as sinful and absurd. But people who take a pride in doubting everything honor religion in a sense, for they are a tangible proof of the corruption of our nature and the necessity of Christ's redemption. Now Montaigne ridicules all attempts at reaching certitude; he even doubts about his doubts, enjoys this and calls ignorance and incuriousness two charming pillows for a sound head.<sup>22</sup>

"Here are two celebrated writers in direct opposition to each other in their fundamental view of truth and duty," Newman observes. He grants that, analysing the arguments of either, he cannot discover transgressions of logical rules. But how account for it? Is there no truth nor error, or is truth "what each man troweth"? No, truth exists, and we can attain it, but its rays stream in upon us not only through our intellectual being but through our moral disposition. In virtue of this fact the perception of the primary elements of truth, which is connatural to us, may be enfeebled, hampered, perverted, by the allurements of sense or by self-interest, and on the other hand it may be intensified by supernatural aspirations. In this way two characters and systems of thought are born, totally different from each other and tending in opposite directions. In other words, the firm conviction about the primary element of certitude has arisen from the workings of the illative sense and not from logical operations.<sup>23</sup> With Montaigne, it was the illative sense applied to false premisses, the falsehood of which he did not perceive because of his personal moral disposition; with Pascal, it was the illative sense applied to true premisses.

So in every proof there is something personal except in strict demonstration.

#### B. COMMON PARLANCE, EXPERIENCE, GOD'S SANCTION

1. *Common Parlance*: It appears from common parlance that Newman's description of human thinking is universally acknowledged. Even Locke although maintaining that certitude is not rational without demonstrative proof speaks in the same vein. So many probabilities may concur in favor of concrete propositions that they "border near on certainty" and then "we assent to them as firm-

22. *Ibid.* 310-311.

23. *Ibid.* 311-312.

ly as if they were infallibly demonstrated.”<sup>24</sup> “We should never say in abstract science,” Newman continues, “that . . . a man had no right to say that a tangent to a circle at the extremity of the radius makes an acute angle with it.” We never speak about not being able to escape a strict mathematical conclusion. But we do say that “the insularity of Great Britain is as good as demonstrated, or that none but a fool expects never to die.” These phrases are used to express the absence of any kind of doubt, and imply that we have not reached these conclusions *ex opere operato*, i.e. by a scientific necessity and as it were automatically, but by the subtle action of our own minds, by our individual perception of the truth in question.<sup>25</sup> When Vince is speaking about the arguments for the rotatory motion of the earth — not being able to give a strict demonstrative proof for it — says: “When these reasons, all upon different principles, are considered, they amount to a proof of the earth’s rotation about its axis, which is as satisfactory to the mind as the most direct demonstration could be.” He wants to say that we have no demonstration for the fact; we only find a number of “reasons on different principles” or an accumulation of independent probabilities; further that they amount to a proof, and lastly that the mind rests equally satisfied as if the matter was strictly proved, i.e. we are certain about the point.<sup>26</sup> Butler, too, speaks in the same way when dealing with the proofs of Revelation. He wants to establish the truth of religion by a cumulation of evidences consisting of probabilities. Suppose we wish to prove a disputed fact, he says, by means of a great number of certain facts, then there are two possibilities. Either each certain fact is a sufficient proof in itself, or each fact is insufficient in itself but the facts taken together cannot have happened unless the disputed fact be true. Here again no demonstration, here again the same cumulating and converging indications, here again the same indirectness and the same avowal that the conclusion is not only probable but true. But now, the moral state of the parties comes into play, which is not the case in an astronomical proof like that of Vince. Butler expresses it in this way: People must be “as much in earnest about religion, as about their temporal affairs, capable of being convinced, on real evidence,

24. *Ibid.* 316.

25. *Ibid.* 317-318.

26. *Ibid.* 318-319.

that there is a God who governs the world, and feel themselves to be of a moral nature and accountable creatures.”<sup>27</sup>

Newman gives these instances by the way. He rather wanted to give a few instances of people who, while thus reasoning, at the same time explicitly acknowledged *totidem verbis* that they proceeded on these lines. It was no easy task to find them because these processes are carried on from beginning to end as much without words as with them.<sup>28</sup> He gives three illustrations:

1. The first is taken from physics. Wood when treating of the laws of motion in his *Mechanics* describes the process of thought in this way: “They are not indeed self-evident, nor do they admit of accurate proof by experiment, on account of the effects of friction and the air’s resistance, which cannot be entirely removed. They are, however, constantly and invariably suggested to our senses, and they agree with experiment, as far as experiment can go; and the more accurately the experiments are made, and the greater care we take to remove all those impediments which tend to render the conclusions erroneous, the more nearly do the experiments coincide with these laws.

“Their truth is also established upon a different ground: from these general principles innumerable particular conclusions have been deducted; sometimes the deductions are simple and immediate, sometimes they are made by tedious and intricate operations; yet they are all, without exception, consistent with each other and with experiment. It follows thereby, that the principles upon which the calculations are founded are true.”

Here, then, the author affirms that the conclusion has not been strictly proved but that one would act unreasonably if one did not consider it virtually proved. The consistency of the facts and indications has been so variously put to the test and exemplified that the upshot of it all is a rational conviction of the truth of this theory as rational “as a witness in a court of law may, after a severe cross-examination, satisfy and assure judge, jury and the whole court, of his simple veracity.”<sup>29</sup>

2. The second instance is from the courts of law. According to

27. *Ibid.* 319-320.

28. *Ibid.* 322.

29. *Ibid.* 322-323.

the learned author Phillipps, in criminal prosecutions the circumstantial evidence against the accused should produce nearly the same degree of certitude as a direct testimony, so that a rational probability of innocence is excluded. When speaking about degrees of certitude he probably means degrees of proof, Newman observes, and rational probability of innocence is an expression denoting a probability which has not been logically proved indeed, but which is founded on implicit reasons. We perceive the reasons but we cannot formulate them in such a way that they satisfy logic, either on account of their subtlety or because they are circuitous. Therefore, nothing may occur in the evidence which is obscure, suspicious, unnatural or defective so as to hinder the converging of the probabilities to a proof.<sup>30</sup>

This is the principle. The application follows. Newman recounts the story of a murder, committed at the time, which caused much excitement in England. The evidence against the accused was necessarily circumstantial. When the judge was going to give the jury some explanation of the nature of proof required for a verdict of guilty, he began by observing that circumstantial evidence did not prove the actual crime directly, but led to the conclusion that the prisoner at the bar must have perpetrated the crime. The strength of the evidence should only be that with which they decided on and concluded their own most important transactions in life : "Take the facts which are proved before you, separate those you believe from those which you do not believe, and all the conclusions that naturally and almost necessarily result from those facts, you may confide in as much as in the facts themselves. The case on the part of the prosecution is the *story* of the murder, told by the *different* witnesses, who *unfold the circumstances one after another*, according to their occurrence, together with the *gradual* discovery of some apparent connection between the property that was lost, and the possession of it by the prisoner."<sup>31</sup>

The conclusion, meant by the judge, Newman observes, is a proved or certain conclusion. The motives for the rational proof and this satisfactory certitude need not be stronger than those on which he prudently act in matters of important interest to ourselves,

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30. *Ibid.* 324-325.

31. *Ibid.* 325-327.

i.e. probable reasons viewed in their convergence and continuation. This certitude follows on converging probabilities which constitute a rational though not demonstrative proof, while the process is but an accumulation of details and deductions which fit into each other. It is the case of two straight lines which are sure to meet at a given distance though we do not actually see the junction.<sup>32</sup>

3. The third instance has a literary character and shows how the authorship of a certain anonymous publication was found out shortly before Newman wrote his *Grammar*. This instance is a steady proceeding to a conclusion which is still out of sight; a rational judgement that the conclusion has been proved indeed; personal certitude, connected with the avowal that no logical argument can be found for it and that the various details of proof are implicit and impalpable in a high degree.

In the passage, quoted by Newman, the author of the study confesses that he does not hesitate at all to attribute the authorship of the anonymous book to a certain person although he is unable to put his reasons into words. These reasons are too subtle and too intricate, they are even partly imperceptible except to those who from the circumstances have an intellectual perception of what does not appear to the many. They are personal to the individual. "This again is an instance," says Newman, "of the particular mode in which the mind progresses in concrete matters, *viz.* from merely probable antecedents to the sufficient proof of a fact or a truth, and, after the proof, to an act of certitude about it."<sup>33</sup>

2. *Experience:* When Newman is enlarging on the fact that the workings of the illative sense are exceedingly natural, after a long introduction already quoted,<sup>34</sup> he gives a series of instances from experience.

1. We meet peasants who are able to foretell the weather in a very accurate way, always proved correct by the event. But if you ask for their reasons they cannot give them, or if they can, these reasons seem very unsatisfactory, which, however, does not affect their confidence. Without knowing how, they feel the force of various combined phenomena.<sup>35</sup>

32. *Ibid.* 327-328.

33. *Ibid.* 328-329.

34. See *Franc. Stud.* vol. 10 (1950), 136ff.

35. *Gramm.* 332.

2. We find physicians who are extremely skilful in making a diagnosis of their patients' diseases but who cannot always defend their judgment against the objections of a disagreeing colleague. A natural acuteness, experience, personal methods, help them to reach the result. Do not ask for their reasons because they can only appeal to their authority and to the future event.<sup>36</sup>

3. In *Orley Farm*, a well-known book by Anthony Trollope, the author introduces a lawyer who could tell almost by instinct whether an accused person was guilty or not.<sup>37</sup>

4. When examining mysterious cases experts and detectives often with incredible sagacity find indications which prove the key to an unexpired-for solution.<sup>38</sup>

5. Some people have been favored with an intuitive perception of characters. They find it impossible to prove their conclusions except by the further history of the person concerned. It is a natural capacity or talent, made perfect by using it, enabling the mind to proceed from one set of facts to another, without being conscious of middle terms or premisses.<sup>39</sup>

6. Sometimes this power may be called genius. Newton, for instance, happened to reach mathematical and physical conclusions without being able to give his proofs. For one of those theses the proof was only found in Newman's day. Napoleon, too, possessed a similar gift in another province: he was able to form a true judgment about the position, the forces and the plans of the hostile army, apparently without any ratiocinative media.<sup>40</sup>

7. There are people who can tell at once what is good for their health and what is bad, who is kindly disposed towards them and who is unfriendly, what is to happen to them and how they can prepare themselves for it. There are others who keep their presence of mind in critical difficulties, or who fathom the motives of their fellow-men, or who are quick at repartee. In all these instances the illative sense is at work. In the same way Newman quotes Sir Walter Scott's heroine in *Peveril of the Peak*, who without being able to discover what was wrong, instinctively felt herself to be in danger,

36. *Ibid.*

37. *Ibid.*

38. *Ibid.*

39. *Ibid.* 332-333.

40. *Ibid.* 333-334.

and lastly he mentions Mother Margaret M. Hallahan, who could distinguish heresy from truth without knowing how.<sup>41</sup>

8. Even when we study the way in which the mass of religious men receive the truths of religion we experience that it is by the workings of the illative sense.<sup>42</sup>

3. *God's Sanction*: Newman's special chapter on the illative sense contains a consideration entitled 'the sanction of the illative sense', i.e. the confirmation of the existence of an illative sense by authority.<sup>43</sup> Let us give a summary; it will be a new proof for his thesis.

We are living in a world of facts and should take things as they are. This is true as regards beings external to ourselves but also and more as regards the fact of our existence. We accept the elements and profit by them without criticizing them; in the same way we must accept our nature and our natural powers without criticism and make them serve our welfare. It is our first duty to resign ourselves to the laws of our nature: we must not be impatient at them nor cherish a distrust of them; we must avail ourselves of their uses.<sup>44</sup>

So far is clear. We find the same phenomenon in universal nature: every being is sufficient for itself in this sense that from nature it has the power to reach its special object. A function or a power of any class of beings is always beneficial to them and never a deficiency or an enormity. We even observe that every being finds its welfare and perfection in using its special nature. Why would this be different with man? Consequently, we only need examine what we are and what we are able to do in order to know what is natural to us.<sup>45</sup>

Now the specific difference between man and an animal is the fact that man is a being of progress or development. This progress is not mechanical nor necessary, but depends on the personal exertion of each individual man. This is a law of his nature and nobody can escape it. Whatever is implied in it, man is bound to fulfil.<sup>46</sup>

41. *Ibid.* 334-335.

42. *Ibid.* 336. The passage was quoted in *Franc. Stud.* vol. 10 (1950), 143.

43. *Ibid.* 346ff.

44. *Ibid.* 346-347.

45. *Ibid.* 348.

46. *Ibid.* 348-349.

This law of progress, however, is carried out by the acquisition of knowledge. Its immediate instruments are inference and assent. So, if development of our nature is a duty, this duty is closely related with the right use of these instruments. And as we do not gain the knowledge of this law by *a priori* considerations but on the strength of reasonings *a posteriori*, in the same way we must consider man as a fact to get acquainted with the laws of inference and assent, and not betake ourselves to abstract, antecedent theories.<sup>47</sup>

Now, we find that inference is always more or less obscure, whereas assent and certitude is ever distinct and definite. We find that absolute, unconditional assent follows a complex, indirect and hidden act. What else can we do than take things as they are and resign ourselves to what we find? In other words, we must not try to invent a science of reasoning which could force us into certitude as regards concrete conclusions — rather, we should confess that the mind itself reaches truth, pronounces its judgment upon it and knows that it knows, without "formulas and contrivances of language." We must trace the method used by the mind itself, and avail ourselves of it.<sup>48</sup>

These laws of the mind like the laws of the universe are the expression of God's will. Therefore we may accept them confidently and use them without fear. His blessing will be over them, especially when we are concerned with the search after religious truth, because He has willed that this path should be rugged, difficult and circuitous. In the words of Newman himself:

As the structure of the universe speaks to us of Him who made it, so the laws of the mind are the expression, not of mere constituted order, but of His will. I should be bound by them even were they not His laws; but since one of their very functions is to tell me of Him, they throw a reflex light upon themselves, and, for resignation to my destiny, I substitute a cheerful concurrence in an overruling Providence. We may gladly welcome such difficulties as are to be found in our mental constitution, and in the interaction of our faculties, if we are able to feel that He gave them to us, and He can overrule them for us. We may securely take them as they are, and use them as we find them. It is He who teaches us all knowledge; and the way by which we acquire it is His way. He varies that way according to the subject-matter; but whether He has set before us in our particular pursuit the way of observation or of experiment, of speculation

47. *Ibid.* 349-350.

48. *Ibid.* 349-350.

or of research, of demonstration or of probability, whether we are inquiring into the system of the universe, or into the elements of matter and of life, or into the history of human society and past times, if we take the way proper to our subject-matter, we have His blessing upon us, and shall find, besides abundant matter for mere opinion, the materials in due measure of proof and assent.<sup>49</sup>

So Newman's argument comes to this: What is natural for a being cannot be a defect but must lead to its end. Now facts prove that reasoning processes, conducted by means of the illative sense, are quite natural. Therefore reasoning by means of the illative sense must lead to our end, *viz.* certitude. Then, we know that we depend on God as to our being, our nature, our faculties. The illative sense is something natural. Therefore God must have given us this faculty. This is the deepest reason why we should accept this power without fear and avail ourselves of it without suspicion.

### C. CONFIRMATION

Newman gives several confirmatory arguments to prove the existence of an illative sense. The first is derived from a comparison, the other from a consideration of the commencement and the course of an argument.<sup>50</sup>

1. *A comparison with parallel faculties:* In order to clarify the nature of his psychological discovery Newman institutes a close comparison between the illative sense and what he calls parallel faculties, such as Aristotle's *phronesis*, skill and sagacity in different professions and functions, taste in matters of art, and the like.

In these fields we are not exclusively led on by means of books, rules of criticism, scientific treatises, but much more by a living, personal principle, which functions as an instinct, by way of inspiration.

Now, when intellectual acts of that kind come into being in this way, why should reasoning be the exception? It is an intellectual act as well as writing poetry, determining one's duty in a special case, swaying a public meeting, commanding an army, playing instruments, and singing. Why should reasoning coincide with

49. *Ibid.* 351-352.

50. He leaves out the end of an argument because he had considered it when he dealt with certitude, derived from an accumulation of probabilities. See this Chapter, A, 1. Cf. *Gramm.* 362-363.

the science of logic? Why is logic made a mechanical art, sufficient to determine truth? <sup>51</sup>

2. *The beginning of an argument:* Newman enlarges on the great difficulty in starting an argumentation because we have to chose first principles and assumptions and we have to form a definite opinion about the kind of arguments to be used. But the choice of first principles, assumptions and the kind of arguments will be impossible without a special faculty which implies the absences of syllogisms, in other words we need for it the illative sense.

1. Only by an illative sense shall we be enabled to find out under what aspect we should consider a problem in order to reach a conclusion. How do we know whether we should apply the principle of finality or the principle of causality when studying physics? How does a clever lawyer or judge discover the disentangling principle in a chaos of facts? Under which philosophical view shall we consider historical facts so that we are not theorising or dealing with unreal aspects but actually find the key to reality? <sup>52</sup>

The senses of different persons perceive the same objects in a different way. The shape of letters strikes differently the minds of different people. The handwriting of a friend impresses everybody quite differently and makes each form distinct judgments upon him. Likenesses between relatives are variously recognized. Mistakes in identity are by no means infrequent. Now, if we perceive different objects of sense in such different ways, we are right in supposing antecedently that the aspects of intellectual objects will be more varied still. Newman does not wish to assert that each of us perceive different objects, but there may be endless disputes about relations and circumstances. Vehement differences of opinion raged about the question whether the nineteenth century began with January 1800 or January 1801. Newman remembered persons who even in 1870 did not wish to give their opinion on the subject lest they should excite angry feelings: the overpowering sense of the truth of the one opinion causes a serious animosity against those who eagerly keep to the other. <sup>53</sup>

51. *Ibid.* 353-359; this argument is to be found *in extenso* in *Franc. Stud.*, vol. 10. (1950), 138ff.

52. *Gramm.* 371-373.

53. *Ibid.* 373-375.

2. Apart from the first principles with which we start a course of reasoning, or the aspects under which we consider our problems, there are many propositions which in the commencement of an argument we accept implicitly or discard implicitly. They are assumptions or unproved suppositions of all kinds which we must deal with in a quick and easy way lest we should make it impossible for us to start reasoning at all. If for example we were going to write a book on Holy Scripture it would be absurd to pay attention to opinions like these: the history of Abraham is an astronomical record; Christ is the sun in *Aries*; Solomon is a mighty wizard; Noah is the patriarch of the Chinese people; the ten tribes still live in their descendants, the Red Indians, or are the ancestors of the Goths and Vandals, and in this way of the present European races; Adam was a negro, etc. For these theories several serious advocates could be quoted. Nevertheless, we must disregard all such maxims, hypotheses, false starting-points, assumptions and incredible facts, while on the other hand we accept and suppose other propositions without proof. A healthy mind knows how to distinguish between these several opinions: it is our illative sense at work.<sup>54</sup>

Then Newman proceeds to give a series of illustrations in which we implicitly assume certain propositions by the quick and subtle action of our illative sense.

Some authors assert that in everything we ought to begin with universal doubt; we must not proceed from assumptions without proof. But Newman on the contrary maintains that this is the greatest of all assumptions imaginable and that objections against the right of starting from assumptions only prove that "we have no right to make any assumption we please."<sup>55</sup>

An assumption, used as a starting-point for the proofs of Revelation, is Paine's maxim: "A revelation which is to be received as true ought to be written on the sun." Christians could admit this *mutatis mutandis*, but Paine believes it destroys religion.<sup>56</sup>

Another source of controversy about first principles or assump-

54. *Ibid.* 375-376.

55. *Ibid.* 376-377.

56. *Ibid.* 378.

tions is the problem: Ought government and legislation to be of a religious character or not?<sup>57</sup>

The answer to such questions we assume implicitly, under influence of our illative sense.

Among Christians there is another conflict of assumption, *viz.* whether the Bible is the only rule of faith or not. Those who answer in the affirmative think it "rather a truism than a truth." Nevertheless it is far from self-evident that all religious truth is to be found in a collection of works written at different times and not always forming one book. Newman considered this assumption an illustration of an act of the illative sense, but, as he said in 1870, "I should now add, the Illative Sense, acting on mistaken elements of thought."<sup>58</sup>

3. In the third place, when arguing we have to determine the value of the kind of arguments used. Newman, then, examined the value of antecedent reasons in some instances. This value varies according to circumstances. When antecedent reasons are negative, they are decisive;<sup>59</sup> when they are positive, then "we cannot adjust the claims of conflicting and heterogenous arguments except by the keen and subtle operation of the Illative Sense." Thus a high and pure character may be a strong antecedent argument against low imputations. Thus Butler's antecedent reasoning from the parallels, discovered in the order of nature, constitute a satisfactory proof against the doctrine that Christianity cannot be of divine origin, though he cannot adduce it positively and decisively in favor of the divine origin of Christian doctrines. Thus unbelievers use the order of nature as an antecedent argument against our belief in miracles. If they confined themselves to the inference: the order of nature makes an exception improbable, there would be no objection to the argument.

All these and many more delicate problems require the constant exercise of the illative sense.<sup>60</sup>

3. *The course of an argument:* Another confirmative proof for the existence of an illative sense may be inferred from the long

57. *Ibid.* 379.

58. *Ibid.* 379-381.

59. See *Franc. Stud.*, vol. 10 (1950), 229.

60. *Gramm.* 381-383.

discussion, mentioned before,<sup>61</sup> about the influence of the illative sense on the course of an argument. Newman illustrates his thesis by considering pre-historic Greece and Rome as described by learned authors, *viz.* Niebuhr, Clinton, Sir George Lewis, Grote and Colonel Mure. After a general introduction, which is quoted above<sup>62</sup> and which stresses the need of an illative sense in this difficult case, he proceeds to give his reflections on the concrete side of the question.

He asks himself how it comes about that these authors disagree so strongly in their conclusions. They are indeed learned and logical thinkers, and they avail themselves of their data with a conscientious care. The answer is this: Their estimation of facts and testimony is personal, and very much bound up with personal assumptions, either implicit or explicit, which find their origin in a personal state of thought; and all these successive processes, so delicate and so subtle, are directed by a power of the mind, which cannot be scientific on account of its very subtlety and spirituality.<sup>63</sup>

Niebuhr, for instance, believed that he had to study, analyse, re-arrange and explain the testimonies of the historians. He called a fact proved when it had been told for centuries and was in harmony with itself and with other facts: "Prescription together with internal consistency was to him the evidence of fact," said Newman. With this principle he could trace the history of the Roman constitution with minute accuracy down to the beginning of the Republic.<sup>64</sup> But Sir George Lewis observes: "Unless he can support those hypotheses by sufficient evidence, they are not entitled to our belief." And Francis Newman: "Niebuhr often expresses much contempt for mere incredulous criticism and negative conclusions; ...yet wisely to disbelieve is our first grand requisite in dealing with materials of mixed worth."<sup>64</sup>

Thus Niebuhr maintained that the Trojan war is a fable with an undeniably historical foundation. But Grote writes that this may be true, yet cannot be proved. Clinton, however, thinks that the old traditional view should be respected till another argument overthrows it. So he lodges the *onus probandi* with the adversaries, whereas Grote and Sir George Lewis throw it upon the advocates

61. *Franc. Stud.*, vol. 10 (1950), 144-145.

62. *Ibid.*

63. *Gramm.* 364.

64. *Ibid.* 365.

of the received account. Colonel Mure does not wish to be so severe.<sup>65</sup>

Newman here infers that these authors would never reach a conclusion if they confined themselves to mere facts. It is the "tacit understandings," "the vague and unpalpable notions of reasonableness" on the one side as well as on the other which make conclusions possible. These conclusions vary with the authors because each of them writes from his own point of view and with his own principles, which do not bear a common measure of mind.<sup>66</sup>

The authors themselves confess this. Thus Colonel Mure observes that only a kind of probability can be inferred from the data for the historicity of the disputed events, and this only as regards their general substance, not as regards the details. Therefore Grote thinks it regrettable that contrary opinions are often so categorically laid down and defended: "it creates a painful sensation of diffidence, when we read the expressions of equal and absolute persuasion with which the two opposite conclusions have both been advanced." Newman quotes some instances of such categorical contradiction.<sup>67</sup>

After this he returns to Niebuhr's methods of investigation, especially his great confidence in internal evidence. Grote, Colonel Mure and Sir George Lewis adduce several objections to its supposed value. Niebuhr appeals to his "tact which determines his judgment and choice among different statements." It enables him with limited data to form an image of things which have not been described by an eye-witness. Sir George Lewis blames him for this divining and guessing. But Newman adds that Niebuhr's principle is obviously the same as he himself should advocate.<sup>68</sup>

These considerations prove that a controversy of this kind cannot be carried on with explicit arguments but that the mind itself uses the data in its own way, much more profoundly and thoroughly than can be done by syllogisms. And this is the action of the illative sense.<sup>69</sup>

65. *Ibid.* 365-367.

66. *Ibid.* 367.

67. *Ibid.* 367-369.

68. *Ibid.* 369-371.

69. *Ibid.* 191.

## D. AN APPLICATION

We have seen that Newman's chief motive for writing the *Grammar of Assent* was his wish to explain the relation between reason and faith and to adjust the claims of secular knowledge and revelation.<sup>70</sup> His psychological discovery, the illative sense, constituted the main theory by means of which he endeavored to gain his end. Hence one fifth of his book is concerned with the application of this doctrine, the relation between inference and assent or the existence and the action of the illative sense, as instanced in a long and fascinating consideration of the grounds for natural and supernatural religion.<sup>71</sup>

The grounds which strike him most and which he is to develop for his readers, are sufficient in his opinion, and he believes that others, too, accept them implicitly or in substance. At any rate people would hold them if they inquired fairly, and they will hold them if they listen to him unless they reject them on account of impediments, invincible or not.<sup>72</sup>

As regards the first part of his discussion, *viz.* the grounds for natural religion, or rather for the necessity of religion as proved from nature, it is almost a hopeless task to summarize Newman's theories. To give a survey, to reconstruct a scheme, is simple enough. But in this way we do not trace the action of the illative sense as a proof for the existence of this faculty. That is why I should like to confine myself to Newman's proofs for revealed religion, after giving the framework of his proofs for natural religion.

Nature furnishes us with three main channels for acquiring the knowledge of religion: our conscience, the common voice of mankind and the course of the world. In other words, three voices teach us God's existence, the voice of conscience, the universal testimony of mankind and the history of society and of the world.<sup>73</sup>

Our great internal teacher of religion is conscience. Newman had already explained in a former chapter<sup>74</sup> how conscience presented us with a living image of God. Now he points out to us how reliable this personal guide is and what it teaches us about God's

70. *Franc. Stud.*, vol. 10 (1950), 120ff.

71. *Gramm.* 386-492.

72. *Ibid.* 386.

73. *Ibid.* 389.

74. *Ibid.* 105-118.

Nature. And the most prominent doctrine brought home to us by conscience is this: God is our Judge and He will punish our evil deeds with justice.<sup>75</sup>

And now the voice of mankind comes in, speaking by means of the different rites and devotions from the beginning of history. We are taught by it that these forms of worship were always founded in one way or other on the sense of guilt and sin, confirming and supplementing what conscience had made us know. True, we find a numberless variety of rites and devotions, but this only proves that man lives in a servile condition and wants expiation, reconciliation and inward change. Especially the notion of atonement stands out by its universality and by its relation to vicarious satisfaction, i.e. a satisfaction given by others in behalf of the sinner.<sup>76</sup>

The third voice sounds from "the system and the course of the world." We feel surprised and dismayed that God's influence on the living world of men is so obscure. It is as if others have conquered His earth. Considering this state in all its aspects we come to the conclusion: Either there is no Creator or God has disowned His creatures. Now, here intervenes the voice of conscience, convinced by its sense of guilt, saying that our iniquities have alienated us from God. Another conspicuous fact in the course of history is the problem of the "amount of suffering, bodily and mental, which is our portion in this life." Here again the common voice of mankind and the teachings of conscience agree in confirming that this, too, is a proof of the "chronic alienation between God and men."<sup>77</sup>

This is the first form in which we learn to know religion. But its gloomy aspect is relieved by other aspects, which we come to know by listening to the same threefold voice. The hope of some happier state in reserve for us, the enjoyment of the real blessings of life, the belief in Providence controlling everything, prayer and its comfort, the anticipation of a revelation, the principle of vicarious satisfaction and atonement, the certainty that good and holy men

75. *Ibid.* 389-391.

76. *Ibid.* 391-396.

77. *Ibid.* 396-400.

intercede for us with God — all these things are cheerful aspects of natural religion.<sup>78</sup>

In order to appreciate these considerations as a proof of the existence of the illative sense, we should read and re-read every line of Newman's argument; we should let every sentence penetrate our minds; we should study the passage as a whole. In this way we should gradually apprehend his ideas; we should take them in and develop them in our own individual way. We should assimilate them and fit them in with the circumstances of our individual lives, with our actual knowledge, with our temperament and our feelings, and this will make them real. The conclusion would follow spontaneously and assent would be a matter of course. If we are Christians we will most naturally connect all this with our notions of Christianity, but Newman believes to have proved that we can infer a natural religion, independently of Revelation, though he is compelled to confess that natural religion in its highest form and development will not occur without inward graces, gained by Christ, nor without traditions which still live among primitive peoples and have their origin in the revelations of Paradise.<sup>79</sup>

There may be those who object that this proof for the existence of a God and the necessity of religion is too personal and therefore not objectively justified. They may say that Newman has only considered the fact from the point of view of his own individual experiences, under the aspects which presented themselves spontaneously to his mind, and by the aid of his own illative sense. His answer, however, is: "I only do on one side of the question what those who think differently do on the other. As they start with one set of first principles, I start with another." Moreover, he knew that hundreds and thousands felt what he felt.<sup>80</sup>

This refutation is at the same time an introduction to his proof for the truth of Revelation, i.e. for the truth of the Catholic Religion.<sup>81</sup> Here everything depends on first principles, which in their turn require a certain preparation of mind. Here, too, he does

78. *Ibid.* 400-408.

79. *Ibid.* 408.

80. *Ibid.* 409-410.

81. Newman does not use the word Catholicism but Christianity, evidently, meaning the Catholic Religion. See also Ward, *Life* I, 121: "Catholicism and Christianity had in my mind become identical".

not intend to give a mathematical demonstration although his thesis is intrinsically, objectively, and abstractly demonstrable. Furthermore, he prefers to rely on an accumulation of probabilities, which may construct legitimate proof, verified and warranted by the illative sense.<sup>82</sup>

As light is not recognized by a blind man, so the truth of Catholicism is not recognized by those who lack the necessary preparation of mind and do not assent to the essential first principles and assumptions.<sup>83</sup> Not only Aristotle asks this preparation of mind, but Holy Scripture too, especially regarding revealed religion, as Newman shows with many texts.<sup>84</sup>

He thought it pleasant to his own feelings to follow the theologian Amort in corroboration of his thesis on converging probabilities. This theological writer enjoyed great authority at the time and had dedicated to the great Pope Benedict XIV a work entitled: *A new, modest, and easy way of demonstrating the Catholic Religion*. It was written against Protestants. His easy way consisted in the arguments of greater probability. So Newman concluded that from probabilities a good proof could be constructed, sufficient for certitude.<sup>85</sup>

What Aristotle and Holy Scripture require, Newman, too, asks from his readers, *viz.* a certain preparation of mind, consisting in assent to the propositions which we have just been mentioning as regards natural religion and of the first principles and assumptions related to it.<sup>86</sup>

It would be foolish to prove the truth of Catholicism in this way for those who e.g. do not see the difference between moral and physical evil, who hold that knowledge is virtue and ignorance vice, that sin is a bugbear and not a reality, that the only true religion consists in acting our part well in this world, that it is useless to inquire into a future life since it is all a matter of guessing.<sup>87</sup>

If anyone should object that the religious rites and doctrines of paganism are notoriously immoral so that Newman has no

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82. *Gramm.* 410-415.

83. *Ibid.* 410.

84. *Ibid.* 114-115.

85. See E. Amort, *Ethica Christiana. Gramm.* 411-412.

86. *Gramm.* 416, 417, 418.

87. *Ibid.* 416.

right to appeal to them for the first elements of natural religion, he answers that they had also their better side and that he considers their teachings and traditions only in so far as they agree with our moral sense. In this way he corrects the common voice of mankind by the voice of conscience because no religion can be from God if it contradicts our sense of right and wrong, supposing, of course, that we have satisfactorily ascertained what the dictates of our moral nature are and that we apply them rightly.<sup>88</sup>

One of the most important elements of Newman's proof for Catholicism is the anticipation that a revelation will be given, and this anticipation is one of the main effects of Natural Religion. Natural Religion makes us see the wounds of our souls and the infinite goodness of God, so that it becomes probable to us that a Revelation will be granted. When the mind is penetrated by this strong anticipation, it will want very few positive proofs, as appears from the conversion of Dionysius and Damaris at Athens where St. Paul worked no miracles.<sup>89</sup> Paley, however, the Anglican Apologist, seems to think otherwise. When defending the truth of Christianity, he reasons more or less like a mathematician; he does not suppose anything; he does not require any preparation of mind. You need but accept his syllogisms. This method has something which looks like charity, but Newman is suspicious of it. Those who lack religious earnestness and do not feel the need of a revelation, will always find new arguments against Paley's abstractly convincing proofs. We must not consider these problems as a lawer does legal proceedings and legal arguments "with dispassionateness, a judicial temper, clearheadedness and candour."

Men are too well inclined to sit at home, instead of stirring themselves to inquire whether a revelation has been given; they expect its evidences to come to them without their trouble; they act, not as suppliants, but as judges. Modes of argument such as Paley's encourage this state of mind; they allow men to forget that revelation is a boon, not a debt on the part of the Giver; they treat it as a mere historical phenomenon. If I were told that some great man, a foreigner, whom I did not know, had come into town, and was on his way to call on me, and to go over my house, I should send to ascertain the fact, and meanwhile should do my best to put my house into a condition to receive him. He would not be pleased if

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88. *Ibid.* 418-419.

89. *Ibid.* 422-424.

I left the matter to take its chance, and went on the maxim that seeing is believing.<sup>90</sup>

Referring to Paley's argument from miracles, Newman observes that besides miracles there are other circumstances which point to an unmistakably divine influence. A number of circumstances, taken together, may form a proof of revelation. This does not mean that after all they do not require a miraculous intervention but this is contained in an aggregate of these circumstances. And it is by means of the illative sense that prepared minds recognize God's presence in these indications.

For instance, if I am a believer in a God of Truth and Avenger of dishonesty, and know for certain that a market-woman, after calling on Him to strike her dead if she had in her possession a piece of money not hers, did fall down on the spot, and that the money was found in her hand, how can I call this a blind coincidence, and not discern in it an act of Providence over and above its general laws? So, certainly, thought the inhabitants of an English town, when they erected a pillar as a record of such an event at the place where it occurred.<sup>91</sup>

Has the antecedent probability of a revelation been fulfilled? It is clear, says Newman, that only one religion can claim to be the realization of this anticipation. There is but one religion which answers the aspirations, the needs and hopes of natural faith and devotion. And he then enumerates a long series of reasons from which appears the divine origin of Christianity and why it surpasses all other religions, no matter how old and wide-spread they may be, so that he feels himself justified in saying: "Either Christianity is from God, or a revelation has not yet been given to us."<sup>92</sup>

Mentioning old religions he is brought to the consideration of the Jewish religion as the first step in the direct evidence for Christianity. He collects a mass of miraculous facts which have such a force that even in themselves they prove to a pious mind the certainty of the Jewish and Catholic Religions. He masterfully paints in a few powerful strokes the singular position of the Jews in an entirely polytheistic world; he describes their privileges, their excellencies, their gifts which made them surpass other peoples: their ever growing Revelation, their theocracy, their religious books,

90. *Ibid.* 424-427.

91. *Ibid.* 427-429.

92. *Ibid.* 429-431.

their prophets and their anticipation of a perfect fulfilment of their hopes, the time of which they knew beforehand.<sup>93</sup> When the time had come we see how one of their prophecies, pronounced centuries before, finds its realization with an awful accuracy: the Jews are overthrown, their holy City is destroyed, and the remainder of the people is scattered all over the earth to wander everywhere, not absorbed in other peoples, without rest, in many persecutions. Why did God's protection not follow them for ever? They were not to disappear, but they would change into a new people, more wonderful even than before. There was to come a King, a Messiah, who was to expand the dominion of their people over the entire world! Abraham had been promised that his descendants were to conquer and to occupy the whole earth. Was this not part of the covenant with God?<sup>94</sup>

If, then, we read the conditions contained in this covenant written in the sacred books, we find an explanation for this apparent contradiction. The Jews did not live up to those terms, they neglected them, and therefore the trials, prophesied with emphasis and detail, fell on them, whereas in Catholicism, born from the Jewish religion, being the perfection of it, were fulfilled the glorious promises. When the Jews had committed their unpardonable sin, Christianity began its journey from Jerusalem to conquer the whole world:<sup>95</sup>

The fact that Christianity actually has done what Judaism was to have done, decides the controversy, by logic of facts, in favour of Christianity. The prophecies announced that the Messiah was to come at a definite time and place; Christians point to Him as coming then and there, as announced; they are not met by any counterclaim or rival claimant on the part of the Jews, only by their assertion that He did not come at all, though up to the event they had said He was then and there coming. Further, Christianity clears up the mystery which hangs over Judaism, accounting fully for the punishment of the people, by specifying their sin, their heinous sin. If, instead of hailing their own Messiah, they crucified Him, then the strange scourge which has pursued them after the deed, and the energetic wording of the curse before it, are explained by the very strangeness of their guilt; —or rather, their sin is their punishment; for in rejecting their Divine King, they *ipso facto* lost the living principle and tie of their nationality. Moreover we see what led them into error; they thought a triumph and an empire were

93. *Ibid.* 432-433.

94. *Ibid.* 433-435.

95. *Ibid.* 435-438.

to be given to them at once, which were given indeed eventually, but by the slow and gradual growth of many centuries and long warfare.<sup>96</sup>

Newman summarizes all this in one beautiful page and makes the probabilities converge in such a way that this phenomenon of cumulative marvels raises the probability, both for Judaism and Christianity, in religious minds, almost to a certainty.<sup>97</sup>

Then he proceeds to examine more closely the character and value of the Jewish prophecies. Everyone grants that they were written down long before Christianity arrived. Therefore they must be either happy conjectures or real predictions. The Jews gathered from their sacred writings that a mighty personality was to be born of their race, who was to conquer the whole earth and to be the instrument of extraordinary blessings; that he was to appear at a fixed time, and even at such a time as our Lord really was born into this world. On the strength of many texts Newman proves the truth of these statements. In the oldest books of Holy Scripture it was said distinctly and emphatically: "One man, born of the chosen tribe, was the destined minister of blessing to the whole world; and the race as presented by that tribe, was to lose its old self in gaining a new self in Him." From its beginning Judaism had been destined for that end and this anticipation constituted its life. The first revelations, given in succession, were discontinued for a long time so as to imprint them effectually on the minds of men. And indeed, the Jews had thus understood them so that even the pagan historians Tacitus and Suetonius witness this by their writings. With the Jewish author Josephus they recount the strong belief of the Eastern peoples that at that time a man was to rise from Judah who was to govern the whole world. If we consider what happened in the event, we may call it at least a remarkable coincidence of facts so linked up with other remarkable circumstances as to make us even think of a miracle. For exactly at that junction of time the Saviour appeared as a teacher and founded not only a religion but an empire indeed, a militant kingdom, a ruling Catholic Church, which wished to profit all peoples by incorporating them all. The contest began at that moment and has been continued till the present. The blessings have come and

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96. *Ibid.* 438.

97. *Ibid.* 439-440.

continue to come: millions and millions, who otherwise would live and die in irreligiousness, now receive an intelligent notion about God; great social anomalies and miseries were done away with; the female sex was restored to its dignity; the poor received protection; slavery was abolished; literature and philosophy were encouraged and they helped to the development and civilization of mankind. It is impossible that these facts, seen in their relation to other facts, should have taken place without direct intervention of God. Now we know that many more prophecies become clear, and we see the truth of apparently contradictory predictions. Now we understand e.g. how the Messiah could suffer and conquer at once; how His Kingdom could be Jewish in structure and yet evangelic in spirit; and how its members could be children of Abraham and at the same time "sinners of the Gentiles."<sup>98</sup>

The prophecies of Christianity did not stop with the predictions of the Old Testament. When it arose new prophecies were given, which not only explain the former and solve their difficult parts, but constitute a new proof of miraculous prescience.<sup>99</sup>

Newman draws attention to the fact that the Messiah, quite unlike the Evangelists, shows little conscious dependence on the old prophecies. He took His own course without being careful to accomodate Himself to them and He does not so much recur to past predictions as He utters new ones.<sup>100</sup>

From the beginning of his public life Christ resisted the interpretations given by the Jews about the universality of his Kingdom. He admitted a certain universality but He could not comply with conquests by means of the sword. He wished a heavenly Kingdom, supernatural in essence, developing and conquering by preaching not by contest, by persuasion not by force. And this wish was no "afterthought upon trial and experience," but a clear prophecy of the Founder, long before His empire came into being.<sup>101</sup>

The old prophecies spoke about preaching, too, when they mentioned the victories of the Messiah, but the same Psalm which sings of those "who preach good tidings" sings also of their

98. *Ibid.* 440-447.

99. *Ibid.* 447-448.

100. *Ibid.* 448-449.

101. *Ibid.* 450-452.

King's "foot being dipped in the blood of His enemies." Nevertheless, Christ himself speaks only about preaching and suffering, about persecutions and hatred, about perseverance till the end. Is that the proper encouragement for those who are going to start such a labor? "Do men in this way send out their soldiers to battle, or their sons to Australia?" The Apostles, too, pointed to the necessity of sufferings and roused the first disciples to think of the examples given by the Prophets "of suffering evil, of labour and patience." And the first preachers saw no difficulty in a prospect so hopeless, as we observe in the words and the examples of St. Paul.<sup>102</sup>

The old prophecies had predicted a divine empire in which He would reign in wonderful peace and justice. But from the beginning Christ in a sense corrected this prophecy and interpreted it by predicting that a great number of its subjects would be a scandal and an injury to it; that the good and the bad would be found in it as at a marriage feast; that there would be noxious seed growing up amid the good; that only at the end of the world the wicked would be separated from the just. He foretold ambition and rivalry and even grosser sins in its leading members. And all these things have come true as we know.<sup>103</sup>

Is it not strange and inexplicable that Christ announces the victory and the dominion of Christianity all over the world, to be gained not by force of arms, but by the new instrument of holiness and sufferings? If the Orleans family or a branch of the Hohenzollern wished to found a kingdom only by the practice of virtue, would this not startle us exceedingly? Would not we be as much overwhelmed with wonder as were the Jews when our Lord revealed his plans to them? Nevertheless, Christ's prophecy has been fulfilled. How could this be without some Divine Power?<sup>104</sup>

But leaving alone the prophecies, let us consider whether the rise and the establishment of Catholicism can be explained by moral, social or political causes.

Gibbon has enumerated five causes of the kind, which, when combined, fairly account for the fact. But he did not account for

102. *Ibid.* 452-454.

103. *Ibid.* 454-456.

104. *Ibid.* 456-457.

their combination; hence nothing has been proved. How did it come to pass that all these factors were found together: the zeal of the Christians, their doctrine of a future state, their claim to miraculous power, their virtues and their ecclesiastical organization? How could a multitude of heathens be influenced with Jewish zeal? How could this impetuous zeal submit to a strict ecclesiastical discipline? How is a secular organization related to the immortality of the soul? How could the philosophical doctrine of the immortality of the soul lead to belief in miracles, which is but superstition? How could miracles and magic develop such power as to change men and make them austere virtuous? Lastly, how could a code of virtues as calm and enlightened as that of Antoninus generate a zeal as that of Maccabaeus? Moreover, the point is this: Are these historical characteristics of Christianity really the actual historical causes of its rise? Has Gibbon proved this? Or is it only an hypothesis, a conjecture? He may believe that they were sufficient to produce millions of Christians but have they produced them in fact? That is the crucial point.<sup>105</sup>

Newman considers whether these five characteristics really are the historical causes of Christianity as claimed by Gibbon; i.e. whether they were strong enough to convert great numbers of men to Christianity. His conclusion comes to this: not only have these characteristics *de facto* not effected these conversions, but they did not even have the power to effect them.<sup>106</sup>

Why did not Gibbon study the facts instead of devising theories? Why did not he start with the theories of faith, hope and charity? Did he never hear about repentance and faith in Christ? Did not he remember the writings of the Apostles, Bishops, Apologists and Martyrs, which constitute one testimony? No, this was impossible because "he needs the due formation for such an exercise of mind."<sup>107</sup>

And now Newman himself proceeds to consider the facts. It will be difficult to find a more fascinating and illuminating survey of this rise and the development of Christianity caused by the influence of the image of Christ.

105. *Ibid.* 457-458.

106. *Ibid.* 458-462.

107. *Ibid.* 462-463.

A Deliverer of the human race through the Jewish nation had been promised from time immemorial. The day came when he was to appear, and He was eagerly expected; moreover, One actually did make His appearance at that date in Palestine, and claimed to be He. He left the earth without apparently doing much for the object of His coming. But when He was gone, His disciples took upon themselves to go forth to preach to all parts of the earth with the object of preaching Him, and collecting converts in *His Name*. After a little while they are found wonderfully to have succeeded. Large bodies of men in various places are to be seen, professing to be His disciples, owning Him as their King, and continually swelling in number and penetrating into the populations of the Roman Empire; at length they convert the Empire itself. All this is historical fact. Now, we want to know the farther historical fact, *viz.* the cause of their conversion; in other words, what were the topics of that preaching which was so effective? If we believe what is told us by the preachers and their converts, the answer is plain. They "preached Christ"; they called on men to believe, hope, and place their affections, in that Deliverer who had come and gone; and the moral instrument by which they persuaded them to do so, was a description of the life, character, mission, and power of that Deliverer, a promise of His invisible Presence and Protection here, and of the Vision and Fruition of Him hereafter. From first to last to Christians, as to Abraham, He Himself is the centre and fulness of the dispensation. They, as Abraham, "see His day, and are glad."

A temporal sovereign makes himself felt by means of his subordinate administrators, who bring his power and will to bear upon every individual of his subjects who personally do not know him; the universal Deliverer, long expected, when He came, He too, instead of making and securing subjects by a visible graciousness or majesty, departs;—but is found, through His preachers, to have imprinted the Image or idea of Himself in the minds of His subjects individually; and that Image, apprehended and worshipped in individual minds, becomes a principle of association, and a real bond of those subjects one with another, who are thus united to the body by being united to that Image; and moreover that Image, which is their moral life, when they have been already converted, is also the original instrument of their conversion. It is the Image of Him who fulfils the one great need of human nature, the Healer of its wounds, the Physician of the soul, this Image it is which both creates faith, and then rewards it.<sup>108</sup>

This vivifying idea, this central Image, this thought of Christ explains indeed two of Gibbon's causes: the zeal of the Christians and the hope of an eternal life. If you like to call this a miracle, you are right. For it is impossible that this one idea should inspire myriads of people, men, women and children, of all ranks and conditions of life, especially the lower, redeem them from their sinful habits, strengthen them in the most horrible torments and influence them constantly for seven or eight generations till a world-

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108. *Ibid.* 463-464.

wide organization had been founded, the resistance of the strongest and wisest government of the civilized world had been broken, and the idea itself had made its way triumphantly from caves and catacombs to imperial power.<sup>109</sup>

Then Newman proceeds to describe this new idea from the words of St. Paul, St. Peter and St. John, and how they thought it the central principle of Christian doctrine and Christian life.<sup>110</sup> He shows how the Apostles and the first Christians belonged to the lower classes,<sup>111</sup> how their numbers were very great even in the earliest times, so great that they alarmed the pagans,<sup>112</sup> and how the devotion to Christ was considered as the vivifying principle of unity among the Christians.<sup>113</sup> The heathens, too, inquired into the causes of this wonderful phenomenon: educated minds attributed it to the obstinacy of Christians and the populace to their magical powers,<sup>114</sup> but their persecutions could not break their constancy; on the contrary, they strengthened the powerful energy of mind and excited the enthusiasm even of children, weak young girls and aged people.<sup>115</sup> "Does Gibbon think to sound the depths of the eternal ocean with the tape and measuring-rod of his merely literary philosophy?" Newman asks.<sup>116</sup> Christianity and no other religion is the necessary complement of natural religion, which is only a mere inchoation. At the same time it is the fulfilment of the promise made to Abraham, and of the revelations received by Moses. That is why the Roman power could not resist it successfully and why even now it shows a wonderful mysterious power, in spite of formidable adversaries, and why it heals the deep wounds of human nature: "It is a living truth which never can grow old."<sup>117</sup>

There are those who consider religion as something historical, merely abstract conclusions from dumb documents and dead facts. It is, however, always living and exercises an easily perceptible influence by means of faith and by its ever-recurring gifts.<sup>118</sup>

109. *Ibid.* 465.

110. *Ibid.* 466.

111. *Ibid.* 467-469.

112. *Ibid.* 469-472, 474-476.

113. *Ibid.* 472-474.

114. *Ibid.* 476-477.

115. *Ibid.* 477-485.

116. *Ibid.* 483.

117. *Ibid.* 486-487.

118. *Ibid.* 487-489.

Our communion with it is in the unseen, not in the obsolete. At this very day its rites and ordinances are continually eliciting the active interposition of that Omnipotence in which the Religion long ago began. First and above all is the Holy Mass, in which He who once died for us upon the Cross, brings back and perpetuates, by His literal presence in it, that one and the same sacrifice which cannot be repeated. Next, there is the actual entrance of Himself, soul and body and divinity, into the soul and body of every worshipper who comes to Him for the gift, a privilege more intimate than if we lived with Him during His long-past sojourn upon earth. And then, moreover, there is His personal abidance in our churches, raising earthly service into a foretaste of heaven. Such is the profession of Christianity, and, I repeat, its very divination of our needs is in itself a proof that it is really the supply of them.

Upon the doctrines which I have mentioned as central truths, others, as we all know, follow, which rule our personal conduct and course of life, and our social and civil relations. The promised Deliverer, the Expectation of the nations, has not done His work by halves. He has given us Saints and Angels for our protection. He has taught us how by our prayers and services to benefit our departed friends, and to keep up a memorial of ourselves when we are gone. He has created a visible hierarchy and a succession of sacraments to be the channels of His mercies, and the crucifix; secures the thought of Him in every house and chamber. In all these ways He brings Himself before us. I am not speaking of His gifts as gifts but as memorials; not as what Christians know they convey, but in their visible character; and I say, that, as human nature itself is still in life and action as much as ever it was, so He too lives, to our imaginations, by His visible symbols, as if He were on earth, with a practical efficacy which even unbelievers cannot deny, so as to be the corrective of that nature, and its strength, day by day,—and that this power of perpetuating His Image, being altogether singular and special, and the prerogative of Him and Him alone, is a grand evidence how well He fulfils to this day that Sovereign Mission which, from the first beginning of the world's history, has been in prophecy assigned to Him.<sup>119</sup>

Newman could not have finished his book in a better way than by illustrating his long argument for Catholicism by referring to Napoleon's words on the living and vivifying Thought of Christ which he gave "in the solitude of his imprisonment and in the view of death."<sup>120</sup>

This, then, is the application of Newman's doctrine of the illative sense to prove the truth of Catholicism. It is only one of the many arguments which might be given.<sup>121</sup>

### (Conclusion)

119. *Ibid.* 488-489.

120. *Ibid.* 489-491.

121. *Ibid.* 491-492.

## THE NEWMAN-MEYNELL CORRESPONDENCE

WHILE writing the *Grammar of Assent* Newman was fully aware of the fact that he was trying to penetrate a *terra incognita* which might prove dangerous. He confessed that he did not feel at home in the philosophical literature of the Catholic Schools and he realized that many errors might have crept into his teachings. Hence he looked for somebody who could guard him against dangers and pitfalls. Now Dr. Charles Meynell, Professor of Philosophy at the Seminary of Oscott near Birmingham, had let him know at one time that he appreciated very much his University Sermons. Parts of this book dealt with the same subject as the Grammar although much more concisely. This led Newman to ask Meynell whether he would be so kind as to look through the text before it was published.<sup>1</sup>

Ward calls Meynell "a trained scholastic philosopher and theologian." But from his letters it will be clear that this statement must not be taken in its literal sense. He seems rather an eclectic and we may say that his appreciation of Scholastic Philosophy does not appear to be very high. As to his character, he proves to be a very modest man, who shows the profoundest veneration for Newman is far superior to himself in every respect, so much so, that one might even suspect an inferiority complex. Nevertheless, he always faithfully formulated and unravelled every objection against Newman's doctrine which came into his mind while reading the sheets.

Some of the letters printed here have already been published in Ward's biography of Newman. These are reprinted here since in some instances they were published only in part, and since, furthermore, we consider the publishing of the complete correspondence helpful to the skein of thought as well as timely. The other letters inserted by the author as an appendix to his dissertation printed in Dutch contained many inaccuracies and were incomplete due to

1. See Wilfrid Ward, *The Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman* (New impression, London: Longmans, Green, and Co.) II, 243, 255-256.

their edition having been made from a copy of the original. They are here presented for the first time in English-speaking countries.<sup>2</sup>

The details of the manuscript text of the correspondence may be related in a few words. The Oratorian Fathers of Birmingham preserve an immense collection of letters, a collection steadily growing thanks to their searching out as many manuscripts as they may discover whether in copies or the originals. This collection, at the time of Wilfrid Ward's biography, was as yet incomplete as to the present correspondence. Ward himself says in his chapter on the *Grammar of Assent* that he could not find the text of Meynell's criticisms (Cf. Ward, ed. 1913, II, 255). The correspondence now gathered together in the Meynell file of the Oratory Archives is here presented.

It must be borne in mind that we have edited this correspondence *exactly* as found in the original: no attempt has been made to supply punctuation, alter spelling, italicize titles of books, or anything of this sort. We consider an edition of this kind at the same time more interesting and more valuable.

We avail myself of the present opportunity to thank Fr. Henry Tristram of the Oratory for his kindly giving us permission in August 1950 to reprint the full text in *Franciscan Studies*.

### 1. *Meynell to Newman.*<sup>3</sup>

Dear Dr. Newman — If you think I can be of any use I send you my address for the next ten or twelve days:

13 George Street, Wolverhampton.

I wish you heartily the joy of the season.

Sincerely and respectfully  
Charles Meynell.

### 2. *Newman to Meynell.*

July 2, 1869.

At length, on an auspicious day, I send you my sheets. The printers have only sent the second this morning.

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2. Cf. Newman's *Leer over het Menselijk Denken* (Utrecht, 1943).

3. This Letter bears no date; it was written probably about Easter 1869 and is apparently an answer to Newman's request as to whether Dr. Meynell would be willing to correct the proofs.

Your experienced eye will see if I have run into any language which offends against doctrinal propriety or common sense. Thanking you for your trouble,

Very sincerely yours  
John H. Newman.

### 3. *Meynell to Newman.*

(July 1869)

Because I send it back immediately by return of post please don't think I have not read it with the utmost care and interest. I felt squeamish when I saw it, thinking how much you gave me credit for knowing beyond what I know, but I determined immediately to put down this feeling as standing in the way of what you required of me. I was relieved at finding nothing for me to do.

Only one passage made me pause where it is said that nothing exists objectively except the *Individual*;<sup>4</sup> in the application of which statement to the doctrine of the H. Trinity I remembered that Roscelin got himself into trouble, but I reflected that the Church never condemned the principle but only its wrong application. Then it occurred to me that St. Thomas, according to Liberatore, held the same doctrine, and I quoted him as holding it in my pamphlet.— 'Fr. Liberatore calls him a realist; but he admitted the fundamental doctrine of the conceptualists, that nothing exists, objectively, besides the individuals with that ratio of resemblance which is the foundation of the "universals".' I looked in St. Thomas to find a passage, but could not find one to suit exactly, though I feel quite sure enough in my own mind. Well this will show that I am doing my duty.

I also remembered carefully your injunction as to silence.

### 4. *Newman to Meynell.*

(July 4, 1869)

I thank you very much both for your anxious attention to my sheets and for your despatch. I have altered the passage about 'individual'. What I relied on was the 'Sacro-sanctæ et individuae

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4. The reference is probably to the *Grammar of Assent*, (Standard Edition, Longmans, Green, and Co.: London) p. 9.

'Trinitatis' — but I was aware that the word 'individual' was unsuited, if *directly* applied to the Holy Trinity or the Divine Being under the notion that the word stood for instances of an infima species differing only in number, which would be classing God with His creatures. I am glad you had not other things to remark.

If you will allow me to inflict on you the charitable trouble of looking at some other sheets, I am not certain that you will not suddenly light on a wasp-nest, though I have no *suspicion* of it --- but where a matter has not been one's study it is difficult to have confidence in oneself.

P.S. I ought before now to have thanked you for your Pamphlet, and said a word about it. I thought it very clever and very amusing, and that Fr. Liberatori caught it, but I wish I knew enough on the main subject to have a right to an opinion.

### *5. Meynell to Newman.*

July 24, 1869. I am so pleased with it. It systematizes many random thoughts which I have had, and gives the account and reason of those incompatibilities, of which Mansel only stated the existence. And the illustrations make it easy to follow and pleasant to read. I hope you will pardon my praising it, which is an impertinence on my part, and not the business I have to do.

In order to save my modesty I have hit upon the following plan. I adopt the printer's plan of putting Q's<sup>5</sup> to the passages I wish to remark upon, and these Q's I wish to be considered exactly in the same light as you would consider the printer's — some of which may hit an oversight, while others are to be pooh-poohed, and others, perhaps, to be laughed at, as only betraying the querist's own ignorance. But I will append notes to the passages Q'd to show why the crooked letter was affixed to them.

Q1. Chap. IV p.34.<sup>6</sup> 'I do not think it unfair reasoning thus to identify the apprehension with its object.'

Q2. p.43.<sup>7</sup> 'A mystery is a proposition . . . or is a statement of the inconceivable': Q stêt? (But I see the correction is intended to be expunged.)

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5. Q = query. These queries are questions in connection with the text of the Grammar.

6. Gramm., p. 36.

7. *Ibid.* 45.

Q3. p.45.<sup>8</sup> 'Whereas the *paralogism* lies' etc. Qu. Antilog?

Q4. p.47.<sup>9</sup> 'Our notions of things are *never* commensurate with the things themselves'. Q. *almost* never?

Q5. p.49.<sup>10</sup> The Supreme Being is rather to be considered a *monad* than a *unit*. QQ.

Q6. p.49.<sup>10a</sup> 'If I deny the possibility of two straight lines inclosing a space... I do so because a straight line is a notion and nothing more, *not a thing of which I have an image*, and an imperfect one.' Q.

Please pardon me, if I am in anything guilty of a usurpation and meddling in matters which do not belong to me in the remarks I am going to make.

Qu.1. I thought *identify* too strong a word in this place, and that more is said than is meant. The absolute identification of subject and object is Hegelianism. Of course this was not meant. But *even in thought* is there not always an antithesis between subject and object? between the act of apprehension and its object?

Qu.2 explains itself.

Qu.3. I don't know how the word *paralogism* is used in ordinary English, but the word is used by Kant exclusively to designate a halt conclusion where the reasoning goes beyond its data ( $\pi\alpha\varrho\alpha$ ). The incompatibilities you refer to he calls antilogies, which name they have retained. Please see if this distinction be worth anything.

Qu.4. Isn't it too much to say that our notions are *never* commensurate with things? Is not my notion of dirt, as, for instance, 'the right thing in the wrong place' commensurate with the thing thought about? And when we use, for the sake of emphasis identical propositions ('a man's a man for a' that') — is it not of the very essence of such propositions that the thought should be commensurate with the things?<sup>11</sup>

Qu.5. The distinction between a monad and a unit is rather sharp. (I suppose a unit is one of many, while monad refers not to number at all, but to the absence of the note of divisibility. — A

8. *Ibid.* 47.

9. *Ibid.* 49.

10. *Ibid.* 51.

11. Footnote added by Meynell: "However there is a sense in which the proposition is plainly true. We don't know anything fully."

word or so within brackets to explain the distinction? Or do your own words sufficiently explain it, and it's only my own dulness?)

Qu.6. Should not the words 'not a thing of which I have an image' be within hooks? Because when I read it first, I referred the words 'and an imperfect one' to 'image'; but it is clear they belong to 'notion'.

'Commas and points they set exactly right  
And 't were a sin to rob them of their mite.'

Now about the doctrine. Does it not imply or seem to imply, as it stands ('because a straight line is a notion and nothing more') that *absolutely speaking* two straight lines may enclose a space? But the axioms concerning time and space are *necessary* axioms. Does not this seem to imply that necessary truth is only notional? And if necessary truth is only notional in one order of things, is it not equally open to say that it is only notional in another, and would not thus intrinsic morality be jeopardized? Perhaps all this criticism is premature: perhaps it is not pertinent. But I think it worth while to make it. For I remember that the Saturday Review considered that one of the weakest points in Mill's critique on Hamilton was his holding the view that 'if there were a universe in which whosoever two pairs of things were contemplated by the mind, the Almighty always created a fifth thing, in such a world two-and-two would make five!'

Please look at p.48<sup>12</sup> where I have ventured to correct the printer. 'Phocians or Ciceros' surely it ought to be — not Phocians.

I am really quite horrified at the *sang froid* of these criticisms of mine. Pray say that you forgive me.

P.S. I see that there is another way still in which the passage at p.49 may be grammatically construed; so I give it up, and am glad I called attention to it.

#### 6. Newman to Meynell.<sup>13</sup>

July 25, 1869. I thank you very much for your criticisms which will be very useful to me.

The only one which I feel a difficulty about is that about two straight lines inclosing a space. I cannot for the life of me, and

12. *Gramm.* 50.

13. This Letter is partly given by Ward, *Life II*, 256.

never have, put it on a level with the Moral Law. Lines are our own creation, the Moral Law is in the Nature of God Himself. The only thing which is not *ours* in reasoning is that 'if it is true that A is, it is not true that A is not.' But this foundation being allowed, lines are our own creation. They do not exist in nature. Who ever saw a line? it is an abstraction.

However, the next sheet will be my great difficulty — and I should not wonder if it was decisive one way or the other. You will find I there consider that the dictate of conscience is particular — not general — and that from the multiplication of particulars I *infer* the general — so that the moral sense, as a knowledge generally of the moral law, is a deduction of particulars.

Next, that this dictate of conscience, which is natural and the voice of God, is a moral *instinct*, and its own evidence as the *belief* in an external world is an *instrict* on the apprehension of sensible phenomena.

That to *deny* these instincts is an absurdity, because they are the voice of nature.

That it is a duty to trust or rather to use our nature —and not to do so is absurdity.

That to recognize our nature is really to *recognize God*.

Hence those *instincts* come from *God* — and as the moral law is an inference or generalisation from those instincts, the moral law is ultimately taught us from *God*, whose nature it is.

Now if this is a wasp-nest tell me. If the Church has said otherwise, I give it all up — but somehow it is so mixed up with my whole book, that, if it is not safe, I shall not go on.

### 7. *Meynell to Newman.*

July 26, 1864. Dear Dr. Newman — There is no wasp's nest at all, in the sense you mean. And if you were to give up the work, I should grieve to the last day of my life that I ever, though in fear and trembling, expressed any opinion on the matter. I feel convinced that the book will do great good. And I have not the slightest doubt but that you are allowed to hold what you hold. If so then why did I say anything about my own hobby of Necessity? Because I wished to say everything about the matters submitted to me at the risk of being impertinent, rather than omit anything which might

prove pertinent. In fact I wished to leave it to you to judge what was of use and what was of none. What I think is of very little importance to anybody; but I thought it important, or might be important to say what others would say, and if I were mistaken there would be no harm done. If you had said 'Ne sutor ultra crepidam' I might have deserved it but I should still have thought that I erred on the right side. And still, if I say anything to no purpose (and I very probably may) please take it as not said.

I consider that in matters of philosophy one cannot please everybody. If I take one view I am at war with one set of thinkers, if another with another. Coleridge said (or rather Schlegel said it first) that every man is born either a Platonist or an Aristotelian: at any rate every man is either one or the other. Be realist, like me, and you will get, or may get into hot water: be conceptualist, and I cannot promise you a better fate. The bother of the thing is that one must be either one or the other. Well, I am prosing. Isn't it enough that the Church allows you to say what you say, and that every moderate well-regulated mind will allow you to say it? They will say very likely, 'I cannot say it on my principles, because I don't see how it is reconcileable (*sic*) with certain primary truths of reason and revelation;<sup>14</sup> but *he* can say it because he thinks it is reconcileable with such principles.' I say the Church is a good Mother, and will condemn no man for his Logic. You do not hold as necessary and à (*sic*) priori some principles which I think are so; whereas if I denied these to be such, it seems, I should have to go on and deny all the others. I am sorry indeed that this is the case, for the love of approbation is very strong in me, and I would very far rather agree with you than differ from you. But this does not injure in my eyes the real good that the book will do. Indeed it seems that I agree with the statements; though something is implied that the School to which I belong would not agree with. But does this matter? Still I thought it well to call attention to the fact.

Look please, if you have patience, how I stand.

I used to hold, at the age of twenty, that all truth was derived from, and is an abstraction upon experience; and should have added that the only necessary truth, really, is that 'a thing cannot be and not be at the same time'. I think this goes a little beyond what you

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14. This word is indistinctly written; it may be *and* as *or*.

say to me in your letter; but I never heard, then or since that I am forbidden by the Church to hold this view, if I like.

Since then I read Cousin, Rosmini, Gioberti, Kant, and others, and have also struck out a line of my own. And now I say: That the principle of contradiction itself would not be a necessary truth, if it were not for the element of *Time* that is brought into it. For Reason does not forbid me to hold that one thing may not become another thing; but only that it cannot be another *in the same time*. Kant's arguments had convinced me before I read Hamilton's approbation of them, that the intuition of time is *a priori* a necessary: because we cannot annihilate in thought the *scheme* in which all changes are possible, though we may so annihilate the changes themselves. So with space. Hence the axioms of Time and Space are necessary axioms. I do not, cannot think it possible that, say in Sirius two straight lines enclose a space. True I never say a straight line. I suppose, as you say, that a straight line is an abstraction, from experience; but the element of necessity which attaches to space, and to the axioms concerning space, is not from experience, because everything which I experience is contingent. Time and space account for most necessary axioms.

Then there is the principle of causation. It is necessary. That things have causes, I know indeed by experience; but not that they *must* have causes; for this axiom carries me far beyond experience — to a First Cause, for instance, of which I have no experience. I find the same inexorable Necessity in æsthetics and morals. My conscience says: Do this: refrain from that: licet; non licet. But my reason tells me that some things must of necessity be done, and others, always, of necessity be refrained from. See then, how with me these things hang together. It seems if I gave an empirical account of Necessity in one order of things, I must do it in another. I could not then prove the existence of God by the Speculative Reason, which the Church authorities (but I speak under correction) oblige me to do. The argument from design would indeed make believe that the world had a Designer — but I should want this attribute of Necessity, and therefore of Eternity; and should have only such a notion of His moral goodness, as the blurred beauty of this earth and certain aspirations in my vile personality would give me.

You will see that I do not agree with Dr. Ward (though I have not yet told him so) that Necessity is a mere negation. Nor do I see how he reconciles this principle with another that he holds — that of synthetical judgments à priori. The principle of causation is positive surely. The principle of contradiction is negative certainly<sup>15</sup> — save as to the positive element of Time, which it contains. My Necessity is positive: is God; for there is only One Necessary Being.

Well: how does this concern yourself? Really I don't know; but it may do so for all that. You might wish to know how you stand towards the class of thinkers which, in the main, I represent. You might possibly hit upon some way of pleasing everybody. Or you might make some other use of what I have said, that I have no conception of. Anyhow it can do no harm to say it.

I hope that you will not find it necessary to answer this. But if you were to write a line and say that you would go on with the work, I believe that my sleep would be sweeter in consequence on the night after receiving such an assurance.

#### 8. *Newman to Meynell.*<sup>16</sup>

I am extremely obliged to you for the trouble you are taking with me, and I hope my shying, as I do, will not keep you from speaking out. Pray bring out always what you have to say. I am quite conscious that metaphysics is a subject on which one cannot hope to agree with those with whom in other matters one agrees most heartily, from the extreme subtlety — but I am also deeply conscious of my own ignorance on the whole matter, and it sometimes amazes me that I have ventured to write on a subject which is even accidentally connected with it. And this makes me so very fearful lest I should be saying anything temerarious or dangerous — the ultimate angles being so small from which lines diverge to truth and error.

Be sure I should never hastily give over what I am doing, because I should have trouble in correcting or thinking out again what I have said — but if I found some irreconcileable (*sic*) difference, running through my view, between its conditions and

15. Footnote added by Meynell: "It is analytical of course."

16. This Letter is partly found in Ward, *Life*, II, 257.

what the Church teaches or has sanctioned of course I should have no hesitation of stopping at once.

So please to bear with me if I start or plunge.

In my next sheet, which perhaps won't make its appearance for some time, I fear there will be much crudeness — over and above the doctrine — and perhaps faults of composition.

You interest me very much in what you say of your own opinions — and the history of them; and it is a proof to me that you will both understand and see the position of my own views better than I do myself.

P.S. Thank you for altering *Phocians*.

#### 9. *Newman to Meynell.*<sup>17</sup>

I send you with much trepidation my Asses' Bridge. Not that I have not many skeleton bridges to pass and pontoons to construct in what is to come, but, if I get over the present, I shall despair of nothing. Recollect, all your kindness and considerateness cannot alter facts; if I am wrong, I am wrong — if I am rash, I'm rash, — yet certainly I do wish to get at King Theodore over the tops of the mountains if I can.

#### 10. *Meynell to Newman.*

Aug. 13, 1869. Let me take a little more time to think about this one, please — but I hope to finish with it before Monday — I read it all through at once greedily. But my mind is slow at taking in another's thoughts — I am like the animal in your funny seal, except that he is supposed to be *sure* as well as slow. And then I imagine all sorts of breakers ahead. However I trust that you have said nothing which it is unlawful to say. There is always this one great consolation, that I can do no harm, if I do no good — except perhaps I might suggest groundless fears, which is not unlikely.

#### 11. *Meynell to Newman.*

Aug. 16, 1869. Now I know that I can speak quite freely to you — that you will not only suffer me, but wish me to do so, I feel at ease.

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17. Ward gives the whole note, *Life*, II, 257.

Though it is not my business to do so, I shall first express the pleasurable feeling I experience in finding that your philosophy is not so empirical as I had anticipated — or rather feared. The recognition that 'even one act of cruelty, ingratitude, generosity or justice reveals to us at once intensive the immutable distinction between those qualities and their contraries (*sic pro hac vice*)'<sup>18</sup> — the recognition also, of 'original forms of thinking or formative ideas connatural with our minds without which we could not reason at all'<sup>19</sup> will abundantly satisfy the school of thinkers to which I belong. And if this element in your work does not stand out in prominent relief this is explained by the fact that you contemplate the mental organism not as it is *in fieri*, but as *in facto esse*. I feel very glad of this.

And now I will tell you that I do not think that in what you have written there is anything which could possibly be censured — I mean fall under any of the existing censures that I know of — but I fear for your *Idealism*. I am sure that very many persons would most strongly object to it, as dangerous in tendency, and possibly, if somebody, some disciple, relying on your authority went a little farther in this direction, it might bring your own work into disrepute, as being unsafe on this head, and possibly into censure. This is precisely what happened to the Sulpitian philosophical course, which I used for ten years, and then, one fine morning, I got a little note from my bishop to say it was pronounced unsafe.

The Cartesians were all idealists, I know; that is why I say, that I cannot believe the doctrine is condemned. *Malebranche*, it is true, is on the index; but other of his doctrines account for the condemnation; not his idealism. Still, it was only his Catholicism that prevented his agreeing with Berkeley. If there be no such thing as material substance, there can of course, be no transubstantiation. You will say that you believe in the external world as firmly as I do myself. No doubt you do. You are not idealist *pur et simple*; but you are idealistic. They would call you hypothetical realistic. The theory which you hold, that of a natural suggestion which refers, by instinct, our sensations to an external object, is considered by our modern philosophers to be quite as indefensible as pure

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18. *Gramm.* 65.

19. *Ibid.* 64.

idealism. Perhaps you know this. If so I have not one word to say.

I held this once myself. I suppose I got it from some part of *Reid* (for *Reid* wavers between two views of sensible perception, one of direct immediate perception, and another which is precisely your own): or else I got it from *Brown*. Anyhow I gave it up: and I remember that while holding it I was uncomfortable about it in my mind. Our sensations, I said, are merely subjective; but we refer them to an object by the principle of causation. The object produces some effects constantly: the constant effects are *qualities*: since it constantly produces them it is its nature to produce them. What made me give it up at last was this thought (whether mine or somebody else's I don't know) that *there is no such thing as a sensation of resistance* — though a sensation always accompanies resistance. We are made aware of the object as an energy which opposes itself to *my energy*, an obstacle. My body — 'Corpus quod aggravat animam' — is the first object, one which it is my nature to be brought into contact with, which I know: through that I know others. Suppose I had no sensations at all I should still be aware of objects as the obstacles to my activity: so I felt it was not true to say that what we perceive are sensations which we refer to an external cause. The cause itself immediately opposes, resists us, and we refer to it the various sensations which accompany this resistance. I held with you that we first know ourself as cause,<sup>20</sup> and then by analogy regard objects as counter-causes, and I afterwards learned that this view was first taught by *Maine de Biran* — about whom I know nothing more. (It is difficult to write philosophy *currente calamo*; but I trust you will make out my meaning). Here is an element in your system, in what you say about the origin of our notion of causation which might correct your idealistic tendency. Again the idealism is not interwoven with your system. With little trouble, if you cared to do so, you might put yourself into harmony with the modern teaching on the subject of sense-perception.

I find myself writing in a shockingly dogmatic style; but please

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20. *Gramm.* 66.

consider it only as the opening of my mind to you fully, as you gave me leave: so I go on.

I do not like *instincts*<sup>21</sup> in philosophy, and would apply Occam's razor to all of them, as asserted of intelligence. If this surprise you, I cannot help it. I know what I mean when I say that the brutes have instinct, because I have such myself *quatenus animal*. I wink my eyes e.g. instinctively i.e. spontaneously, because if it depended on me, I should forget to do it and should go blind. Instinct, I say, is not an intellectual act. I even hold that in animals, instinct and intelligence are in inverse ratio. The more intelligence an animal has the less instinct, because he wants it less. Bees and ants are full of instincts; but a dog has fewer, and man fewest. The intelligence which belongs to instinct is not in the subject of it but in the Author — i.e. in God. I do not then understand what is meant by saying that we refer our sensations to an external object by an instinct.

Now for some particulars:

1. 'The tokens of creative skill need not suggest a want of creative power'. I failed to catch your meaning: are, or how are skill and power in apparent antagonism? p.1.<sup>22</sup>

2. 'Theology as such is always notional'. Q. dogmatical theology — not moral. p.2.<sup>23</sup>

3. 'Their highest opinion in religion is, generally speaking, an assent to a probability, as even Butler has been understood to teach' i.e. he has been *by some persons* so understood, or misunderstood? (I fear you be quoted as endorsing an opinion which I venture to think you do not hold — that according to Butler Christianity is *only* most probably true.) p.4.<sup>24</sup>

4. Its acts are often inaccurate, nor do we invariably assent to them' (said of Memory or Reason) p.4.<sup>25</sup> It does not seem to me that Memory really ever deceives us any more than perception. We are deceived in the *use* we make of what it presents to us, confusing and mistaking, and misreading: so likewise it is in the *use* of reason we err; reason itself is infallible. If Memory or reason really ever

21. *Gramm.* 61.

22. Meynell's references were presumably to the galley proofs. The passage is on p. 52 of the *Grammar*.

23. *Gramm.* 55.

24. *Ibid.* 59.

25. *Ibid.* 61.

once *lied*, absolutely, how should we believe it another time? Perhaps your meaning is sufficient (*sic.*) obvious; but I should make some explanation myself.

5. 'That things exist external to ourselves is founded on an instinct' p.4. (See what I have said above.)

6. 'The human mind lays down' 'by an inductive process the great aphorism that there is an external world'. p.5.<sup>26</sup> I would like this statement to receive a qualification (or rather a caution) similar to the one about the Moral Law being an induction — viz. *an external object* recognized in each act of perception, immediately — to save yourself from idealism — if you can bring yourself to think so.

7. 'We consider mere images on the retina to be infallible tokens of something real beyond them.' p.5.<sup>26a</sup> It is not — or is it meant that the image on the retina is the direct object perceived? It resembles the object neither in shape nor size. The optic nerve is opaque and unsuited to convey such images to the brain — so says Reid. According to Aristotle all the senses are modifications of that of touch.

8. 'It is a perplexity . . . that grave philosophers should speak of it as an intuitive truth that whatever is must have a cause'. p.6.<sup>27</sup> Surely you do these writers less than justice: they would say, whatsoever *happens* must have a cause. And they would agree with you that the notion of causation is derived from experience. For instance Hamilton admits that we learn from experience that things have causes; but that whatsoever happens *must* have causes he would say is not derived from experience; because experience only teaches us what *is the case*, not what must be. It is possible some one may have stated the axiom as you have put it; but it is incorrectly so stated. When they say it is *à priori* they only mean that the necessary element in it is *à priori*. Compare it with the law of gravitation and one sees the difference.

9. 'Some philosophers teach a necessity of the laws of nature' p.8.<sup>28</sup> seems to require some stronger rejection: it is pantheism.

10. There is 'no unvarying law in nature' — I can't help

26. *Ibid.* 63.

26a. *Ibid.*

27. *Ibid.* 66.

28. *Gramm.* 70.

thinking that you mean *invariable*. It is a law that the sun rises and sets — when did it fail to do this? But of course it might fail by *miracle*. It is not invariable though it is unvarying.

I think that the style is, as you said, a little crude here and there, but provided it be clear (which it is) and not slipshod (of which I don't find any instance) I would not do much towards altering it, because I think it rather a good fault in philosophy to be homely. You could hardly be more homely than Plato.

## 12. *Newman to Meynell.*<sup>29</sup>

Aug. 17. I only hope I am not spoiling your holiday. You are doing me great service.

To bring matters to a point, I propose to send you my chapter on the apprehension and assent to the doctrine of a Supreme Being. If you find principles in that chapter, which cannot be allowed, *res finita est*. As to your remarks on the printed slips, let me trouble you with the following questions.

1. You mean that it is dangerous to hold that we believe in matter as a conclusion from our sensations — for our belief in matter is in consequence of our consciousness of resistance, which is not a sensation. Will it mend matters to observe that I don't use the word 'sensations' — but experiences? and surely resistance is an experience — but if we infer matter from resistance, therefore we infer it from experience.

2. By instinct I mean a realization of a *particular*: by intuition, of a *general* fact — in both cases without assignable or recognizable media of realization. Is there any word I could use instead of instinct to denote the realization of particulars? Still, I do not see how you solve my difficulty of instinct leading brutes to the realization of something external to themselves? Perhaps it ought not to be called instinct in brutes, but by some other name.

3. Am I right in thinking that you wish me to infer matter as a *cause* from phenomena as an *effect*, from *my own view* of cause and effect. But in *my own view* cause is *Will*; how can matter be *Will*?

4. '*Hypothetical* realism', yes — if conclusions are necessarily conditional. But I consider ratiocination far higher, more subtle,

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29. Published by Ward, *Life*, II, 258.

wider, more certain than logical Inference — and its principle of action is the 'Illative Sense', which I treat of towards the end of the volume. If I say that Ratiocination leads to absolute truth, am I still a hypothetical realist?

### 13. *Newman to Meynell.*<sup>30</sup>

Aug. 18, 1869. I send you by this post the MSS. which I spoke of in my last.

On second thoughts I don't see how I can change the word 'instinct' — I have not indeed any where used it for the *perception of God* from our experiences, but in later chapters I speak of Catholic instincts, Mother Margaret's instincts, the instinct of calculating boys, in all cases using the word 'instinct' to mean a spontaneous impulse, physical or intelligent, in the individual, leading to a result without assignable or recognizable intellectual media.

P.S. I don't recollect saying anything about my style.

### 14. *Meynell to Newman.*

Aug. 18, 1869. I would not at all mind making some little sacrifice of myself to be useful to you; but I don't feel that I have done it yet. I had arranged to go out fishing to-day: so this will not go to-night. I fear I was hurried last time and not clear.

If you use the word 'experience' as to sensible objects, you will certainly save yourself from idealism. The *idealist* maintains that we experience certain sensations, all of which as being merely *subjective* facts, do not give the *objective* reality: that the soul is the subject of such sensations, and that God is their cause: and, since material substance is eliminated by the law of Parcimony (for God can cause the sensation, without material substance), this is the whole account of the matter. A hypothetical realist (I take it) is one who admits that we perceive nothing but our own sensations which are subjective, but he postulates an external object as an hypothesis to account for the sensations. He cannot *prove* the existence of such object. A natural realist believes that we immediately perceive the object, and therefore it requires no proof. Dr. Johnson's 'Thus I prove it Sir' — stamping on the ground is the vulgar expression

30. Published by Ward, *Life*, II, 258, without the postscript.

of the doctrine of immediate perception. Resistance is indeed an experience. But I regarded (once) resistance as a sensation, till I saw that, although all sorts of sensations accompany resistance, yet there is no sensation properly speaking of resistance. It is the fact of a resisting object which makes us refer the sensations to it. As far as I know Hamilton first introduced the terms *cosmopolitan idealist* (I suppose one who holds the theory of image-ideas: what does cosmopolitan mean?) *hypothetical realist*, *natural realist*. I think I use his language in calling your theory as I understood it hypothetical realism.

I cannot but think instinct a bad and misleading word for the perception of sensible objects: what is the matter with 'perception', a good old English word? As for abstract ideas I should call them *conceptions, notions*, if you like; and then for universal truths, *laws of thought and things*, if you wish to designate the faculty which considers them as intuition, you will follow the general usage, I think. Don't we call them intuitive truths? As to the term instinct for the intuition of particulars, as it misled me it might easily mislead others. But you say we call that instinct which leads the brutes to realize external objects. Perhaps we do. But that is because we are contented to put up with the loosest kind of knowledge about the brutes (I think). I do not call it instinct, but intelligence which makes a brute realize the object: the lowest act of intelligence seems sufficient for the purpose: but it is a great difficulty where intelligence leaves off and instinct begins.

Since writing the above I got your note of yesterday. It is clear that you use instinct in quite a different sense from that in which I use it. Instinct with me never comes in, except where intelligence or reasoning would be insufficient for the purpose. I suppose I got my ideas about instinct from Paley and a paper in the Spectator. But we certainly do use the word in ordinary language in the sense that you use it in, for an act in which we grasp a conclusion without being able to assign the process by which we arrived at it.

Terminology is a great difficulty to every philosopher. It is my business, I conceive, to throw out observations, and yours to despise or use them as you think fit: so never mind what I say.

The passage you mention doesn't I think require a 'prospective withdrawal', as it does not contain anything directly against the

teaching of the schools. But as there are so many persons, imbued with the modern doctrine of perception, who hold that, if we do not immediately perceive external objects, it is absolutely impossible to prove their existence, I should be careful not to seem to deny such immediate perception. They will say 'if the external object has to be proved, it cannot be proved and there's an end of it' I know a priest (and he is by no means a fool) who holds that matter is nothing else than the action of God upon the sensitive faculty. Such a one would be pleased at this seeming denial of immediate perception. But the passage as I read it first, seemed to deny such immediate perception. It seemed to say 'We conclude, we know not how, by an *instinct*, that the subjective sensations are caused by a real outstanding object. Then by induction, from particulars, we arrive at what we call the external world'.

You have misunderstood something which I said about the origin of our notion of causation. 'In my own view Cause is Will: how can matter be will?' you ask. I thought there was an element in your writings which might correct the seeming idealism of the passage we have discussed i.e. you held (I gathered) Maine de Biran's view of the origin of causation. We are conscious of self as an *energy producing effects*, as when I lift up my arm. Here is cause and effect. When I encounter an object (put my hand in contact with a wall) the witness of conscience is to this purpose, that an energy opposes itself to the energy of my will. There is a countercause, immediately perceived by me — acting upon me. Here I said is a recognition of the doctrine of immediate perception, which would correct the notion implied by the former passage which seemed to say that we are only conscious of certain subjective sensations, from which we *argue* that there must be a cause for such sensations; for we come into immediate contact, not with resistance, for resistance is an abstraction, but with *something which resists*, with an external object. Then, when you go on further to say that nothing can move matter but Will — that is (as I understand) that it is God who moves matter, as it is I who move my arm, I am still better pleased, and find no objection whatsoever. — Do we now understand one (*sic*) each other?

I do not understand perhaps what you say at the end of your antepenultimate note. 'Hypothetical realism: yes if the conclusions

are conditional. But I consider ratiocination far higher *etc.* than logical inference'. I write merely at a venture in saying that by no possible glorification of Ratiocination will you satisfy the *philosophers*, if you hold that we *conclude* an external object. But the very next line in which you contrast Ratiocination with logical inference shows me that I must be misunderstanding, and am speaking before I have learnt my lesson.

When I read what I have written, it seems to me that there is a dogmatic tone about it which amazes me. You have been the occasion of my losing every sense of modesty. But I should have considered it a great piece of impertinence in me to criticize your style of writing!! But as you wrote 'I fear there will be much crudeness — over and above doctrine — and perhaps faults of composition' (speaking of a coming sheet I wrote, I conceive, that it was impossible, perhaps, to avoid crudity (by which I understood a certain homeliness of expression) in philosophy, and that it was a good fault. Well, if ever I do the like again snub me soundly.

I will begin with the MS and finish as soon as possible.

### 15. *Meynell to Newman.*

Aug. 20, 1869. I have carefully read it, and have been deeply interested and delighted with it. I would say I endorse it with all my heart, if that were worth anything to you. For I must now retire again into my native littleness — as I feel that the work for which you wanted to use me is as good as at an end. If the pages you have submitted me this last time are to be the final test, it is finished as far as I am concerned, and may God bless it to do good, is my earnest prayer. I will pray, or rather I will say a Mass so soon as I hear it is all ready for publication, for this object that God may bless the work.

I will tell you, as soon as I can, what I think of certain particulars. My remarks will almost all bear upon points of terminology. I see this matter will be a great difficulty, as the word 'instinct' and 'instinctive' occur in so many places. If you resolve to retain the word, I wish you could do so, without denying the doctrine of immediate perception of a *resisting object*. All the sensible phenomena are shifty and unsubstantial enough, but this it seems to me is hardly a phenomenon, and is certainly (I think)

not a sensible phenomenon. But I seem to be, again, dictating. Pray use and despise me where it seems right to do so.

There is one passage (p.8) which seems (but perhaps I am wrong) to smack of *representationalism* — what I suppose Hamilton calls cosmothetic idealism. According to this doctrine we do not perceive *objects*, but only and always *images of objects*. If then you say, But the images supposes the object? The answer is, How do you know that? If you never know the copy, how do you know that what you call the copy is a copy? Suppose the copy is the only reality, the reality itself. Instinct, *our nature*, you think will cut this Gordian knot? Our nature cannot deceive us. But the voice of Nature (even the idealists allow) witnesses that we perceive the objects not the images. Descartes says that, before he became a philosopher he thought that the objects perceived were the real things. Reid says (in effect) that in this matter he finds the philosopher on one side and the vulgar on the other, and that he goes in with the vulgar. And Berkeley says that the very object of his speculation was to reconcile philosophy with unsophisticated nature. The philosophers say that we perceive only ideas (images) and the vulgar that we perceive the real things, but Berkeley himself says *the ideas are the real things*. But perhaps I am wrong in attributing representationalism to the passage, and perhaps wrong in supposing that you do not know all this better than myself.

One thing strikes me about the terminology. Thompson in his laws of thought calls a single object perceived a *perception* or *intuition*, and what you call notion he calls concept. However notion requires no change. But how would it do to use intuition for *facts* as well as *truths*? It suits the etymology of the world. Is this worth anything?

Yet another thing. I think it is customary to confine the world perception to sensible things (especially since the time of Reid). But at p.8 you speak of the *perceptive power of conscience*.<sup>31</sup> Would moral sense do better? And at p.9 of the perception of the supernatural and Divine Object.<sup>32</sup> In philosophy I should not use perception but intuition of divine things.

I should like to say something, if you would let me, on the

31. *Gramm.* 109.

32. *Ibid.* 110.

subject of p.20 about the beasts, about which what you have written has so much pleased me.<sup>33</sup> But I must defer this. You will see that I have not yet retired into 'my native littleness'. I will do so soon I hope.

16. *Newman to Meynell.*<sup>34</sup>

Aug. 20. 1869. Pray forgive me if unknown to myself and unintentionally I have led you to think, quite contrary to *my* thoughts, that you wrote dogmatically. Just the contrary, and you are doing me a great service in letting me see *how* matters stand in the philosophical school.

Forgive too the treacherousness of my memory, though by 'composition' I meant the composition of my matter, the drawing out of my argument, etc.

Nothing can be clearer than your remarks. Now let me say I had no intention at all of saying that I know, e.g. that I have a sheet of paper before me, by an *argument* from the impression on my senses — 'that impression *must* have a cause' — but it is a *perception* (that is, a kind of instinct). I have used the word 'perception' again and again; that perception comes to me *through* my senses — therefore I cannot call it *immediate*. If it were not for my senses, nothing would excite me to perceive — but as soon as I see the white paper, I perceive by instinct (as I call it) without *argumentative* media, *through* my senses, but not logically *by* my senses, that there is a *thing*, of which the white paper is the outward token. Then, when I have this experience again and again, I go on from the one, two, three etc. accompanying perceptions of one, two, three etc. external objects, to make an induction 'There is a vast external world' This induction leads to a conclusion much larger than the particular perceptions — because it includes in it that the earth has an inside, and that the moon has a farther side, though I don't see it.

Therefore I hold that we do not *prove* external individual objects, but *perceive* them — I cannot say that we *immediately* perceive them, because it is through the *experience* as an instrument that we are led to them — and though we do not prove the

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33. *Ibid.* 110-111.

34. This Letter is found in Ward's *Life*, II, 259.

particular, we *do*, prove the *general*, i.e. by induction from the particulars. I am sanguine in thinking this is in substance what you say yourself.

(There exists a rough draft of this letter, written on the same day and headed: 'In substance but very different in manner'. So I transcribe it:)

Nothing can be clearer than your letter and I thank you for it. I am very sorry my memory was so treacherous — however, I meant composition of the matter. Your remarks were very kind.

Certainly I meant that brutes had a *perception* of the world external to them and that by an instinct. *Instinct* is the name I gave to the general faculty by which they perceived. I had no intention to blackball the word perception, on the contrary I have used it myself in various places I think.....<sup>35</sup> — that perception is the *ground* of realizing and holding the external world — perception is a kind of instinct and that it is not immediate, but through the medium of sense, sense not as a proof but as an instrument.

But your letter opens a more anxious question. Do you really mean that the Philosophical Schola would not allow it to be said that an external world is reasoned out as a conclusion from particular instinctive perceptions of particular objects? that it would not allow it to be said — I perceive something external here, there, in a third, in a fourth place etc. *therefore* I conclude it to exist when I do *not* see the phenomena indicating it, as the interior of the earth or the farther side of the moon?

J.H.N.

And is the *reason why* this may not be said this, viz. because a conclusion is logically doubtful? So too is it logically doubtful to me that Great Britain is an island, but my illative sense is keener than my logical analysis which can represent it, and brings it home to me, that under the circumstances, (i.e. under the existing premisses) though they are not enough for the requirements of logic, I shall be a fool to doubt the conclusion to which they point. In like manner my illative sense carries me from particular perceptions to the *truth* of an external world, and that truth elicits an act of assent to it.

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35. Illegible words.

Again I have no where said that there are no physical causes — but only that we have no experience of them i.e. making cause as represented by willing and doing.

17. *Newman to Meynell.*<sup>36</sup>

Aug. 21, 1869. Your intention to give up has shocked and dismayed me more than I can say — *shocked* me because I fear I must have said something or other in writing which has scared you, — and *dismayed* me, for what am I to do?

I quite understand that you must feel it a *most* unpleasant responsibility (though of course I should not tell anyone) and an endless work, for when will it be finished? It is enough to spoil your holiday, and to bother your Professorial work, and I really have not a word to say besides thanking you for what you have already done for me, and begging you to forgive me if like a camel, when they are loading it, I have uttered dismal cries.

Well, now I am in a most forlorn condition, and, like Adam, I feel 'the world is all before me'. — Whom am I to ask to do the work which you have so kindly begun? I shall not get anyone so patient as you, and, alas, alas, what is to come is, for what I know, more ticklish even than what you have seen.

I have availed myself of all your remarks in some way or other, though I have not always taken them pure and simple.

Thank you for saying you will say Mass for me. It is a great kindness.<sup>37</sup>

18. *Meynell to Newman.*<sup>38</sup>

I ought to have sent this yesterday for there is really nothing to correct. But there is some hitch or other at the bottom of p.124 and top of 125 — some correction which you seem to have begun and not finished.

Is it not said too absolutely that Man 'cannot change his nature

36. Given by Ward, *Life II*, 260. It refers to the end of Letter 15, where Meynell speaks of retiring into his 'native littleness'.

37. From this Letter it is clear that Ward's explanation in *Life II*, 259-260, is quite without basis. Meynell did not want to give up the task on account of the difficulty.

38. This Letter has no date but begins: Saturday. As it refers to passages following those mentioned in Letter 16, which begins: Friday August 20, and as it is apparently written before the following Letters, it should be dated Aug. 21.

or *habits* at will? (p.126 near the middle). You do not speak it is true of *men* but of *man*. But in a note you refer to Callista, who says, 'Let me alone; such as nature made me I will be. *I cannot change*'.<sup>39</sup> I thought that when people spoke of the impossibility of changing from an evil course, they meant not impossibility — not even moral impossibility but only excessive difficulty. You will see if there be anything in this, or if it be only my squeamishness.

I was very thankful to read it, and very much interested. I said the Mass for it which I promised and I hope the work will do a great deal of good.

P.S. Perhaps the passage referred to is sufficiently qualified by what follows after — 'or at least . . . the longer he lives the more difficult he is'.<sup>39a</sup>

#### 19. *Meynell to Newman.*

August 23, 1869. I read the proofs which I return without (I think) having anything to remark upon them.

Be sure that nothing you *could* say would scare me: you are too considerate to do harm in this way. It is my own fault, but partly my misfortune. For I am a poor, nervous, frightened creature, really. And when I talked of retiring 'into my own littleness' my head was giddy, and I felt squeamish, as I do when I have to preach to superiors and equals in the Oscott pulpit — or when somebody comes to me for spiritual direction so infinitely better than oneself that I feel no power to speak and, if I obeyed my impulse, would rather fall down and weep at their feet. But is a fault also in part — I believe a sneaking vanity, born of the fear of making a fool of myself; for I observe that religious men have never this nervousness, but just act and speak straight on. And so I will try to do for the future. But I thought probably you might not want me any more. However, since it is otherwise, I will go through with it as I promised, and I trust without making a scene or sensation about it any more.

When I am at Oscott I shall be just as well able to work for you as I am here, for there are less distractions. You have not spoilt my vacation, which I have enjoyed very much. It is not so much

39. This passage seems to have been cancelled in the *Grammar*.

39a. This likewise.

the cessation from work which does me good as the *change of life* — and I have good friends here who make me as happy as they can.

Do you know of a statement of Sir W. Hamilton to this effect that sensation and perception are in inverse ratio; that where sensation is at its maximum, perception is at its minimum? In the tongue (I suppose) sensation is at its maximum when tasting: but the tongue would be a very unsuitable member for perceiving the surface of a body. The muscles of the fingers, by which the mind is made aware of resistance in its different modes and degrees, render them the proper members as instruments of perception. This is a fact which connects the doctrine of perception with the Will. However, it is time to leave you alone, to your own judgment, on the subject of perception.

I want to make a remark or so about p.20 which you can use as you think fit.

How do the brutes get their knowledge of, shall we say distance, from sight? You say 'Not by sense, for they are transcending sense; not by reason' — then by instinct.<sup>40</sup> This passage supposes that reason and instinct exhaust the division. The Cartesians — at any rate Malebranche — denied *intelligence* to the brutes. I do not hold this view — I consider it, and I suppose it is considered now-a-days as one of that great man's sublime paradoxes. But how then do brutes get distance from sight — learn the meaning of light and shade? etc. Intelligence is not equal to the requirements of the case: I grant it. It is said that in infancy men *learn* to see. Anyhow the adult whom Cheselden cured of total blindness from cataract said 'it seemed the objects touched his eye', and he had to learn to perceive distance. But in animals, the struggle for life, does not admit of this education by experience. They would perish before the education was finished. Hence the newly-hatched brood of the wild duck, disturbed in their nest on the bank, plunge at once into the water; and the young plovers run about and 'do for themselves', as soon as hatched. I must hold then that intelligence in the case of at least some animals is perfected by instinct.<sup>41</sup> But I do not

40. *Gramm.* 110-111.

41. Footnote added by Meynell: "I am speaking of course about the case in point as to judging distances. It would be superfluous to say that I do not deny instinct to animals."

therefore deny intelligence to the animals. And as to instinct, as I think I said, I consider it, as far as the animals are concerned a very sorry sort of thing. I give God the credit of it all: the beasts do by this guidance they know not what. And those of them who have it at its maximum, as the bee and the ant, have intelligence at its minimum. My canary knows the nature of glass and checks himself in his flight when he comes near the window, while a bee and a blue-bottle will go banging his head against the pane for ever. Instinct, though in general it preserves life, yet often it is the occasion of death. The instinct that directs a rat, or a snake to make for his hole, or a moth to make for the light is often the cause of death, where a little intelligence might have saved them. The loss of instinct in domestication, mentioned by Darwin, is instructive. The intelligence is improved by exercise, as our own is, and so many instincts are disused, as not being required. Our own education weans us from the animal guidance of instincts. So you see with me instinct and intelligence are in smart opposition, and therefore I should not consider man's knowledge of objects as instinctive, like that of the brutes; nor even compare it with their instinct.

p.7: 'images them on these phenomena'. It might have been my dulness, but I didn't make out the meaning of the sentence in which these words occur until I read on. Does it matter?<sup>42</sup>

p.8. Our sensations give 'no exact measure or account' of the things.<sup>43</sup> The account seems accurate *as far as it goes*. Qu. *Full account?* sufficient account. Every sensation is a manifestation of the nature of the object as related to sense; but what it is, in itself, apart from its manner of affecting us, of course we don't know. (It is at this page I met with something that looked like representationalism).

I don't think there is anything to remark further on the MS beyond what I said in the former letter.

Never mind thanking me. I told you I would make a sacrifice for you if it were called for; but I have not done it yet. I have enjoyed this vacation as much as any and more than some.

42. This refers probably to *Gramm.* 103, where it says: "we picture them to ourselves in those phenomena."

43. *Gramm.* 103 reads: "The phenomena give us no exact measure or character of the unknown things beyond them."

*20. Newman to Meynell.*

Sept. 27, 1869. At last I have more to send you, and you will receive with this 12 slips.

I don't think I have thanked you yet for your late most friendly letter and self-denying purpose. I hope these slips will not plague you.

Mr. Keon, who holds a high (legal?) post in the Bermudas, called on me just now with his wife. He is of Stonyhurst, but I met him at Oscott in 1846. He is going up to Oscott tomorrow to renew his recollections of it, and I ventured to tell him he might use my name to Dr. Northcote.

*21. Meynell to Newman.<sup>44</sup>*

There was a great deal to read over, *carefully*, or I had returned it yesterday. It is theological, and in that region you are an authority and I am none. But I will say the little that occurs to me. I was very glad to read it, as this portion especially seems calculated to do so much good. I do not remember to have seen the opponents of dogmatical religion anywhere systematically dealt with.

I see a query, in pencil, to the term 'modes'<sup>45</sup> as applied to the Divine Personalities — but is not the term scholastic? Another at 'according as we view Him in one or the other of them;<sup>46</sup> God 'is the Father, *or* the Son, or the Holy Ghost'.<sup>47</sup> I suppose this sounds like Sabellianism; but the Sabellian meaning is obviously excluded by the context — that 'the Father is all that is meant by the word "God", as if there were no Son, no Spirit'. If I were inclined to doubt, it would be about the propriety of the word *separately*,<sup>48</sup> in saying that the Father is *separately God*, or the Son separately God — considering that the Father is that God who is necessarily Father, Son and Holy Ghost. Of course the context forbids any misapprehension, by asserting that 'God is a living Monas — more really one even than an individual man'. However, I suppose the

44. There is no date, but the following letter of Newman, dated October 3, 1869, is obviously the answer to it.

45. *Gramm.* 124.

46. *Ibid.* 124. Here it says however: 'in the one or the other of them'. So he changed it.

47. *Ibid.* 125.

48. This word was changed into: 'as if we knew nothing of Son, or of Spirit'. *Ibid.* 125.

poverty of language, or the poverty of our conceptions requires that what we say of God in one aspect has necessarily to be corrected by what we say of Him in another — as is said elsewhere in these sheets. (I admire the luminous school-dictum 'Omnia unum idemque sunt, ubi non est relatio oppositionis'.)

I don't know why there is a pencil query p.25 at 'any more than there can be an inference without a conclusion';<sup>49</sup> or at p.26, at 'the objects (of devotion) as supernatural'<sup>49a</sup> — Perhaps it is marked as if implying that there could be no natural object of devotion i.e. the Sacred Humanity? Again 'arbitrary prohibitions' at bottom of p.29<sup>50</sup> is marked and indeed I cannot say that I know distinctly what is meant by the word. Perhaps these q's were only intended for your own guidance in the choice of language.

P.S. I dreamt last night that you told me you were unwell (absit omen!). I suppose, because I find in my own case that mental exertion and health, are almost inconsistent.

## 22. *Newman to Meynell.*

Octob. 3. Many thanks for your notice. I had found out my blunder on reading the proof over again, and set it right. It is astonishing how difficult it is not to make mistakes.

My corrector here put you out; I meant to have rubbed out his pencil marks. Arbitrary prohibitions are such as St. Augustine's that we may not say that God is in one Person as well as Three — and Father Perrone's that we may not call St. Anne 'God's grandmother'. Perhaps another is '*Three* objects of Divine Worship', which I have altered into 'There are Three that give testimony in heaven'.<sup>51</sup>

## 23. *Meynell to Newman.*

Oscott. Friday.<sup>52</sup> I see nothing except a slip of the pen, or press at p.47, line 4 to correct 'and of course *he* can assent' for *we*?

When I have nothing to notice but a slip like this I presume

49. Newman apparently altered these passages.

49a. This likewise.

50. *Gramm.* 132.

51. *Gramm.* 135.

52. No other date.

I may just draw attention to it in pencil on the margin(?) and so save myself a penny! for the postage of a letter.

*24. Meynell to Newman.*

Oscott. Saturday.<sup>52a</sup> I write about something which I forgot in my last note. It may be a trifle not worth writing about: but that you will judge. I noticed that the Four Last Things were numbered not as Death, Judgment, Hell, Heaven: but as Death, Purgatory<sup>53</sup> etc. And the sentence appeared to quote the Catechism. I assume that the Fire of Judgment is Purgatory: but there might be some who would miss the sound of the old form: and might not the Judgment be something more than Purgatory? I only ask the question, and leave you to consider whether it be worth a thought.

*25. Meynell to Newman.*<sup>54</sup>

Oscott. I have plenty of time on Thursdays so can send it back at once, having carefully read it. I have almost nothing to say, for it is plainsailing in the open sea. But just, please, look at p.44 (near top) 'His assents are really only inferences, and assents is a name without a meaning, the needless repetition of *an assent*' (of an inference?)<sup>55</sup>

Secondly and lastly. You have thought out the subject and I have not, so I speak with great diffidence: but is it so great a condemnation of the view which you refute to say that it makes assent useless, if it only be the double<sup>56</sup> of inference? (p.40 and passim). Consciousness is only the echo of direct knowledge — but do we say that it (is) useless to have the word 'reflexion' and that it implies nothing? We are so constituted that there is always the thought that is echo of the thought knowledge and consciousness. But I don't admit, of course, the view which you condemn. You will soon see if there is anything in this, and if any qualification be necessary. I am glad it goes on so briskly, and look forward to the time when I shall see it as a whole, and not piecemeal.

52a. No other date.

53. *Gramm.* 145.

54. No date, but Newman's letter of Oct. 8 seems to be an answer to it.

55. *Gramm.* 175.

56. *Ibid.* 165.

26. *Newman to Meynell.*<sup>57</sup>

Octob. 8, 1869. Thank you for your criticism about the Echo. I certainly ought to have taken notice of it, and my only difficulty will be how to bring it in. — You are ten times more likely to be right on such a point than I am — however, at present I don't follow you, though I will think about it. My reason is this, that consciousness or reflection on one's acts is an act different in kind from those acts themselves. Its object is distinct. If I walk, my eyes may watch my walking. If I sing, my ears listen to my voice and tell me if I am in tune. These are acts of reflection on my walking and singing, are they not? but the original act is bodily, and the reflex act is mental. I assure you I most deeply feel that I may be out of my depth.

P.S. By no manner or means ever dream of giving yourself the trouble of writing one word by letter, when marks on the margin will do.

I am not sure from what you said, whether you read the inclosed bits of theology. Please to cast your eye over them. I must have a theological eye upon them, and one of your eyes is theological, though the other is philosophical.

27. *Meynell to Newman.*

Octob. 11, 1869. I went home on Saturday, and returned late yesterday evening: else you would have heard from me before.

First about the theological subject. I *did* read the parts you refer to, but I expressed myself doubtfully about them, because I didn't think my opinion was worth giving — I fear before I get to the end of these sheets I shall lose every vestige of modesty! I will tell you frankly that the expression 'The Father is *by Himself* God' sounded new to me when you first used it (for you know this it not the first time), but I deferred to you, and thought you had authority for saying it. When again I read that the 'Son and the Spirit are each *separately* God,'<sup>58</sup> as if *Each Other and the Father were not*; and that the Father is all that is meant by the word "God", I hesitated, but again deferred to you, thinking that doubtless you weighed your words, and had authority for saying it. At the

57. Partly cited by Ward, *Life II*, 260-261.

58. *Gramm.* 125. See Letter 21.

same time I told you that if I doubted about anything it would be about these expressions. I asked myself: How is it true to say that the Father is separately or by Himself God, since God is Father, Son and Holy Ghost? Is God the Father *all* that I mean by the word God, as if the Son and Holy Ghost had no existence. I reflected, however, that the expressions were meant as an emphatic distinction of the Persons, and any false notion on the subject was forbidden by the context. But this morning I betook myself to find an illustration. I said: the three angles of a Triangle are one Triangle: but is each one of them a triangle, as if the other two had no existence. I know that these illustrations are treacherous things:<sup>59</sup> so whether there be anything in this objection I leave you to judge. I next went to my books, and after some trouble lighted upon something like the matter in hand. St. Thomas (*Summa* II.2.xxi art. IV)<sup>60</sup> asks: *Utrum dictio exclusiva possit adjungi termino personali.* He does not forbid the proposition *Solus Pater est Deus* in the sense '*Ille, qui solus dicitur Pater, est Deus*'. Please look at this article, and also at the *one immediately preceding*, and especially at the second objection and the answer to it.

On the whole it seems to me doubtful whether you can say that each of the Three Divine Persons is, *by Himself*, simply and absolutely God, *as though the Other Two were not*. But you will judge.

As to the philosophical matter, I used to consider consciousness as a special faculty, as Reid and other metaphysicians did, till I learnt Sir W. Hamilton's doctrine about it, which is this. He says that knowledge and consciousness are only different aspects of the same thing. All thought being the relation of subject with object, if I consider the object known, I have knowledge; if I consider myself as knowing the object, I have consciousness. In the examples you give, to walk, or to sing — these are bodily acts, and, of course, as such, are neither knowledge nor consciousness. But if I think of my walk or my song, it is knowledge, if I think that I am walking, I am singing it is consciousness. Or I might have consciousness only — as not thinking about the *walk* but that it

59. "I see already that the illustration is not to the point: for we do not call each one of the angles a triangle, as we call *each person* of the H. Trinity God." — Note by Meynell.

60. This should read: *Summa I, XXXI, art. IV.*

is *I who am walking* — but even then the *object* would be present *confusedly*; and so in knowledge there must be some confused sense, at least, of my self, and my act. Here then are two names for the same thing. But if you think that there is nothing in the objection as connected with inference and assent, couldn't you deal with it in a note? — if it be worth mentioning at all: for consciousness and knowledge are the same kind of thing; but inference and assent are, clearly, different kinds of things.

I don't think there is anything to notice in the present sheets, beyond a printers' error which I corrected.

#### 28. *Meynell to Newman.*

Octob. 13, 1869. Is this of any use? Brancherai gives it as the characteristic of evidence that it is an equipoise of the active and receptive elements in thought. He means that no more is given in an evident judgment than is strictly warranted by the intuition (perception). Thus the judgment says 'I am hot or cold', because, in fact, I am, hot or cold — says: 'Two-and-two make four' because we perceive that they do. You will see from this that he uses the term *evident* in the sense of self-evident: and also how in this case the judgment only rehearses, or echoes the statement of the case which is given in the intuition. He would not say therefore that it was *evident* that God exists, though he would say that it was *certain*.

I am not to be understood as disagreeing with what you say, because I put what appears as an objection. I may also say something that seems irrelevant; but there's a method in my madness, because you might make some use or other of what I say, which I do not know. Hence I went into the subject of the Hamiltonian view about consciousness being only another aspect of knowledge, and not a special faculty. But I have misgivings that I was incoherent in some parts of my last, and I thought as I folded it up, that it was a slovenly production. But I write sometimes under great disadvantages and that is an excuse to a certain extent.

I wonder whether I made 'ado about nothing' in what I said about the 'separately, or by Himself'. This is a great trouble with me that I might only be suggesting scruples instead of being of

any real use. But I can only do my best. Please don't think it necessary to answer this.

29. *Newman to Meynell.*

Octob. 19, 1869. I rejoice to think that your task is coming towards an end. I send you four slips. Don't hurry yourself about them.

Thank you for your remarks on the subject of the Holy Trinity. I altered one passage at your suggestion — as 'by Himself' is in the Athanasian Creed (vid. Garden of the Soul and Crown of Jesus,) I have left it.

As to Hamilton, I did not at all mean to go to the question whether the act of consciousness was different in kind from the simple act, but that it was not a repetition of a similar act, because the objects of the two are distinct. 'This is a house' — house is the object of my act. 'I am beholding a house' — my beholding the house is the object of the act.

I am quite ashamed to think what I have cost you in paper, pens, ink, stamps, and time.

30. *Meynell to Newman.*

Octob. 20, 1869. I don't find anything in these sheets to remark upon. I have no doubt that you are quite right as to the 'by Himself'. It would be absurd indeed to expect you should trust me about a matter, on which I had no confidence in myself; for I contradicted myself, in my two notes, defending the expression in one and finding fault with it in the other. However consistency in objection is not looked for in a devil's advocate.

If you think that the Creed expresses in effect (it does not in fact) '*Pater, per se, est Deus*', I give in. I thought it equivalent to the hypothetical cancelling of the other Persons, which I doubted about. Pray do not think I write this to persist in the objection, but merely to explain myself. I withdraw it altogether.

You will hurt my feelings if you say a word about postage stamps. I never missed them. I abound in these and note-paper; and am one of the richest persons in England, for the only things which I cannot afford to buy are those which I don't want. And as to time, I have given it with such good-will that I have not felt the

loss, and shall be abundantly rewarded if you have borne patiently with my blunders and stupidity.

### 31. *Meynell to Newman.*

Octob. 23. I like it very much, and (if that's worth anything) I agree with it: but I don't know whether you would altogether agree with me. I used to distinguish between *direct*, and *reflex* certainty. The direct certitude was what I suppose you would call instinctive belief. The reflex I used to call scientific certainty. I justified the direct, instinctive belief, as a certitude quite as reasonable as the reflex. I said that a simple rustic in believing the reality of an external world, of the objects of memory, of the Sovereign Being, had, really, sufficient, good reasons of his belief, and that his reasons for believing would be found precisely the same as those of the educated, were they brought out by an analysis of the facts of consciousness. But I think that you have done better in limiting the term 'certitude' to designate the belief informed by conscious reasoning.<sup>61</sup> It seems on the face of it, inappropriate to speak of a man as having certitude who has never asked himself *why* he believes.

You have made it clear enough that certitude is not to be confused with infallibility.<sup>62</sup> I have, however, always held that Reason (though it sounds strange to say until one has explained) is infallible — and that, I think, even according to the designation of 'a gift or faculty which relates to all propositions in a given subject matter'. I distinguish, of course, between reason and *reasoning* — our *use* of reason. The distinction seems to my mind so obvious to be made that I should not mention it, had not Simpson pooh-poohed it when I made it in the 'Rambler'. I say that there is an end of all certainty if Reason itself be once supposed to be fallible. If a man incautiously uses in argument an illicit process, or undistributed middle, I can show that is not a deliverance of the reason; it only looks like one; it is a fallacy: I appeal to reason against this particular reasoning. I don't suppose that *you* deny this, but if not why can I not say — or can I not say, that I am infallibly certain of the primary deliverances of reason — *of things*

61. *Gramm.* 195-196, 210-212, and *passim*.

62. *Ibid.* 224-227.

*that are self-evident?* And if some persons have altogether confounded certitude and infallibility, is it not because to some extent these are identical? To be sure we must distinguish between the *guide* and the *guided subject*; but an infallible guide, guides infallibly; and so does reason, properly consulted. Hence you yourself speak of indefectible certitudes as to the primary deliverances of conscience.

Hence though I do not quarrel with such expressions as the treacherousness of memory, or the deceptions of sense, used colloquially, I hold that strictly and philosophically speaking, sense and memory are infallible, because their trustworthiness can be tested by a primary deliverance of reason — the principle of contradiction. The only way in which memory could deceive me, since it is a representative faculty, would be by *re-presenting* that which had never been *presented*, and the only way sense could really deceive me would be if I perceived that which I did not perceive which is absurd.

Even in wrong reasoning, reason is right (though it seems a paradox). Thus when two astronomers argued — one 'that the moon revolves round her axis, because she constantly shows the same side towards the earth', and the other that 'the moon *does not* revolve round her axis, because *she shows the same side towards the earth*', the judges of the dispute decided that the *reasoning itself* was right from the point of the two astronomers, though it issued in contradiction: the fault was in the data reasoned upon, which were insufficient. If a man goes wrong in reasoning it is because he has not consulted his reason sufficiently attentively, or because the data are wrong.

I fear I have written at unnecessary length. Please bear with my loquaciousness — a sign of premature old age?

P.S. Your appeal to the Athanasian Creed put out my 'theological eye'. If I had been prudent I should have left the theology alone.

### 32. *Newman to Meynell.*

Nov. 2, 1869. By this post I inflict some more on you. Thank you for the encouragement you gave me in your last. As to your question about right reason etc. I wish I were a metaphysician to

answer it — but I have the greatest difficulty in passing to the *in fieri* from the *in facto esse*.

I seem quite to concur with what you say about direct and reflex certitude.

### 33. *Meynell to Newman.*

F.S.Caroli. Nov. 4, 1869. What you say in your note reminds me of what I am too apt to forget that we are in two different grooves. Much of what I have said would have been unnecessary had I read your work as a whole instead of reading it piece-meal. I think of the abstract, while you have to do with the concrete. I look out for laws of thought, you for general rules to guide the mind in the application of them. When you speak of Certitude, I think of apodictical certitude, whereas your's is practical certitude — 'certitudine prudente', Rosmini somewhere calls it. This difference sets me at a disadvantage; though I have done my best to throw myself into your line, and would say anything that occurred to me even at the risk of blundering. I spent a great deal of time last night in trying to find a weak point, without success.

So far as I know the philosophical hand-books make the objective truth enter into the very definition of certitude, so as to exclude the notion of a false certitude; whereas you contemplate the possibility — and indeed the fact of spurious certitudes: for is not prejudice a spurious certitude? But this seems to me only a difference of words arising out of the different subject matters, the one abstract, and the other concrete which you and the Metaphysicians have respectively to deal with. Metaphysics doesn't care about the merely general, and dislikes exceptions: its object is the universal and variable. It looks for a certitude which shall lie at the base of science, and be proof against scepticism, i.e. apodictical certitude, and discovers its criterion to be the law of contradiction. Whereas you speak, it seems, of the certitude concrete and practical, which results when a prudent man has with due care and diligence examined the grounds of his beliefs on all kinds of subjects and justified them to himself. It is an essential inconvenience that there should be no internal criterion of this kind of certitude, such as the law of contradiction is to apodictical certitude; but there is at least the negative external one of general indefectibility — if he

changes it shows he wasn't certain. Now, if I haven't blundered, but have learnt my lesson correctly, I don't see that you are in contradiction with the Metaphysicians.

I must beg your pardon if I am wrong in asking you a question. Have you contemplated the case, or is (it) worth while contemplating, of a man who denies the existence of certitude? I met such a one once who referred me for his views to a criticism on yourself, in, I forget in what Magazine — perhaps McMillian — and of which I suspect he was the author. It was to the purpose that 'it was the very A.B.C. of scientific men that it is the greatest mistake to make up one's mind once and for all *upon any subject whatsoever religious or otherwise*'. He told me that if anything in the world was demonstrated it was the impossibility of perpetual motion, but that he was not prepared to say that even that was an absolute truth. What is to be done with a man like this? I thought of sending you the article, but concluded that you would have seen it.

The proofs you sent me last could not detain me long. I read them as I have read the whole with the greatest relish, so you are wrong in calling it an *infliction*. All that I feel is my poverty to be of use, and I feel the artificial position I have been put in which has made one write in such a style sometimes that I shudder to think of it. It seems to me that I am like that prophet whom an angel carried aloft by the hair of his head all the way from Judæa to Babylon.

P.S. Look, please, at the date of this, and say a little prayer to my saint for me.

#### *34. Meynell to Newman.*

Nov. 8, 1869. The statement that an inference can *never* (absolutely) 'reach so far as to ascertain a fact'<sup>63</sup> seems to me a very important statement; and therefore, as it is not a general, but a universal statement, I shall do my best to pick a hole in it. (But pray, be merciful if I blunder: consider I never thought of the question till this morning!)

By inference you mean, inference by a middle term, syllogistic inference? Our new logicians call a *conversion*, even an inference;

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63. *Gramm.* 278.

and you would not deny, I suppose, that you can attain a fact by an inference from *opposition*: e.g. either Dick or Tom did it, and Tom did not: Dick did, and vice versa. I will not ask you therefore what you think of Leibnitz's enthymeme 'the compound exists, therefore the simple exists' (if you say 'notions these!' put it in this way: The compound is a *fact*: the simple is a *fact*). I will not ask you, I say, about this, because it may be said that there is no third term here, by means of which I get at the conclusion, but on analysing the notion of the compound you find in it the notion of the simple: if so it is not a mediate but an immediate inference.

But we are speaking (I presume) of *mediate* inference. Now if, here, the middle term be the expression of a notion, we shall not get beyond a notion in the conclusion; *if Caesar is a man, and all men are mortal*, he is mortal. But now, suppose that the middle term be the expression, not of a notion, but of a fact, will it not get me at a concrete truth? Suppose I say 'This lock has been meddled with by somebody for I find a fragment of the wards of a key in it?' Is it not *absolutely certain* that 'it has been meddled with?' — If I saw a murder committed and that the murderer had blue eyes, whereas the prisoner had deep hazel eyes, it would not perhaps be absolutely certain that the prisoner was not the murderer; there might be a miracle, or a *lucus naturæ* — but if the prisoner was dining with me in Paris, when the murder was committed in London? Or suppose I infer that this snake (*coluber ratrix*) is a true serpent because it can distend the thorax, or that this other (*anguis fragilis*, blind worm) is not a true serpent, because he cannot distend the thorax, do I not get at a concrete truth? If you say these classifications are but arbitrary, and there may be another division, on another ground next year. True, but it is a fact that such or such is now the case: as, if you shoot a hare it is game, under one set of game-laws, or is not under another.

Well, that is all I can find to say. I should say just that by inference you mean *only mediate inference* — is it not so?

Mind, I don't say I am right by any means: I dare not say so: you'll see if there is anything in it.

P.S. I am so eager to see the part about the 'illative sense', but I suspect I shall be out of my depth.

Please look at p.83 near top '*All inferential processes require*

*general notions*'.<sup>64</sup> Well, but remember the controversy between Descartes and Gassendi on this head. This proposition I think therefore I exist, supposes, says Gassendi 'this major, that all which thinks exists, and consequently implies a begging of the question'. To whom Descartes, 'I don't beg the question, for I suppose no major. I maintain that the proposition *I think therefore I exist* is a particular truth which enters into the mind without the aid of any other more general, *and independently of all logical inferences*... *As for you, you think that every particular truth rests upon a general truth from which it has to be deduced by syllogisms, according to the dialectic rules.* Imbued with this error, you gratuitously attribute it to me. This is your constant method' etc. This is a translation of a free translation! But Cousin quotes the original passage (*Histoire de la Philosophie Moderne*).

### 35. Newman to Meynell.

Nov. 17, 1869. Thank you for your two very good letters.

I have put a note on the passage, in consequence of one of them, in which I boldly say 'If it is not A. it must be B' is not reasoning, except materially.<sup>65</sup> I quite agree with you that the deepest men say that we can never be certain of any thing — and it has been my object therefore in (a) good part of my volume to prove that there is such a thing as *unconditional assent*.

I have defined certitude, a conviction of what is *true*. When a conviction of what is not true is considered as if it was a conviction of what is true, I have called it a false certitude.

You will be sadly disappointed in my 'illative sense', which is a grand word for a common thing.

P.S. I send a number of slips.

### 36. Meynell to Newman.

Nov. 18, 1869. I have read the proofs, which I send back, with great interest and pleasure. I feel quite sorry I am coming to the end — I didn't find anything to remark upon in the proofs.

After I had sent my last letter I got to see, what you would have seen at once, that in all the instances I gave of inference, the middle

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64. *Gramm.* 283.

65. This probably refers to *Gramm.* 287, footnote.

term had to do simply with the law of contradiction. Well, I have learnt a great deal from you: I had no notion that an inference was such a leaky sort of thing!

I take for granted that you will remember that my attitude of critic is a secret. If the world knew what would they think of me! When I calmly reflect upon it I am amazed at myself.

### 37. *Meynell to Newman.*

Nov. 27, 1869. I am very much pleased with it, and especially with the part about instinctive inference. I should never have objected to the use of the word *instinctive*<sup>66</sup> in this case as it is the popular use of the word. But when applied to a philosophical subject like perception, I feared it might get you classed with a set whom you perhaps would not agree with, if you explained yourself.

As the subject is one which I have only thought of in a random way, I am afraid to write about it. But I might chance to suggest something.

Although the inference be instinctive, it is only instinctive in the sense that the process is not brought up to the surface of consciousness, for process you evidently suppose there is. It isn't like a young duck taking to the water. This being the case I want some theory about the matter. Can I not have one? When a musician strikes off a complicated group of notes with such rapidity that I feel he cannot think separately of each note, I say that is by the law of contiguity. Separate notions combine so as to make part of a whole, and one note suggests the group. But this law is inadequate to meet the cases mentioned. I would wish to refer each phenomenon to some law of the mind.

I should like to know why women intue (as Dr. Ward terms it) rather than reason; <sup>67</sup> according to the saying of Swift 'Woman is a creature which doth not reason, and poketh the fire from the top'. I hazard this reason, that it requires concentration to submit a complicated process to the consciousness in reflective acts, and it seems that concentration of the mind is stronger in men than in women. These pursue the train of direct thought in consciousness a little way, then through giddiness, or impatience drop the thread.

66. This probably refers to *Gramm.* 260.

67. Does this refer to *Gramm.* 331: 'to women more than to men'?

'There' exclaimed a lady, after finishing an arithmetical puzzle, 'it's done, but for goodness' sake don't ask me how I did it.' The swiftness of thought sometimes prevents our recovering the links in consciousness; and when we recover them it would take some time to repeat over the process. 'When', (I read in Thomson's Outline of the Laws of Thought) 'Captain Head was travelling across the Pam-pas of South America, his guide one day suddenly stopped him, and pointing high into the air, cried out, a lion!... He turned up his eyes, and with difficulty perceived, at an immeasurable height, a flight of condors soaring in circles in a particular spot.' Beneath this spot, far out of sight of himself and the guide, lay the carcass of a horse and over it a lion. The process is obvious: but the flight and manner of the condors would suggest the lion by the law of contiguity; and so the recognition of the lion was instantaneous.

But I have already written too much, and whether to any good purpose I don't know. Perhaps in the sequel there may (come) some theory of the subject, perhaps from the nature of the case there cannot be at present. I do not know how (and from what you say, now I read it again) it seems I cannot know, how one reasons from things to things.

I can furnish a case parallel to the calculating boys losing their art by learning the educational modes. A friend who plays beautifully by ear on the pianoforte, refused to be taught on the ground that he should lose *what he had got* by gift.

I apologise for this *talk*: but you know, you won't have to answer it, else I become a nuisance.

P.S. From one sentence, where you essentially require media for ratiocination,<sup>68</sup> I should infer that, if the process of instinctive inference could be recovered in consciousness, it would fall under the ordinary dialectic rules. If so, I want no theory for this kind of inference, and it is only stupidity which has prevented my seeing this. But I am not sure that I understand.

Isn't Mother Margaret's name O'Hallaham — in the reference it is given M. Hallaham<sup>69</sup> (I haven't the book by me)?

68. This refers perhaps to *Gramm.* 259 (the antecedent), or 260 (from premiss to conclusion, from antecedent to conclusion), or 330-331.

69. *Gramm.* 335.

38. *Meynell to Newman.*

Dec. 9, 1869. Had I seen this before, I might have spared you the infliction of my last lengthy note. It was a great gratification to read these proofs, and I hope the reading will benefit my lop-sided understanding. You know that you have been out of my depth for a long time, and all I have to do is to follow and learn my lesson.

I am not to understand, am I? that you admit the antecedent of those who argue that because 'experience only leads to probabilities, certitude is a mistake?' p.105.<sup>70</sup> But pardon me if this be a stupidity of mine, or a hypercriticism. It is all that I have to say.

39. *Newman to Meynell.*

Dec. 10, 1869. I always look with great interest for your letters, tho' I don't expect them. That of this morning I might, were I fidgetty,<sup>71</sup> to understand wrongly, as if (since my book is on a subject which you say you have not considered as much as other subjects) you put it aside as a bad job, which you could make neither head nor tail of. But I do not understand it so — but thus — that all you can say, whatever there be in the book odd or bizarre, you have found nothing (except what you have noticed) which you conceive goes counter to what ought to be maintained on its subjectmatter — and my assurance for this, is, that in your present letter you have been kind and vigilant enough to point out the clause about probability.

This does not require any answer, but merely to show you how clever I am in interpreting your words and your state of mind regarding the book. You are getting to the end of the IXth chapter. There will be only one more. I wish it were done.

P.S. I have referred to the passage and find I have said that 'experience logically only leads to probabilities'.

40. *Meynell to Newman.*

Please read first the *last* postscript. C.M.

Dec. 11, 1869. As I am not particularly busy I will tell you about my last letter — I wrote it with a nervous fear that I was

70. *Gramm.* 343.

71. 'to' is obviously a slip; it should be left out.

sadly boring you with letters (I should have felt this much more if you had answered all of them) — So I wrote briefly and I suppose was obscure. However thank you for putting the best construction on my words — whatever they were. I certainly did not put the subject aside as a bad job, but I wished to express that my mind is both slow — and I fear narrow, and when a larger view of a subject is put before it, takes some time to expand to it — I ought to have seen that it was no part of your subject to enter into my crotchets and answer my difficulties as to how men reason intuitively from *things to things*, but to deal with the *fact* in its relation to the subject of certainty and assent. I thought this narrowness of mind made me a very poor critic; nevertheless I might possibly find something to point out which a reader might misinterpret, and I pitched, but doubtfully, on the sentence about experience only giving probabilities. It is only in this kind of way that I flatter myself I may be still of some use. I try to read it as if I were an enemy, eager to catch you tripping, if I can; so that there may be nothing that anybody can possibly take hold of to twist against your own sense.

And I wanted to say when the work was finished — but I may as well say it now — that I feel most painfully that I have sometimes overdone this function. And I wish you knew me better, that you might know how little, on some occasions, my letters have represented my mind, or rather my character. I should no more have dreamed of setting up my opinion against yours on a point of theology for instance than I should of flying; but I did so in my artificial character — no nor in a point of philosophy, if you knew the whole bearings of the case. I might hold a different opinion, of course, but I should never try the *force* mine against yours.

Don't think from this that I repent of what I undertook in St. Chad's. I would do it again, if I were asked. Only it is natural perhaps that I should not wish to appear in a disadvantageous light.

I should speak very enthusiastically about the book if I were not afraid of wounding your modesty. I will say one thing however, and that is that it is very interesting reading, so that I should not be surprised if it became *popular* (you know what I mean).

As I am as it were taking my farewell (though I remember that

there is a little more to come and am very glad of it) I have only to ask you to pardon my faults.

P.S. You must *by no means*, be at the trouble of answering this letter, nor do I see that it can any way require it. I wonder what it was in my letter that you considered to mean that I thought this or any other portion of the book 'odd or bizarre'. I said *my mind* was lop-sided. I thought the form of all reasoning was the Barbara, Celarent, and now a larger view was put before me which I hoped might do me good.

P.S. I know now how I led you wrong. I wrote I have been out of my depth for some time — I did not mean in reading the last proofs — but from the time when you shewed me that all reasoning wasn't shut up in the logical forms. This opened a new world to me, and I thought, 'A pretty fellow I am to be making believe I am to be a critic, when it is my business rather to learn my lesson!' I like this part quite as well as any other and am sorry to have conveyed a different impression, and given you the trouble of writing.

#### 41. *Meynell to Newman.*<sup>72</sup>

I have only to remark that I don't much like the expression 'mental sensation' at p.112 1.35; but perhaps it is a trifle. It seems 'sensation' or 'sentiment' would do just as well without the mental.

Are there any *philosophers* (you do not *say* so, but perhaps it seems implied)<sup>74</sup> who really teach that one must begin with universal doubt? p.118. This is the popular notion of Descartes' doubt: but Cousin, Balmez, and Dugald Stewart understand it differently — as only *hypothetical*, in order to find out some fact that it was impossible to doubt about — *the conscious self*. Reid says Descartes' system begot a sect of sceptical egoists. But Hamilton says he doesn't believe in their existence; that while Reid puts them in France, F. Buffier puts them in Scotland. He, Buffier, wrote before Hume. But Hume only assumed the rôle of sceptic as a pretended disciple of Locke's philosophy. And it is easy to see that

72. This Letter bears no date. There is only 'Thursday'. According to the references it should be put between number 40 and 42, although it is the last letter of the file at the Birmingham Oratory.

74. *Gramm.* 377.

Hume is laughing in his sleeve, when he describes his situation as a sceptic calling himself 'some uncouth monster' — 'expelled all human commerce', apologizing for using such expressions as '*t is certain*, *t is evident*', 'which a due deference to the public ought perhaps to prevent'.

Fichte was an egoist, in a sense. He believed in all the facts of consciousness just as other people, only he gave a different account of them. In fact I don't know a thorough-going sceptic in philosophy (but *you may*). There are plenty of sceptics *practically*.

I think any philosopher would see what you say, that scepticism, thorough-going, is a contradiction. How can a man be certain that there is no certainty? I dare say that you don't intend to charge any *philosopher*; but I think people will think that you mean Descartes' philosophical doubt.

I write *in haste*; but I read it all most carefully and like it very much.

#### *42. Meynell to Newman.* <sup>75</sup>

I read it and wrote 'Nothing to remark upon' in the margin, as you will see. Since then it has occurred to me that somebody might object regarding what you say of eternal punishment, that you evade a real difficulty by a metaphysical subtlety. When is the notion of eternity a mere negation? <sup>76</sup> Is it not the negation of a negation which equals an affirmation; for *limit* is a negation, and endlessness the negation of that negation? That is what Fenelon says by way of proving that infinity is a positive idea.

Is it *possible* that the Apocalypse can have been fulfilled in events unrecorded in history? But I don't know anything of that subject.

You would I am sure be pleased if you could know with what delight I read it.

#### *43. Meynell to Newman.*

Jan. 9, 1870. I suspect that you have finished with the book, and that I shall soon be able to read it altogether. But in case I

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75. No date, except 1870 in pencil.

76. *Gramm.* 422.

am wrong and you might want me to read over something, a letter addressed to me under the care of J. Perry Esq., Oxford Road, Banbury, will find me after to-morrow, and for the next week, at the end of which I shall return to Oscott.

#### 44. *Newman to Meynell.*<sup>77</sup>

Febr. 23, 1870. I ought before now to have written you a letter both of congratulation and thanks on the termination of the long and teasing task which you have so valiantly performed in my behalf. All I can say is, that whatever be the amount of trouble you have had from your charitable undertaking my amount of gain from it has been greater. What the positive value is of my volume, I do not know; but this I do know, that, many as are its imperfections and faults, they would have been many more and much worse but for you.

Now I want you to accept some keepsake in token of my gratitude and as a memorial for after years. I don't care what it is, so that it is something you would like. This is why I don't send you something without asking, for it might be as unwelcome to you, when it came, as the elephant in Leach's picture. But give me two or three sets of books to choose out of, or picture-books, or astronomical instruments, or images or what you please.

#### 45. *Meynell to Newman.*

Feb. 24, 1870. Your letter this morning was very grateful to me, for I felt sheer disgust first for the manner in which I did my part as to the book. However that is all over now. It is exceedingly kind of you to ask me to accept of a keepsake as a memorial of you, and I wish no other than the book itself, if you will be so kind as to write my name in it. I shall not regard it as a reward, because I cannot feel that I deserve one, nor should I wish for one if I did, but I shall always most dearly prize it as a keepsake from yourself.<sup>78</sup>

#### 46. *Meynell to Newman.*

24 May. 1870. I thank you for your kind invitation, and wish

77. This letter is quoted by Ward, *Life II*, 261, with a few slips e. g. the date.

78. Newman presented him with a silver chalice. See *A Study on Cardinal Newman's Grammar of Assent* by Charles E. Ryder, p. 3, as also the last Letter.

you, by anticipation, a happy feast. I propose to come for High Mass on Thursday (weather permitting).

I read the review of your book with great interest. If I wrote I should say, that since you look at man in the concrete, it is not so much for you to reconcile yourself with metaphysics as for the latter to reconcile itself with you. If metaphysics doesn't account for the concrete man, I say so much the worse for metaphysics. As for the writer who says that *the book* does not follow the scholastic system, I say What is the Scholastic system? I never heard of it.. The ultra-realism of the writer who considers the *ideas* as separate entities was not held by all the scholastics, nor is it held by the modern Catholic metaphysicians. And Liberatore and the S. Congregation suspect it. Excuse this talk.

#### 47. *Meynell 'o Newman.*

March 12, 1871. I do not know how to thank you for your kindness. I shall prize the chalice more than anything which I possess. I have been used often to put your name in the Memento of the Mass, and pray that God would bless you and your work in the Church. When I forget to do this the chalice will remind me.

I told Fr. Ryder to say to you how much I blame myself that I have never once been to pay my respects to you, since I have been so near to you. But having two thousand people to attend to is a fair sort of excuse.

I think you will be glad to know I am happy in my new life.

*Edited by*  
DR. ZENO, O.F.M. CAP.

*Holland*

# INCIPITS OF LOGICAL WRITINGS of the **XIIIth-XVth CENTURIES**

The ever-increasing interest shown the writings of the Late Middle Ages and the popularity which their authors enjoy convinces one that there is an immediate need for catalogues of incipits of such writings. The répertoires of Glorieux and Stegmüller and the incipit catalogues of Little and Thorndyke, to mention but a few, have performed an immeasurable service in the fields of their interest, but as far as can be determined, no such catalogue dedicated solely to philosophical works has yet made its appearance. Students of the history of Philosophy in the Late Middle Ages have had to resort to a countless host of magazines and periodicals in their search for primary sources or to the laborious task of ferreting such material from the various manuscript catalogues, many of which are good, but many of which are decidedly inadequate, incomplete, and not infrequently incorrect. At first it was our intention to wait until such time as we could present a more extensive listing of all the philosophical incipits we have collected over the years, but the kind encouragement of friends and the hope that others will be encouraged to continue and expand our initial attempts prompted us to limit ourselves for the present to a list of incipits of Logical works of the XIIIth-XVth centuries.

A few items about this collection are to be noted. No attempt is made here to give a complete listing of all the possible incipits of logical writings: even a cursory glance at the comparatively few catalogues and other sources at our disposal will convince the reader that we have barely scratched the surface and that there is still much to be done. Nor, in ascribing incipits to particular authors, is it our intention to correct the catalogues, but simply to report our findings. Only those catalogue references have been included which expressly carry an incipit; all others have been relegated to our files. A few references to codices of the X-XIIth centuries have been added to

give completeness, and in some instances an incipit which is manifestly not of a logical work has been added because of its resemblance to a neighboring incipit or because a particular catalogue lists it as one. All library call numbers are had as indicated in the various catalogues used, with the sole exception of St. Mark's in Venice; here references are to Valentinelli's catalogue (see "Catalogues of Manuscripts"). References to sources other than the MSS. catalogues are enclosed in square brackets [ ] and placed immediately after the library call numbers they are meant to control. These will refer the reader to the "List of Abbreviations" at the beginning of the work. Other sources less frequently cited may be found in the main body of our work. Usually only one edition of a work is included, preference being given to an incunabulum edition where same is possible, while the spelling has been made to conform to modern usage.

## CATALOGUES OF MANUSCRIPTS

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- AFH — Meier L., *Aufzeichnungen aus vernichteten Handschriften des Würzburger Minoritenklosters*, in *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, XLIV (Quaracchi 1951), pp. 191-209.
- Al — Lacombe G., *Aristoteles Latinus*, Union Académique Internationale (Corp. Philosophorum Medii Aevi), Rome 1939.
- Bale — Bale J., *Illustrium Maioris Britanniae Scriptorum... Summarium...*, Wesel 1549.
- Bs — Bochéński I. M., *Petri Hispani Summulæ Logicales*, (Turin 1947), pp. xx-xxiii.
- EPM — Baudry L., *Guillaume d'Occam Sa Vie, Ses Oeuvres, Ses Idées Sociales et Politiques. Tom. I. L'Homme et Les Oeuvres* ("Etudes de Philosophie Médiévale," XXXIX), Paris 1950, pp. 273-287.
- Ff — Boehner Ph., *MSS. des œuvres non polémiques d'Occam*, in *France Franciscaine*, XXIII (Paris 1939), pp. 171-175.
- Gm — Glorieux P., *Répertoire des Maîtres en Théologie de Paris au XIIIe Siècle* ("Etudes de Philosophie Médiévale," XVII and XVIII), Paris 1933-1934.
- GW — *Gesamtkatalog der Wiegendrucke*, Leipzig 1925-(to date).
- H — Hain L., *Repertorium Bibliographicum*, Stuttgart 1826-1838.

- Hn — Hauréau B., *Notices et Extraits de quelques Manuscrits latins de la Bibliothèque Nationale*, I-VI, Paris 1890-1893.
- Li — Little A. G., *Initia Operum Latinorum quæ Sæculis XIII. XIV. XV. attribuuntur*, Manchester 1904.
- Pell — Pellechet M. L. C., *Catalogue Général des Incunables des Bibliothèques Publiques de France*, Paris 1897-(to date).
- Pits — Pits J., *Relationum Historicarum de Rebus Anglicis tomus primus*, Paris 1619.
- SeT — Meier L., *Quibusnam codicibus mss. editio Formalitatum Nicolai O. Min. hucusque fulciatur, in "Studi e Testi" 122 (Misc. Mercati, Vol. II)*, Vatican City 1946, pp. 431-464.
- Ss — Sbaralea I. H., *Supplementum et Castigatio ad Scriptores trium ordinum S. Francisci*, ed. nova, I-III, 1908-1936.

### INCIPITS OF LOGICAL WRITINGS IN LATIN XIII-XVth CENTURIES

A est scitum a te et idem...

Guilelmus Hentisberg, Conclusiones : *Perugia Com.* 1070 (N. 21), f. 84-102

A est scitum a te et idem A est tibi dubium...

(Hentisberg), De scitu et creditu : *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 311, f. 226-228 ; ed. Venice 1494, f. 191v

Ab arte demonstrativa trahit hoc opus exordium...

Raimundus Lull, L. propositionum secundum artem demonstrativam : ed. Mainz 1722. For MSS. see Gm 335 aa

Ab eo quod res est vel non est, oratio dicitur esse vera vel falsa...

Logica : *Metz, Municipale* 642 : *Zwettl, Cisterzienskloster* 257, f. 54r-77v [A1 141]

Abstinens de topicis...

Comment. in libros topicorum, elenchorum et analyticorum Aristotelis : *Vienna NB* 2506, f. 257r-296v

Absurdum est querere scientiam et modum...

Utrum logica sit scientia : *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 2182, f. 58v [Gm 210 af]

Accedo ad novam quæ quattuor habet partes principales...

(Marsilius ab Inghen), Priora, Posteriora, Topica, Elenchi : *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 284, f. 13'-104

Accidens est quod adest et abest...

Definitiones logicales : Vaticana Urbin. 1419, f. 76 ; *Vienna NB* 4698, f. 9r ; *Worcester Cathedral F.* 142 (Jo. Damascenus)

Accidens ponitur in eo...

Comm. alphabeticus in Prædicamenta etc. Porphyrii : *Vienna NB* 2506, f. 240r-256r

Accidens quod prædicatur quod naturale (?), Porphyrius...

Tabula logicalis : *Leipzig Univ.* 1354, f. 1r-3v [A1 973]

Ad annuendum votis amici etc...

Thomas Aquinas, De contradictionibus: *Erfurt Ampl.* Fol. 79, f. 124-125'.

Ad clariorem notitiam istarum duarum distinctionum incipit et desinit habendam sic procedamus. Primo aliquas suppositiones...

Thomas Manlevelt (?), Tract. de incipit et desinit: *Vienna Dominikaner* 153

Ad cognoscendum æquipollentias modalium dantur regulæ...

De modalibus: *Oxford Magd.* 92, f. 151

Ad cognoscendum prædicamenta... Hic determinat auctor de prædicamentis ubi sciendum quod prædicamentum potest sumi dupl. citer...

Nicolaus de Orbello, De prædicamentis (Logica brevis): ed. Parma 1482; Venice 1489

Ad cognoscendum prædicamenta quædam necessaria præmittenda...

Iste est tertius tractatus summularum magistri Petri Hispani in quo ipse determinat de decem prædicamentis...

Joannes de Monte, Super summulas Petri Hispani: Ed. Venice 1495

Ad cognoscendum prædicamenta quædam sunt...

Gerardus Hardewick, Comment. sex tractatum Petri Hispani: Ed. Cologne 1488 [H 8361]. See also 'Circa initium huius secundæ scientiæ...'.

Ad cognoscendum suppositiones terminorum a quo fundatur...

Petrus Hispanus, De suppositionibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 283, f. 93-102'

Ad evidentiam dictionis prædicamentorum...

(Duns) Scotus, De distinctione prædicamentorum: *Erfurt Ampl. Fol.* 182, f. 113'-148

Ad evidentiam dictorum quæritur utrum definitio subiecti vel passionis sit medium in demonstratione...

Paulus Venetus, Q. de medio demonstrationis (Posteriora, L.II, Tract. 2): *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 828, f. 128

Ad evidentiam distinctionis prædicamentorum sic intendo procedere...  
 Petrus Thomae, Formalitates: Assisi Conv. 659; *Erfurt Ampl. Fol.* 182; *Oxford Bodleian (Digby)* 54; *Magd.* 80; *Merton* 133; *Turin Naz.* 981

Ad evidentiam distinctionis sic intendo procedere. Primo præmittam necessaria, secundo concludam. Quantum ad primum...

Petrus Thomae, De identitate prædicamentorum: *Munich CLM* 18530 b, f. 131v-142v; *Vaticana Urbin.* 1419, f. 81; ed. Venice 1520

Ad evidentiam formalitatum et modorum...

Petrus Thomae, Formalitates: *Arezzo Fraternit. dei laici* 432; *Assisi Conv.* 659

Ad gloriam Dei et honorem et perfectionem scolarium intendo aliquid breviter dicere de istis propositionibus in quibus ponitur incipit et desinit...

De incipit et desinit: *Vienna Dominikaner* 153, f. 222

Ad gloriam et honorem Dei principaliter et secundario ad utilitatem et perfectionem scolarium...

Thomas Manlevelt (?), De incipit et desinit: *Vienna Dominikaner* 153

Ad habendam cognitionem de demonstratione, sciendum...

Thomas Aquinas (?), De demonstratione: *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 807, f. 94; ed. Vives XXVII, 531

Ad habendam notitiam de universalibus realibus est notandum quod universalia sunt res...

De universalibus: *Leipzig Univ. cod. lat.* 1348, f. 247r-v [SeT 122]

Ad habendam notitiam eorum quæ Aristoteles tradit in libro elenchorum quattuor distinctiones assignabimus...

Thomas Aquinas (?), De syllogismo sophistico: *Vaticana Urbin.* 215, f. 54v. See also 'Ad notitiam habendam eorum quæ atrahit...'

Ad maiorem fallaciarum evidentiam...

See 'Incipit prologus fallaciarum: Ad...'

Ad melius intelligendam suppositiones, ampliations et appellations movebuntur aliqua sophismata quorum primum est hoc: non supponens est supponens...

Sophismata: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 311, f. 221-225'

Ad notitiam habendam eorum quæ atrahit (!) in libro elenchorum quattuor distinctiones in hoc tractatu assignamus...

(Thomas Aquinas), Compilatio libri elenchorum: *Bologna Communale A.* 1454, f. 135v; ed. Parma 1852-72, XVI, p. 377

Ad omnium methodorum principia viam habens...

Summulæ (Petri Hispani): *Saint-Dié Municipale* 69. See also 'Dialectica est ars artium...'

Ad planiorem intellectum primi libri...

Super Posteriora Analytica: *London Brit. Mus. Royal 12 D. II*, f. 209b

Ad rudium eruditionem et mei exercitationem opusculum super logicam componendum (?) decrevi... Continebit autem præsens opusculum tres partes...

Tract. logicæ: *Vaticana Vat. lat. 946*, f. 1-15r

Ad secundum sic...

Hervaeus (?), Q. de prædicamentis: *Paris Arsenal 530*, f. 16-20 [Gm aj]; *Vienna NB 2411*, f. 60r-66r

Ad utrumque dubitare potentes facilius speculabimus verum et falsum...

Sophismata: *Bruges de la ville* 497, f. 64va-73vb

Ad utrumque dubitare potentis facile speculemur, ut dicit...

Climiton (Jo. Clinchton?), Sophismata: *Erfurt Ampl. Fol. 313*, f. 147-158'; *Oct. 76*, f. 37-71 (Ric. Chillington)

Ad veritatis lumen intuendum iuvenum ac adolescentum animi invitati... Circa initium summularum logicalium aliqua generalia sunt præmittenda...

Florentius Diel, Summulæ logicales: ed. Speyer c. 1489 [GW 8337]

Adhuc circa genus oppositionis restat inquirendum utrum contradictio sit maxima oppositio...

Contradictoria: *Bruges de la ville* 501, f. 105r-111r; *Vaticana Vat. lat. 817*, f. 223r

Aequivoca dicuntur ea quorum nomen solum commune est...

Aristoteles, Categoriae (Jo. Argyropulo interprete): *Vaticana Urbin.* 208, f. 14; *Venice, S. Mark Class, X, cod. 24*, f. 4-9

Aequivoca dicuntur quorum nomen solum commune est...

*Urbin.* 208, f. 14; *Venice, S. Mark Class X, cod. 24*, f. 4-9

Aristoteles, *Categoriae*: *Arras Municipale* 862 (XIth c.); *Assisi Conv.* 658, f. 13-30; 664, f. 13-40; *Avranche de le ville* 227; 228; *Barboursville (West Virginia)* *Owens* 1, f. 8r-18r; *Charleville Municipale* 39; 187 (XIIth c.); *Erfurt Ampl. Fol.* 39, f. 9'-25; *Qu.* 20, f. 6-15'; *Qu.* 267, f. 7-16'; *Qu.* 271, f. 101'-115'; *Laon Comm.* 433; *Metz Municipale* 151; 269; 508; *Rome Angel.* 953 (R. 5.4), f. 74-79; *Boncompagni* 360, f. 135-139; *Toulouse de le ville* 735, f. 9; *Utrecht Univ.* 816 (*Gr.* 26), f. 139-153; *Vaticana Regin.* 358, f. 89-90; *Vat. lat.* 10683, f. 13; *Venice S. Mark cl. X, cod. 15*, f. 8-22; *cod. 16*, f. 6-17; *cod. 17*, f. 13-23; *cod. 18*, f. 19-26; *cod. 19*, f. 7-17; *cod. 23*, f. 7-21; *Worcester Cathedral F.* 66, f. 10b; ed. 1503

Aequivoca dicuntur... Circa librum Prædicamentorum quæritur utrum de prædicamentis possit esse scientia...

Simon de Faversham, *Qq. super libro Prædicamentorum: Milan Ambros. C. 161. Inf.*, f. 11v-21v; ed. Rome 1930

Aequivoca dicuntur... Ex prius dictis apparet in divisione logices...  
Prædicamenta: *Oxford Mert.* 296, f. 7b-24

Aequivoca dicuntur... Iste liber continuari potest...

Thomas Aquinas, *Super Prædicamentis Aristotelis: Erfurt Ampl. Fol.* 135, f. 106-125. Anon., *Glossa s. Prædicamentis: Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 266, 8-20

Aequivoca dicuntur... Sicut dicit Boethius in commento suo iste liber est de decem vocibus...

Gerardus de Nagemo, *Categoriae: Paris BN 14984.* f. 222 [Hn IV, 254]

Aequivoca discuntur... Causa efficiens extra huius libri...

Robertus Kilwardby, *Prædicamenta: Oxford Bodleian (Can. Misc.) 403; Rawlinson C 677 [Li]*

Aequivoca sunt quorum nomen...

L. Prædicamentorum: *Charleville Municipale* 250

Aequivoca sunt quorum nomen... Circa librum istum, scilicet prædicamentorum, quædam...

Petrus de Alvernia, *Super Categorias: Florence Laurent. XII, sin. cod. 3; Paris BN 16170,* f. 89b-99c [Gm 210 c<sup>1</sup>]

Aequivoca sunt... Dubitatur utrum descriptio æquivocorum sit bene data...

In Prædicamenta Aristotelis: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 32,* f. 20-50

Aequivoca vero dicuntur. Hic Prædicendum est quod omnes res aut suo nomine, aut sua definitione demonstrantur...

Boethius, De anteprädicamentis: *Vaticana Regin. 230. II, f. 42-* 44v; ed. Migne PL 64, 163

Aequivoca vero dicuntur. Hic prædicendum est quod omnis res...

Categorica Aristotelis: *London Brit. Mus. (Royal) 7 D XXV. 8*

Affectuose cognitionem summariam...

Regulæ de confusionibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 245, f. 165'-186'*

See also 'Assiduose congeriem summariam...'

Affectuose cognitionem summarum. Terminorum...

(Thomas) Manlevet, De confusionibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 30,* f. 142-144

Alexander in commentariis suis hac se impulsum causa pronuntiat sumpsisse longissimum expositionis laborem...

Boethius, De interpretatione (Comm. maiora): *Vaticana Urbin.* 188, f. 119; *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 22, f. 1-85;* ed. Migne PL 64, 393-638

Algazel dicit in logica sua quod non est via...

Angelus de Camelino (Camerino), Commenta super libris Topi-  
corum: *Erfurt Ampl. Fol. 304.* See also "Frater Angelus... Licet  
continuis..."

Aliquis homo est species. Circa hoc sophisma (?) quærebatur utrum secundæ intentiones essent in prædicamento...

Sophismata: *Vaticana Palat. 1202, f. 279*

Aliquis homo est species. Ista fuit oratio proposita...

Radulphus de Hotot (Brito), Sophismata: *Paris BN Nouv.* Acquis. 1374, f. 103v; *Vaticana Vat. lat. 3061, f. 36 [Gm 225 i<sup>2</sup>]*

Almi spiritus gubernaculo de propositionibus...

Martinus Anglicus, De veritate et falsitate: *Vienna NB 4698,* f. 40r-48r

Alpharabius in logica sua volens quandam notitiam tradere...

Aegidius Romanus, Expos. libri Elenchorum : *Vaticana lat.* 823, f. 1r-84v. See also 'Ex illustri prosapia oriundo...'

Alphiabius dicit in libro...

De æquivocis: *Vienna NB 4989, f. 86r-136r*

Amatus sum vel fui. Circa hunc sermonem...

Guilelmus Scardeborough, Logica: *Worcester Cathedral Q.* 13,  
f. 37-42

Ampliatio est acceptio termini pro aliquo...

Regulæ de ampliationibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 245, f. 233-237';  
f. 240, 241' (Tract. alter)

An verbum infinitum maneat... Quod sic videtur quia Aristoteles  
dicit...

Joannes Scotus, II Perihermenias: [Li]

An verbum infinitum maneat infinitum in oratione...

Duns (Scotus), Qq. in II Perihermenias: Ed. Lyons 1639, I,  
204-210. See also 'Quæritur circa secundum librum Perihermenias  
primo an verbum...'

Anima est locus specierum. Hoc sit sophisma propositum...

Sophisma: *Bruges de la ville* 510, f. 207ra-209rb

Animadvertis hinc logicæ codicum prolixitatem...

Nicolaus Eymericus, Breviloquium logicæ: Ed. Barcelona 1498  
[GW 9544]

Animal est omnis homo. Probatur sic: animal est sors...

Sophismata: *Bruges de la ville* 509, f. 76ra-107vb

Ante initium libri Perihermenias quæritur utrum notitiæ libri Peri-  
hermenias enuntiatio sit subiectum... Primum oportet constituere  
quid sit nomen... Quæritur. Utrum in hoc libro...

Florentius Diel, Qq. de interpretatione Aristotelis: Ed. Speyer c.  
1490 [GW 8336]

Antequam ad textum accedamus...

See 'Circa initium veteris artis. Antequam...'

Antequam Raimundus seu Raimundista et Averroista recesserent...

Raimundus Lull, De syllogismis contradictionis: *Munich Clm*  
10588, f. 149; *Paris BN* 17829, f. 395 [Gm 335 ff]

Antiqua docti quid tum si discere nolint... Pythagoras ille quandam  
a quo præstantissimus moribus... Tria sunt quibus res omnes  
comprehenduntur elementa et ut nunc loquimur prædicamenta...  
Laurentius Valla, Disputationes dialecticarum I-III: *Vaticana*  
*Urbin.* 1207, f. 39v; ed. Basel 1540

Appellatio dupliciter definitur; uno: appellatio est...

De appellationibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 245, f. 241'-245'

Appellatio est acceptio termini pro re existente. Dico autem pro  
re existente...

Nicolaus de Orbello, *De appellationibus* (*Summa logicæ*): Ed. Venice 1489

Appellatio est acceptio termini... Iste est quartus tractatus parvorum logicalium in quo determinatur de quadam alia passione termini...  
Joannes de Monte, *Super summulas Petri Hispani Tract. VII*: Ed. Venice 1500

Appellatio est acceptio termini... Iste est quartus tractatus parvorum logicalium in quo ipse (*Petrus Hispanus*) determinat...  
Joannes de Magistris, *De appellatione* (*Summularum Petri Hispani Glossulæ*): Ed. Venice 1490

Apposui cor meum ut viderem distinctionem quæ versatur in terra...  
In quibus verbis tria notantur scilicet diligens investigatio...  
Petrus Thomae, *Formalitates*: *Cracow Univ.* 2130, f. 68r-127v  
[SeT 122]; *Erfurt Ampl. Fol.* 182

Arguenda de sensu composito ad sensum divisum et eius frequentia fallit Aristotelem...

Hentisbery; de sensu composito et diviso: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 200*, f. 49-53; ed. Venice 1494

Arguendo a sensu...

Thisberius (Hentisbery), *De sensu composito et diviso*: *Assisi Conv. 690*, f. 258-265

Argumentum autem... Quia argumentum conformatur per locum ideo consequenter auctor definit locum dicens quod locus est sedes argumenti...

Nicolaus de Orbello, *De locis dialecticis* (*Logica brevis*): Ed. Parma 1482

(Aristoteles exemplificat) hæc autem in hunc modum omne C ex necessitate...

See 'Dixit oportet ut incipiamus...'

Aristoteles in quinto Metaphysicæ dicit quod unum quod—Forma est. Liber sex principiorum cuius expositionem intendimus...  
*De sex Principiis*: *Oxford Merton 288*, f. 1-34

Aristoteles octavo physicorum ponit aliquas regulas de primo instanti et ultimo quas quidem satis...

Joannes de Hollandia, *De instanti*: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 219*, f. 137-152

Aristoteles octavo physicorum scribit...

Qq. super Meteora: Oriel 33 [Li]

Arma militiae nostrae non sunt carnalia...

Franciscus Mayron, Passus super Universalia et Prædicamenta:  
*Bologna Com. dell' Archiginnasio A 96*; ed. Bologna 1479

Ars arbori antiquissime assimulatur...

De dialectica: *Vienna NB 3533*, f. 95r-106r

Ars imitatur naturam in quantum potest...

Joannes Pagus, Prædicamenta: *Padua Univ. 1589*, f. 24r-67v

Ars ista dialectica quam peripatetici...

Introductiones dialecticæ: *Vienna NB 2499*, f. 23r-67v

Artes liberales sunt septem...

Rodulphus Strodus, De arte logica: *Oxford Bodleian (Can. Misc.) 219* [Li]

Artis logicæ auctorem ac firmam...

Joannes Botrell, (De utilitate Logices): [Li]

Artis logicæ auctorem ac primum...

Joannes Botrell, De utilitate Logices: [Pits 568]

Assiduoſe congeriem summariam...

De terminorum confusione: *Vienna NB 4698*, f. 32r-36r. See also 'Affectuose cognitionem summarium...'

Auctoritates libri Porphyrii... Deque (Neque?) genus species...

(Libellus auctoritatum philosophiæ): *Namur de la ville 14*, f. 219r-232r. Compare 'Neque genus neque species videtur simpliciter dici...'; 'Videtur autem neque genus neque species...'

Aura, id est favor, ut apud...

Ricardus Kendall, Aequivocorum exempla: [Pits 623]; [Li: R. 'Kendale']

Aurelius vocatur dominus noster augustinus ab aura id est favore populari...

Ps. Augustinus, Dialectica cum scholiis: *Vaticana Urbin. 393*, f. 37; ed. Migne PL 32, 1409-1420 (Appendix)

Ave Maria. Hoc opus gratia profectus mei incipiens...

Marsilius de Inghen, Qq. de logica Porphyrii, prædicamentis Aristotelis: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 246*, f. 1-137

Bene fundatum exigit debitum...

Guilelmus Chubs (Stubs), Introductio Logices: [Pits 686]

Bene fundatum præexigit debitum...

(Guilelmus) Chubbes, *Isagoge ad Logicam*: [Bale f. 254]

Bœthius inquit Argumentum est ratio rei dubiæ fidem vel certitudinem faciens...

Marinus de Castignano, *Tract. syllogismorum: Vaticana Vat. lat. 3037*, f. 157r-163r. See also 'Cum sæpenumero in me...'

Bonum est quod homines diversis...

Super divisionibus Bœthii: *Erfurt Ampl. Fol. 135*, f. 85-90'

Capitulum de iis quæ debent proponi ad intelligentiam logicæ et ad ostendendas utilitates eius et partes eius...

Algazel, *Logica: London Brit. Mus. (Royal) 15 B. IV*, f. 72 (incomplete); *Paris BN 14700*, f. 62r-76r [Al 640]; *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 173*, f. 1-18; ed. Venice 1506. See also 'Quod autem proponi debet...'

Capitulo de movente innuit Philosophus tertio de anima...

Glossa super Porphyrium: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 266*, f. 1-7'

Capitulum primum docens quis utitur syllogismo sophistico et quot sunt metæ sophisticæ...

De fallaciis: *Oxford Corp. Christi 228*, f. 8-14

Causa efficiens extra huius libri...

Robertus Kilwardby, *Prædicamenta: Oxford Bodleian (Can. Misc.) 403; Rawlinson C. 677* [Li]

Cautelæ proponentis sunt multæ...

De fallaciis: *Oxford Magd. 38*, f. 13-14

Circa autem...

De modo opponendi et respondendi: *Vaticana Vat. lat 4537*, f. 46r-52r [Bs p. xxi]

Circa considerationem quare sensus...

Ricardus Lavingham, *De scientia et sensu: [Pits 534]*

Circa considerationem sensus quare sit singularium et intellectus universalium...

(Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas), *De sensu singularium etc.: Vaticana Vat. lat. 806*; ed. Rome 1570, XVII, f. 35v

Circa conversionem propositionum non quantarum etiam propositionum exceptivarum...

Nicolaus de Orbellis, *De conversione (Logica brevis)*: Ed. Parma 1482

Circa conversiones aliquarum...

Ricardus Lavingham, *De conversione propositionum*: [Pits 535] Circa conversiones dubitatur primo utrum conversio sit species argumentationis communiter tenetur quod non...

Gualterus Burlæus (?), *Super libro Priorum Analyticorum: Vaticana Vat. lat. 901, f. 17r*

Circa dictiones exclusivas est sciendum quod dictio exclusiva addita subiecto...

Gualterus Burley, *Exclusivæ: London, Brit. Mus. (Royal) 12 F. XIX, f. 123*

Circa distinctiones exceptivas et exclusivas est sciendum quod exclusiva...

De distinctionibus exceptivis etc.: *Burges de la ville 500, f. 81vb-94ra*

Circa exordium categoriarum Aristotelis quæ latine prædicamenta appellantur antequam ad textum procedatur...

Gerardus de Hardewijck, *Prædicamenta: Ed. Cologne 1494 [Pell 5063]*

Circa exordium libri elenchorum antequam ad textum procedatur... *Nova Logica: Ed. Cologne 1494 [H 8357]*

Circa exordium libri prædicabilium Porphyrii quæritur utrum logica sit unus habitus scientificus rationalis ab aliis distinctus...

Joannes de Magistris, *Qq. super logicam: Ed. Venice 1490, f. 2*

Circa finem octavi Metaphysicæ...

Thomas Aquinas, *Super Isagogis Porphyrii: Erfurt Ampl. Fol. 135, f. 91-105*

Circa finem octavi Metaphysicæ scientia Aristotelis quæ quasi tollit ab entibus proprias opiniones...

Suger de Curtivo, *Super veterem logicam: Venice S. Mark Cl X, cod. 62, f. 92-108*

Circa finem seu terminum tam...

Gul. Heytesbury, *De maximo et minimo: [Li]*

Circa finem seu terminum tam activæ potentiae quam passivæ divisiones fieri solent multiplices...

Guilelmus Hentisbery, *De maximo et minimo*: Ed. Venice 1494,  
f. 29v

Circa finem seu terminum ultimum...

Rogerus Suisset, *Insolubilia*: [Pits 478]; [Li: 'Swineshead']  
Circa hunc librum super... videndum est primo de libri titulo qui  
est talis...

Joannes de Burgo, *De sophisticis elenchis*: *Venice S. Mark Cl.*  
*X, cod. 38*, f. 49-82

Circa idem laborat dialectica et sophistica cum prima philosophia...  
(Principium) super logica: *Vaticana Vat. lat. 845*, f. 307v-  
309v

Circa initium ampliationum dubitatur primo penes quod debent...

Gul. de Heidelberg, Qq. de ampliationibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.*  
280, f. 91-96

Circa initium appellationum dubitatur primo utrum quomodo de  
appellatione debet...

Gul. de Heidelberg, Qq. de appellationibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.*  
280, f. 96-100

Circa initium Biligam (Billingham) quæritur utrum de propositione  
prout...

Qq. de propositionibus Billingham: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 256,  
f. 68'-102

Circa initium compendii logicæ tria exordialiter...

Bartholomæus de Usingen, *Logica*: Ed. Leipzig 1500 [GW  
3461]

Circa initium consequentiarum dubitatur primo quid sit ponendum  
pro subiecto...

Gul. Heidelberg, Qq. de consequentiis: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 280,  
f. 101-131

Circa initium exercitii novæ logicæ: utrum nova logica sit scientia...

Henricus Blomberg, Qq. Priorum, Posteriorum, Elenchorum: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 279, f. 119

Circa initium huius libri est sciendum quod iste liber correspondet  
libro elenchorum Aristotelis...

Comment. in librum fallaciarum: *Erfurt Ampl. Oct.* 71, f. 195-  
209'.

Circa initium huius secundæ scientiæ trivialis moventur quædam  
dubia præambula...

Gerardus de Harderwijck, Comment. in Summulas Petri Hispani:  
Ed. Cologne 1492, f. 2 [Pell 5066]

Circa initium intentionum...

Eypheus, Comment. in Prædicamenta Aristoteles: Vienna NB  
4007, f. 1r-29v

Circa initium isagogarum Porphyrii quæritur primo utrum omnium  
conclusionum logicalium...

Joannes de Magistris, Qq. veteris artis: Ed. Heidelberg 1488,  
f. 2 [H 10454]

Circa initium libri ampliationibus ponentur a nobis aliqua nota-  
bilia...

Qq. de ampliationibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 277, f. 113'-130'

Circa initium libri analyticorum priorum Aristotelis...

Copulata novæ logicæ: [H 1675]

Circa initium libri appellationibus ponentur aliqua notabilia, post  
hoc dubia...

Bartholomæus de Traiecto Superiori, Qq. de appellationibus:  
*Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 277, f. 131-135

Circa initium libri confusionum videndum est primo de subiecto  
libri confusionum et ibi communiter...

De confusionibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Duod.* 13, f. 79-80' (Fragment)

Circa initium libri consequentiarum quæritur primo quid sit con-  
sequenta...

Qq. de consequentiis: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 256, f. 48-68'

Circa initium libri Elenchorum secundi dicendum est...

L. II Elenchorum: *Utrecht Univ.* 825 (*Eccl.* 506), f. 36a

Circa initium libri Porphyrii quæritur primo utrum logica sit scientia  
specialis...

Qq. veteris ac novæ Logicæ: *Frankfurt Stadtb.* (*Dominic.*)  
1224, f. 258r-451r [Al 922]

Circa initium libri prædicamentorum Aristotelis quæritur primo  
utrum decem prædicamentis sit aliquod commune univocum  
intentionale quod sit subiectum...

Joannes de Magistris, Prædicamenta (Qq. super totum cursum  
logicæ): Ed. Heidelberg 1488

Circa initium libri prædicamentorum Aristotelis quæritur utrum  
decem prædicamentis sit aliquod unum intentionale commune...

Joannes de Magistris, *Prædicamenta* (Qq. super totum cursum logicæ): Ed. Venice 1490

Circa initium libri primi quæritur primo utrum scripturæ sint ad placitum signa vocum...

Joannes de Magistris, *Perihermenias* (Qq. super totum cursum logicæ): Ed. Heidelberg 1488

Circa initium libri sex principiorum Gilberti Porretani. Forma est compositioni contingens...

Qq. de sex Principiis Gilberti Porretani: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 264, f. 59-76

Circa initium logicæ Aristotelis occurrit primo dubitandum de numero artium liberalium (?)...

De arte logica: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 288

Circa initium logicæ quædam præambulariter quæruntur...

Arnoldus de Tongern, *Reparationes logicæ veteris et novæ*: Ed. Cologne 1496 [GW 2514]

Circa initium logicæ quæritur utrum logica sit scientia specialis ab aliis distincta...

Joannes Vensor, Qq. in veterem artem: [H 16028]

Circa initium logicæ veteris et primo circa isagogas Porphyrii monenda sunt quædam dubia antequam ad textum procedatur...

Gerardus de Harderwijck, *Super veterem artem Aristotelis*: Ed. Cologne 1494 [Pell 5063]

Circa initium novæ logicæ Aristotelis antequam ad textum procedatur videndum est...

Copulata novæ logicæ: Ed. Cologne 1489 [Pell 1188]

Circa initium novæ logicæ Aristotelis quæritur primo de quo determinatur in nova logica...

Arnoldus de Tongern, *Reparationes novæ logicæ*: Ed. Cologne 1496, f. 123 [GW 2514]

Circa initium novæ logicæ exercitii primo quæritur utrum nova logica sit scientia...

Joannes Dyest, Qq. novæ logicæ: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 250, f. 1-149

Circa initium parvorum logicalium dubitatur primo utrum notitia...

Bernardus de Villingen, Qq. de suppositionibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 282, f. 16'-33

Circa initium parvorum logicalium quæritur primo utrum logica...

Comment. in I, IV Parvorum Logicalium Petri Hispani et super tractatibus Marsilii: Ed. Hagenau 1495 [H 8708]

Circa initium parvorum logicalium quæritur primo utrum notitia parvorum logicalium sit in logica necessaria...

Arnoldus de Tongern, Reparationes parvorum logicalium Petri Hispani: Ed. Cologne 1500 [GW 2516]

Circa initium parvorum logicalium sunt aliqua notanda; sciendum quod iste liber suppositionum...

Comment. in tractatum Th. Maulevelt de suppositionibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Duod. 13a*, f. 1-34

Circa initium parvuli logicæ ante textus exordium quædam præambularia...

Bartholomæus de Usingen, Parvulus logicæ: Ed. Leipzig 1499 [GW 3462]

Circa initium Posteriorum est notandum: nota circa præsentem materiam tria...

Comment. in Posteriora Aristotelis: *Erfurt Ampl. Oct.* 71, f. 179-194'

Circa initium præsentis libri quædam generalia... et dico breviter quia dicit (H)oratius: quidquid præcipies, est brevis...

Posteriora Analytica: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 84*

Circa initium primi libri consequentiârum utrum definitio consequiæ sit bona...

Fredericus de Nuremberg, Qq. de consequentiis: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 277*, f. 138-166'

Circa initium primi libri elenchorum quæritur primo...

(Florentius Diel), Summulæ logicales modernorum: Ed. Speyer c. 1489 [H 15185]

Circa initium primi libri elenchorum quæritur utrum de syllogismo sophistico sit scientia sophistica distincta ab aliis partibus logicæ...

Joannes de Magistris, Qq. elenchorum (Qq. super totum cursum logicæ): Ed. Venice 1490

Circa initium primi perihermenias quæritur utrum scripturæ sint ad placitum signa vocum et voces passionum animæ...

Joannes de Magistris, Perihermenias (Qq. super totum cursum logicæ): Ed. Venice 1490

Circa initium primi libri posteriorum quæritur primo utrum de

syllogismo demonstrativo sit scientia tamquam de subiecto...  
Joannes de Magistris, I Posteriorum (Qq. super totum cursum logicæ): Ed. Venice 1490

Circa initium primi libri priorum quæritur primo utrum ad hunc primum librum novæ logicæ... spectet determinare de syllogismo simpliciter dicto...

Joannes de Magistris, Priora (Qq. super totum cursum logicæ): logicæ): Ed. Venice 1490

Circa initium primi libri topicorum quæritur primo utrum syllogismus sub ratione probabilitatis sit subiectum adæquatum dialecticæ...

Joannes de Magistris, I Topicorum (Qq. super totum cursum logicæ): Ed. Venice 1490

Circa initium quarti libri topicorum Aristotelis quæritur utrum quidditas generis sit a quidditate differentiæ realiter distincta...

Joannes de Magistris, IV Topicorum (Qq. super totum cursum logicæ): Ed. Venice 1490

Circa initium secundi libri elenchorum Aristotelis quæritur primo utrum in hoc libro oporteat determinare de solutione paralogismorum...

Joannes de Magistris, II Elenchorum (Qq. super totum cursum logicæ): Ed. Venice 1490

Circa initium secundi libri perihermenias quæritur primo utrum a negativa ad affirmativam prædicato variato penes finitum et infinitum et e contra sit bona consequentia...

Joannes de Magistris, II Perihermenias (Qq. super totum cursum logicæ): Ed. Venice 1490

Circa initium secundi libri posteriorum quæritur primo utrum tantum sint quattuor quæstiones vere scibiles...

Joannes de Magistris, II Posteriorum (Qq. super totum cursum logicæ): Ed. Venice 1490

Circa initium secundi libri priorum quæritur utrum idem syllogismus possit plura concludere...

Joannes de Magistris, II Priorum (Qq. super totum cursum logicæ): Ed. Venice 1490

Circa initium secundi libri topicorum quæritur utrum in accidentibus ab inesse ad esse sit formalis consequentia...

Joannes de Magistris, II Topicorum (Qq. super totum cursum logicæ): Ed. Venice 1490

Circa initium summularum logicalium aliqua generalia sunt præmit-tenda...

See 'Ad veritatis lumen...'

Circa initium summularum Petri Hispani in quibus breviter et compendiose determinat de his...

Super sex tractatus Petri Hispani: Ed. (Cologne) 1496 [H 8706]

Circa initium suppositionum quæritur primo utrum definitio sup-positionis data...

Qq. de suppositionibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 256, f. 1-38

Circa initium tertii libri topicorum quæritur utrum illud quod est in genere sit magis eligendum eo quod non est in genere...

Joannes de Magistris, III Topicorum (Qq. super totum cursum logicæ): Ed. Venice 1490

Circa initium totius logicæ Aristotelis movetur talis quæstio logicalis, Utrum logica sit...

Petrus Tartareetus, Comm. in libros logicæ: Ed. (Freiburg in Breisgau 1494) [H 15337]

Circa initium tractatus octavi summularum logicæ iuxta ordinem in prooemio...

Gerardus de Harderwijck, Copulata super parva logicalia Petri Hispani: Ed. (Cologne) 1488 [Pell 5067]

Circa initium tractatum Petri Hispani notandum utrum notitia tractatum Petri Hispani sit scientia...

Qq. de tractatibus Petri H. et sophismatibus Alberti de Saxonie: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 326, f. 1-112

Circa initium veteris artis. Antequam ad textum accedamus...

Copulata super veterem artem: Ed. (Cologne) 1488 [Pell 1186]

Circa initium veteris artis priusquam ad textum procedatur quæritur de duobus, primo de obiecto logicæ secundo de habitu...

Petrus Niger, Qq. super artem veterem Aristotelis: Ed. Venice 1481

Circa initium veteris artis quæritur primo...

Joannes Parreut, Exercitationes veteris artis: Ed. (Ingolstadt 1492)

Circa insolubilia quæruntur duo primo circa insolubile compositum...  
Insolubilia: Paris BN 16130, f. 114v-118r

- Circa insolubilia quæruntur duo, primo circa insolubile simplex...  
De insolubilibus: *London Brit. Mus. (Royal) 12 F. XIX*, f. 133b
- Circa insolubilia solvenda primo sunt divisiones proponendæ...  
Bradwardine, Insolubilia: *Erfurt Ampl. Fol. 135*, f. 17'-20'
- Circa libros prædicamentorum...  
Joannes Batus, Prædicamenta Aristotelis: [Pits 614]
- Circa libros Prædicamentorum est...  
Gualterus Burley, Prædicamenta: [Pits 435]
- Circa librum de suppositionibus Marsili est sciendum quod suppositio potest capi duobus...  
See 'Circa tractatum de suppositionibus. Circa librum...'
- Circa librum Elementorum (Elenchorum?)...  
Comment. in librum Elementorum Aristotelis: *Assisi Conv. 670*, f. 34-55
- Circa librum Elenchorum...  
Simon Anglicus, Qq. super Elenchis: *Vienna NB 2302*, f. 1r-8r
- Circa librum Elenchorum cuius subiectum est argumentatio sophistica...  
Comment. in librum Elenchorum: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 261*, f. 141-143 (fragm.)
- Circa librum elenchorum primo quæritur utrum de syllogismo sophistico...  
Qq. super libris elenchorum: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 262*, f. 49-147; 275a, f. 1-97
- Circa librum Elenchorum primo videndum an notitia syllogismorum sophisticorum sit vera scientia...  
Guilelmus Ockham, Super Elenchis: *Bruges de la ville 499*, f. 61r-108r; *Oxford Bodleian (Can. Misc.) 558* [Li]. For other MSS. see EPM; Ff
- Circa librum perihermenias primo est notandum quod ly perihermenias...  
Qq. de libro perihermenias: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 282*, f. 176'-185
- Circa librum perihermenias sciendum quod iste liber apud antiquos intitulatur...  
Q. libri Perihermenias: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 265*, f. 4'-20
- Circa librum Porphyrii movetur prima quæstio utrum logica sit scientia...

Logica vetus: Ed. Poitiers n.d. [Pell 1185]

Circa librum Porphyrii quædam primo...

Guilelmus Ockham (?), Super Porphyrium et VI Principia: [Ss]  
Circa librum Porphyrii quæruntur quædam in generali...

Petrus de Alvernia, Qq. super Porphyrium: Florence Laurent.  
XII, sin. cod. 3; *Paris BN 16170*, f. 82a-89b [Gm 210 b]

Circa librum posteriorum primo quæratur utrum de demonstratione  
possit esse scientia...

Rudolphus Brito, Qq. super libros Posteriorum: *Vienna NB*  
2319, f. 34r-55r

Circa librum posteriorum quæritur primo utrum de demonstratione  
sit scientia tamquam de subiecto proprio...

Marsilius ab Inguen, Qq. super Posteriora Analytica: *Venice S.*  
*Mark Cl. X*, cod. 24, f. 198-223

Circa librum posteriorum sciendum quod apud antiquos intitulatur...  
Qq. Posteriorum: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 265*, f. 73-105'

Circa librum prædicamentorum...

Gualterus Burley, Prædicamenta: *Oxford Magd. 146*, f. 11;  
[Li: Jo. Baconsthorpe (Tanner) *sive* W. Burley]

Circa librum prædicamentorum Aristotelis...

Joannes Bate, Super Prædicamenta: [Bale 191v]

Circa librum prædicamentorum Aristotelis consequenter quæritur  
primo utrum æquivocum...

Henricus Brekenar, Qq. super Prædicamentis Buridani collectæ:  
*Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 262*, f. 33

Circa librum Prædicamentorum Aristotelis potest primo quæri utrum  
aliquid sit æquivocum...

Thomas Manlevelt, Qq. de prædicamentis: *Erfurt Ampl. 288*,  
f. 43'-140

Circa librum prædicamentorum Aristotelis quæritur primo utrum  
de prædicamentis sit scientia rationalis... Prædicamenta: *Oxford*  
*Bodleian (Can. Misc.) 486*, [Li]

Circa librum prædicamentorum Aristotelis quæritur primo utrum  
notitia libri prædicamentorum sit de decem prædicamentis ut  
de subiecto...

Petrus Niger, Super Prædicamenta (Qq. super arte veteri): Ed.  
Venice 1481

Circa librum prædicamentorum dubitatur primo utrum decem prædicamenta ab invicem sunt distincta...

Augustinus de Ferrara, *Universalia et Prædicamenta*: *Stuttgart Region. Cod. H. B. X. 10*, f. 221v-252r [SeT 450]

Circa librum prædicamentorum est sciendum quod subiectum contentum (!) totius logicæ traditæ in libro prædicamentorum est ens dicibile incomplexum...

Gualterus Burley, *Super I. Prædicamentorum*: *Vaticana Vat. lat. 10610*, f. 17; ed. Venice 1481

Circa librum prædicamentorum est sciendum quod subiectum extensem totius scientiæ traditæ in libro prædicamentorum...

Gualterus Burley, *Prædicamenta*: *Rome S. Isidoro 1/98*, f. 25r-86v

Circa librum prædicamentorum pri...

Joannes Baconsthorpe, *Prædicamenta*: [Pits 454]

Circa librum prædicamentorum quæritur utrum de prædicamentis possit esse scientia...

See 'Aequivoca dicuntur... Circa librum...'

Circa librum prædicamentorum quæritur utrum definitiones univocorum et æquivocorum datae in prædicamentis...

Qq. de prædicamentis: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 252*, f. 13

Circa librum prædicamentorum quæritur utrum de prædicamentis...

Radulphus de Hotot, Qq. super Prædicamenta: *Vaticana Vat. lat. 2141*, f. 87. For other MSS. see Gm 225 b

Circa librum prædicamentorum quæritur utrum sit de decem vocibus decem genera rerum significantibus, quod sic videtur...

Joannes Scotus, *Super libro prædicamentorum*: *Rome S. Isidoro 1/14*, f. 134r-156r; ed. Lyons 1639, I, 124

Circa librum priorum est primo notandum quod ideo dicitur Priorum...

Comment. in libros Priorum: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 282*, f. 48-130

Circa librum priorum in principio quæritur de quo est nova logica...

Qq. Priorum Aristotelis: *Erfurt Qu. 244*, f. 1-71'

Circa librum priorum nota quod in eo consideratur de syllogismo...

Comment. in Priora: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 261*, f. 109-141

Circa librum priorum omissa recommendatione quia lectura est cursoria...

Nicolaus de Dacia, Qq. Priorum: *Erfurt Ampl. Oct. 74*, f. 1-34

Circa librum priorum primo quæritur utrum de syllogismo simpli-  
citer...

Albertus, Qq. super libris priorum: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 255, f.  
70-113'

Circa librum priorum quædam nota. Dicit Albertus quod syllogis-  
mus...

Regulæ prioristicæ: *Erfurt Ampl. Fol.* 303, f. 57'-58'

Circa librum priorum quæratur primo utrum de syllogismo possit  
esset (!) scientia...

Radulphus Brito, Qq. in *Priora Analytica*: *Venice S. Mark Cl.* X, cod. 39, f. 1-52. See also 'Sicut dicit Tullius...'

Circa librum topicorum Aristotelis: utrum scientiæ dialecticæ syllo-  
gismus dialecticus sit subiectum...

Qq. super libris Topicorum: *Erfurt Ampl.* 311, f. 181-219'

Circa logicalia diligenter intendens ut veritates quæ in eis sunt  
dubiæ clarius elucescant movendo dubia... Quæro utrum logica  
sit scientia...

Joannes Scotus, Qq. super universalibus Porphyrii: Ed. Venice  
1492, f. 2. See also 'Quæritur utrum logica sit scientia...'

Circa logicam Aristotelis quæritur primo utrum logica sit scientia  
ab aliis distincta...

Georgius Bruxellensis, Qq. logicæ Aristotelis: Ed. Paris 1493  
[GW 5534]

Circa materiam Bilingam notandum quod de subiecto huius noti-  
tiæ...

Puncta de probationibus propositionum: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 241,  
f. 64'-79; 263

Circa materiam consequentiarum notandum quod argumentatio  
consideratur...

De consequentiis Thomae Maulivelt (?): *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 241,  
f. 55'-64'; 263

Circa materiam de apparentiis multa occurunt dubia...

De apparentiis: *Oxford Corp. Christi* 228, f. 1-4

Circa materiam de terminis quæ...

Joannes Boix, Logica: Ed. (Valencia 1493) [GW 4614]

Circa materiam insolubilium nota quod scientia insolubilium...

Puncta de insolubilibus Hollandrini: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 241, f.  
82-83'; 263

Circa materiam libri Porphyrii circa initium veteris artis...

Qq. in artem veterem: *Darmstadt Landesbibl.* 77, f. 53r-219r  
[Al 845]

Circa materiam obligationum nota quod obligatio causatur...

Puncta de obligationibus Hollandrini: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 241,  
f. 79-82; 263

Circa materiam prædicabilium dubitatur an sit tantum quinque...

De prædicabilibus: *Philadelphia Free Libr. (Lewis)* 168, f.  
220v

Circa materiam primi tractatus Petri Hispani...

Hieronymus sive Joannes Faber de Werdea, *Concepta parvorum  
logicalium*: *Vienna NB* 4785, f. 1r-201r

Circa materiam totius libri posteriorum Aristotelis movetur talis  
quæstio...

(Thomas Bricot), *Posteriora Analytica*: Ed. Paris 1497 [Pell  
1184]

Circa materiam totius libri posteriorum Aristotelis movetur talis  
quæstio. Utrum omnis doctrina et...

Thomas Bricot, Qq. logicales super libris Posteriorum: Ed. Paris  
1497 [Pell 2992]

Circa materiam veteris artis quæritur primo utrum logica sit scien-  
tia...

Conradus de Rotenburg, *Super veteri arte*: *Vienna NB* 4911,  
f. 1r-100v

Circa materiam veteris quæritur primo ad quid sit utile...

Joannes Dyest, Qq. artis veteris logicæ: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 254,  
f. 1-148

Circa naturam universalis quæritur utrum universalia sint in parti-  
cularibus...

Q. de universalibus: *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 773, f. 96r

Circa notitiam ampliationum cuius subiectum est ly ampliatio...

Joannes de Gemunden, *De ampliationibus Marsilii*: *Erfurt Ampl.*  
*Qu.* 278, f. 39'-48'; *Qu.* 282, f. 34-42' (Bernardus de Villin-  
gen)

Circa notitiam insolubilium sunt aliqua dubia...

Joannes Hollandrinus, *De insolubilibus*: *Vienna NB* 4953, f.  
86r-118v

- Circa notitiam libri elenchorum primo est notandum quod talis scientia subordinatur...
- De sophisticis elenchis: *Erfurt Ampl. Oct. 71*, f. 133-137
- Circa notitiam parvorum logicalium dubitatur primo utrum notitia...
- Joannes de Gemunden, Sophismata: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 278*, f. 1-39'
- Circa notitiam parvorum logicalium quæritur primo utrum suppositio sit subiectum...
- Qq. de parvis logicis: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 64*
- Circa notitiam Porphyrii quæritur primo...
- Gossoldus, De parvis logicalibus: *Vienna NB 4911*, f. 101r-126v
- Circa obligationes quæritur utrum definitio obligationis sit bona...
- Thomas Bricot, Obligationes: Ed. Paris 1491 [GW 5520, f. 27]
- Circa obligationes sunt aliquæ...
- De obligationibus: *Vienna NB 4698*, f. 146r-155v
- Circa obligationum primo dubitatur utrum sit scientia...
- Qq. de obligationibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Oct. 71*, f. 141-175
- Circa postprædicamenta sciendum est quod sic dicitur: cuius notitia...
- Disputata postprædicamentorum: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 265*, f. 1-4
- Circa primam consequent. quæritur primo quæstio ista utrum definitio consequentiæ...
- Qq. de consequentiis: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 280*, f. 17-90
- Circa primam partem consequentiarum quæritur utrum...
- De consequentiis: *Munich Clm 19844*, f. 60
- Circa primum articulum sic est procedendum: primo dicendum est circa maximum talium divisionum: secundo ponendæ sunt aliquæ conclusiones...
- Rosetus, De maximo et minimo: *Venice S. Mark Cl. XI, cod. 14*, f. 55-66
- Circa primum librum analyticorum movetur quæstio: Quæritur utrum syllogismus demonstrativus sit...
- Qq. super I Analyticorum: *Metz Municipale 642*
- Circa primum librum perihermenias Aristotelis quæritur primo utrum de enuntiatione...
- Perihermenias: *Oxford Bodleian (Can. Misc.) 485* [Li<sup>1</sup>]

Circa primum librum Posteriorum Analyticorum quæritur primo utrum de syllogismo...

Posteriora Analytica: *Oxford Bodleian (Can. Misc.)* 485 [Li]

Circa primum librum Priorum Aristotelis movetur primo talis quæstio utrum de syllogismo...

Priora Analytica: *Oxford Bodleian (Can. Misc.)* 485 [Li]

Circa primum principale advertendum quod Hentisber ad primam rationem...

Caietanus de Thienis, Super sophismata Hentisberi: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X. cod. 221*, f. 49-81. See also 'Omnis homo est omnis homo. Circa...'

Circa principium huius libri... Horum quæ dicuntur... Iste tractatus qui intitulatur...

Petrus Hispanus, Suppositiones cum commento: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 253*, f. 29'-49

Circa principium huius libri sunt quædam quæstiones quærendæ...  
See 'Prætermissa divisione grammaticæ...'

Circa principium libri priorum sciendum quod iste liber apud anti-quos intitulatur...

Qq. Priorum: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 265*, f. 25-72

Circa principium parvorum logicalium...

Gossoldus, De parvis logicalibus: *Vienna NB 4911*, f. 136r-169r

Circa relativa...

De terminis relativis: *Worcester Cathedral F.* 86, f. 143b

Circa relativa est sciendum...

De relativis: *Vaticana Vat. lat. 2146*, f. 248-249

Circa scire et dubitare notandæ sunt istæ conclusiones quorum prima hæc est tu scis istam propositionem esse veram...

De scire et dubitare: *Vaticana Vat. lat. 674*, f. 144v

Circa secundum librum consequentiарum primo quæritur utrum modus...

Qq. consequentiарum (Pars II): *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 262*, f. 148-174.

Circa secundum librum priorum quæritur utrum syllogismus ex hypothesi differat a syllogismo ostensivo...

Joannes Scotus, Qq. super II Priorum Analyticorum: Ed. Venice 1520, f. 22r

Circa secundum perihermenias quæritur primo utrum a negativa ad affirmativam prædicato variato penes finitum et infinitum sit bona consequentia...

Joannes de Magistris, II Perihermenias: Ed. Heidelberg 1488.  
See 'Circa initium secundi libri perihermenias...'

Circa signa universalia quattuor proponimus inquirere quorum primum est de signis universalibus distinctivis substantiæ...

Gualterus Burley, De sophismatibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 276, f. 22-62; *Rome S. Isidoro 1/10*, f. 2r ('Bonaventura'); *Venice S. Mark Cl. X. cod. 204*, f. 1-50 ('Burley: Flores totius logicæ'); ed. S. Bonaventuræ *Opera Omnia*, Bassani 1767, col. 467. See also 'Scripta signa...'

Circa summulas Petri Hispani aliqua facilia propono colligere...  
Dialectica est ars artium... Circa istud sciendum est quod auctor noster definit hic...

Joannes Hokelim, Super tractatibus Petri Hispani: *Erfurt Ampl. Oct. 65*, ff. 123

Circa suppositionem tractatus...

Qq. super Porphyrium et Aristotelem: *St. Omer Municipale* 600

Circa suppositiones logicales quæritur primo utrum definitio... (Hericus de Udem), Suppositiones: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 255, f. 58-64'

Circa syllogismum expositorum qui habent (!) fieri in tertia figura.  
quia habet fieri ex præmissis singularibus...

De syllogismo expositorio: *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 1108, f. 138

Circa terminationem activæ potentiae aut passivæ divisiones multiplices flunt pro quarum declaratione...

Caietanus de Thienis, De maximo et minimo: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X. cod. 220*, f. 143-150; ed. Venice 1494 (Hentisbery, *De sensu composito*), f. 33v

Circa textum dubitatur primo quid sit confusio...

Qq. de confusionibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 256, f. 38'-48

Circa tractatum de ampliationibus est primo præmittenda definitio...

De ampliationibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 283, f. 121'-128'

Circa tractatum de ampliationibus quæritur et est talis: utrum aliquis terminus...

Qq. de ampliationibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 280, f. 1-10

Circa tractatum de ampliationibus quod ampliatio a modernis logicis...

Tract. de ampliationibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 283, f. 193-198

Circa tractatum de appellationibus est primo notandum quod duplices...

Bernardus de Villigen, Qq. de appellationibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 282, f. 42'-47

Circa tractatum de appellationibus nota primo quod duplices sunt...

Joannes de Gumenden, De appellationibus Marsilii: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 278, f. 50'-54'

Circa tractatum de appellationibus procedam sic, primo ponam...

De appellationibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 283, f. 129-133

Circa tractatum de appellationibus quæritur primo utrum aliquis terminus positus...

Qq. de appellationibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 280, f. 10-16'

Circa tractatum de consequentiis primo quæritur utrum definitio consequentiæ sit bona...

De consequentiis: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 270, f. 44-74

Circa tractatum de insolubilibus primo sciendum quod hoc nomen insolibile dicitur tripliciter...

De insolubilibus: *Paris BN 16617*, f. 46v-54v

Circa tractatum de insolubilibus tria sunt notanda per ordinem...

De insolubilibus: *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 674, f. 115v

Circa tractatum de restrictionibus notandum primo quod status ultra quem...

Joannes de Gemunden, De restrictionibus Marsilii: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 278, f. 49-50

Circa tractatum de suppositione primo in generali videndum est de aliquibus...

Marsilius de Inghen, Suppositiones: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 30, f. 121-127'; 277, f. 1-9; 280, f. 132-140'; 283, f. 107-120'

Circa tractatum de suppositionibus. Circa librum de suppositionibus Marsilii est sciendum quod suppositio potest capi duobus...

De suppositionibus Marsilii de Inghen: *Erfurt Ampl.* 326, f. 118-138

Circa tractatum de suppositionibus Petri Hispani quæritur primo quod sunt tractatus parvorum logicalium...

Qq. parvorum logicalium Petri Hispani: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 244, f. 199-257

Circa tractatum de suppositionibus primo in generali...

Marsilius, De suppositionibus: *Vienna NB* 4698, f. 129v-130r (incomplete)

Circa tractatum de suppositionibus primo in generali videndum est de aliquibus suppositionum definitionibus...

Marsilius Inghen, De suppositionibus: *Munich Clm* 4385, f. 45

Circa tractatum de suppositionibus primo in generali videndum est quod iste terminus...

Qq. de suppositionibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 277, f. 73-113

Circa tractatum de suppositionibus utrum quilibet terminus pro quo-libet suo...

Qq. de suppositionibus et sophismatibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 327, f. 1-40

Circa tractatum de veritate propositionum...

De veritate propositionum: *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 674, f. 114

Circa tractatum fallaciarum sancti Thomae de Aquino...

(Dominicus de Flandria), Qq. fallaciarum D. Thomae: *Bologna Com. dell' Archigin. A.* 969, f. 9v; ed. Venice 1600, p. 167

Circa tractatum insolubilium magistri Thomae bricot quæritur utrum sit aliquis modus salvandi possibilitates...

Thomas Bricot, Insolubilia ac Obligationes: Ed. Lyons 1495 [Pell 2997]

Circa tractatum insolubilium quæritur primo utrum ad propositionem...

Qq. de insolubilibus Hollandini: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 280, f. 179-186

Circa tractatum obligationum antequam procedatur ad textum...

Joannes Hollandinus, Tract. obligationum: *Vienna NB* 4953, f. 68r-85v

Circa tractatum Petri Hispani continentur aliqua facilia...

Henricus de Coesfeldia, Super tract. Petri Hispani: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 243, f. 54-115

Circa tractatum primum parvorum logicalium. Iste est tractatus primus parvorum logicalium reverendi magistri Marsilii qui tractatus parvi dicuntur tripliciter...

De suppositionibus Marsilii: *Erfurt Ampl. Duod.* 14, f. 1-98'

Circa tractatum quintum Petri Hispani ut subsequentia lucidius clareant...

Qq. de locis dialecticis: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 283, f. 165'-176

Circa tractatum terminorum confudentium tria sunt notanda. Primo ponendæ sunt...

Super tract. terminorum confudentium: *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 674, f. 145

Circa unionem universalem scientiarum...

Aegidius Romanus, De universalibus: *Erlangen Univ.* 213, f. 81-82' (cf. G. Bruni, *Le opere di E. Romano*, Florence 1936, p. 45)

Circa unitatem materialem...

Aegidius Romanus, De universalibus: [Gm 400 ci]

Circa unitatem numeralem substantiarum duo quæruntur. primum est utrum substantia sit una numero...

Aegidius Romanus (?), De universalibus: *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 828, f. 127-128r

Circa universalia multiplex fuit et diversorum philosophorum opinio...

Thomas Aquinas (?), *De universalibus Tract. I*: Ed. Parma 1852-72, XVII, 128

Circa universalia quoque...

Gualterus Burley, De universalibus: [Li]

Circa universalia sunt dubitationes...

G. Burley, De universalibus: *Oxford Magd.* 146, (f. 43-99); *Coll. Univ.* 120 [Li]

Circa universalia sunt dubitationes non paucæ, prima est utrum universalia existant in rerum natura aut non...

Gualterus Burley, Qq. de universalibus: Ed. Venice 1492-93 [GW 5770]. See also 'Quia de dictis...'

Circa universalia sunt dubitationes notandæ. prima est utrum universalia existunt in rerum natura...

Burley (?), De universalibus: *Madrid BN* 2017, f. 51v-65v

Circa universalia sunt dubitationes paucæ, prima est utrum universalia...

Gualterus Burley, Q. de universalibus: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 221*, f. 203-209

Circa universalibus...

(G.) Burley, Q. de universalibus: *Perugia Communale* 580, f. 55-60

Circa mare et aridam... Quia transcendentia prædicamenta non solum prædicentalis coordinationis...

Franciscus Mayron, De transcendentibus: *Munich Clm* 18530b, f. 121v (cf. B. Roth, *Franz von Mayronis*, "Franziskanische Forschungen", 3 Heft, Werl 1936)

Cognitionem rerum aut occultarum aut admirabilium ad bene beatique vivendum necessariam duximus... Si itaque bene...

Joannes de Monte, Super summulas Petri Hispani: Ed. Venice 1500

Completa expositione libri Porphyrii ad prædicamenta Aristotelis ac totam logicam exponendam accedimus...

Guilelmus Ockham, Prædicamenta: *Bruges de la ville* 499, f. 17r-47r; *Oxford Bodleian (Can. Misc.)* 558 [Li]; *Paris Bn.* 6431, f. 89v. For other mss. see EPM, Ff (Expositio aurea). See also 'Quoniam omne operans...'

Completis duobus primis tractatibus nunc ad tertium tractatum est accedendum...

Guilelmus Ockham, Logica (Pars III): *Paris BN* 6430, f. 45r-64v; 6431, f. 33r; *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 947, f. 57v; ed. Venice 1508, f. 57v. For other mss. see EPM; Ff

Consequenter dicendum est de ampliationibus primo præmittendum est definitio...

De ampliationibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 280, f. 141-145

Consequenter quæritur circa... librum priorum utrum ex syllogismis...

Qq. de I, II Priorum: *Erfurt Ampl. Fol.* 263, f. 75-76

Consequentia dicitur illatio consequentis ex antecedenti et quæ poterit...

Rodulphus Strodes, Consequentialiae: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X. cod. 32*, f. 102-112; *cod. 211*, f. 73-111. See also 'Consequentialia est illatio...'

Consequentialia est aggregatio ex antecedente et consequente...

Martinus Anglicus, De consequentiis: *Vienna NB* 4698, f. 36r-39v

Consequentialia est aggregatum ex consequente et antecedente cum nota illationis...

Paulus de Candia, Consequentiæ: *Vaticana Vat. lat. 3065*, f. 37-40 (cf. *Dict. Théol. Cath.* XII, col. 1894: *Pierre de Candie*)

Consequentia est antecedens et consequens...

Ricardus Lavingham, Probationes propositionum: [Pits 535]

Consequentia est antecedentis...

Guilelmus Hentisbury, Regulæ consequentiarum: [Pits 527]

Consequentia est habitudo in qua consequens...

Rudolphus Anglicus, De consequentiis: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 271, f. 141-151

Consequentia est habitudo inter antecedens et consequens...

(De consequentiis): *London Brit. Mus. (Royal)* 12 F. XIX, f. 111

Consequentia est illatio consequentis...

Radulphus Stodus, Consequentiarum formulæ: [Li]

Consequentia est illatio consequentis ex altero...

(De consequentiis): *Florence Naz. Centr.* II, IV, 553, f. 116-121

Consequentia est illatio consequentis ex antecedente...

Caietanus de Thienis, Recollectæ super consequentiis Strodi: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 220*, f. 109-118; 221, f. 31-42; ed. *Venice* 1507, f. 5v

Consequentia est oratio composita ex antecedente...

(Wilhelmus Lodderpape), De consequentiis: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 255, f. 38-46

Consequentia est quædam habitudo...

Rodulphus, De consequentiis: *Vienna NB 4698*, f. 87v-97v

Consequentia est quoddam aggregatum ex antecedente et consequente... Guilelmus de O(ckham?), De consequentiis: *Danzig Stadt b.* 2181

Consequentia est totum aggregatum ex antecedente et consequente...

Martinus Anglicus (?), De consequentiis: *Vaticana Urbin.* 1419, f. 60

Consequentialium alia est simplex...

De consequentiis: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 395, f. 91-93'

Consequentialium quædam est bona...

Ricardus Feribrigus, Regulæ consequentiarum: [Pits 489]; ed. *Venice* 1507

Consequenterum quædam est bona et formalis... Circa primam divisionum...

Caietanus de Thienis, Super consequentiis Gul. Ferabrich: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 220*, f. 118-122; ed. Venice 1507

Consequenterum quædam est formalis...

De consequentiis (Tract. alter): *Vienna NB 4698*, f. 138v-145v

Consequenterum quædam sunt obiectiones ponendæ et solvendæ...

Martinus Anglicus, De generibus consequenterum: *Vienna NB 4698*, f. 48v-56r

Considerantes veterem logicam et antiquam ab inquirentibus...

Raimundus Lull, Nova logica: *Rome S. Isidoro 1/20*, f. 16 (ms.: f. '102'). See also 'Deus cum tua benedictione novum...'

Consideratio logici tractatus debet incipere desinit...

Guilelmus Ockham, Logica (Abbreviatio): *Paris BN 15904*, f. 205 (ms.: f. '204')-213 (incomplete)

Conspiciens in circuitu...

Logica: *Perugia Comunale 531*

Conspiciens in circuitu librorum...

Paulus Venetus, Logica: *Oxford Bodleian (Can. Misc.) 9 [Li]; Assisi Conv. 681 (anon.); Bologna Com. dell' Archigin A. 97*

Conspiciens in circuitu librorum magnitudinem, studentium tedium constituentem in animo... Terminus est signum orationis constitutivum...

Paulus Venetus, Summa logicæ: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 209*, f. 4-23; ed. Venice 1495

Constructio est passio convertibilium. Philosophus tamen definit sic:  
constructio est congrua dictionum ordinatio...

Martinus de Dacia, De modis significandis (Pars II): *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 186*, f. 14. See also 'Cum cuiuslibet artificis principiis...

Consultissimis tractantibus reliquere... distant quidem nomina sine tempore...

L. syllogismorum categoricorum: *Tours Municipale 676*, f. 57r-v [Al 765]

Contra communem definitionem de propositione categorica...

De obiectionibus contra varias propositiones: *Oxford New Coll. 289*, f. 19-25

C<sub>ontradic</sub>tio in Deo non est...

Ockham, *Dialectica nova*: [Pits 458]

C<sub>ontradictori</sub>um et tamen...

Petrus Mantuanus, *Logica*: *Oxford Bodleian (Can. Misc.)* 219  
[Li]

C<sub>onversio</sub> est transpositio termini...

Ricardus Lavingham, *Canones sophismatum*: [Pits 535]  
... convertitur si ad aliquem eorum...

Aristoteles, *Prædicamenta*: *Vienna NB* 2498, f. 81r-85v

C<sub>onvocatis</sub> sapientibus studii Parisiensis, proposuit sophista quidam...

Siger de Brabantia, *Impossibilia*: *Paris BN* 16297, f. 106r-110v (cf. F. van Steenberghen, *Siger de Brabant*, "Les Philosophes Belges", XIII, vol. II, Louvain 1942)

Creberreme instantiusque rogatus a fratribus mei ac scolaribus ut aliqua per modum commenti ederem super logicam... Scoti...  
Joannes de Anglia (Foxalls), *Comment. in Porphyrium Scoti: Roma, S. Isidoro 1/14*, f. 171r; ed. Venice 1483, 1492, 1500 etc.

Cum ad completam cognitionem uniuscuiusque...

Robertus Kilwardby (?), *Perihermenias*: *Oxford Corp. Christi* 119, f. 126-141

Cum ad cuiuslibet scientiæ logicalem cognitionem...

Expositio Donati: *Worcester Cathedral Q.* 50, f. 38

Cum alicui secundum eius entitatem...

Joannes Baconsthorpe, *De sophismatibus*: [Pits 454]

Cum a principio logicae determinatum sit quod logica est scientia docens per notum venire ad cognitionem...

Albertus Magnus, *L. de divisionibus Boethii*: [Li]; *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 177*, f. 119-131 (anon.). See also 'Quam magnos studiosis... Cum a...'

Cum apud nos infinita...

(Raimundus Lull), *Ars inveniendi particularia in universalibus*: *Oxford Bodleian (Can. Misc.)* 141. For other mss. see Gm 335 z; Ss III, 13

Cum ars obligatoria sit...

Burley, *Obligatoria*: *Erfurt Ampl. Oct.* 76, f. 34'-36

Cum autem principio logicæ determinatum sit quod logica est scientia...

Albertus, L. Divisionum: *Oxford Merton* 253, f. 165-180

Cum cognitio syllogismi...

See 'Primum oportet constituere... Cum cognitio...

Cum cuiuslibet artificis principia essentialia...

Petrus de Dacia, De modis significandi: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 281, f. 1-18

Cum cuiuslibet artificis principia sive artis primo et per se considerare intersit nos igitur grammaticæ eius principia...

Martinus de Dacia, De modis significandis: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 186; 187; Vaticana Urbin. lat. 1163 (anon.)*

Cum cuiuslibet artis principia essentialia primo intersit...

Joannes de Daco, De modis significandi: *Troyes Municipale 2006*

Cum de propositionibus intendamus...

De propositionibus: *Rome Angel.* 953, f. 58-69

Cum dictum est de argumentis et speciebus argumentorum restat dicere de defectibus argumentorum et consequentiarum...

Guilelmus Ockham, De fallaciis (Summa logicæ, Part. III, pars 4): *Paris BN* 6430, f. 91r; 6431, f. 68r; *Vaticana Vat. lat. 947*, f. 111r; ed. *Venice* 1508, f. 94r. For other mss. see EPM; Ff.

Cum duo sunt tantum rerum principia...

Guilelmus de Lincoln, Introductiones in logicam: *Paris BN* 16617 [Gm 125 c]; ed. M. Grabmann, *Die Introductiones in logicam des Wilhelm von Shyreswood*, "Sitzungsberichte der Bayerisch. Akad. der Wissenschaften," Munich 1937, Heft 10

Cum honorandi viri videlicet patres nostri...

Boethius de Dacia, Qq. super Topica: *Bruges de la ville* 509, f. 1r-30v; *Oxford Merton* 296, f. 47-83 (anon.)

Cum id sit necessarium, Grisaori, et ad eam quæ est apud Aristotelem...

Petrus de Thenis, Continuationes Vi Priorum logica: *St. Omer Municipale* 585

Cum in erudiendis artistis quorum...

Joannes Maior, Sophisticalia Parisiensia: [Bale 218r]

Cum in omnibus philosophiæ disciplinis...

Boethius, De syllogismis hypotheticis: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 346, f. 53'-75; *Venice S. Mark Cl.*, X, cod. 23, f. 85-110; 27, f. 30-68; ed. Migne *PL* 64, 831

Cum in singulis scientiis secundum magnitudinem subiecti sit certitudo quærenda primo ethicorum...

Ricardus Suyset, Obligationes: *Venice S. Mark Cl.* XI, cod. 12, f. 41-44

Cum in singulis secundum materiam subiectam sit certitudo quærenda primo ethicorum et materia artis dialecticæ est vox significativa...

Rogerus Swineshead, Obligationes: *Bruges de la ville* 500, f. 143v-150r ('Rogerus Sumcet'); *Oxford Bodleian (Can. Lat.)* 278 [Li: 'Suise Anglicus']; *Paris BN* 14715, f. 86-91 ('Joannes de...'); *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 950, f. 117v ('Ricardus Swyneshead'); 2185, f. 78r-v; 3065, f. 122v-125r

Cum iurista et medicus debeant investigare principia generalia, quibus quilibet suam scientiam faciliorem...

Raimundus Lull, Logica nova ad scientiam iuris et medicinæ: *Venice S. Mark Cl.* X, cod. 191, f. 30-32

Cum logica quoad artem syllogizandi sufficienter dividatur in artem inveniendi et iudicandi de quarum prima tractatur...

De sufficientia syllogismorum: *Cracow Univ.* 2130, f. 26a-28a  
[SeT 435]

Cum logici circa obligationes...

See 'Quoniam logici...'

Cum magnos studiosis fructus afferat...

L. divisionum: *Metz Municipale* 508. See also 'Quam magnos...'

Cum multis in philosophia prima...

Wyclif, De universalibus: [Li]

Cum necessarium sit chrisaori et ad Aristotelis...

See 'Memini me iamdudum...'

Cum omnes homines scire desiderant nulliter constat quod hoc desiderium...

Posteriora Analytica: *Venice S. Mark Cl.* X, cod. 43, f. 45-61

Cum omnis divisio libri sit penes...

Galfridus Grammaticus, Aequivoca: [Bale 212r]

Cum omnis error rationis...

De obligationibus: *Oxford New Coll.* 289 [Li]

- Cum omnis logica id est sermocinalis vel disputabilis scientia...  
 Gerlandus, *Regulæ super dialectica* (L. IV): *Orleans* 216, P. 41 (cf. L. Delisle, *Notices et extraits des mss. de la Bibl. nat. et autres bibl.*, Tom. 31, p. 390, Paris 1884)
- Cum omnis scientia... manifestius erudiri...  
 Categoriae ab Augustino trans.: *Paris BN* 6288, f. 3v-18r (XIth cent.) [Al 544]
- Cum omnis scientia disciplinaque...  
 Aristoteles, *Categoriae* (ab Augustino translatæ): *Parie BN* 11129, f. 172r-176v (XIth cent.) [Al 620]; *Troyes Municipale* 40; 70; ed. Migne *PL* 32, 1419
- Cum omnis scientia erit inquisitiva....  
 Burley, *Super libris Priorum: Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 276, f. 63-97'
- Cum omnis scientia sit veri acquisitiva...  
 Robertus Grosseteste, *Priora*: [Pits 330] (but see S. H. Thomson, *The Writings of Robert Grosseteste Bishop of Lincoln*, Cambridge 1940, p. 260)
- Cum omnis scientia sit veri inquisitiva...  
 Aegidius Romanus, *Priora Analytica*: *Florence Laurent.* LXXI. 29; *Paris BN* 16620; *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod.* 40 Gm 400 b; ed. *Venice* 1499, f. 5
- Cum omnis scientia sit veri inquisitiva...  
 Robertus Kilwardby, *Priora Analytica*: *Oxford Merton* 289, f. 33-101; *Paris BN* 16620, f. 2r-51v [Al 702]
- Cum philosophia sit effectus primæ causæ...  
 Raimundus Lull, *De principiis philosophiæ*: [Li]
- Cum res omnes quæ digne expetuntur propter aliquam trium causarum quas docet Tullius...  
 Porphyrius, *Isagoge*: *Rome Boncompagni* 350, f. 89-116
- Cum sæpenumero...  
 Sanctus de Salvis, *Logica*: *Assisi Conv.* 494, f. 165 (?)
- Cum sæpenumero cogitarem non mediocrem fructum iuvenibus afferre si compositionis materiam clarissime intelligerent...  
 Paulus Pergulensis, *De sensu composito*: *Oxford Bodleian (Can. Misc.)* 458 [Li]; *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod.* 211, f. 67-73; cod. 217, f. 89-92
- Cum sæpenumero in me cogitarem Ioannes Iacobi Orgilini non mediocrem tibi fructum argumentorum materiam asserere... Inquit

Boethius de Castignano, Tract. syllogismorum: *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 1109, f. 145r-147r

Cum scientia libri divisionum maxime conferat ad cognitionem libro-rum logices... quam magnos etc. Tunc scimus compositum... Glossæ in primam partem Divisionum Boethii: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 26*, f. 30-31

Cum scientia libri prædicamentorum generet dicibile... Primum oportet etc. Quoniam tunc scire opinamur compositum... Perihermenias (Boethio interprete): *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 26*, f. 1-18

Cum scientia libri sexti conferat ad scientiam priorum... Forma est compositioni contingens etc. Sed quoniam tunc cognoscimus compositum...

Sex Principia Gilberti Porretani: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 26*, f. 18-29

Cum sit necessarium, Chrisaori, et ad eam quæ apud Aristotelem prædicamentorum doctrinam nosse quid genus sit...

Porphyrius, Isagoge (Boethio transl.): *Arras Municipale* 362; 890; *Assisi Conv.* 664, f. 1-18; f. 118-133; *Avranche de la ville* 227; 228; *Barboursville (West Virginia)* Owens 1, f. 1r-3r; *Charleville Municipale* 250; *Erfurt Ampl. Fol.* 39, f. 1-9; *Qu.* 20, f. 1-6; *Qu.* 267, f. 1-6'; *Qu.* 271, f. 93-101'; *Qu.* 340, f. 1-9; *Laon Communale* 433; *Metz Municipale* 151; 508; *Sandaniele del Friuli Com.* 143; *Troyes Municipale* 1456; 1457; *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 15*, f. 1-8; *cod. 16*, f. 1-6; *cod. 17*, f. 1-12; *cod. 18*, f. 1-7; *cod. 19*, f. 1-7; *Venice Museo Correr* 179; *Worcester Cathedral F.* 66

Cum sit necessarium Grisarori et ad eam quæ est apud Aristotelem...

Marsilius, Super Porphyrium et prædicamenta Aristotelis: *Erfurt Ampl. Fol.* 306, f. 1-16

Cum sit necessarium... Ad eam quæ est apud Aristotelem prædicamentorum doctrina...

Raimundus Lull (?), Prædicamenta: *Milan Ambros. Y. 21 Sup.*, f. 112-121 [Gm 335 jb]; *Oxford Bodleian (Can. Misc.) 365* [Li]

Cum sit necessarium... dubitatur utrum universale in multis ad extra de pluribus prædicabile existens...

Augustinus de Ferrara, L. Prædicamentorum: *Stuttgart, Region. Cod. H. B. X. 10*, f. 206a-221b [SeT 450]

Cum sit necessarium... Genus dicitur aliquorum...

Notulæ super Porphyrium: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 235, f. 14'-21

Cum sit necessarium... Iste est liber prædicabilium Porphyrii qui dividitur in duas partes...

Gerardus de Hardewijck, *Perihermenias* (Comm. super veterem artem): Ed. Cologne 1494, f. 146 [Pell 5063]

Cum sit necessarium... Pro faciliore introductione textus philosophici secundum expositionem domini Alberti...

*Qq. Categoriarum, Priorum, etc.*: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 264, f. 1-58; 80-302'

Cum sit necessarium... Quæritur circa librum Porphyrii quid sit subiectum...

De arte vet. logicæ: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 313, f. 89-129'

Cum sit nostra præsens intentio ad artem dialecticam... Quare magis dicit præsens...

Logica: *London Brit. Mus. Add* 8167, f. 189; *Brit. Mus. (Royal)* 12 F. XIX, f. 90; f. 106 ('Organon Arist.'); *Oxford Bodleian (Digby)* 2; 24 [Li]

Cum tota intentio...

Glossa in Porphyrium: *Assisi Conv.* 658, f. 1-11

Cum universalium cognitio ut testatur Porphyrius...

Rogerus Whelpdale, *Universalia*: *London Brit. Mus. (Royal)* 12 B. XIX, f. 85; *Oxford Bodleian (Rawl.) C* 677 [Li]; *Worcester Cathedral Q.* 54, f. 12

Cum velimus tradere introductoriam artis demonstrativæ...

Raimundus Lull, *Introductorium artis demonstrativæ*: For mss. see Gm 335v; Ss III, II

Cum viderem Pauli Veneti logicam non parva indigere expositione...

Menghus Blanchellus, *Super logicam Pauli Veneti*: Ed. Treviso 1476 [Pell 2411]

De difficilibus accidentibus circa hoc signum: omnis, primo quæritur utrum possit congrue addi...

Henricus Gandavensis, *De syncategorematibus*: *Bruges de la ville* 510, f. 227-237c; *Erfurt Ampl. Fol.* 135, f. 60-84' [Gm 192 a]

De his apparent simul et...

Ricardus Billingham, *Fallaciæ*: [Li]

De his appetent simul et...

Ricardus Billingham, *Fallaciæ*: [Pits 489]

De incipere differre et scire...

Guilelmus Mylverley, *Sophismata*: [Pits 477]

De logica intendentibus primum considerandum est qualis scientia sit logica...

Albertus Magnus, *De prædicabilibus*: *Berlin Staatsb.* 456, f. 223r-229r; *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 719, f. 1r-47v; *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 30*, f. 3-46; *cod. 177*, f. 2-45; *Worcester Cathedral F. 23*, f. 47; ed. *Venice 1494*, f. 9

De negatione infinitante...

De negationibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 395, f. 98

De ordine librorum logicalium primo dicendum...

Introductio ad summulas logicales Petri Hispani: *Vaticana Vat. 10044*, f. 24-25v

De quocumque per totum et partes...

Logica: *Vienna NB 2486*, f. 37r-44v

De responsione autem et quomodo oportet solvere... Postquam Philosophus in primo libro docuit orationes sophisticas...

Aegidius Romanus, L. II Elenchorum: *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 823, f. 54-84v; ed. *Venice 1496*

De restrictione paucorum...

De restrictione: *Vienna NB 4698*, f. 164v-165v

De sophismatibus quæ non re, sed nomine insolubilia extant superest pertractare...

Joannes Dumbleton, *Insolubilia, etc.*: *Oxford Merton 306*, f. 3-8

De sophisticis autem elenchis et de iis qui videntur quidem elenchi sunt autem paralogismi sed non elenchi...

Aristoteles. Libri I, II Elenchorum (Boethio interprete): *Assisi Conv.* 658, f. 178-202; *Avranche de la ville* 227; 228; *Charleville Municipale* 39; 250; *Laon Communale* 433; 435; 435 bis; 435 ter; *London Brit. Mus. (Royal)* 12 D. II, f. 3; *Metz Municipale* 151; 269; *St. Omier Municipale* 620; *Toulouse de la ville* 735 (I, 275), f. 71; *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 10683, f. 225 (Jacobus de Venetiis?); *Urbin. lat.* 1318, f. 61; *Venice S. Mark Cl. X.*

*cod. 15*, f. 188-208; *cod. 16*, f. 75-89; *cod. 17*, f. 224-251; *cod. 18*, f. 81-96; *cod. 19*, f. 97-108; *cod. 59*, f. 294-317; *Worcester Cathedral F.* 66, f. 133; *F.* 119, f. 73; *Q.* 30, f. 50; ed. Migne *PL* 64, col. 1007

De sophisticis autem elenchis...

Guilelmus Breton, Elench.: [Pits 481]

De sophisticis autem elenchis...

Joannes Baconsthorpe, Elench.: [Pits 454]

De sophisticis autem elenchis...

Radulphus Spaulding, Super elenchos [Pits 550]

De sophisticis autem elenchis...

Robertus Grosseteste, In Elenchos Aristotelis: *Oxford Merton* 280, f. 3A-37C (cf. S. Thomson, *The Writings of Robt. Grosseteste*, Cambridge 1940, p. 81)

De sophisticis autem elenchis...

Thomas de Wick De Fallaciis: *Oxford Bodleian (Digby)* 204, f. 81b-87b (cf. J. Russell, *Dict. of Writers XIIIth Cent. England*, London 1936)

De sophisticis autem elenchis... Circa principium huius libri plura possunt...

Petrus de Hibernia (?), Elench.: *Florence Laurenz. pl.* 17, *sin. cod. 3*, f. 39 [Gm 210 ad: Addenda]

De sophisticis autem elenchis... Iste liber prima sui distinctione...

De s. elenchis: *Erfurt Ampl. Fol.* 263, f. 8'-12

De sophisticis autem elenchis... Liber est qui dicitur elenchorum sicut alii libri philosophi...

Aegidius Romanus, L. Elenchorum: *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 824, f. 4r; 825, f. 1r-66v; 826; ed. Venice 1496. See also 'Ex illustri prosapia oriundo...'

De sophisticis autem elenchis... Quæratur an sophistica...

Thomas Wyk (de Wick?), De fallaciis: *Oxford Bodleian (Digby)* 204 [Li]

De sophisticis autem elenchis...

Joannes Scotus, Qq. super librum elenchorum: Ed. Venice 1508, f. 39v

De sophisticis autem elenchis... Sicut dicit Philosophus in primo metaphysicæ omnes homines...

Simon Anglicus (?). Qq. super Elenchis: *Milan Ambros.* C.

161. *Inf.*, f. 113r-120v (cf. C. Ottaviano, "Qq. super libro *Prædicamentorum*" di S. F., R. Accademia Naz. dei Lincei, Classe Scienze Morali Stor. e Filologiche, Rome 1930, p. 258)

De sophisticis autem elenchis... videntur quidem...

Aristoteles, Duo libri elenchorum: *Erfurt Ampl. Fol. 22*, f. 53-70; *Fol. 39*, f. 157-179; *Qu. 20*, f. 92-106; *Qu. 248*, f. 1-16'; *Qu. 340*, f. 76' (fragm.)

De sophisticis elenchis... In hoc libro cuius subiectum est elenches...

Notulæ super II. elenchorum: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 235*, f. 87-93'

De syllogismo et syllogismi...

Albertus Magnus, In libris Topicorum: *Bruges de la ville* 488, ff. 102; ed. Lyons 1651, I, 658

De universalibus an subsistant...

Joannes Botrell, Summulæ logicales: [Pits 568]

De universalibus. Universalia seu prædicabilia...

Joannes Argyropulos, De regulis ratiocinandi: *Rome Angel. 1288*

De vero et falso aliquid generaliter...

Stanislaus de Znoyma, De vero et falso: *Vienna NB* 4002, f. 90r-124v

Declaratio præfationis introductiunculæ terminorum præfixæ. Qui inter auctorum probatorum celebres conventus...

Introductio in logicam Aristotelis: *Florence Naz. Centr. II, IV, 552*

Deus cum tua benedictione novum et compendiosum... Considerantes veterem logicam et antiquam...

Raimundus Lull, Logica nova: For mss. see Gm 335 ct; *Ss III 16*. See also 'Considerantes veterem...'

Deus cum tua (gratia et) benedictione incipiunt regulæ...

Raimundus Lull, Regulæ artis demonstrativæ: For mss. see Gm 335 ac; *Ss III, 16*

Deus qui es clarificatio totius intellectus... Quoniam hæc ars demonstrativa...

Raimundus Lull, Ars demonstrativa: For mss. see Gm 335 f

Dialectica dicitur ars artium, scientia scientiarum, ad omnium methodorum...

Dialectica: *Paris BN (Nov. Acquis.) 219* (cf. L. Delisle, *Mss. lat. et franc. Inventaire alphabétique*, Paris 1891, p. 219)

Dialectica est ars ad omnium methodorum principia vim habens...

Dialectica: *Iurea Capitolare* 79

Dialectica est ars artium...

De dialectica: *Vienna NB* 4698, f. 1r-16v

Dialectica est ars artium et scientia scientiarum ad omnium methodorum principia viam habens...

Petrus Hispanus, Summulæ logicales: *Arras Municipale* 820 (511), f. 43r-48v [Al 417]; *Erfurt Ampl. Fol.* 263, f. 29'-31 (fragm.); *Qu.* 7, f. 3-50; *Qu.* 245, f. 33-135'; *Qu.* 260, f. 1-35; *Qu.* 283, f. 1-27': *Milan Ambros. H* 64 *Inf.*, f. 1-49v [Bs]; *Paris BN* 16611, f. 4-22v Al 701; *Vaticana Chigi E. V.* 148, f. 1r-13v; *Palat.* 995, f. 1-29; *Regin.* 1205; 1731, f. 1r-55v; *Vat. lat.* 3051, f. 53r-85r; *Vat. lat.* 4537, f. 1r-29r [Bs]; *Vat. lat.* 10044, F. 26; *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod.* 55, f. 10-32 (anon.); *cod.* 184, f. 1-9 (anon.); ed. Bochenski, (Turin 1947)

Dialectica est ars artium et scientia scientiarum...

Logica: *Saint-Die* 69

Dialectica est ars artium scientia scientiarum...

Parva logicalia (ex tract. I-VII Summularum Petri H. excerpta):  
*Vaticana Vat. lat.* 10044, f. 1

Dialectica est ars artium scientia scientiarum...

Joannes Buridan, Summula dialectices: *Metz Municipale* 638; 642; *Troyes Municipale* 1737; 2015; 2018; ed. Paris 1487

Dialectica est ars artium scientia scientiarum...

Petrus de Pulka, Parva logicalia: *London Univ. Coll. cod.* 4, f. 1a-109d [AFH XLIV, 205]

Dialectica est ars artium... Circa hunc textum notandum est...

Joannes de Magistris, Glossulæ Petri H. (Qq. super totum cursum logicæ): Ed. Venice 1490

Dialectica est ars artium... In principio huius libri sicut et in principiis aliorum librorum logicæ octo genera...

Guilelmus de Tortona, Logica: [Ss I, 350]

Dialectica est ars artium... Iste est tractatus summularum magistri J. Buridani qui prima sui divisione...

Joannes Dorpt, Com. in opera Buridani: *Erfurt Ampl. Fol.* 300, f. 1-163; *Qu.* 167; *Qu.* 327, f. 65-89; ed. Paris 1487

Dialectica est ars artium... Iste est tractatus summularum magistri Petri Hispani in quo ipse...,

Joannes de Monte, *Super summulas Petri Hispani*: Ed. Venice  
1495

Dialectica est ars artium... Quia omnis nostra cognitio procedit a  
notioribus in minus nota...

Joannes de Persico, *Super dialecticam Petri H. et fallacias*  
Thomae Aq.: *Cremona Governativa* 27 (48.3.11 - 3689), cc.  
69a-124b

Dialectica... Circa istam partem primo nota quod iste terminus...

Comment. in dialecticam Petri Hispani: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 261,  
f. 1-108'

Dialectica... In Dei nomine...

See 'In Dei nomine...'

Dialectica est bene disputandi scientia. Disputamus autem verbis.

Verba igitur aut simplicia sunt aut coniuncta...

S. Augustinus, *Principia dialecticæ*: *Charleville Municipale* 187  
(XIIth cent.); *Paris BN* 12949, f. 12r-22r (IXth cent.) [Al  
621]; *Troyes Municipale* 40 (anon.); 70 (anon.); *Vaticana*  
*Regin.* 233, f. 28-38v; *Vat. lat.* 1485, f. 79v; *Venice S. Mark*  
*Cl. X, cod. 22*, f. 85-87; ed. Migne *PL* 32, col. 1409-1420

Dialectica tamen ut dicit Aristoteles...

Rodulphus Strodus, *De arte logica*: *Oxford Bodleian (Can.*  
*Misc.)* 219 [Li]

Dialecticam ignorantibus primo videndum est quid sit dialectica et  
unde dicatur et quid intendat...

Dialectica: *Paris BN* 11412 [Hn II, 43]

Dicemus prius quod suppositio est statio termini in oratione con-  
nexi pro supposito vel suppositis...

Petrus de Mantua, *De suppositionibus*: *Venice S. Mark Cl. XI,*  
*cod. 16*, f. 1-80

Dicemus prius naturaliter loquentes quod solum forma secundum  
se et quamlibet sui partem potest...

Petrus de Mantua, *De instanti*: *Venice S. Mark Cl. XI, cod. 16.*  
f. 81-93

Dicemus quod intentio philosophiæ...

Avicenna Logica: *Paris BN* 6443, f. 208r-220v [Al 583]. See  
also 'Studiosam animam nostram...'; 'Dico quod intentio...'

Dicendum est de materia parvorum logicorum et ergo circa tractatum  
suppositionum quæritur utrum de suppositione...

- Qq. de parvis logicis: *Erfurt Ampl. Fol. 313*, f. 1-47  
 Dicit Aristoteles in principio veteris metaphysicæ quod omnes...  
 Henricus Brito (?), *Philosophia*: *Oxford Corp. Christi 283*, f. 145b-148  
 Dicit Philosophus sexto metaphysicæ: tres sunt partes...  
 Qq. veteris artis Britonis et Hentisberii: *Nuremberg Stadt. Cent. V, 21*, f. 58r-124v [AI 1089]  
 Dico igitur quod nullum insolubile de quo præsens est locutio est simpliciter verum vel simpliciter falsum...  
 De insolubili: *Bruges de la ville 500*, f. 30r-32v  
 Dicto de his quæ quantum ad rem significatam pertinent...  
 (Avicenna, *Logica*): *Oxford Merton 282*, f. 168r-175v [AI 371].  
 See also 'Dicemus quod...'; 'Studiosam animam nostram...'  
 Dictio exclusiva ut solus sol...  
 De confusionibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 395*, f. 93'-95'  
 Dictio præter exceptivam tenetur: aliquis homo...  
 De exceptivis: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 95'*-98  
 Dicto de his quæ quantum ad rem significatam pertinent...  
 Thomas Aquinas, *De enuntiatione*: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 185*, f. 25-33  
 Dicto de obligationibus iam restat ut processum...  
 Rogerus de Swineshead, *Insolubilia*: *Bruges de la ville 500*, f. 150v-157v ('Seveneset'); *Vaticana Vat. lat. 2130*, f. 152r-154v, 154v-159v; *Vat. lat. 2154*, f. 1r-6r, 6v-12v. See also 'Cum in singulis (scientiis) secundum...'  
 Dicto de prædicamentis absolutis dicendum est de respectivis...  
 Thomas Aquinas, *De prædicamento ad aliquid*: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 185*, f. 16-18  
 Dicto de suppositionibus dicendum est de ampliationibus...  
 Marsilius (de Inghen), *De ampliationibus*: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 30*, f. 127'-133; *Qu. 277*, f. 9'-16  
 Dicto de syllogismis dicendum est...  
 Logica (?): *Rheims de la ville 869*, f. 90v (fragm.) [AI 739]  
 Dicto de terminorum suppositione restat nunc dicere de ampliatione...  
 De ampliationibus: *Vienna NB 4698*, f. 155v-161r  
 Dictum est de syllogismo in universali...  
 Rogerus Bacon (?): [Gm 312 cf]

Dicturi de universalibus prius videndum est de genere...

Super Porphyrium: *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 2186, f. 100v-103v

Dicunt aliqui...

Tract. logicales varii: *Padua Anton. XIX*, f. 407 (cf. B. Roth,  
*Franz von Mayronis*, "Franziskan. Forschungen," Werl 1936,  
p. 205)

Differt sensus compositus a diviso...

Logica: *Florence Naz. Centr. II, IV*, 553, f. 64

Digna est imperio, Porphyrius capitulo de specie in principio...

Tractatus in laudem logicæ: *Oxford Magd.* 38, f. 15-16

Dilecto sibi præposito Lovaniensi... Diligentiæ tuæ... Sicut Philosophus dicit in tertio de Anima...

Thomas Aquinas, Expos. in 11. Perihermenias: Ed. Rome 1882,  
Tom. I, p. 7

Disciplina est ars quædam dicta a discendo...

(Pseudo-) Augustinus, Decem Categoriae: *Vaticana Regin.* 233;  
*Vat. lat.* 567

Disputatio est actus argumentationis unius...

De argumentationibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 245, f. 262-264'

Distributio est multiplicatio termini communis... Iste est sextus tractatus parvorum logicalium in quo...

Joannes de Magistris, De distributione (Qq. super totum cursum logicæ): Ed. Venice 1490

Distributio est multiplicatio termini communis per signum universale... Iste est sextus tractatus parvorum logicalium in quo determinat auctor...

Joannes de Monte, Super summulas Petri Hispani: Ed. Venice 1495

Distributio est multiplicatio termini communis per signum universale facta: ut cum dicitur omnis homo...

Nicoalus de Orbellis, De distributionibus (Summulæ logicæ Petri Hispani): Ed. Venice 1489

Diversis potentis et virtutibus diversi...

Robertus Kilwardby, De sophisticis elenchis: *Oxford Bodleian (Can. Misc.)* 403 [Li]

Dixit et oportet quod dicamus primo quid sit nomen...

Averroes, Perihermenias: *Erfurt Ampl. Fol.* 318, f. 44-51'

Dixit et oportet ut dicamus primo quid est nomen et quid est verbum...

Averroes, I, II Perihermenias: *Vaticana Urbin.* 221, f. 250;  
*Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 176*, f. 20-29

Dixit. Omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina...

Averroes, Posteriora Analytica I, II: *Vaticana Urbin.* 221, f. 142v; ed. Venice 1489

Dixit oportet ut incipiamus primo et enuntiemus in re de qua est inquisitio...

Averroes, Priora Analytica I, II: *Vaticana Urbin.* 221, f. 118; ed. Venice 1489

Docet Aristoteles in suis prædicamentis in capitulo de qualitate quod scientia stat solum... Circa primam partem huius operis sic procedit...

Aegidius Romanus, Posteriora Analytica: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 46*. Compare 'Venerabili ex anglorum...'

Dominus potest facere omne quod fieri vult...

Guilelmus Ockham, Defensorium logices: [Pits 458]

Duæ sunt partes logicæ. Grammatica. Ratio disserendi...

Hugo St. Victor (?), Epitoma Dindimi in philosophiam: *Vaticana Urbin.* 108, f. 258v; ed. Hauréau, *Hugues de S. Victor..., Paris 1895*, p. 161-175

Dubitatur quid sit intentio prima et quid secunda ideo ad horum declarationem oportet hic videre...

De intentione: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 185*, f. 44-45

Dubium est utrum omnis motus verus...

Misin (de Coderonco), De tribus prædicamentis Hesberi: *Oxford Bodleian (Can. Lat.) 278* [Li]

Dubium est utrum motus verus et proprie dictus in aliquo trium prædicamentorum consistat...

Super de tribus prædicamentis Hentisberi: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 220*, f. 255-275

Dubium est utrum omnis motus verus et proprie dictus in argumento trium prædicamentorum consistat...

Messinus et Caietanus de Thienis, Super de tribus prædicamentis Hentisberi: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 218*, f. 47-65

Dubium est utrum veritatem habeat propositio ista posita in primo posteriorum ab Aristotele...

Q. anonyma: *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 760, f. 77r

Dudum expletis lectionibus...

Ockham, *Summa maior Logices*: [Pits 458]

Dudum me frater et amice carissime tuis litteris studebas inducere...

Guilelmus Ockham, *Summa logicæ*: Barcelona Ripoll (Garcia 71;1); Bruges 497, f. 1r-40r; 498; Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 259, f. 3-157'; Paris BN 6430, f. 1r; 6431, f. 1r; 6432, f. 1r; Saint-Die Municipale 63; *Vaticana Chigi E.IV.99*; E.VII.220; *Vat. lat.* 674; 950, f. 1r-117r; 951, f. 1r. See also 'Quam magnos veritatis sectatoribus...'; 'Omnes logicæ tractatores...'; 'Quidem me frater...'

Duodecim syllogismos intendimus...

Raimundus Lull, De duodecim syllogismis: *Milan Ambros.* N. 259. *Sup.*, f. 99r-v [Gm 335 dx]

Duplex est modus prioritatis...

Briggemour, De divisione secundum Boethium: *Vaticana Ottobon.* 1276, f. 141-155 (cf. C. Ottaviano, *Tract. de universalibus, Reale Acad. de Italia*, Rome 1932, p. 13)

Duplex est potentia, scilicet activa et passiva...

Burley, De sensu et sensato: *Oxford Magd.* 146, f. 99

Dupliciter contingit significare rem...

Robertus Kilwardby, Super librum de Interpretatione: *Oxford Bodleian (Can. Misc.) 403* [Li]

Dupliciter enim est necessarium præcognoscere...

"Joannes de Cass.", Posteriora Analytica: *Rome Angel.* 1051 (R.8.5), f. 6-40

E sophisticis autem elenchis...

L. Elenchorum: *Utrecht Univ.* 825, f. 21b-52. See also 'De sophisticis...'

Ea quæ sunt in voce...

Guido Terreni, Perihermenias [Gm 422 r]

Elementa sunt quattuor rerum naturalium principia de quibus...

Raimundus Lull, Super figuram elementalem artis demonstratiæ: *Rome S. Isidoro* 1/20, f. 2r. For other mss. see Gm 335 ab

Ens commune nomen... confusum et invertibile...

Joannes Damascenus, Logica: *Paris BN* 14700, f. 371r-388r [Al 640]

Ens commune nomen est omnium...

Damascenus, Logica: *London Brit. Mus. (Royal) 5 C. IV*, f. 85

Eorum quæ dicuntur quædam dicuntur cum complexione...

Gualterus Burley, Suppositiones: *London Brit. Mus. (Royal) 12 F. XIX*, f. 130

Eorum quæ dicuntur quædam dicuntur cum complexione...

De confusionibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 283*, f. 200-204'. See also 'Horum quæ dicuntur...'

... equivalent huic argumento...

Joannes Buridan, Logica: *Oxford Magd. 88*, f. 139

Est autem quando quod ex temporis adiacentia relinquitur...

Thomas Aquinas, De prædicamento quando: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 185*, f. 20-21

Est dubitatio utrum universale sit subiectum in libro Porphyrii...

Qq. de universalibus: *Erfurt Qu. 276*, f. 155-158

... et dein omnia terminorum (?) primo ergo describendo Philosophus æquivoca dicit...

Gualterus Burley, Prædicamenta: *Rome Angel. 1498 (V.3.5)*, f. 1-73a; ed. Venice 1549. See also 'Quia de dictis in logica...'

Et primo quæritur utrum de enuntiatione possit esse scientia...

Radulphus de Hotot (Brito), Qq. super Perihermenias: (For mss. see Gm 225 c)

... et quid per discrimina demonstramus...

Robertus Kilwardby, Super primos Priorum Aristotelis: *Brussels Royale 2907*, f. 1-24v

Et si aliquo modo de actibus rationis sit logica...

Q. philosophica: *Paris BN 16297*

Et si Aristoteles universæ philosophiæ pater: artis dialecticæ...

Logica est scientia qua sciendi verumque a falso...

Georgius Benignus de Salviatis, Dialectica nova: Ed. Florence 1488, f. 2

Etsi logica difficilima sit studium tamen ab ea incipit...

Joannes de S. Dominico, De universalibus: Ed. Zamora 1484

Ex illustri prosapia oriundo... Alpharabius in logica sua volens quandam notitiam tradere... De sophisticis autem elenchis. Liber iste dicitur elenchorum...

Aegidius Romanus, Expositio Elenchorum: *Bruges de la ville 493*, f. 243r-287v; *511*, f. 1r-107v; *Cremona Governativa 135*

(L.9.18-12226), cc. 1a-74a; *Erfurt Ampl. Fol. 104*, f. 40-123; 309, f. 1-70; 310; *Vaticana Vat. lat. 823*, f. 1r-84v; 10135, f. 118v (fragm.); ed. Venice 1500, f. 2-67r. For other mss. see Gm 400 ae

Ex istis duobus tanquam ex materiali et formal...  
Simon Faversham (?), *De interpretatione: Oxford Merton 292*, f. 95 (cf. C. Ottaviano, "Qq. super 1. Prædicamentorum" di S. F., R. Accad. Naz, dei Lincei, Classe di Scienze Morali Stor. e Filologiche, Rome 1930, p. 260)

Ex prius dictis apparet in divisione logices...  
See 'Aequivoca dicuntur... Ex prius...'

Exercitium præbet humanæ naturæ...  
See 'Incipit disputata libri confusionum...'

Expedit ut terminorum acceptio lucide cognoscatur...  
(Thomas) Manlevet, *De suppositionibus: Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 30*, f. 139-141'; *Qu. 245*, f. 136-164 (anon.); *Vienna NB 4698*, f. 28r-32r ('Malveld')

Expeditis his quæ ad prædicamenta Aristotelis Porphyrii institutione digesta sunt...  
Boethius, *Categoriae: Erfurt Ampl. Oct. 66*, f. 58-85'; *Saint-Mihiel Municipale 26* (XIth cent.); *Vaticana Urbin. 188*, f. 65; *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 25*, f. 31-64; *Cl. X, cod. 170*, f. 45-90; ed. Migne *PL 64*, 159-294

Expedito de opinionibus falsis et erroneis...  
(Thomas) Bradwardine, *Insolubilia: Erfurt Qu. 276*, f. 163-167

Expositurus igitur binas Burlaei commentationes alteram quæ ante Porphyrium feriatim exponemus...  
Tiberius de Bazaleriis, *Q. de prædicatione reali: Ed. Bologna 1496 [GW 3750]*

Fallacia apud logicos dicitur deceptio...  
Magister Willlemus, *Fallaciæ: London Brit. Mus. (Royal) 9 E. XII*, f. 227

Fallacia est deceptio sive assensus erroneus quo assentimus...  
De fallaciis: *Oxford Magd. 92*, f. 164-171

Fallacia est deceptio sive ut...  
Ricardus Lavingham, *De fallaciis: [Pits 535]*

Fallacia est defectus in forma argumenti...

De fallaciis: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 245, f. 322-334'; *Vienna NB* 4698, f. 62r-70r

Fallacia est oratio apparerter arguens et latenter deficiens...

De fallaciis: *Oxford Magd.* 38, f. 10b-13

Finito tractatu propositionis conclusionis et argumenti...

See 'Omnia quidem quæ superioris...'

Firma est compositio...

L. sex Principiorum (Gilberti Porretani): *St. Omer Municipale* 620. See also 'Forma est...'

Forma est compositi contingens simplici...

Gerardus Cremonensis, Sex Principia: *Rome Angel.* 242 (C.4. 10), f. 27a-29a

Forma est compositioni contingens...

L. Bosden, De sex Principiis: [Li]

Forma est compositioni contingens simplici...

Gerardus de Harderwijck, L. sex Principiorum (Comm. super artem veterem): Ed. Cologne 1494, f. 127 [Pell 5063]

Forma est compositioni contingens simplici et invariabili essentia consistens...

Gilbertus Porretanus, L. sex principiorum: *Assisi Conv.* 228; 658, f. 92-99; 664, f. 41-51; *Barboursville (West Virginia) Owens* 1, f. 27r-34r; *Charleville Municipale* 250 ('Perihermenias'); *Erfurt Ampl. Fol.* 39, f. 25-33; *Qu.* 20, f. 21-25; *Qu.* 267, f. 24-30; *Qu.* 310, f. 26-30'; *Qu.* 340, f. 31-37'; *Laon Commune* 433; *Toulouse de la ville* 735 (I,275), f. 24; *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 2005, f. 121 (fragm.); 10683, f. 45; *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod.* 15, f. 32-39; *Cl. X, 16*, f. 23-28; *Cl. X, cod.* 17, f. 33-43; *Cl. X, 18*, f. 26-32; *Cl. X, cod.* 19, f. 17-21; *Vienna NB* 2374, f. 71v-78r; ed. *Venice* 1503, f. 31v-34v. (Variant: 'Forma est compositum...')

Forma est compositioni contingens, ut testatur Plato...

See 'In cuiuslibet sermonis principio... Forma est...'

Forma est compositum...

See 'Forma est compositioni...'

Forma est... Circa istum librum prius quæritur...

Petrus de Alvernia, Qq. super sex Principia: *Florence Laurenz. pl. 17, sin. cod. 3*, f. 12 [Gm 210 ab (Addenda)]

Forma est... Compositio enim non est quando a natura compositionis seiungitur...

De sex Principiis G. Porretani: *Avranches de la ville* 228

Forma est... Compositio etenim forma non est...

De sex Principiis: *Paris BN 6575* [Hn VI, 300]

Forma est... Forma est compositioni contingens simplici...

Notulæ super Prædicamentis Aristotelis: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 235, f. 21-25'

Forma est... Intentio auctoris in hoc libello est diffusius tractare...

Guilelmus Mylverley (Robertus Alington?), Sex Principia: *London Brit. Mus. (Harley)* 2178, f. 78; (*Royal*) 12 B. XIX, f. 96-123; *Oxford Bodleian (Rawl. C.* 677 [Li]; *Magd.* 47, f. 67b-86; *Oriel* 35, f. 134b-152; *Worcester Cathedral Q.* 54, f. 116

Forma est... Iste liber intitulatur...

Gualterus Burley, De sex Principiis G. Porretani: *Oxford Bodleian (Can. Misc.)* 385; *Magd.* 146 [Li]; *Paris BN 1804*, f. 14

Forma est... Liber sex principiorum...

See 'Aristoteles in quinto metaphysicæ...'.

Forma est... Postquam Aristoteles in libro prædicamentorum...

B (?) in Gilb. Porret. de sex principiis: *Oxford Bodleian (Can. Misc.)* 181 [Li]

Forma est... Postquam... (?) in libro prædicamentorum sufficienter in quantum est de intentione logici determinavit...

L. sex Principiorum: *Rome S. Isidoro* 1/98, f. 86v-98v. See also 'Forma est... Quamvis Aristoteles...'

Forma est... Quæritur utrum omnis forma sit simplex in essentia...

Antonius Andreeae, De sex Principiis, Q. II: Ed. Venice 1512

Forma est... Quamvis Aristoteles in libro prædicamentorum sufficienter quantum de intentione logici est determinat...

Burley, De sex Principiis: *Allegany* (New York) Franciscan Institute 2, f. 1r-22r; *London Brit. Mus. (Royal)* 12 F. XIX, f. 23; *Rome Angel.* 1498 (V. 3.5), f. 73b-93

Forma est... Quamvis Aristoteles in libro principiorum...

(Gualterus) Burley, Comment. in Sex Principiis: *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 10610, f. 62

Forma est... Quamvis de ordine prædicabilium iam in prædicamentis...

- Albertus Magnus, Sex Principia Gilb. Porretani: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 30*, f. 91-112; *Cl. X, cod. 62*, f. 158-159 (fragm.)  
 Forma est... supposito quod sex principia sunt...  
 Sex Principia: *Oxford Merton* 296, f. 40b-47  
 Fortuna est...  
 Burley (?), Super Sex Principiis: *Perugia Communale* 580  
 Frater Angelus de Camerino... Antiquus appetitus etsi non cogit...  
 Philosophus in primo Topicorum...  
 Angelus de Camerino, Comment. in Porphyrium: *Rome Angel. 832*, f. 1-20  
 Frater Angelus de Camerino... O Grisarori. Cum sit necessarium assignare. Dicit ergo loquens suo discipulo...  
 Angelus de Camerino, Comment. in Porphyrium: *Rome Angel. 1040*, f. 1-17b  
 Frater Angelus de Camerino... Primum omnium constituere... Iste liber habet duas partes...  
 Angelus de Camerino, Perihermenias: *Rome Angel. 1040*, f. 56-90  
 Frater Angelus de Camerino... Quia ratio intellectiva... Sicut dicit Philosophus sexto metaphysicæ...  
 Angelus de Camerino, Perihermenias: *Rome Angel. 832*, f. 67-113

- Genera et species aut sunt et subsistunt aut intellectu et sola cogitatione formantur...  
 Boethius, In Isagogen Porphyrii (L. I, cap. 10): *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 722, f. 208r-v; ed. Migne *PL* 64, col. 83, l. 12 - col. 86, l. 14  
 Genus uno modo est collectio aliquorum...  
 Super Porphyrium: *Oxford Bodleian (Rawl.) C. 677*  
 Gratia iuvante divina in hoc præsenti opusculo...  
 (Henricus de Udem), De scire et dubitare, de sensu composito et diviso: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 255*, f. 50-56  
 Gyrum cœli circuivi sola... Sicut scribitur primo metaphysicæ propter admirari cœperunt homines philosophari...  
 Antonius Andreeae, In artem veterem: Ed. Venice 1480 [GW 1669]

Habito de proprietatibus distinctionum categoricarum...

Henricus Gandavensis, Syncategoremata: *Bruges de la ville* 510, f. 227r-237v

Habito de syllogismo in communi et de syllogismo demonstrativo agendum est de argumentis et consequentiis...

Guilelmus Ockham, Summa logicæ (Part. III, pars 3): *Paris BN 6430*, f. 77

Habitus est corporum et eorum quæ circa corpus sunt adiacentia...

Thomas Aquinas, De habitu (Summa logicæ, cap. 4): *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 185*, f. 23-25

Harum... Hic consequenter auctor determinat de consequentiis et æquipollentiis modalium...

Nicolaus de Orbellis, De consequentiis (Logica brevis): Ed. Parma 1482

Hic est alter libellus parvorum logicalium qui intitulatur liber confusionum...

Comment. in tract. de confusionibus Thomae Manlevelt: *Erfurt Ampl. Duod. 13a*, f. 34'-56'

Hic incipit obligationes notabiliores secundum usum Cantobriensium.

Obligatio est oratio...

De obligationibus Cantabrigensium: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 332*, f. 102-103'

Hiemantis anni tempore in Aureliæ montibus concesseramus...

Boethius, Diagoli I, II in Porphyrium (a Victorino transl.): *Vaticana Urbin. 188*, f. 1; *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 25*, f. 2-15; *Cl. X, cod. 170*, f. 21-43; ed. Migne *PL 64*, 9-70

Hoc sigum præter aliquando tenetur exceptive...

Gualterus Burley, Exceptivæ: *London Brit. Mus. (Royal) 12 F. XIX*, f. 126b

Hoc tertium capitulum secundi huius... in quo auctor vult determinare de suppositione simplici...

De parvis logicis: *Erfurt Ampl. Oct. 71*, f. 2-49

Homo est animal. Hoc est sophisma propositum...

Radulphus de Hotot (Brito), Sophismata: *Paris BN (Nouv. Acq.) 1374*, f. 96 [Gm 225 i]

Homo est animal rationale... Causa efficiens huius libri dicitur fuisse

Petrus Hispanus...

Comment. in de locis dialecticis Petri Hispani: *Erfurt Ampl.*  
*Oct. 70, ff. 36*

Horum quæ dicuntur quædam dicuntur cum complexione...

Joannes de Magistris, *De suppositione (Glossulæ Summularum Petri Hispani)*: Ed. Venice 1490

Horum quæ dicuntur quædam dicuntur cum complexione... Quia logicus habet considerare de termino...

Nicolaus de Orbello, *De Suppositionibus (Expositio textus Petri Hispani)*: Ed. Venice 1489

Horum quæ dicuntur quædam dicuntur cum complexione... Iste est septimus et ultimus tractatus summularum magistri Petri Hispani qui communiter intitulatur tractatus parvorum logicalium...

Joannes de Monte, *Super Summulas P. H. (Tract. VII)*: Ed. Venice 1500

Huius operis intentio est de prioris (!) vocibus...

Prædicamenta: *Paris BN 2788, f. 49r-67v (XI-XIIth cent.)*  
 [Al 538]

Iam ad materiam significationis...

De significatione: *Oxford New Coll. 289 [Li]*

Iam quidem nobis in præfatis dictum est superscriptionibus non erit absurdum commemorari et nunc quemadmodum sint utilia prædicti...

(Joannis Philoponi comment. in analytica priora Aristotelis, anon. interprete): *Vaticana Urbin. 1364*

Iam sequuntur regulæ de insolubilibus et primo videndum est quid sit casus...

Guilelmus Hentisberi, *Insolubilia: Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 270, f. 37-42'*

Iesum Deum et hominem... Tripartitum vobis tractatum tradere institui ut sic toto libello trinitas suffragetur. Prima itaque generalis consequentiarum regulas...

Paulus Pergulensis, *Dubia super consequentiis Strodi: Perugia Communale 1070; Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 212, f. 1-59; cod. 213, ff. 39; cod. 214, ff. 60; cod. 215, f. 1-39 (incomplete); cod. 216, f. 1-52; cod. 217, f. 1-76; ed. Venice 1507*

Ignoratis principiis ignorantur et alia in principiis...

Jacobus de Placentia, Prædicamenta: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 31*, f. 28-57

Implicita propositiones a dialecticis...

De propositionibus: *London Brit. Mus. (Royal) 9 E. XII*, f. 98

Impossibile est aliquid calefieri...

Guilelmus Hentisberus, Sophismata: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 258*

In antehabitis dictum est quod logica est scientia per quam docetur...

Albertus Magnus, De prædicamentis: *Vaticana Vat. lat. 719, f. 52r-102r; Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 30*, f. 47-91; cod. 177, f. 46-97; ed. Lyons 1651

In cuiuslibet scilicet Sermonis principio ut testatur Plato...

See 'Omnis homines qui se se moribus...'

In cuiuslibet sermonis principio... Forma est compositioni contingens ut testatur Plato...

Gilbertus Porretanus, Sex Principia: *Rome Angel. 835*, f. 1-75

In Dei nomine invocato circa unamquamquem (?) rem inchoantem primo et principaliter sunt quattuor scienda...

Petrus Hispanus, Summulæ logicales: *Vaticana Urbin. 1419, f. 41; ed. Venice 1568*, f. 2v

In disputatione dialectica sunt duæ partes, scilicet opponens et respondens...

Gualterus Burley, De obligationibus: *Bruges de la ville 500, f. 72r-81v; London Brit. Mus. (Royal) 2 F. XIX*, f. 138; *Venice S. Mark Cl. XI, cod. 12*, f. 37-41; (anon. 'Insolubilia secundum usum Esoniensem'); cod. 12, 47-57

In hoc elenchorum sophisticorum libro de syllogismo litigatorio agendum est...

Albertus Magnus, L. Elenchorum: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 268, f. 35 95'; Rome Angel. 97, ff. 102; ed. Lyons 1651, I, 840-953*

In hoc libello vellem tractare de consequentiis tractando sicut possem causas earum...

Joannes Buridan, Consequentiae: Ed. Paris (c. 1493) [Pell 3061]

In hoc libro qui intitulatur de sensu et sensato intendit Aristoteles determinare de natura ipsorum instrumentorum...

L. de sensu et sensato: *Oxford New Coll. 285*, f. 158-182

In hoc primo Perihermeniarum...

Joannes Baconthorpe, Perihermenias: [Pits 454]

In hoc primo tractatu determinatur de propositionibus quas solubiles vocant...

Caietanus de Thienis, *Super insolubilibus Hentisberi: Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 221, f. 1-31.* See also 'Regula solvendi sophismata... In hoc...

In hoc tractatu intendo perscrutare de causa intrinseca susceptionis magis et minus...

Gualterus Burley, *De intensione et remissione formarum: Ed. Venice 1496 [Pell 3081]*

In hoc tractatu intendo perscrutare de quibusdam proprietatibus... Bradwardine, *De syllogismis hypotheticis: Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 276, f. 152-154'*

In hoc tractatu primo videndum est de suppositione...

Rodulphus Stodus, *De suppositionibus: Barcelona Ripoll (Garcia 141; 9); Oxford Bodleian (Can. Misc.) 219 [Li]*

In hoc tractatu secundo intendo perscrutari de propositionibus... Gualterus Burley, *Logica (Tr. II): Munich Clm 4379, f. 106r; Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 77, f. 44-70.*

In hoc tractatu secundo sic intendo scrutari de causa intrinseca susceptionis magis et minus...

*De intensione et remissione formarum: Paris BN 15889, f. 176r-189v.* See also 'In hoc tractatu intendo perscrutare de causa...'

In libro posteriorum cuius subiectum est syllogismus...

Parum de I Posteriorum: *Erfurt Ampl. F. 346, f. 76'-77'*

In materia de propositione...

Guilelmus Mylverley, *De propositione: [Pits 477]*

In materia sæpe tacta de ampliatione...

Joannes Cunningham, *Contra Wyclif: [Li]*

In materia sæpe tacta de tempore...

Joannes Kiningham, *De temporis ampliatione: [Pits 565]*

In materia universalium ante...

Thomas Waldensis, *Prædicabilia: [Pits 620] [Li: 'Walden']*

In nomine piissimi... ad faciendam bonitatem...

L. in artem Logicæ Demonstrationis a Mathomat collectus: *Paris BN 6443, f. 195r-197v [Al 583]*

In omni prædicamento potest esse mutatio quoniam in quolibet, ut dicit Commentator, reperitur potentia et actus...

Angelus de Forosempronii (Fossambrone), *Super regulas Hen-*

tisberii: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X*, cod. 218, f. 65-79; cod. 219, f. 1-13; cod. 220; cod. 221; *Cl. XI*, cod. 18, f. 156-178; ed. (Pavia 1482) [GW 1947: 'De velocitate motus']

In parte præcedenti Porphyrius determinavit...

Hervaeus Natalis (?), *Super Communitatibus Porphyrii: Paris Arsenal 530*, f. 32v [Gm 64 am]

In potentis activis est divisio assignanda per affirmationem de maximo et negationem de minimo...

Guilelmus Hentisbury, *De maximo et minimo*: Ed. Venice 1494, f. 193v

In prima quæstione quarti sententiarum dixi...

Burley, *De naturalibus ex logica: Erfurt Ampl. Oct.* 76, f. 84-127

In prima quæstione quarti sententiarum dixi quædam quæ aliquibus dubia et aliquibus sophismata videbantur...

Gualterus Burley, *Quolibet de speciebus: Venice S. Mark Cl. X*, cod. 220, f. 49-66

In principio mææ lecturæ de summa logicæ dixi nonum et ultimum tractatum esse de practica sophismatum sive de eorum formatiōne...

Buridan, *Sophismata: Erfurt Ampl. Fol.* 302, f. 155-191'

In principio uniuscuique operis, Domini nomen est præmittendum nam appetitum humanum solum divina bonitas replet...

De sensu composito et diviso: *Venice S. Mark Cl. XI*, cod. 12, f. 44-47

In purgando errores circa universalia sunt tria introductoria præmittenda...

Joannes Wiclef, *De universalibus: Venice S. Mark Cl. XI*, cod. 9, f. 29-79; *Vienna NB 4523*, f. 58r-132v

In quantis ergo figuris per quales et quot... Hic incipit secundus liber...

Super II Priorum: *Erfurt Ampl. Fol.* 263, f. 13-16

In terminis relationis multa sophismata fiunt secundum eorum modos supponendi...

Caietanus de Thienis, *De materia relationum: Venice S. Mark Cl. X*, cod. 220, f. 136-139; ed. Venice 1494

In terminis relativis sophismata multa concurrunt ad quæ solvenda diversi diversa principia sibi formant...

Guilelmus Hentisberus, De relativis: Ed. Venice 1494, f. 20r  
 In tractatu secundo intendo perscrutare de propositionibus...

Burley, De propositionibus et syllogismis hypotheticis: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 259, f. 175-208. See also 'In hoc tractatu secundo...'

Incipere dupliciter solet exponi, videlicet per positionem de præsenti et remotionem de præterito...

Guilelmus Hentisberi, De incipit et desinit: [Li]; ed. Venice 1494, f. 23v

Incipiendum est a primis cum minimus error in principio in fine maximus est...

Joannes Dumbleton, Summa de logicis et naturalibus: *Oxford Merton* 279, f. 179 (incomplete); [Bale 174v: 'Robertus Humbleton']. See also 'Plurimorum scribentium grati laboris...'

Incipiens et consequenter aliorum sociorum meorum parvorum non minus in scientia perfectorum...

Qq. de Isagogis Porphyrii: *Erfurt Ampl. Fol.* 313, f. 48-66.  
 Compare: 'Parvorum precibus puerorum...'

Incipit disputata libri confusionum. Exercitium præbet humanæ naturæ...

Petrus de Prentzavia, De confusionibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 282, f. 161-175

Incipit et desinit apud plures sunt termini exponibiles et apud (non) nullos habent causas veritatis...

Caietanus de Thienis, Super de Incipit et Desinit Hentisberi: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 220*, f. 139-147; ed. Venice 1494, f. 27r

Incipit liber de topicis differentiis...

Boethius, Topica (L. IV): *Avranches de la ville* 228: *Charleville Municipale* 187 (XIIth cent.). See also 'Si quis huius operis...'

Incipit prologus fallaciarum: Ad maiorem fallaciarum evidentiam videndum est...

Logica: *London Brit. Mus. (Royal) 2 D. IX*, f. 127

Incipiunt auctoritates libri prædicabilium Porphyrii in nomine Iesu.  
 Videtur autem nec genus neque species...

Joannes Jordanus Parschon, Libellus Auctoritatum philosophiae Aristotelis: *Rome Angel.* 127 (B.44), f. 347-377

Incipiunt rationes super tractatum magistri Petri... Ego frater Aegidius...

Aegidius de S. Sino, Super tractatum magistri Petri: *Perugia Communale* 1124, f. 1-83

Infinita sunt finita; probatio: duo sunt finita...

Sophismata cum sophisteria Lincolniensis: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 328, f. 1-73'

Infinitæ sunt partes sibi æquales non communicantes et tamen nulla istarum est pars sibi æqualis non communicans...

De relatis: *Venice S. Mark Cl. XI, cod.* 14, f. 42-43

Infinitæ sunt partes sor(tis?) æquales non communicantes quarum nulla est pars...

Guilelmus Hentisberus, Probationes conclusionum: Ed. Venice 1494, f. 188v

Infinitivus est verbum impersonale...

Collectio sophismatum: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 437, f. 13-49

Innuit Philosophus tertio de anima...

See 'Capitulo de movente...'

Insolubile est difficilis...

Insolubilia: *Rome Angel. 1017 (R.6.32)*, f. 14a-19b

Insolubile est propositio de qua fit mentio...

Paulus Pergulensis, Insolubilia: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod.* 211, f. 59-66

Insolubile est propositio signans primo et principaliter sicut est et ex consequenti aliter quam est...

(Robertus) Fland, Insolubilia: *Bruges de la ville* 497, f. 43r-44v

Insolubilia dicuntur non quia nullo modo possint solvi sed quia solvere est difficile...

Albertus de Saxonia, Insolubilia (Sophismata): Ed. Paris 1490, f. 93 [GW 800]

Intendentibus primum de logica...

Albertus Magnus, De prædicabilibus: [Li]. See 'De logica intendentibus...'

Intentio Aristotelis est in hoc opere de decem primis vocibus decem prima rerum genera significantibus...

Boethius, Catagoriæ Aristotelis: *Paris BN 13368; Vaticana Regin. 230.II*, f. 41-42; ed. Migne *PL* 64, 160A-161A

Intentio Aristotelis est in hoc opere de primis vocibus... Aequivoca  
vero dicuntur. Hic prædicendum est...

(Boethius), *Categoriae Aristotelis: London Brit. Mus. (Royal)*  
*7 D. XXV*, f. 55 (incomplete)

Intentio Aristotelis est in hoc opere de simplici enuntiativa inter-  
pretatione et de eius elementis. nomine scilicet atque verbo...  
Boethius, *De Interpretatione Aristotelis: Paris BN 13368*, f.  
95; *Vaticana Regin.* 230.II, f. 80-87; ed. Migne *PL* 64, 396

Intentio Aristotelis in hoc libro est manifestare et investigare essen-  
tialia demonstrationis...

Vaticana Vat.

(Robertus Grosseteste), *Comment. in Prosteroia Analytica: Va-*  
*ticana Vat. lat. 760*, f. 44r-61v. For other mss. and edd. see S. H.  
Thomson, *The Writings of Robert Grosseteste Bishop of Lin-*  
*coln*, Cambridge 1940, p. 84

Intentio auctoris in hoc libello...

See 'Forma est... Intentio auctoris...

Intentio Boëthii est in hoc opere veri similium argumentorum copiam  
demonstrare... Omnis ratio. Priusquam B(oethius) ad proposi-  
tam materiam descendat...

L. I in topicas differentias Boethii: *Vaticana Regin.* 230.II, f.  
72-76v; ed. Migne *PL* 64, 1173

Intentio in hac dictione est explanatio eius...

Averroës, *Super Porphyrio* (G. de Luna transl.): *Erfurt Ampl.*  
*Fol. 318*, f. 33-36'

Intentio in hac dictione est explicatio eius quod continet liber  
Porphyrii in introductionem ad scientiam rationalem...

Averroës, *De quinque vocibus Porphyrii: Vaticana Urbin.* 221,  
f. 114; ed. Venice 1489, f. 373 [Pell 1179]

Intentio in hac dictione est explicatio eius quod continet liber  
priorum...

Averroës, *Isagoge Porphyrii: Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 176,*  
f. 1-8

Intentio in hoc sermone est explanare sententias contentas in libris  
Aristotelis in arte logica et acquirere eas secundum posse...

Averroës, *Prædicamenta Aristotelis: Erfurt Ampl. Fol. 318*,  
f. 37-44; *Vaticana Urbin.* 221, f. 116v (incomplete); *Urbin.*  
221, f. 241; *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 176*, f. 11-20; ed. Venice

1489, f. 376 [Pell 1179]. Variant: 'Intentio nostra in hoc sermone...'

Intentio præsentis est primo tractare...

Grammatica latina: *New York Columbia (Plimpton) 143*

Intentio præsentis primo est perscrutare de terminis primæ et secundæ intentionis...

(Albertus de Saxonia) Logica: *Paris BN 14715*, f. 1. Variant.  
'Intentionis præsentis...'

Intentio Porphyrii...

Comm, in Porphyrium: *Assisi Conv. 573*

Intentionis præsentis est primo determinare de propositionibus in communi... Dialectica est ars artium...

Comment, in logicam Petri Hispani: *Erfurt Ampl. Oct. 69*, f. 1-61

Intentionis præsentis est primo tractare (tam) de terminis primæ (quam) secundæ intentionis...

Albertus de Saxonia, Logica: *Assisi Conv. 291*, f. 1-50; *Bologna Comun. dell' Archigin. A. 887*; *Cremona Governativa 8*; *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 242*, f. 1; *Perugia Communale 28*

Inter libros totius scientiæ iste liber...

Super Perihermenias Aristotelis: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 62*, f. 137-158

Introducendis in artem dialecticam primo videndum quid sit ars...

Logica: *London Brit. Mus. (Royal) 8 A. VI*, f. 68

Introductio est brevis et aperta demonstratio...

Robertus Bacon, Summulæ dialectices: *Oxford Bodleian (Digby) 204*, f. 48 (cf J. Russell, *Dictionary of Writers XIIIth Century England*, London 1936, p. 130) (Pits 369: 'Rogerus Bacon') (Gm 312 bs: 'Rob. Kilwardby? ou Petrus Hispanus?')

Iste est alter libellus parvorum logicalium et est tertius in ordine...

De consequentiis Th. Maulevelt: *Erfurt Ampl. Duod. 13a*, f. 81-103

Iste est alter libellus parvorum logicalium in quo vult determinare de probationibus propositionum...

De probationibus propositionum R. Billingham: *Erfurt Ampl. Duod. 13a*, f. 57-81

Iste est liber universalium Porphyrii introductorys...

Paulus Venetus: *Oxford Bodleian (Can. Lat.) 286*; 452 [Li]

Iste est tractatus alienationibus magistri M(arsilii) in quo magister ponit suas regulas alienationum...

De alienationibus Marsili de Inghen: *Erfurt Ampl. Duod.* 14, f. 124'-126

Iste est tractatus ampliationum in quo magister determinat de alia proprietate...

De ampliationibus Marsili de Inghen: *Erfurt Ampl. Duod.* 14, f. 100-118'

Iste est tractatus primus summularum magistri Petri Hispani, in quo ipse compendiose determinat de iis quæ in libro logicæ... Petrus Hispanus, I-III Tract. Summularum: *Vienna NB* 2335, f. 56r-193v

Iste est tractatus restrictionum magistri M(arsilii) in quo determinat de ipsa restrictione, puta de suppositione...

De restrictionibus Marsili de Inghen: *Erfurt Ampl. Duod.* 14, f. 120-124

Iste liber continuari potest...

See 'Aequivoca dicuntur... Iste liber...'

Iste liber continuari potest ad illa quæ dicta sunt de universalibus scientiæ...

Super Prædicamenta Aristotelis: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod.* 62, f. 108-136. See also 'Aequivoca dicuntur... Iste liber...'

Iste liber cuius...

De sophisticis elenchis: *Perugia Comunale* 1057

Iste liber cuius subiectum est coniunctio sive modus significandi...

Thomas Erfurtensis, Comment. in carmen "Fundamentum puerorum"; *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 51, f. 92-107

Iste liber cuius subiectum est suppositio...

De suppositionibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Duod.* 13, f. 9'-78'

Iste liber est posteriorum Aristotelis in quo determinatur de syllogismo demonstrativo...

Paulus de Venetiis, Posteriora: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod.* 49; *cod.* 50; *cod.* 51; ed. Venice 1481

Iste liber est prædicamentorum Aristotelis in quo determinatur de ordine...

Paulus Venetus: *Oxford Bodleian (Can. Lat.)* 286 [Li]

Iste liber intitulatur...

See 'Forma est... Iste liber...'

Iste liber intitulatur sex principia...

Burley, Sex Principia Porretani: [Pits 435]; [Bale 191v, Pits 614: 'Joannes Bate']

Iste liber isagogarum in introductione Porphyrii...

Comment. Aristotelis et Porphyrii: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 4, f. 79-112

Iste liber quem in præsens intendimus...

G. Burley, Perihermenias: [Li]

Iste tractatus dividitur in partes sex...

De arte opponendi et respondendi: *Wurzburg Minorit. I.* 63, f. 307r-311v [*AFH XLIV*, 199]

Iste vocatur liber priorum analyticorum et resolutionum in quo omnis intentio est nobis tradere notitiam...

Joannes de Burgo, Priora: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 38*, f. 1-45

Iuvenum rogantibus quibus afficior superatus...

Joannes Wyclif, Continuatio logicæ: Assisi Conv. 662 (Joannes Vicf'); *Oxford New Coll.* 289, f. 37r; *Vienna NB* 4523, f. 16r-58v

Luxta hunc textum...

Gul. Heytesbury, L. consequentiarum: [Li]

Luxta hunc textum Aristotelis in libro perihermenias...

(Guilelmus) Hentisberi, Tractatus: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 207*, f. 79-91

Luxta hunc textum in libro perihermenias...

Ioannes Thorp, Regulæ consequentiarum: [Li]

Luxta hunc textum tactum in libro perihermenias de quolibet dicitur affirmatio...

(Guilelmus) Hentisberi, De scire et dubitare: *Venice S. Mark Cl. XI, cod. 13*, f. 23-39

Luxta processum Aristotelis...

Ricardus Lavingham, Summulæ logicales: [Pits 535]

Liber posteriorum qui est de syllogismo demonstrativo tamquam de subiecto...

Conclusiones Posteriorum: *Munich Clm 4379*, f. 193r

Liber quem præ manibus habemus...

Petrus Stokes, Lecturæ scholasticæ: [Pits 566]

Licet secundum Boethium verbum infinitum...

De infinitis seu distributivis: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 395, f. 98-100' Logica cum dicat...

(Guilelmus) Ockham, Compendium logicæ: *Wurzburg Minorit.* I. 63, f. 1r-12r [AFH XLIV, p. 194]

Logica cum dicatur...

Guilelmus Ockham (?), Compendium logicæ: *Munich Clm* 1060 [EPM]

Logica cum dicatur... a logis quod est sermo...

Ockham, Minor tract. novæ logicæ: *Assisi Conv.* 690, f. 227v-246

Logica est ars et scientia...

Raimundus Lull, Logica parva: *Munich Clm* 10542 [Ss III, 16]

Logica est ars qua verum et falsum ratiocinando...

Raimundus Lull, Logica brevis: [Gm 335 cv]

Logica est ars seu scientia sermocinalis...

De suppositionibus: *Vienna NB* 4698, f. 56v-61

Logica est pars organica...

Soger, Compendium Priorum: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 268, f. 1-8'

Logica est pars organica (?) totius philosophiæ ut dicit Simplicius in prædicamentis quia illud dicitur esse pars...

'Segerus de Colterato', Ars priorum: *Paris BN* 16130, f. 65r-72r

Logica est rationalis scientia...

Thomas Aquinas, Fallaciæ: *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 4537, f. 29v-38r [Bs]. See also 'Quia logica est...

Logica est scientia. Hoc est sophisma propositum cuius probatio et improbatio...

(Petrus de Insula?), Sophisma: *Bruges de la ville* 510, f. 210r-212v

Logica est scientia qua sciendi verumque a falso se cernendi docetur modus...

Georgius Benignus de Salviatis, Dialectica nova: Ed. Florence 1488, f. 3

Logica procedit ab incomplexis ad complexa...

Guilelmus Ockham (?), Defensorium Logices: *Rome Angel.* 1017 (R.6.32) f. 21-36

... logicæ sed potius est superior scientia...

Tract. logicæ: *Cortona del Comune e dell' Accademia Etrusca*; 135, f. 1-9

Logici loquuntur de omnibus. Hoc fuit sophisma propositum cuius probatio et improbatio tunc patuerunt circa quod...

Bartholomaeus de Brugis, Sophisma: *Vaticana Palat.* 1202, f. 283v

Loquar propositiones ab initio sophismatum...

Paulus Venetus, De sophismatibus: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 209*, f. 24-71

Magistri sumus quia verax est...

Qq. philosophicæ: *Assisi Conv.* 576

Magnam quidem libri huius apud peripateticam sectam probatur auctoritas...

Boethius, Perihermenias (Comment. minora): *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 25*, f. 65-83; ed Migne *PL* 64, 293

Maxime universalia...

Bartholomaeus de Brugis, De Subiecto Logices: *Nuremberg Stadt. Cent. V*, 21, f. 54r-58r [Al 1089]

Meludine professionis...

Logica: *London Brit. Mus. (Royal)* 2 D. XXX, after f. 94

Memini me iamdudum magnificentissime pater... Cum necessarium sit Chrisaori et ad Aristotelis...

Porphyrius, De quinque vocibus (Jo. Argyropulo interpr.): *Vaticana Urbin.* 208, f. 3v; *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 23*, f. 1-6 (fragm.); *cod. 24*, f. 1-4

Meta est aliquod inconveniens...

Bradwardine, De fallaciis elenchorum: *Erfurt Fol.* 297, f. 41-43

Motus sum per quosdam...

Joannes Wyclif, Logica: *Vienna NB* 4523, f. 1r-16r; 4536, f. 98r-121v ('De fundatione sectarum')

Motus sum per quosdam legis Dei amicos...

Wyclif, Logica: [Li]

Motus sum per quosdam legis Dei amicos... convertam. Terminus large loquendo...

Joannes Wicleff, Summula logicæ: *Erfurt Qu.* 253, f. 1-24'

- Movetur quæstio ex intentione Aristotelis in secundo Posteriorum  
quid sit medium in demonstratione potissima...
- Augustinus de Meschiatis, Q. de medio demonstrationis: (See  
Aegidus Romanus, De sophisticis elenchis, Ed. Venice 1496/97,  
f. 67)
- Multa Græci veteres posteris suis in consultissimis reliquere trac-  
titibus... quibus priusquam ad res...
- Boethius, De syllogismo categorico: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 346, f.  
36-53; *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 23*, f. 66-85; *Cl. X, cod. 27*,  
f. 1-30; ed. Migne *PL* 64, 793
- Multa requiruntur ad interrogationem propositionis per se notæ...  
De propositione per se nota: *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 674, f. 117v
- Multa sub ambigua versabar iugiter ipse...
- Maritius Massi (?), De suppositione terminorum: *Florence Naz.*  
*Centr. (Panciatich.)* 147
- Multa sunt, mi Petre, quæ faciunt ut omni cura omnique diligentia  
cogitem qua ratione... Dialectica igitur est diligens disserendi  
ratio...
- Georgius Trapezuntius, Dialectica: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod.*  
224, ff. 41; *Vienna NB* 2485
- Multa veteres philosophiæ duces posteriorum studiis contulerunt...  
Boethius, Introductio ad syllogismos categoricos: *Vaticana Vat.*  
*lat.* 1722, f. 33 (XIIth cent.); ed. Migne *PL* 64, 761
- Multa veteris...
- Boethius, In priora anteprædicamenta: *Vienna NB* 2269, f. 92r-  
96v
- Multi multas habuerunt sollicitudines in libris prædicamentorum  
Aristotelis, non solum quod proœmium sit totius philosophiæ...  
Simplicius, Categoriae Aristotelis: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod.*  
20; *cod. 21*
- Multi multis adhibuerunt... Aequivoca dicuntur...
- Simplicius, Super Prædicamenta Aristotelis: *Erfurt Ampl. Fol.*  
34
- Multum quidem inter sapientes...
- Guilelmus Moerbeke, Perihermenias Ammonii (transl.) [Gm  
21 p]

Naturæ sagacitas ex eius...

Aegidius Romanus, Super libros Elenchorum: *Oxford Balliol 119 [Li]*

Neque genus neque species videtur simpliciter dici...

Auctoritates logices: *London Brit. Mus. (Royal) 8 A. XVIII*, f. 4. Compare 'Auctoritates libri Porphyrii...'; 'Incipiunt auctoritates...'; 'Videtur autem nec (neque) genus...'

Nomen est terminus significativus sine tempore...

De Logica: *Paris BN 6637*, f. 89r-v (fragm.) [Al 595]

Nomen est vox significativa...

Thomas Waldensis, Summulæ logicales: [Pits 620]

Nomen libri Perihermenias qui...

Burley, Perihermenias: [Pits 435]

Nota hic magister est oratio subiecti...

(Joannes Aurifaber Erfurtensis), Circa modos significandi grammaticorum: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 276* f. 136-137'

Nota quando dicitur inter agens infinitum et faciens finitum nulla est proportio verum est quando...

Propositiones notabiles: *Paris BN 16130*, f. 72r-76v. See also 'Quando dicitur...'

Nota quod ad augmentationem...

Joannes Chilmarius, De augmentatione: [Pits 547]

Nota quod consequentia dividitur duobus modis, nam quædam est formalis et quædam materialis...

Robertus Fland, Consequentiæ: *Bruges de la ville 497*, f. 41r-43r

Nota quod omne relativum significat quod suum...

Tract. de relatis: *Venice S. Mark Cl. XI, cod. 13*, f. 40-42

Nota quod prædicamentum potest sumi dupliciter uno modo potest sumi per coordinationem...

Quædam logicalia a summa Joannis abstracta: *Oxford Corp. Christi 116*, f. 131-176

Nota quod quæstio prima est quam Porphyrius movet in suo tractatu de universalibus...

Q. de universalibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Fol. 22*, f. 138-139'

Notandum primo est quod obligatio...

Robertus Fland, Obligationes: *Bruges de la ville 497*, f. 44v-46r

Notandum quod cum sunt...

Burley, De duobus principiis: *Worcester Cathedral F. 86*, f. 142

Notandum quod definitio rei potest accipi ex qualibet causarum eius,  
quia id quod res præhabetur...

Q. quid sit medium in demonstratione: *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 829,  
f. 140r

Notandum quod differt aliquid et non idem eodem modo...

De omnibus terminis vim confundendi habentibus: *Erfurt Ampl.*  
*Oct.* 76, f. 72-82'

Notandum quod isti termini differt aliud et non idem eodem modo  
confundunt terminum in propositione...

De dictione differt: *Vaticana Urbin.* 1419, f. 67

Notandum quod omnis propositio ba... ca vel est vera vel falsa, si  
falsa nulla talis est formalis...

Prædicatio formalis: *Basel Univ. A. VI.* 22

Notandum quod unicum difforme...

De intensione formarum: *Rome Angel.* 1017, f. 6b-7b

Nugatio secundum quod utimur hoc nomine in sophismatibus, est  
præfixi enuntiabilis secundum aliquem statum...

Obligationes: *Paris BN* 16617, f. 54v-62v (cf. M. Grabmann,  
*Die Introductiones in logicam d. Wilh. von Shyreswood*, "Sitzungsberichte der Bayer. Akad. der Wissenschaften," Munich  
1937, Heft 10, p. 21). Compare 'Obligatio secundum quod nos...'

Nulla differunt...

Guilelmus Mylverley, De differentia: *Oxford New Coll.* 289  
[Li]

Nulla est affirmatio...

(Ricardus Armachanus?), De universalibus: *Oxford Bodleian*  
(*Digby*) 2; (*Digby*) 24 [Li]

Nulla est affirmatio in qua universale universaliter sumptum prædi-  
catur... Hæc auctoritas communiter glossatur...

Ricardus Sophista, De sophismatibus: *Bruges de la ville* 497,  
f. 74r-95v; *London Brit. Mus. (Royal)* 12 F. XIX, f. 112b  
(anon.); *Oxford Corp. Christi* 293, f. 337-357 (G. Hentisbury?)

Nulla sunt æquivoca quorum...

Joannes Tartays, De æquivocis: [Li]; *Oxford New Coll.* 289,  
f. 192r

Numquid anima est magis rationalis quam homo...

Notabilia logicalia: *Oxford Corp. Christi* 116, f. 61-69

Numquid præter divinum adiutorium...

Petrus Stokes, Conclusiones: [Pits 566]; [Li: 'Simon Stokes']  
Nunc dicendum est de obligationibus. Et primo ponendæ sunt aliquæ  
descriptiones quorundam terminorum...

Albertus de Saxonia, Tract. obligationum: Ed. (Lyons c. 1498)  
[Pell 390]

Nunc dicendum est de prædicamentis et quia prædicamentum dici-  
tur...

Thomas Aquinas, De prædicabilibus: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X,*  
*cod. 185*, f. 6-10

Nunc est dicendum de prædicamento qualitatis...

Thomas Aquinas, De prædicamento qualitatis: *Venice S. Mark*  
*Cl. X, cod. 185*, f. 14-16

Nunc quæritur consequenter circa capitulum de prius; primo quæ-  
ritur utrum aliquid sit prius primo tempore...

Thomas Manlevelt, Qq. de libris Perihermenias: *Erfurt Ampl.*  
*Qu. 288*, f. 140-145

Nunc restat dicendum de aliis sex prædicamentis, quæ sex principia  
dicuntur...

Thomas Aquinas, De sex prædicamentis et eorum prædicatione:  
*Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 185*, f. 18-19

Nunc restat tractare de obligationibus et præponendæ sunt aliquæ  
descriptiones quorundam theorematum...

De obligationibus: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 12*, f. 57-58

O Grisarori. Cum sit necessarium assignare...

See 'Frater Angelus de Camerino... O Grisarori...'

Ob rogatum...

See 'Obrogatum...'

Obligatio est ars mediante qua quis opponens potest ligare...

Bartholus de Cassia, Tract. obligationum: *Rome Angel. 1053*  
(R. 8.7), f. 36b-39

Obligatio est oratio...

See 'Hic incipit obligationes notabiliiores...'

Obligatio est oratio mediante qua...

Ricardus Lavingham, De arte obligatoria: [Pits 535]

Obligatio est quædam ars mediante qua quis obligatus tenetur  
affirmative respondere...

Martinus Anglicus (?), *De obligationibus: Vaticana Urbin.*  
1419, f. 62

Obligatio est quædam ars primo metaphysicæ...

Martinus Anglicus, *De obligatione in arguendo: Vienna NB*  
4698, f. 71r-78v

Obligatio secundum quod nos utimur hoc nomine in sophismatibus  
est præfixio enuntiabilis...

Gualterus Burley, *De obligationibus: Chambéry de la ville* 27,  
f. 270v-271v (anon.) [Al 456]; *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 204,*  
f. 151-240. See also 'Nugatio secundum quod...'

Obligationes secundum quod nos utimur...

Burley, *Obligationes: Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 259*, f. 209-214'; *Paris*  
*BN 16130*, f. 110v-114r

Obligationum alia est institutio nova...

De obligationibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 395*, f. 102'-104

Obrogatum quondam...

Guilelmus Buser, *Obligationes: Oxford Bodleian (Can. Misc.)*  
278 [Li]

Obrogatum quorundam sociorum Deo concurrente...

Albertus de Saxonia (Richmersdorf), *Sophismata: Erfurt Ampl.*  
*Qu. 313*, f. 1-87; ed. Paris 1489 [Pell 392]

Occupationibus quas interrumpere mihi durum est...

Guilelmus Ockham, *Logicæ tract. medius: Munich Clm 4379,*  
f. 189v

Omne coloratum est. *Probatio: aliquid coloratum...*

Guilelmus Hentisberi, *Sophismata: Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 332*, f.  
3-100'

Omne corpus est album...

Notæ de insolubilibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Oct. 76*, f. 5

Omne debitum dimisi tibi quod rogasti me... *Sicut patet ex textu*  
*litteræ Porphyrius...*

Antonius Andreeae, *Logica: Ed. St. Albans 1483* [GW 1673]

Omne imperfectum possibile tamen perfici movetur ad perfectio-  
nem...

Nicolaus Cornubiensis, *Super Porphyrium: Oxford Corp. Christi*  
293, f. 197-207

Omne quod appetitur aut est bonum simpliciter aut bonum appetens.

Bonum autem simpliciter aut est bonum quod finis...

Bonaventura (!), Qq. super IV libros Topicorum: *Rome S. Isidoro 1/10*, f. 81r (ms.: '80')-101v

Omnes homines natura scire...

Joannes Folsham, *Isagoge*: [Pits 460]

Omnes homines natura scire desiderant: scire autem est effectus demonstrationis...

Thomas Aquinas, De quinque universalibus: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 185*, f. 1-6; [Gm dp: 'Pseudo-Thomas']

Omnes homines natura scire desiderant, ut dicit Aristoteles in principio metaphysicæ; sed cum natura vel aliquis appetitus naturalis...

Compilationes supra tract. Petri Hispani: *Paris BN (Nouv. Acquis.) 308* (cf. L. Delisle, *Mss. Latins et Franc. ajoutés aux fonds des nouvelles acquisitions...* *Inventaire Alphabet.*, Paris 1891, p. 479)

Omnes homines naturaliter scire desiderant...

Thomas Aquinas, Summa logicæ: *Vaticana Urbin. 215*, f. 4v; ed. *Venice 1593, XVII*, f. 14v-35v

Omnes homines qui sese moribus et doctrina suppeditare student...

In cuiuslibet scilicet Sermonis principio, ut testatur Plato...

Ambrosius de Cora, Sex Principia G. Porretani: *Rome Angel. 12* (A.2.20)

Omnes logicæ tractatores intendunt astruere quod argumenta ex propositionibus et propositiones ex terminis componuntur...

Guilelmus Ockham, Summa Logicæ: For mss. see EPM; Ff; ed. Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure (New York) 1951 (Pars Prima). See also 'Quam magnos veritatis...'; 'Dudum me frater et amice...'.

Omnes logicæ tractatores... Capitulum istud continet...

Guilelmus Ockham, Summa Logicæ (Abbreviatio): *Vaticana Vat. lat. 674*, f. 122-135, 146, 148-152

Omnes qui ad...

Magister 'F', Logica: *Perugia Comunale 674*

Omnes qui aliquid...

Paulus Pergulensis, Compendium in dialectica facultate: *Forli Communale (Antic. Fondo) 4* (757)

Omnes qui aliquid memoria dignum...

Paulus Pergulensis, Compendium logicæ: Ed. *Venice 1481*, f. 1

**Omnis operans...**

Guilelmus Ockham, (*Super artem veterem expositio aurea*):  
*Assisi* 670, f. 1-25. See also 'Quoniam omne operans...'

**Omnia quidem quæ superioris...** Finito tractatu propositionis conclusionis et argumenti contendit ad tractatum argumentationis...  
 In *topicas differentias Boethii* (L. II): *Ovranches de la ville* 228;  
*Vaticana Regin.* 230.II, f. 76v-79v

**Omnis cognitio nostra vel est sensitiva...**

Gualterus Burley, L. Posteriorum: [Li]

**Omnis didascalia et omnis disciplina deliberativa...**

See 'Vallatum multis occupationibus...'

**Omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina intellectiva fit ex præexistenti cognitione...**

Aristoteles, *Posteriora Analytica*: *Assisi Conv.* 658, f. 256-291; *Charleville Municipale* 39; 250; *Epinal Municipale* 92; *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 20, f. 137-158; *Qu.* 235, f. 62-75; *Qu.* 245, f. 264'-277'; *Qu.* 248, f. 120-142; *Florence Naz. Centr.* II, IV, 553; *Laon Communale* 433; 435; 435 bis; *London Brit. Mus. (Royal)* 12 D. II, f. 171; *Metz Municipale* 269; *St. Omer Municipale* 620; *Toulouse de la ville* 735 (l. 275), f. 194; *Vaticana Urbin.* 1318, f. 122; *Vat. lat.* 10683, f. 179; *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod.* 15, f. 91-124; *cod.* 16, f. 119-138; *cod.* 17, f. 253-294; *cod.* 19, f. 109-126; *cod.* 59, f. 261-293; ed. Migne *PL* 64, 711-762

**Omnis doctrina...**

Joannes Foxalls, *Super libros Posteriorum*: [Ss, III, 74]

**Omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina...**

Joannes Baconsthorpe, *Posteriora*: [Pits 454]

**Omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina...**

Magister Petrus (Hispanus?), *Excerpta ex libris Posteriorum*:  
*Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 271, f. 124-126

**Omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina...** a qua Aristoteles tripliciter (?) ostendit per inductionem...

Comment. in *Posteriora Aristotelis*: *London Brit. Mus. (Royal)* 12 E. VI, f. 54

**Omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina...** Circa librum Posteriorum quæritur...

Simon Anglicus (Faversham), Qq. libri Posteriorum: *Milan Ambros.* C. 161. Inf.. f. 99-112 (cf. C. Ottaviano, *Le "Quæstiones*

*super 1. Prædicamentorum...”, Classe di Scienze Morali Stor. e Filologiche, R. Accad. Naz. dei Lincei, Rome 1930, p. 258)*

Omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina... Circa quod est intendendum quod omnis cognitio...

G. Burley, Super I Posteriorum: *Oxford Bodleian (Rawl.) C. 677 [Li]*

Omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina... Hic est liber posteriorum in quo secundum Lincolniensem...

Posteriora Aristotelis cum glossa: *Erfurt Ampl. Fol. 333, f. 1r-109r*

Omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina... In isto libro posteriorum traditur ars sciendi instrumenta...

Joannes Buridan, Qq. super libris Posteriorum: *Vaticana Urbin. 1489, f. 119*

Omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina... Intentio Aristotelis...

See ‘Intentio Aristotelis in hoc libro...’

Omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina... Iste est liber posteriorum analyticorum cuius sunt... Quæritur quid est subiectum istius...

Qq. Posteriorum: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 244, f. 72-196*

Omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina... Iste liber est posteriorum Aristotelis in quo determinat de syllogismo...

Comment. in libros Posteriorum: *Bologna Comunale dell’ Archig. A. 26*

Omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina... Liber iste dividitur in duas partes...

(Gualterus) Burley, Posteriora: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 312, f. 29'-32'*

Omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina... Pro introductione expositionis huius libri posteriorum sub brevitate videnda sunt...

Apollinaris Offredus, L. I Posteriorum: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X. cod. 52, f. 1-51; ed. Venice 1493*

Omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina... Secundum modum communem exponendi huic libro sive huic operi non præmittitur prooemium...

Aegidius Romanus, L. I Posteriorum: *Vaticana Vat. lat. 823, f. 91; 824, f. 4r; 825, f. 2v. See ‘Venerabili ex anglorum...’*

Omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina... Secundum Philosophum in moralibus in quibuscumque actibus...

Burley (?), Posteriora Analytica: *London Brit. Mus. (Royal)*

12 B. XIX, f. 244. See also 'Secundum Philosophum in moralibus...'

Omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina... Secundum Ptolomaeum in primo Almagesti non in probabilibus et opinionibus debet homo implere animam suam...

Joannes Anglicus, *Posteriora*: Ed. Venice 1509, f. 1r

Omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina... Sicut ait Aristoteles primo et decimo ethicorum...

Petrus de Alvernio (?), *Qq. super Libros Posteriorum*: *Florence Laurenz. pl. 17, sin. cod. 3*, f. 28 [Gm 210 ac: Addenda]

Omnis doctrina omnisque disciplina intellectiva...

See 'Si nihil esset aliud...'; 'Ut tibi semel promisi ita facio...'

Omnis homo est homo. Circa primum principale...

In sophismata Guilelmus Heytesbury: *Oxford Bodleian (Can. Misc.) 137* [Li]

Omnis homo est omnis homo. Hoc sophisma patet sic: iste homo est iste homo et iste homo est iste homo...

Guilelmus Hentisberus, Sex sophismata: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 200*, f. 54-79

Omnis homo est omnis homo...

Ricardus Billingham, *Abstractiones*: [Li]

Omnis homo est omnis homo...

Guilelmus Hentisbery, Sophismata: *Cambridge Peterhouse 102*

Omnis homo est omnis homo... Circa primum principale advertendum quod Hentisber...

Caietanus de Thienis, *Super sophismata Hentisberi*: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 220*, f. 150-180 (but see ed. Hentisbury Sophismata, Venice 1494, f. 171r-183v: Simon de Lendenaria)

Omnis homo est omnis homo... Circa primum principale est difficultas quis est modus generalis...

Paulus Pergulensis, *Super Sophismata Hentisberi*: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 220*, f. 181-198

Omnis homo est omnis homo... Circa primum principale huius primi sophismatis: omnis homo est omnis homo, est advertendum quod Hentisber...

Simeon de Lendenaria, *Super septem sophismatibus Hentisberi*: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 220*, f. 199-224. See 'Omnis homo... Circa primum principale advertendum...'

- Omnis homo est omnis homo probatur iste homo est iste homo...  
Guilelmus Hentisbury, Sophismata: Ed. Venice 1494. See 'Omnis homo... Hoc sophisma patet...'.
- Omnis homo est omnis homo. Probatur quod iste...  
(Thomas Wallensis *sive* Hervaeus?), In Aristotelis Logic.: Oxford Bodleian (Can. Lat.) 311 [Li]
- Omnis homo est risibilis hoc est sophisticum propositum... Circa quod quærebatur utrum definitio subiecti... sit medium in demonstratione...  
Sophisma: *Vaticana Palat.* 1202, f. 245-250
- Omnis numerus præter binarium...  
(G. Heytesbury *sive* Rodulphus Strodes?), Sophismata: Oxford Oriel 33 [Li]
- Omnis propositio...  
(De consequentiis?): *Worcester Cathedral* F. 116, f. 51
- Omnis propositio affirmativa...  
Ricardus Lavingham, De regulis consequentiarum: [Pits 535]
- Omnis propositio est vera vel falsa...  
Guilelmus Heytesbury: [Li]; ed. Venice 1494: 'De veritate et falsitate propositionis'
- Omnis propositio vel eius contradictoria est vera. Circa primum principale huius sophismatis...  
Simeon de Lendenaria, Super Sophismata Esbari (Hentisbury): *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 221*, f. 107-108
- Omnis qui aliquid memoria dignum suis posteris relinquunt; aut rerum magnitudine aut ipsorum dispositione...  
Paulus de Pergula, Compendium logicæ: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 211*, f. 1-59. See also 'Omnes qui ad...'; 'Omnes qui ali-quid...'
- Omnis ratio disserendi quam logiken Peripatetici veteres appellavere, in duas distribuitur partes...  
Boethius, De Differentiis Topicis: *Assisi Conv.* 664, f. 78-113; *Avranches de la ville* 228; *Charleville Municipale* 250; *Erfurt Ampl. Fol. 39*, f. 54'-86; *Qu. 20*, f. 32-50'; *Qu. 340*, f. 47-76'; *Laon Communale* 433; *Rome Boncompagni* 360, f. 117-134; *Toulouse de la ville* 735 (I, 275), f. 41; *Troyes Municipales* 1457; *Utrecht Univ.* 816 (Gr. 26), f. 153a-175a (XII-XIIIth Cent.); *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 1722, f. 8 (Libri I-III) (XIIth

Cent.); *Vat. lat.* 10683, f. 69; *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod.* 23,

f. 43-66; *cod.* 27, f. 94-118; ed. Migne *PL* 64, 1173-1216

Omnis ratio... Priusquam B(oethius) ad propositam materiam...

See 'Intentio Boethii est...'

Omnis ratio... Quoniam multæ quæ in hoc libro ponuntur...

Notulæ super libris Topicorum Aristotelis: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 235, f. 35'-39'

Omnis scientia aut est de complexis...

Hervaeus Natalis (?), Super librum Divisionum Boethii: *Paris Arsenal* 530, f. 28v-32v [Gm 64 al]

Omnis scientia et doctrina intellectiva quæ per discursum acquisit...

Posteriora (paraphrasis Panormitana): *Breslau Univ. IV.Q.55*, f. 307r-340v [Al 1120]

Oportet enim ad hanc scientiam esse boni ingenii ut possit Deus eligere...

Jacobus de Placentia, Perihermenias: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod.* 31, f. 58-71

Oratio est vox significativa ad pluralitatem...

Joannes Buridan, Logica: *Erfurt Ampl. Oct.* 305

Oratio est vox significativa...

Logica: *Metz Municipale* 643

Ostensa in parte...

Paulus Venetus, Logica (?): *Perugia Communale* 580

Partium orationis quædam sunt declinabiles...

Robertus Lincolnensis, Syncategoremata: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 328, f. 74-93 (but see S. Thomson, *The Writings of R. Grosseteste*, Cambridge 1940, p. 266: 'Robertus Kilwardby'); *Oxford Bodleian (Digby)* 204 [Li: 'Rogerus Bacon'; Gm 312 ao: Pseudo-R. B.]

Parvorum precibus puerorum iuvenumque non nimis in scientia perfectorum rogatus instantiis... Quantum ad primum sciendum... (Marsilius de Inghen), Compendium Prædicamentorum, Perihem., Isagog. ad modum Parisiensem: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 273, f. 50'-58; *Qu.* 284, f. 1-13'. Compare 'Incipiens et consequenter...'

Paucitas instructionis in logica est magnum impedimentum in co-

gnitione veritatis. Hanc propositionem scribit Commentator... Albertus de Saxonia, De consequentiis: *Paris BN 14715*, f. 59v-78r

Paucitas instructionis in logica... Incipit tractatus Petri de Hispania... Dialectica. Circa istum textum unus obiiceret...

Qq. de dialectica Petri Hispani: *Erfurt Ampl Qu.* 252, f. 45-90'

Penes tractationem terminorum...

Adam Pountney, Logica: [Li]

Per istas fallacias possunt convenire theologi...

Raimundus Lull, De Fallaciis: For mss. see Ss, III, 16

Personalis suppositio est acceptio termini communis...

De Restrictionibus: *Erfurt Qu.* 283, f. 205-211

Personalis suppositio est acceptio termini communis... Iste est tertius tractatus parvorum logicalium in quo determinatur de quadam alia passione termini quæ ampliatio dicitur...

Joannes de Monte, De ampliatione (Expos. Logicæ Petri H.): Ed. Venice 1500

Personalis suppositio est acceptio... Iste est tertius tractatus parvorum logicalium Petri Hispani...

Joannes de Magistris, De ampliatione (Summularum Petri H. glossulæ): Ed. Venice 1490

Personalis suppositio est acceptio... Quia ampliatio et restrictio opponuntur...

Nicolaus de Orbello, De ampliationibus (Summ. log. Petri Hispani): Ed. Venice 1489

... pertinet propositum de negatione...

Joannes Pagus, Syncategoremata: *Paris BN 15170*, f. 46-48b [Gm 147 b]

Pertractandum venit de causalibus...

Wyclif, De causalibus (Tr. III de Logica): [Li]

Philosophia dupliciter dicitur, secundum nomen et secundum rem... (Adnotationes in Logicam): *London Lambeth Pal.* 456, f. 107r-126v [Al 289]

Philosophus in primo topicorum...

See 'Frater Angelus de Camerino... Antiquus appetitus...'

Philosophus in tertio de anima volens ostendere modum...

See 'Venerabili ex anglorum...'

Philosophus, tertio de anima, tradens modum cognoscendi...

Guilelmus de S. Amore, Prosteriora: *Barcelona de la Corona (Ripoll)* 109, f. 229-253 [Gm 160 b]

Plato scribit in *Thimæo* quod inter...

Super sex Principia: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 266, f. 39-46

Plurimorum scribentium grati laboris dignique memoria particeps ad mensuram meæ facultatis... Incipiendum est a primis cum minimus error in principio...

Joannes Dumbleton, Summa logicæ et philosophiæ naturalis: *Cambridge Gonv. and Caius* 499; *Peterhouse* 272; *London Lambeth Palace* 79; *Oxford Magd.* 32, f. 1-292; *Magd.* 195; *Paris BN* 16146; *Univ.* 599; *Prague, Capit. Metropol.* 1291; *Vaticana Palat.* 1056; *Vat. lat.* 6750, f. 1r-202r; *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod.* 201; *Worcester Cathedral F.* 6; *F.* 23, f. 91 (incomplete). See also 'Incipiendum est a primis...'; 'Post logicalia naturalia aggredientes...'

Porro materia alterationis...

Joannes Chilmark, De alteratione: [Li]. See also 'Pro materia alterionis...'

Positio est ordo seu ordinatio partium in loco...

Thomas Aquinas, De prædicamento situs (Cap. III): *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod.* 185, f. 22-23

Positio est præfatio alicuius...

Ricardus Billingham, Obligationes: [Pits 489]

Positum quid negotii...

Aristoteles, Topica: *St. Omer Municipale* 620. See also 'Propositorum quidem negotii...'

Post categorias ad categoricas propositiones ordine congruo et naturali Aristoteles transit...

De Interpretatione: *Oxford Corp. Christi* 233, f. 129b-154

Post logicalia naturalia aggredientes dubia præposita...

Joannes Dumbleton, Summa logicæ (Pars II): *Oxford Merton* 306, f. 17v; *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 954, f. 1r-18v. See also 'Plurimorum scribentium...'; 'Incipiendum est a primis...'

Post prædendentem summam editam a fratre W(ilhelmi) compilavit Burley alium... Suppositis significatis terminorum... Suppositio communiter dicta est proprietas termini...

(Joannes N. de Dacia?), Excerpta ex logica Burley: *Erfurt Ampl. Oct.* 67, f. 123'-134'

Post tractatum de suppositionibus consequenter est dicendum de ampliatione quæ est passio suppositionis...

Henricus de Udem, De ampliationibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 255, f. 65-67

Post tractatum substantiæ et reliqua de qualitate agere ingreditur.

Cur autem post relationis prædicamentum...

Boethius, De qualitate, etc. (In Categorias Aristotelis, L. III): *Vaticana Regin.* 230.II, f. 60v-65v; ed. Migne *PL* 64, 239

Postquam determinatum est de suppositionibus, ampliationibus, apelationibus, tunc restat...

Marsilius de Inghen, De restrictionibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 277, f. 24-25'

Postquam dicta sunt aliqua de terminis nunc dicendum est...

Guilelmus Ockham, Summa Logicæ (Pars II): *Paris BN* 6430, f. 31v-44v; 6431, f. 21v; 6432, f. 18r; *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 947, f. 37r; ed. Venice 1508, f. 29v

Postquam dictum est breviter de propositionibus quæ componuntur... nunc de suppositione quæ non competit...

Thomas Malveld (Manlevet), Suppositiones: *Venice NB* 4698, f. 28v-32r

Postquam dictum est de consequentiis nunc dicendum est de argumentationibus...

Albertus de Saxonia, Logica: *Paris BN* 14715, f. 44v-59v

Postquam dictum est de syllogismo communi sequitur nunc tractare de speciebus syllogismi...

Guilelmus Ockham, Summa Logicæ (Pars III, pars 2): *Paris BN* 6430, f. 65; 6431, f. 48r; 6432, f. 18r; *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 947, f. 80r; ed. Venice 1508, f. 63v

Postquam dictum est de terminis dicendum est de propositionibus...

Guilelmus Ockham, Summa logicæ (Pars II): *Paris BN* 15904, f. 211v (ms: "210")

Postquam Philosophus...

Guilelmus Ockham, L. Perihermenias: [Li]

Postquam Philosophus in primo libro determinavit de syllogismo demonstrativo...

- See 'Quæstiones sunt æquales... Postquam Philosophus...' Postquam Philosophus in primo libro docuit... Aegidius Romanus, L. II Elenchorum: *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 823, f. 54 (?)
- Postquam visum est de his... De privatione: *Vienna NB* 4698, f. 165b-170a
- Potest quæri de difficultatibus accidentibus... Rogerus Bacon, Summa de sophismatibus: *Oxford Bodleian Digby* 67, f. 117-124v (fragm.) [Gm 312 d]. Compare 'De difficilibus accidentibus...'
- Prædicabile quandoque sumitur proprie... Petrus Hispanus, De prædicabilibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 283, f. 58'-88'
- Prædicabile... Hic auctor incipit agere de prædicabilibus sive universalibus. Ad cuius evidentiam dividit ipsum...
- Nicolaus de Orbellis, De prædicabilibus (Logica brevis): Ed. Parma 1482
- Prædicabile... Iste est secundus tractatus huius libri in quo determinatur de universali sub ratione universalitatis...
- Joannes de Monte, Super Summulas Petri H. (Tract. II): Ed. Venice 1500
- Præsentem aggrediendo replicationis materiam in tres partes... Wyclif, Replicatio de universalibus: [Li]
- Præsentis operis intentio est pro novellis ac novis rudibus theologicis aliqua præambula... Tract. logicæ: *London Brit. Mus. (Royal)* 10 C. V1; *Oxford Bodleian (Rawl.)* C 269; *Magd.* 99, f. 170b 176 [Li]
- Prætermissa divisione grammaticæ et rethorice... Circa principium huius libri sunt quædam quæstiones... Thomas Aquinas (?), Super librum Porphyrii: *Vaticana Urbin.* 24, f. 165
- Prima oportet dicere... See 'Primum oportet dicere...'
- Prima quæstio utrum definitio data de propositione hypothetica... Blasius de Pelacanibus de Parma, Qq. novem de hypotheticis: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 208*, f. 25-43
- Primo de substantivo utrum locus...

Radulphus de Hotot, Qq. circa Topica: *Brussels Royale* 3540-47, f. 163 [Gm 225 h]

Primo ponitur talis causa quo heri vidimus...

Guilelmus Hentisberus, Causæ obligatorii: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 200*, f. 96

Primo quæritur hic cum cui libet divisioni correspondent...

Joannes Scotus (?), Qq. super librum Divisionum Boethii: *Oxford Magd.* 38, f. 16-16b [Gm 344 av]

Primo quæritur utrum demonstratio sit subiectum...

L. I Posteriorum: *Oxford Bodleian (Can. Misc.)* 181 [Li]

Primo quæritur utrum demonstratio sit subiectum libri posteriorum.

Primo sic: de demonstratione non habetur scientia...

Apollinaris Offredus, Qq. super I Posteriorum: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 52*, f. 51-120; ed. *Venice* 1493

Primum autem...

See 'Primum oportet dicere...'

Primum considerandum est qualis scientia est logica...

Albertus Magnus, Logica: *Oxford Merton* 253

Primum debet dicere circa quod et de quo est intentio...

Boethius de Dacia, Super Priora: *Bruges de la ville* 509, f. 31r-58v. See also 'Primum oportet dicere...'

Primum dicendum circa quid et de quo est intentio quoniam circa demonstrationem et de disciplina demonstrativa est...

Boethius, L. Priorum Aristotelis: *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 10683, f. 123. See also 'Primum oportet dicere...'

Primum mihi dicere...

See 'Primum oportet dicere...'

Primum omnium constituere...

See 'Primum oportet constituere...'

Primum oportet constituere quid est nomen et quid verbum, postea quid est negatio et affirmatio...

Aristoteles, Perihermenias (a Boethio transl.): *Assisi Conv.* 664, f. 52-64; *Avranches de la ville* 228; *Barboursville (West Virginia)* Owens I, f. 18r-27r; *Charleville Municipale* 39; 250; *Erfurt Ampl.* Fol. 39, f. 33'-42'; *Qu.* 20, f. 15'-20'; *Qu.* 267, f. 17-23'; *Qu.* 271, f. 115'-123'; *Qu.* 340, f. 22'-31; *Laon Communale* 433; *Metz Municipale* 151; 508; *Oxford Balliol* 291; *Toulouse de la ville* 735, f. 16; *Troyes Municipale* 1456; 1457;

*Utrecht Univ.* 816, f. 128b-138; *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 10683, f. 33;  
*Urbin.* 208, f. 31; *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod.* 15, f. 23-31;  
*cod.* 16, f. 17-22; *cod.* 17, f. 43-55; *cod.* 19, f. 22-27; *cod.* 23,  
f. 21-30; *cod.* 24, f. 9-12; *cod.* 24, f. 51-108; ed. *Venice* 1503,  
f. 35-51

Primum oportet...

Glossa super Perihermenias Aristotelis: *Assisi Conv.* 658, f. 31-  
92

Primum oportet constituere...

Gerardus de Harderwijck, Perihermenias: Ed. Cologne 1494  
[Pell 5063]

Primum oportet constituere... Circa istum librum nota quod in-  
terpretatio...

Comment. in Perihermenias: *Munich Clm* 9676, p. 11-32 [Al  
1043]

Primum oportet constituere... Circa subiectum huius libri notan-  
dum quod Boethius ponit illud esse interpretationem...

Joannes Scotus, Perihermenias: *Oxford Magd.* 162, f. 166;  
*Rome S. Isidoro,* 1/14, f. 156r-163r; *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 870,  
f. 40r-47v; *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod.* 28, f. 94-128; ed. Lyons  
1639, I, pp. 186-203

Primum oportet constituere... Cum cognitio syllogismi sit finis lo-  
gicæ...

Gualterus Burley, Perihermenias: *London Brit. Mus. (Royal)*  
12 F. XIX, f. 14

Primum oportet constituere... Ea quæ sunt in voce...

Notulæ super sex Principiorum: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 235, f. 26-29

Primum oportet constituere... Inter libros totius logicæ...

Thomas Aquinas, Perihermenias: *Erfurt Ampl. Fol.* 135, f. 125-  
129

Primum oportet constituere... Iste est liber perihermenias...

Marsilius de Inghen, Comment. s. librum Perihermenias: *Erfurt*  
*Ampl. Fol.* 306, f. 16-27'

Primum oportet constituere... Iste liber habet duas partes...

See 'Frater Angelus de Camerino... Primum omnium...'

Primum oportet constituere... Iste liber perihermenias quem ad  
præsens intendimus exponere breviter...

Gualterus Burley, *Perihermenias*: *Rome Angel.* 1498, f. 94-119;  
ed. Venice 1488, f. 59r

Primum oportet constituere... Liber perihermenias quem ad præ-sens...

Gualterus Burley, *Perihermenias*: *Oxford Magd.* 146 [Li]

Primum oportet constituere... Postquam Philosophus in libro præ-dicamentorum...

Guilelmus Ockham, *Perihermenias*: *Bruges de la ville* 499, f. 47r-60v; *Oxford Bodleian (Can. Misc.)* 558; *Paris BN* 6431, f. 108r-119v (incomplete)

Primum oportet constituere... Quæritur. Utrum in hoc libro...

See 'Ante initium libri perihermenias...'

Primum oportet constituere... Quia supponitur quod iste liber peri-hermenias...

Petrus de Alvernia, *Super Perihermenias*: *Florence Laurenz.* XII, *sin. cod.* 3; *Paris BN* 16170, f. 99c-113a [Gm 210 c2]

Primum oportet constituere... Quid debeat dici subiectum...

De Interpretatione: *Oxford Merton* 296, f. 24-40

Primum oportet constituere... Quid sit subiectum libri perihermenias.  
Circa subiectum...

See 'Primum oportet constituere... Circa subiectum...'

Primum oportet constituere... Sicut dicit Philosophus in tertio de anima, triplex est operatio intellectus...

Gerardus Nogent (?), *De interpretatione*: *Paris BN* 14984 [Hn IV, 254]

Primum oportet dicere circa quid et de quo est intentio, quoniam circa demonstrationem et de disciplina demonstrativa...

Aristoteles, *Libri I, II Priora Analytica*: *Assisi Conv.* 286; 658, f. 203-255; *Brussels Royale* 370, f. 34v-35v (Cap. I-IV only); *Charleville Municipale* 39; 250; 269; *Epinal Municipale* 92; *Erfurt Ampl.* Fol. 22, f. 70'; Fol. 39, f. 179'; *Qu.* 20, f. 106-136'; *Qu.* 248, f. 98-119; *Laon Communale* 433; 435; 435 bis; *London Brit. Mus. (Royal) 12 D. II*, f. 113; *Metz Municipale* 269; *Paris BN* 6393, f. 92v-142r [Al p. 121;] *St. Omer Municipale* 620; *Toulouse de la ville* 735 (I, 275) f. 142; *Vaticana Urbin.* 208, f. 44; *Urbin* 1318, f. 81; *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 15*, f. 40-91; *cod. 15*, f. 89-118; *cod. 17*, f. 56-124; *cod. 18*, f. 97-158;

*cod.* 19, f. 65-96; *cod.* 24, f. 13-18; *cod.* 59, f. 208-261; *ed.*  
Migne *PL* 64, 639

Primum oportet dicere...

Simon Anglicus, *Qq. super 1. Priorum*: *Vienna NB* 2302, f. 9r-15v

Primum oportet dicere... Iste liber qui est de syllogismo simpliciter  
primo dividitur in duas partes...

Aegidius Romanus, *Priora Analytica*: Ed. Venice 1499

Primum oportet dicere... *Propositio* est...

Notulæ super libris *Priorum*: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 235, f. 75'-87

Primum quidem oportet constituere...

Joannes Baconsthorpe, *Priora*: [Li]

Primum quidem oportet dicere... Circa librum priorum...

Petrus de Alvernia, *Qq. super Priora*: *Florence Laurenz. pl.* 17,  
*sin. cod.* 3, f. 50 [Gm 210 ae: *Addenda*]

Primum quod constituam...

Super *Perihermenias*: *Assisi Conv.* 670, f. 26-34

Primus passus est quod quinque sunt prædicabilia...

Franciscus de Mayron, *Passus super Universalia*: Ed. Venice  
1489

Principium propositi de quo et ad quid...

Adam, *De arte dialectica*: *Paris BN* 14700, f. 246r-272r [Al  
544]

Principium propositi de quo et ad quid...

Alexander, *Dialectica*: *Paris BN* 16581, f. 163r-226r [Al 691]

Pro expositionibus quarundam propositionum...

Natalis de Venetiis, *Propositiones*: *New York Columbia  
(Plimpton)* 199, f. 9r-13v

Pro fundatione ampliationis verbi...

De ampliatione verbi 'est': *Oxford Magd.* 92, f. 81-83

Pro iuvenum informatione...

De reduplicativis: *Oxford Magd.* 38, f. 14

Pro materia de modis et primo...

Joannes Chilmark: [Li]

Pro materia propositionis ne æquivocatio...

- Joannes Chilmark: [Li]

Pro modalibus ad cognoscendum eorum æquipollentias...

*Oxford Magd.* 38, f. 5-7 [Li]

Pro notitia universalium in libro...

Joannes Bate, Super Universalia Porphyrii: [Pits 614]. Compare 'Pro universalium notitia...'

Pro sensu composito et diviso est sciendum et (?) primo de compositione est notandum quod numquam est propositio...

Ricardus de Billingham, De sensu composito et diviso: *Paris BN 14715*, f. 79r-82r

Pro solutione insolubilium Heydisbry et aliorum, si qui sunt, capio...

Joannes de Constantia (?), Insolubilium Hesbri obiectiones: *Erfurt Ampl. Fol. 345*, f. 65'-66'

Pro superficiali notitia quinque universalium...

Guilelmus Mylverley, De quinque universalibus: *London Brit. Mus. (Harley) 2178*, f. 7; (*Royal*) 12 B. XIX, f. 14; *Oxford Corp. Christi 103*, f. 32b; *Magd.* 47, f. 34; 162, f. 1-6; *New Coll.* 289, f. 58-62; *Oriel 35*, f. 1b-5; *Worcester Cathedral Q. 54*, f. 3

Pro universalium notitia...

Universalia: *Oxford Corp. Christi 103*, f. 1-10; *Magd.* 146, f. 47v. Compare 'Pro notitia universalium...'

Problema correspondens libello Porphyrii... Utrum universalia ad aliquem sensum sint de numero...

Joannes Tarteys, Problemata in Porphyrium: *London Brit. Mus. (Royal) 12 B. XIX*, f. 197b; *Oxford Magd.* 47, f. 2; 92, f. 171-195

Problema est hoc, utrum demonstratio sit syllogismus...

M. R., Problemata super Posteriora: *Oxford Magd.* 47, f. 86-105

Propositum quid negotii...

See 'Propositum quidem negotii...'

Propositio est omnino affirmativa...

Natalis de Venetiis, Tract. syllogismorum: *New York Columbia (Plimpton) 199*, f. 32r-37r

Propositio est oratio...

Logica: *Vienna NB 2819*, f. 1r-v (fragm.)

Propositio est oratio affirmativa...

Petrus Hispanus, De syllogismis: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 283, f. 137-154; *Vaticana Chigi E.V.148*, f. 8v [Bs]

Propositio est oratio affirmativa... Iste est quartus tractatus huius

libri correspondens libris priorum Aristotelis in quo determinatur de syllogismo simpliciter...

Joannes de Monte, *Super summulas Petri Hispani* (Tr. IV): Ed. Venice 1500

Propositio est oratio affirmativa... Iste est quartus tractatus summarum magistri Petri Hispani...

Joannes de Magistris, *De syllogismo (Summularum P. H. glossulæ)*: Ed. Venice 1490

Propositio est oratio affirmativa... Postquam in præcedentibus auctor tractavit de partibus syllogismi hic consequenter tractat de ipso syllogismo...

Nicolaus de Orbello, *Syllogismi (Super textum Petri H.)*: Ed. Venice 1489

Propositio est oratio. Finita est vetus ars. Nunc aggreditur... Nova logica: *Wurzburg Minorit. I.51*, f. 87r-91r [AFH 207]

Propositio est oratio vere vel false...

De propositionibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 245, f. 1-32

Propositio est oratio vere vel false significans indicando...

De propositione, suppositione, termino, etc.: *Vaticana Vat. lat. 10044*, f. 13

Propositio est oratio vere vel false significans indicando ut homo currit...

Parvulus logicæ: Ed. (Nuremberg c. 1497) [H 12431]

Propositio et signum... Quia materia fundatur positiva...

De propositionibus: *Oxford Magd.* 92, f. 116

Propositio exponibilis est propositio habens obscurum sensum...

Nicolaus de Orbello, *De exponibilibus (Super textum Petri Hispani)*: Ed. Venice 1489

Propositio exponibilis... Iste est septimus tractatus parvorum logicalium magistri Petri Hispani qui postquam...

Joannes de Magistris, *De exponibilibus (Summularum P. H. glossulæ)*: Ed. Venice 1490

Propositio exponibilis... Iste est septimus tractatus parvorum logicalium intitulatus tractatus de exponibilibus sic dictus ab expositione...

Joannes de Monte, *Super logicam Petri H. (Tr. VII)*: Ed. Venice 1500

Propositionum alia categoria; quæritur utrum divisio propositionis...

Qq. de prædicamentis Petri Hispani: *Erfurt Ampl.* Qu. 47, f. 91-109

Propositum præsentis negotii est de quibusdam complexis et incomplexis aliquid breviter et summatim...

Logica: *London Brit. Mus.* 15 B. IV, f. 70

Propositum quidem... <sup>¶</sup>

Jacobus de Placentia, Topica: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod.* 31, f. 75-79

Propositum quidem negotii est methodum invenire a qua poterimus de omni problemate syllogizare ex probabilitibus et ipsi disputationes sustinentes nihil dicemus repugnans...

Aristoteles, Topica: *Assisi Conv.* 658, f. 100-177; *Charleville Municipale* 250; *Epinal Municipale* 92; *Erfurt Ampl.* Fol. 22, f. 1-52; Fol. 39, f. 87-156; Qu. 20, f. 51-91'; Qu. 235, f. 40-61'; Qu. 248, f. 17-97; Qu. 274, ff. 48; *Laon Communale* 433; 435; 435 bis; 435 ter; *London Brit. Mus. (Royal)* 12 D. II, f. 25; *Metz Municipale* 151; 269; *Oxford Merton* 295; *Paris BN* 6294, f. 37r-138v [Al p. 119]; *Toulouse de la ville* 735 (I. 275), f. 93; *Utrecht Univ.* 825 (Eccl. 506); *Vaticana Urbin.* 1318, f. 1; *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod.* 15, f. 124-189; cod. 16, f. 29-74; cod. 17, f. 125-224; cod. 18, f. 33-80; cod. 19, f. 27-64; *Worcester Cathedral F.* 119, f. 1-73

Propositum quidem negotii...

Jacobus de Venetiis (?), L. Topicorum I-VIII: *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 10683, f. 256

Propositum quidem negotii...

Joannes Baconsthorpe, Topica: *Oxford Merton* 295 [Li]

Propositum quidem negotii...

See also 'Positum quid negotii...'

Propositum quidem negotii... Aristoteles intendens dare artem...

See 'Ut de dicendis...'

Propositum tamen est prædicamentorum...

Logica: *Paris BN* 544 (XIIth cent.)

Propter brevitatem temporis... Omnis homo est omnis homo. Difficultas...

Sophismata antiqua: *Erfurt Ampl.* Qu. 276, f. 1-4

Propter obscuritatem perplexitatem ac opinionum varietatem de natura propositionis per se nota...

De propositione per se nota: *Rome Angel.* 563 (F.3.15), f. 49-81

Propter universalem scientiarum traditionem...

Galfredus Hardeby, L. determinationum: [Pits 491]

Prout vult Aristoteles in quinto...

Lucas Bosden, Sex principia Porretani: [Pits 439]

Pythagoras ille quandam a quo prætantissimus moribus...

See 'Antiqua docti quid tum...'

Quæ sit auctoris intentio in hoc opere...

Notæ super Priora: *Worcester Cathedral Q.* 58

... quæ quattuor habet partes principales. prima quæ considerat de argumentatione...

Priora et Posteriora: *Erfurt Ampl.* Qu. 273, f. 25-50. Compare 'Accedo ad novam quæ...'

... quæ quattuor partes principales continet primaque considerat...

Compendium Priorum, Posteriorum, Elenchorum: *Erfurt Ampl.* Fol. 337a, f. 1'-39. Compare 'Accedo ad novam quæ...'

Quædam affirmatio...

Raimundus (Lull), Fallacia: [Li]

Quælibet ars habet sua organa quibus exercet suas operationes, et hoc maxime notatur in artibus...

Comment. de modis significandis Martini de Dacia: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 188*

Quæratur quæ sit causa susceptionis magis et minus...

Excerptum determinationis Britonis: *Nuremberg, Stadt. Cent. V*, 21, f. 124v-125r [Al 1089]

Quæritur an...

See also 'An...'

Quæritur an hæc sit concedenda...

Logica: *Vienna NB* 2459, f. 101r-114v

Quæritur an nomen significat rem an passionem in anima...

See 'Sicut dicit Phil. in tertio de anima triplex est...'

Quæritur circa initium logicalium: hic est titulus...

Arnoldus Werndach, De suppositionibus: *Erfurt Ampl.* Qu. 282, f. 131'-160

Quæritur circa initium Porphyrii utrum necesse sit aliquem scire...

Thomas Manlevelt, Qq. super Isagogis Porphyrii: *Erfurt Ampl.* Qu. 288, f. 1-43'

Quæritur circa librum perihermenias utrum subiectum primum...  
Joannes Buridan, Qq. libri Perihermenias: *Erfurt Ampl.* Qu. 246, f. 140-164

Quæritur circa librum Prædicamentorum utrum sit de decem vocibus decem genera rerum significantibus...

Joannes Duns Scotus, Qq. super Prædicamenta: *Oxford Bodleian (Rawl.) D 235 [Li]; Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 28,* f. 34-93 ed. Venice 1492, f. 14r

Quæritur circa librum priorum Aristoteles utrum de syllogismo simpliciter sit scientia...

Qq. super libris Priorum: *Erfurt Ampl.* Qu. 311, f. 138-180'

Quæritur circa librum priorum primo utrum de syllogismo simpliciter sit scientia...

Joannes Duns Scotus, Qq. Priorum (L. I): Ed. Venice 1520, f. 2r

Quæritur circa librum (topicorum)...

In libros Topicorum: *Vienna NB 2319,* f. 55r-72r

Quæritur circa partem...

Simon Anglicus (?), De universalibus: *Vienna NB 2302,* f. 16r-26r

Quæritur circa Porphyrium et primo in generali utrum logica sit...

Hugo Traiectensis, Qq. de logica Porphyrii, Prædicamenta Aristotelis: *Erfurt Ampl. Fol. 336,* f. 1-28

Quæritur circa secundum librum an verbum infinitum maneat infinitum in oratione...

Joannes Duns Scotus, Qq. super librum Perihermenias: *Rome S. Isidoro 1/14,* f. 167v-170r; *Vaticana Vat. lat. 870,* f. 52v; ed. Venice 1508, f. 37v

Quæritur circa signatum generis, scilicet utrum genus signat unam naturam vel plures...

Bartholomaeus de Brugis, Sophisma: *Bruges de la ville 510,* f. 223v-226r

Quæritur circa tractatus et primo in generali utrum logica sit...

Qq. de tractatibus Petri Hispani: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 251*

Quæritur circa tractatum proportionum Pravardini (Bradwardini)...  
Blasius de Parma: *Oxford Bodleian (Can. Misc.) 177 [Li]*

- Quæritur communiter circa librum sex principiorum et primo...  
 Radulphus de Hotot, Qq. super Sex Principia: *Brussels (Royale)*  
 3540-47, f. 134; *Padua Anton. scaff. XX*, n. 457 [Gm 225 d]
- Quæritur consequenter quid sit subiectum in logica...  
*Vaticana Palat.* 1202, f. 291r
- Quæritur de obliquis utrum possit fieri syllogismus...  
 G. Burley, De syncategorematibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 276, f.  
 19'-21'
- Quæritur de sensu communi...  
 Albertus Magnus (?), De sensu communi: *London Univ. Coll.*  
 4, f. 227r-233v; *Oxford Oriel* 28, f. 53; *Toulouse de la ville*  
 872, f. 97-102. For other mss. see Gm 6 co
- Quæritur de subiecto in tractatibus. Si dicatur quod syllogismus...  
*Tractatus logicus: Erfurt Ampl. Oct.* 62b
- Quæritur de veritate huius, quæstiones vere scibiles sunt æquales...  
 Joannes Duns Scotus, Qq. II Posteriorum: [Li]; ed. Venice 1520,  
 f. 50r
- Quæritur ergo primo quis fuit primus inventor logicæ...  
 Marsilius de Inghen, Qq. de parvis logicis: *Erfurt Ampl. Duod.*  
 13, f. 1-9
- Quæritur igitur primo quid sit logica...  
 Menghus Blanchellus, Logica: *Florence Na. Centr. II, I*, 194,  
 f. 1-66
- Quæritur primo circa librum Porphyrii utrum logica sit scientia...  
 Qq. de Isagogis Porphyrii: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 252, f. 1-13
- Quæritur primo circa librum priorum utrum de syllogismo potest  
 esse...  
 Marsilius, Qq. super I, II libris Priorum: *Erfurt Ampl. Fol.* 306,  
 f. 91-142; *Qu.* 275a, f. 99-159'
- Quæritur primo circa Porphyrium utrum universale...  
 Qq. circa Porphyrium: *Erfurt Ampl. Fol.* 297, f. 159-168
- Quæritur primo circa primum librum elenchorum utrum ars sophi-  
 stica...  
 Qq. super Elench.: *Erfurt Ampl. Fol.* 263, f. 83'-89
- Quæritur primo circa summulas utrum dialectica insit...  
 Qq. super summulis Petri Hispani: *Erfurt Ampl. Fol.* 263, f.  
 89-92'

Quæritur primo de demonstratione...

Simon Faversham, *Posteriora*: [Pits 506]

Quæritur primo iuxta librum elenchorum utrum de syllogismo possit esse scientia...

Marsilius de Inghen, *Qq. super libro Elenchorum: Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 24*, f. 110-169

Quæritur primo iuxta librum priorum Aristotelis utrum de syllogismo simpliciter possit esse scientia...

Marsilius de Inghen, *Qq. super Analytica Priora: Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 24*, f. 170-198

Quæritur primo pro cognitione traditorum...

Misin de Coderonco, *In libro de Interpretatione: Oxford Bodleian (Can. Lat.) 278 [Li]*

Quæritur primo utrum in insolubilibus sit...

Joannes de Vesalia, *Quinque Qq. super insolubilibus: Venice S. Mark Cl. XI, cod. 12*, f. 18-25

Quæritur primo utrum logica sit scientia...

Dubitaciones logicæ Pauli Pergulensis: *Philadelphia Free Libr. (Lewis) 168*, f. 1

Quæritur primo utrum principia artis obligatoriæ in disputatione dialectica sint necessaria...

*Qq. decem de obligationibus: Venice S. Mark Cl. XI, cod. 12*, f. 1-18

Quæritur quid sit universale...

*Qq. super Universalia: London Brit. Mus. (Royal) 12 E. XXV*, f. 31

Quæritur quot sunt artes liberales...

Petrus Hispanus, *De dialectica: Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 283*, f. 28-57

Quæritur utrum...

See 'Utrum...'

Quæro de veritate istius quæstionis...

Joannes Bampton, *Octo Qq. de veritate propositionum: [Pits 449]*

Quæro utrum universale sit res extra animam totaliter existens in quolibet singulari et de essentia cuiuslibet singularis...

Guilelmus Ockham (?), *Q. de universali: Padua Anton. 173*, f. 57r-b

Quærunt de prædicamento relationis...

Joannes Driton, De relatione: [Pits 340]

Quæstio de subiecto totius logicæ. Utrum logica sit de syllogismo tamquam de subiecto...

Antonius Andreae, In artem veteram: Ed. Bologna 1481, f. 2

Quæstio est quid sit medium in demonstratione...

Aegidius Romanus, Q. de medio demonstrationis: *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 760, f. 75r-77r; *Vat. lat.* 828, f. 125r-127r; ed. Venice 1522.

For other mss. see Gm 400 af

Quæstio est utrum accidens possit intelligi sine subiecto...

Jacobus de Placentia, Qq. duæ logicæ: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 31*, f. 83-85

Quæstio est utrum privatio distinguatur realiter a materia, pro cuius decisione iste ordo servabitur...

Q. de privatione: *Venice S. Mark Cl. XI, cod. 23*, f. 86 (incomplete)

Quæstio principalis sit hæc: utrum dialectica sit scientia...

Blasius de Pelacanibus de Parma, Qq. dialecticæ: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 208*, f. 1-25

Quæstiones æquales sunt numero iis quæcumque vere scimus. Quærimus autem quattuor quia propter quid, si est, et quid est... Aristoteles, Posteriora Analytica (L. II): *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 10683; ed. Migne *PL* 64, 743-762

Quæstiones plurimas ex pluribus et diversis...

Raimundus Lull, Qq. per artem demonstrativam: For mss. see Gm 335 ar

Quæstiones sunt æquales numero... Hic liber secundus videtur differre...

Aegidius Romanus, Posteriora Analytica (L. II): *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 823, f. 190-249r; 824, f. 79v-122v; 825; 829, f. 7r-56r

Quæstiones sunt æquales numero... In libro isto præcedenti determinatum est de syllogismo demonstrativo...

Gualterus Burley, Super II Posteriorum: *Oxford Bodleian (Rawl.) C 677 [Li]*

Quæstiones sunt æquales numero... Postquam Philosophus in primo libro determinavit...

Thomas (Aquinus), Posteriora Analytica (L. II): *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 761, f. 38v

Qualis est scilicet ea dicimur...

Perihermenias: *Assisi Conv.* 296, f. 1-11

Quam magis studiosis afferat...

See 'Quam magnos studiosis...'

Quam magnos studiosis afferat fructus scientia dividendi, quamque apud peripateticam disciplinam...

Boethius, Liber de Divisione: *Assisi Conv.* 514, f. 273-274 (incomplete); *Avranches de la ville* 228; *Charleville Municipale* 187 (XII<sup>th</sup> cent.); 250; *Erfurt Ampl.* Fol. 39, f. 43-54; *Qu.* 20 f. 25'-31'; *Qu.* 267, f. 30-38; *Qu.* 340, f. 37-47; *Laon Communale* 433; *Ravenna Classense* 46, f. 118-134; *Toulouse de la ville* 735 (*I.* 275), f. 31; *Utrecht Univ.* 816 (*Gr.* 26), f. 175a-b (fragm.); *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 10683, f. 55; *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod.* 23, f. 111-119; *cod.* 27, f. 68-81; *Worcester Cathedral Q.* 30, f. 27-33; ed. Migne *PL* 64, 875-892. See also 'Cum magnos studiosis...'; 'Quoniam magnus...'

Quam magnos studiosis afferat fructus scientia...

Gilbertus Porretanus (?), L. de Divisione: *Oxford Magd.* 187, f. 72

Quam magnos studiosis...

Notulæ super libro Divisionum Boethii: *Erfurt Ampl.* *Qu.* 235, f. 32'-35'

Quam magnos studiosis... Cum a principio logicæ determinatum sit...

Albertus Magnus, In librum Boethii de Divisione: for mss. see Gm 6 al. See also 'Cum autem principio...'

Quam magnos veritatis sectatoribus afferat fructus sermocinalis scientia quam logicam dicimus... Dudum me frater et amice carissime... Omnes logicæ tractatores intendunt astruere...

Guilelmus Ockham, Summa Logicæ: *Erfurt Fol.* 301; *Oct.* 67, f. 1-123'; *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 952, f. 1r-114v; 953, f. 1r-152r; *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod.* 205, f. 124; ed. Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure (New York) 1951 (Pars I). For other mss, see EPM; Ff. See also 'Quoniam magnos...'

Quam plurimorum modernorum astutia...

Regulæ Fallaciarum: *Vienna NB* 4698, f. 170v-174

Quamquam ex solventibus...

Joannes Stratford, De verborum significatione: [Pits 460]

Quamvis de ordinatione prædicabilium iam in prædicamentis sufficienter quantum est de intentione logici...

Albertus Magnus, De sex Principiis G. Porretani: *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 719, f. 105r-126v; *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 177*, f. 98-119; ed. Venice 1494, f. 67. See also 'Forma est... Quamvis de ordine...'

Quando dicitur: Inter agens finitum et infinitum nulla est proportio...

Expositiones propositionum: *Munich Clm 4379*, f. 131r; *Wurzburg Minorit. I. 63*, f. 43r-46r [AFH XLIV, 194]. See also 'Nota quando dicitur...'

Quando logica ad omnia scientiarum principia viam habet...

See 'Quoniam logica...'

Quantitas dividitur in discretam et continuam: dicitur autem discreta...

Thomas Aquinas, De prædicamento quantitatis: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 185*, f. 11-14

Quantitatis. Postquam ergo de substantiæ prædicamento congruum ordine prosecutus est...

Boethius, De quantitate: *Vaticana Regin. 230*, f. 50-60v

Quantum ad primum sciendum...

See 'Parvorum precibus puerorum...'

Quarto de causalibus pertractandum...

Wyclif, De causalibus (Logica, Tr. III): [Li]

Quarto metaphysicæ prope principium scribitur...

Qq. de suppositionibus terminorum: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 52*, f. 26-27

Quatenus desiderio iuvenum textus Aristotelis intelligere cupientium...

Compendium philosophiæ: *Utrecht Univ. 324 (Lat. 68)*, f. 1-57

Quatenus liber prædicamentorum et capitulum huius libri pateat quattuor inquiramus causas...

Super Porphyrium, Prædicamenta et sex Principia: *Wurzburg Minorit. I. 51*, f. 39r-86r [AFH XLIV, 207]

Quattuor sunt consideranda...

Rogerus Bacon, Grammatica et logica: [Gm 312 zl]

Quattuor sunt divisiones propositionum...

Rogerus Swineshead, De divisionibus: [Li]

Quemadmodum Alexander in tertio medicæ (metaphysicæ) dicit vocari philosophiam veritatis scientiam...

Gratiadei Esculanus, Super artem veterem: *Vienna NB 2350*, f. 1r-58r

Quemadmodum tres sunt operationes intellectus...

Prædicamenta, Perihermenias Aristotelis: *Oxford St. John's 80*, f. 53-78 (c. 1500)

Qui a rerum opifice summo una cum stellis animos emanasse dixerunt...

Joannes Scotius Parthenopeus, Proœmium ad Priora Aegidii Romani: Ed. Venice 1499, f. 4

Qui autem nominum virtutis sunt ignari et ipsi disputantes et alios audientes paralogizant...

Guilelmus Hentisberus, De proportionum multiplicium significacione: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 220*, f. 252-253

Qui divisit mare rubrum in divisione...

Antonius Andreeae, In librum Divisionum Boethii: Ed. Venice 1480 (cf. Nic. Antonio Hispalensis, *Bibliotheca Hisp. Vetus*, II, Madrid 1788, p. 142)

Quia ad cognitionem alicuius oportet cognoscere...

Guilelmus Shirewood, Syncategoremata: *Oxford Bodleian (Digby) 55 [Li]*; Paris 16617, f. 23r-46r (cf. M. Grabmann, *Introductiones in logicam des W. von Shireswood*, Sitzungsberichte d. Bayerisch. Akad. d. Wissensch., 1937, Heft 10, p. 19)

Quia antiqui modernique magistri...

Logica: *Vaticana Vat. lat. 674*, f. 159v (fragm.)

Quia Aristoteles in libro prædicamentorum de decem prædicamentis quorum quodlibet est universalis...

De prædicamentis: *Oxford Corp. Christi 103*, f. 13-32

Quia Aristoteles in libro prædicamentorum de decem prædicamentis.

Cum sit necessarium... Iste liber dividitur in duas partes principales...

Rogerus Whelpdale, Super Porphyrium: *London Brit. Mus. (Harley) 2178*, f. 14; (*Royal*) 12 B. XIX, f. 36

Quia Aristoteles in libro prædicamentorum frequenter utitur istis nominibus...

*Paris BN 16297*, f. 258-259

Quia de dictione reduplicativa gloriosus doctor s. Thomas et eius declarator excellens magister Hervaeus...

Franciscan de Prato, De reduplicationibus: *Rome Angel.* 1053 (R.8.7), f. 47-53

Quia de dictis in logica intendo quoddam compendium compilare, videnda sunt tria...

Gualterus Burley, Super Porphyrium: *Assisi* 228, f. 191-200; *Cortona Comune e dell' Accad. Etrusca* 138, f. 1-71; *London Brit. Mus. (Royal)* 12 B. XIX, f. 19; *Oxford Magd.* 146, f. 2; 162, f. 6; *Perugia Communale* 28; 1070; *Rome S. Isidoro* 1/98, f. 1r-98v; *Sandaniele del Friuli Communale* 117; *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 10610, f. 1; *Volterra Guarnacci* 45; ed. Venice 1488

Quia de dictis in logica...

Joannes Bate, Compendium Logices: [Bale 191v]

Quia favente Deo iam scripta et expositiones librorum logicæ veteris utcumque complevi antequam ad expositionem novæ logicæ manum ponam...

Antonius Andreea, Comment. in Priora, Posteriora, Elench.: [Ss I, 71]

Quia ignorantibus sensum compositum et sensum divisum...

De sensu composito et diviso: *Wurzburg Minorit.* I. 63, f. 182r-184r [AFH XLIV, 197]

Quia in sophismatibus probando et improbando conclusivis utimur...

De conclusivis, exclusivis, etc.: *London Brit. Mus. (Royal)* 12 F. XIX, f. 116. See also 'Quoniam in sophismatibus...'

Quia in sophismatibus probando...

Gualterus Burley, De consequentiis: *Bruges de la ville* 500, f. 95r-101v; *Oxford Bodleian (Digby)* 24 [Li]

Quia in sophismatibus probando...

Ricardus Billingham, Consequentiæ: [Pits 489]

Quia intentio præsentis lucubrationis est doctoris subtilis difficilium quæstionum in logicam Aristotelis...

Mauritius de Portu Hiberniæ, Qq. dialectica Scoti: Ed. Venice 1500, f. 83r

Quia ipsa logica est de modo sciendi tamquam de subiecto et circa modum sciendi...

Prædicamenta: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 45*, f. 18-26

Quia logica ad omnium scientiarum principia viam habet...

See 'Quoniam logica...'

Quia logica est de secundis intentionibus adjunctis primis...

De secundis intentionibus: *Madrid Escorial f II 8*, f. 86; *Pedua Anton. Sc. 1, 25* (cf. B. Roth, *Franz von Mayronis*, "Franziska-nische Forschungen" Heft 3, Werl 1936, p. 213)

Quia logica est formalis scientia...

Thomas Aquinas, De fallaciis: *Oxford Bodleian (Digby) 55 [Li]*

Quia logica est rationalis scientia et ad ratiocinandum inventa rationari autem contingit...

Thomas Aquinas, De fallaciis: *Bologna Comunale A. 969*, f. 1; *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 283*, f. 178-191; *Oct. 5*, f. 55-61; *Oxford Bodleian (Digby) 204 [Li]*; *Ravenna Classense 293*; *Vaticana Chigi E. V. 148*, f. 14r-22r [Bs]; *Urbin. 215*, f. 57; *Vat. lat. 807*, f. 96-107r; *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 55*, f. 32-40; *cod. 184*, f. 9-16; ed. *Venice 1593, XVII*, f. 213-226

Quia mentionem philosophiae in priore disputationis nostrae sermone fecimus...

Flaccus Albinus (Alcuinus), De dialectica: *Cremona Governativa 56* (54.4.39-3224) cc. Ib-XVIIa ('Augustinus'); *Paris BN 6288*, f. 113r-126v (X-XIth cent.) [Al 544]; *Rouen Municipale 932*, f. 154r-168v Al 747; *Sandaniele del Friuli Communale 99*; *Vaticana Urbin. 484*, f. 107; *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 170*, f. 1-9; ed. *Migne PL 101*, 949-976

Quia mihi debilis est memoria ac caro fragilis...

Notabilia super artem veterem: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 293*, f. 114-1208

Quia nonnulli minus eruditorum Porphyrium...

Guilelmus Altisiodorensis, Super Isagogis Porphyrii: *Erfurt Ampl. Oct. 5*, f. 1-26

Quia nonnulli modernorum...

Stanislaus de Znoima, De universalibus: *Vienna NB 4296*, f. 57v-62v; 4483, f. 48r-67r

Quia notitia subiecti præsupponitur in scientia...

See 'Sumens reliquias dedit eis...'

Quia parva logicalia ad multa tum utilia tum necessaria...

Henricus Greve de Goettingen, *Parva logicalia*: Ed. (Leipzig 1498 (cf. I. Collijn, *Katal. d. Inkunab. zu Uppsala*)

Quia propositio modalis a modo dicitur...

Thomas Aquinas (?), *De propositionibus modalibus*: *Vaticana Urbin.* 127, f. 246v; 215, f. 66; *Vat. lat.* 806, f. 17-18r; 807, f. 203-210v; ed. Venice 1593, XVII, f. 226-226v

Quia ratio intellectiva...

See 'Frater Angelus de Camerino... Quia...'

Quia rerum quidditates volentes investigare...

Joannes Meyger, *Tract. distinctionum*: *Vienna NB* 4963, f. 119r-127r

Quia scientia præsentis libri est de propositionum probationibus...

De probationibus propositionum R. Billingham: *Erfurt Ampl. Oct.* 71, f. 96-116

Quia scire distinguere sophistarum ampullas...

See 'Quoniam scire distinguere...'

Quia scire est rem per causas cognoscere...

See 'Quoniam scire est causam rei...'

Quia secundum dictum Senecæ...

Zdislaus de Zvieretic, *Pro libro universalium Jo. Wiclefi*: *Vienna NB* 4002, f. 24r-33r

Quia secundum Gundissalivum philosophia habetur ex cognitione veritatis...

*Distinctiones logicales*: *Worcester Cathedral Q.* 13, f. 53b

Quia secundum philosophum...

Responsio ad argumenta Strodi: *Vienna NB* 4527, f. 67r-75r

Quia secundum philosophum sanctum...

Wyclif, *Responsiones ad Radulphum Strode*: [Li]

Quia sicut dicit Boethius quamquam multa sint Aristotelis opera quæ subtilissima philosophiæ arte celata sunt...

See 'Sicut a principio istius scientiæ...'

Quia singulorum notitia motu tamquam signo naturali nobis...

Joannes Dumbleton, *Summa Logicæ et Phil. Naturalis (Pars III)*: *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 954, f. 18-37r

Quicumque terminus...

Tract. dialecticus: *Vienna NB* 4785, f. 210v-280v

Quid autem debeat dici subiectum in hac scientia...

Harvaeus Natalis, *Perihermenias*: *Paris Arsenal* 530, f. 21-28  
[Gm 64 ak]

Quid est syllogismus deceptionis... Ad primum dicendum est quod syllogismus contrariæ...

Tabula Quæstionum et Responsiones: *Paris BN* 16130, f. 60r-64v

... quid sit casus de insolubili...

De insolubilibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 245, f. 304'-322

Quid sit principium formale individuationis in omnibus prædicamentis sciendum quod aliqui intelligunt...

Q. de principio formalí individuationis: *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 829, f. 103r

Quidam me frater...

Guilelmus Ockham, *Logica*: *Assisi Conv.* 647. See also 'Dudum me frater...'

... quidem sumentes continue ad prædicatum...

Priora Analytica: *Rome Angel.* 1051 (R.8.5), f. 1-5 (fragm.)

Quidlibet meum est...

Guilelmus Milverley, *De inceptione*: *Oxford New Coll.* 289

Quidquid est sive visibile sive invisible seu intelligibile sive creans sive creatum natura dicitur...

Categoriae decem ex Arist. deceptæ: *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 567, f. 53

Quinque distincta quodam respectu...

De universalibus secundum Avicennam: *Oxford Oriel* 7, f. 198v-199r [Al 375]

Quippe inditione...

Martianus Capella, *De arte dialectica*: *Paris BN* 6288, f. 134r-148r (X-XIth cent.) [Al 544]

Quod autem præponi debet...

Algazel, *Logica*: *Laon Communale* 412, f. 137r-144r [Al 482].  
See also 'Capitulum de iis quæ debent...'

Quod gloriosum rerum principium...

Oliverus Brito, *Philosophia*: *Oxford Corp. Christi* 243, f. 2-12; 283, f. 150-155

Quod locorum differentias...

Boethius, (De Differentiis Topicis) L. III: *Avranches de la ville* 228; ed. Migne *PL* 64, 1195-1206

Quod non est maximum quod scilicet sufficit portare probatur quia si sic illud...

Conclusiones de maximo et minimo: *Venice S. Mark Cl. XI*, cod. 14, f. 45-49

...quod satis prius fuit...

Qq. in Posteriora: *Vienna NB 2302*, f. 45r-46r (fragm.) [Al 105]

Quod sophisma sit falsum patet quia suum contradictorium est necessarium...

Guilelmus Milverley (?), Sophismata: *Wurzburg Minorit. I.63*, f. 72r-81v [AFH XLIV, 194]

Quod tituli prædicabilium...

See 'Quot tituli...'

Quod vero multa designans...

Boethius, L. de Divisione: *Rome Angel. 242* (C.4.10), f. 29a (fragm.)

Quomodo autem reducemos syllogismos...

Boethius, De resolutione syllogismorum (Priora Anal.): *London Brit. Mus. (Royal) 15 B. IV*, f. 93; ed. Migne PL 64, 675

Quomodo modus significandi dividatur...

Duns Scotus, De modis significandi: [Li]

Quoniam a nonnullis dubitatur merito quid sit prima intentio...

Q. de prima intentione: *Vaticana Urbin. 1491*, f. 85

Quoniam ad cognitionem alicuius oportet cognoscere suas partes...

See 'Quia ad cognitionem...'

Quoniam aut secundum ordinem subiectorum...

Nicolaus Bonetus, Theologia naturalis: *St. Omer Municipale 237* (XVII<sup>th</sup> cent.). See also 'Quoniam secundum ordinem...'

Quoniam autem alii quidem sunt universales... Postquam in primo libro determinavit Aristoteles de syllogismo ostensivo in hoc secundo intendit de syllogismo ex hypothesi...

Aegidius Romanus, Priora Analytica (L. II): Ed. Venice 1499

Quoniam autem est. Quoniam omnis enuntiatio...

Notulæ super libris Perihermenias: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 235*, f. 29-32'

Quoniam autem secundum ordinem subiectorum...

Nicolaus Bonetus, In libros Prædicamentorum: *Erfurt Ampl.*

*Fol.* 314, f. 78-108. See also 'Quoniam aut secundum...'; Quoniam secundum ordinem...'

Quoniam autem syllogismi: hic Aristoteles prosequitur intentum...

Super Elenchos: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 275, f. 1-28

Quoniam autem ut dicit Aristoteles tunc opinamur unumquodque...

Grosseteste (?), In librum Posteriorum: [Li] but see S. Thomson, Writings of R. Grosseteste, Cambridge 1940, p. 258. Compare 'Quoniam tunc unumquodque...'; 'Quoniam ut dicit Aristoteles...'

Quoniam circa universalia multæ...

De universalibus: *Vienna NB* 4963, f. 97r-109v

Quoniam Deus multum est recolibilis, intelligibilis et amabilis, est ideo nobis multum necesse...

Raimundus Lull, Super figuras artis demonstrativæ: For mss. see Gm 335 x; Ss III, 11

Quoniam dicit Aristoteles primo posteriorum scientia est sempiternorum et eorum quæ nota sunt...

Thomas Aquinas (?), De universalibus: Ed. Parma 1852-72, XVII, 131

Quoniam enim scientiæ est causam rei cognoscere; causæ autem cuiuslibet rei...

Thomas Aquinas, De natura syllogismorum: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 185*, f. 33-36. Compare 'Quoniam scire est causam rei cognoscere...'

Quoniam felicitates artis... In primo opusculo tractabitur de sophismatibus et regulis obligationum...

Logica: *Bruges de la ville* 500, f. 173-180v

Quoniam gloriosum est in omnibus exercitatum videri...

De Fallaciis: *Paris BN (Nouv. Acquis.)* 892, f. 32

Quoniam hæc ars demonstrativa sequitur...

See 'Deus qui es clarificatio...'

Quoniam humanus intellectus...

See 'Quoniam intellectus humanus...'

Quoniam ignoratis communibus necesse est artem ignorare...

Logica: *Amiens de la ville* 406, f. 130-152 [Gm 312 bw]. Compare 'Quoniam ignoratis rationibus...'

Quoniam ignoratis principiis et ea quæ sequuntur ignorari habent ab iis qui perfecte scire cupiunt...

Marinus de Castignano, Tract. de inventione medii: *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 1109, f. 144v-145r; 3037, f. 151r-154r

Quoniam ignoratis rationibus necesse est...

Nicolaus de Bohemia, Qq. grammaticæ: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 276, f. 131'-134

Quoniam in libris perihermeniarum...

Joannes Fortis Hispanus, Prædicabilia: *Paris BN* 1215

Quoniam innata est nobis via a communibus...

G. Burley, De probationibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 276, f. 6-19'

Quoniam in omni augmentatione probatur aliquid de aliquo...

De inventione medii: *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 2186, f. 99v-100r

Quoniam in qualibet scientia necesse est...

Conradus, De intentionibus: *Vienna NB* 2350, f. 75r-79v

Quoniam in sophismatibus probandis et improbandis...

De consequentiis: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 245, f. 188-207'; *Vienna NB* 4698, f. 134r. See also 'Quia in sophismatibus...'

Quoniam intellectus humanus est valde gravatus per hoc quia opiniones philosophantium...

Raimundus Lull, De novis fallaciis: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 191*, f. 1-26. For other mss. see Gm 335 ec; Ss III, 17

Quoniam logica ad omnium scientiarum principia viam habet...

Robertus Alington, Prædicamenta: *London Brit. Mus. (Harley) 2178*, f. 29; (*Royal*) 12 B. XIX, f. 123b; *Oxford Bodleian (Rawl.) C 677 [Li]*; *Magd.* 92, f. 10; *Oriel* 35, f. 5-43; *Worcester Cathedral Q.* 54, f. 24-107; *Wurzburg Minorit. I*, 63 f. 51v-71v [*AFH XLIV*, 194]

Quoniam logica est rationalis scientia et ad ratiocinandum inventa...

(De fallaciis): *Florence Naz. Centr. II, IV*, 553, f. 33. See also 'Quia logica est rationalis...'

Quoniam logica est rationalis scientia...

Thomas Aquinas (?), Opusculum de Fallaciis: *Vaticana Vat. lat. 806*, f. 18v-19r (incomplete). See also 'Quia logica est rationalis...'

Quoniam logica est scientia difficilis labilis et prolixa...

Raimundus Lull, De venatione substantiæ, accidentis et compositi: [Gm 335 dw]

Quoniam logici circa obligationes et insolubilia speciales faciunt difficultates...

Guilelmus Ockham, De obligatione et speciebus (*Summa Logicae*): *Paris BN 6430*, f. 104r-107r; ed. *Venice 1508*, f. 92r

Quoniam magnos veritatis...

Guilelmus Ockham, *Summa Logicae: Laon Communale 431*. See also 'Quam magnos veritatis...'

Quoniam magnus...

Boethius, L. Divisionum: *Assisi Conv. 664*, f. 64-77. See also 'Quam magnos studiosis afferat...'

Quoniam nostræ integritas doctrinæ in duobus consistit...

De perceptione significantium: *Oxford Corp. Christi 250*, f. 18-24

Quoniam omne operans quod in suis operationibus et actibus potest errare aliquo indiget directivo... Circa istam artem primo sunt aliqua præmittenda...

Guilelmus Ockham, Expos. aurea super artem veterem: *Bruges de la ville 499*, f. 1r-60v; *Los Angeles Univ. Southern California (Hoose) 6*, f. 1r; *Oxford Bodleian (Can. Misc.) 558*; *Paris BN 6431*, f. 78r; *17421*, f. 61r-96v. For other mss. see EPM; Ff. See also 'Omni opere operans...'

Quoniam omnes doctrinæ diversitatem recipiunt...

Joannes Buridan (?), De sex Principiis: *Padua Univ. 1589*, f. 94r-172v

Quoniam omnes quasi sumus...

Raimundus Lull, De syllogismis: [Li]

Quoniam omnia sunt creata ad cognoscendum...

Raimundus Lull, De affirmatione, negatione etc.: [Li]

Quoniam omnis scientia est de universalibus ut per universalia sciamus de particularibus reddere rationem...

Raimundus Lull, Compendium artis demonstrativæ: *Florence Riccardiana 1001*, f. 166r; *Rome Boncompagni 82*, f. 3; *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 194*, f. 81-205; *cod. 195*. For other mss. see Gm 335 y; Ss III, 11 38

Quoniam omnis scientia est de utilibus, ut per utilia sciamus de partibus reddere rationem...

(Raimundus Lull), Compendium artis demonstrativæ: *Troyes Municipale 1462*

Quoniam otium mors hominis est una viventis, necnon ad multorum...

- Paulus de Venetiis, Quattuor dubiorum determinationes: Foligno Jacobili 141 (A. VIII. 7); *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 210*
- Quoniam primus error in parvo...
- Logica cum glossis: *Vienna NB 4007, f. 245r-281r*
- Quoniam principium syllogizandi unamquamque propositionem est medius terminus...
- Thomas Aquinas (?), De inventione medii: *Vaticana Urbin. 127; Vat. lat. 806, f. 18*; ed. Venice 1593, XVII (Pars II), f. 35v
- Quoniam quattuor sunt oppositiones ut dicitur in prædicamentis ideo de eis breviter agere intendimus...
- Thomas Aquinas (?), De quattuor oppositis: *Vaticana Urbin. 215, f. 211v; 472, f. 122; Vat. lat. 806, f. 31; 807, f. 21*; ed. Venice 1593, XVII, f. 217v-220v
- Quoniam quidquid demonstratum fuit ab antiquis...
- Raimundus Lull, De demonstratione per æquiparantiam: For mss. see Gm 335 dl
- Quoniam quinque prædicabilia...
- Raimundus Lull, De quinque prædicabilibus et decem prædicamentis: For mss. see Gm 335 hd; Ss III, 17
- Quoniam scientiæ distinguere sophistarum ampullas...
- De præpositionibus quibusdam æquivocis: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 28, f. 79-105'*
- Quoniam scire distinguere sophistarum ampullas reprimit scripturarum nubem...
- Magister Matheus, Aequivoca cum commento: *St. Omer Municipale 674; Vaticana Ottobon. 131, f. 166r-179v; Vat. lat. 672, f. 89; 1004, f. 1r-4v*
- Quoniam scire est causam rei cognoscere...
- Thomas Aquinas, De natura syllogismorum: *Vaticana Urbin. 215, f. 14*; ed. Venice 1593, XVII, f. 13v-14v
- Quoniam scire est causam rei cognoscere...
- Raimundus Lull, Canones artis generalis: *Oxford Corp. Christi 247 [Li]*
- Quia scire est rem per causas cognoscere...
- De sex Principiis: *London Coll. Univ. 4, f. 234r-248v* (cf. AFH XLIV, 206)
- Quoniam scire et intelligere continet in omni scientia ex cognitione principiorum...

Albertus (?), *De modo significandi*: *Oxford Merton* 260  
Quoniam secundum Aristotelem in primo priorum...

Franciscus de Prato, *Logica*: *Rome Angel.* 1053 (*R.8.7*), f. 1-36a

Quoniam secundum ordinem subiectorum est ordo passionum...

Nicolaus Bonetus, *Prædicamenta*: *Rome Angel.* 558 (*F.3.10*), f. 69-90; ed. Venice 1505. See also 'Quoniam aut (autem) secundum ordinem...'

Quoniam secundum philosophum primo elenchorum: qui virtutem...

Discipulus Raimundi Lull, *Logica*: *Florence Riccardiana* 1001, f. 14r-32r (cf. *AFH III* (1910) 739)

Quoniam testante beato Gregorio...

Franciscus de Prato, de voce univoca: *Rome Angel.* 1053 (*R.8.7*), f. 55-86

Quoniam teste sapiente... adolescens iuxta viam suam... Dialectica est ars artium etc. Hic auctor præmittit definitionem dialecticæ...

Nicolaus de Orbello, *Expositio logicæ*: Ed. Parma 1482

Quoniam topicæ considerationes ad aliquid probandum...

Considerationes librorum Topicorum: *Erfurt Ampl. Oct.* 5, f. 31-54

Quoniam tota logica dicitur esse de syllogismo...

Boethius de Dacia, *Super Posteriora*: *Bruges de la ville* 509, f. 59r-75v

Quoniam tunc unumquodque scire arbitramur, ut scribitur in principio physicorum idcirco videndum...

Isagoge Porphyrii: *Munich Clm* 9676, p. 1-10 [Al 1043]

Quoniam ut dicit Aristoteles in primo physicorum tunc opinamur...

R. de Stannington: *Oxford Bodleian (Digby)* 204 [Li]. Compare 'Quoniam autem ut dicit...'

Quoniam virtutes vocabulorum ignorans...

De actibus syncategorematis: *Leipzig Univ.* 1348, f. 199r-211r [SeT 444]

Quotiens solet opponi dicendum est. Expositis omnibus prædicamentis...

Boethius, In *Categorias* Aristotelis (L. IV): *Vaticana Regin.* 230, II, f. 65v-71; ed. Migne *PL* 64, 263

Quot sunt partes orationis. sunt octo. quæ nomen verbum...

Goro d'Arezzo, Regulæ parvæ: *Florence Naz. (Panciatich.)*  
68, f. 13-20

Quot tituli prædicabilium Porphyrii? Incipiunt Isagoge Porphyrii...  
Theodoricus de Wesalia, Qq. de Isagogis Porphyrii: *Erfurt Ampl.*  
*Qu. 277, f. 167-170'*

Ratio dicitur multipliciter...

See 'Ratio multipliciter dicitur...'

Ratio dicitur multis modis... Iste est quintus tractatus summularum magistri Petri Hispani...

Joannes de Magistris, De locis dialecticis (Summularum P.H. glossulæ): Ed. Venice 1490

Ratio dicitur multis modis... Iste est quintus tractatus summularum Petri Hispani in quo determinatur de syllogismo contracto...

Joannes de Monte, Super logicam P.H. (Tr. V): Ed. Venice 1500

Ratio dicitur multis modis... Postquam auctor determinavit de syllogismo simpliciter seu universaliter considerato...

Nicolaus de Orbells, Super textum P. Hispani: Ed. Venice 1489

Ratio multipliciter dicitur: uno modo ratio idem est quod definitio...

Petrus Hispanus, De locis dialecticis (Summulæ logicales): *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 283, f. 154'-165; Venice NB 4698, f. 16r.*  
For other mss. and edd. see Bs p. xx

Rationale est animal. Hoc est sophisma propositum...

Radulphus de Hotot, Sophismata: *Vaticana Vat. lat. 2141, f. 130v; 3061, f. 27 [Gm 225 i]*

Rationalis philosophiæ de ratione est sive dicibili...

Notulæ super sex Principiis: *Paris BN 15131, f. 75-96 [Hn IV, 266]*

Redargutum dicimus respondentem qui solius argumentationis virtute respectu propositionis alicuius...

Rodulphus Strodus, Obligationes: *Ravenna Classense 32: ed. Venice 1507, f. 129r*

Reduplicatio est propositio categorica in qua ponitur...

De reduplicationibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 245, f. 252'-262*

Regula est quædam utilis ordinatio ex necessariis principiis...

L. propositionum artis demonstrativæ: *Vienna NB 2530*, f. 1r-98v

Regula solvendi sophismata...

See 'Regulas solvendi sophismata...'

Regulæ de copulativis quarum prima est hæc...

Regulæ de copulativis: *Erfurt Ampl. Oct. 76*, f. 4'

Regulas solvendi sophismata non ea quidem quæ apparenti conditio-  
tione undique vallavit inventorum subtilitas...

Guilelmus Hentisberus, Sophismata: *Bruges de la ville 497*, f.  
46r-59v; *Erfurt Ampl. Fol. 313*, f. 192-195; *Venice S. Mark Cl.*  
*X, cod. 200*, f. 1-3

Regulas solvendi sophismata... In hoc primo tractatu determina-  
tur de propositionibus quas insolubiles vocant...

Caietanus de Thienis, In regulas G. Hentisberi: *Venice S. Mark*  
*Cl. X, cod. 220*, f. 122-130; ed. *Venice 1494*, f. 7r

Relativum est duplex. Uno modo relativum est cuius esse est ad  
aliud... In præcedenti tractatu visum est de suppositione termi-  
norum absolutorum...

Joannes de Monte, Super logicam Petri Hispani (Tr. VII): Ed.  
*Venice 1500*

Relativum est duplex... Iste est secundus tractatus parvorum logi-  
calium in quo postquam Petrus Hispanus determinavit...

Joannes de Magistris, De relativis (Summularum P. H. glossu-  
læ): Ed. *Venice 1490*

Rem quæ partim est vel fuit et partim futura est...

Robertus Grosseteste, De veritate propositionis: For mss. see  
S. Thomson, *The Writings of R. Grosseteste*, Cambridge 1940,  
p. 120

Respicio nutricem meam...

Qq. super Isagogis Porphyrii et Prædicamenta Arist.: *Erfurt*  
*Ampl. Qu. 262*, f. 1

Respicio nutricem... Hanc propositionem scribit... Boethius...

Marsilius de Inghen, In Porphyrii Isagogen: *Oxford Bodleian*  
*(Can. Misc.) 381 [Li]*

Restat de demonstratione enim cum sit habitus acquisitus ex spe-  
culatione...

Thomas Aquinas, De demonstratione: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 185*, f. 36-43

Restat nunc dicere de consequentiis et habet textus Marsili...

Joannes de Gemunden, De consequentiis Marsili: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 278*, f. 55-94'

Restat nunc dicere de insolubilibus et primo quid sit casus...

De insolubilibus: *Vienna NB 4698*, f. 78v-87

Restrictio est coartatio termini communis a maiori suppositione ad minorem...

Nicolaus de Orbello, De restrictionibus (Super textum Petri H.): Ed. Venice 1489

Restrictio est coartatio termini communis... Iste est quintus tractatus parvorum logicalium in quo determinatur de quadam alia passione termini supponentis...

Joannes de Monte, Super Logicam Petri H. (Tr. VII): Ed. Venice 1500

Restrictio est coartatio termini communis... Iste est quintus tractatus parvorum logicalium Petri Hispani in quo...

Joannes de Magistris, De restrictione (Summularum P. H. glossulae): Ed. Venice 1490

Restrictio est terminus significativorum quam in rerum...

De restrictionibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 245*, f. 245'-252

Rogasti me carissime...

Natalis de Venetiis (?), Artes obligatoriæ: *New York Columbia U. (Plimpton) 199*, f. 14r-31v

Rogasti me carissime ut tuæ in crucifixi latere caritati...

Petrus de Candia, Obligationes: *Oxford Bodleian (Can. Lat.) 278 [Li]*. For other mss. see *Dict. Théol. Cath.*, Tom. 12, col. 1894

Rogasti me ut tuæ caritati ut controversias doctorum in materia universalium compendioso stilo perstringerem...

De universalibus: *Rome S. Isidoro 1/14*, f. 86r-92v. Compare 'Rogasti me carissime ut tuæ...'

S... pratum quorundam est solutio...

Ricardus de Sherwood, Insolubilia: *Cambridge St. John's 100*

(cf. J. Russell, *Dict. of Writers XIIIth Cent. England*, Inst. Hist. Research Bull. 3, p. 200)

Sapientis signum est posse dicere et omnino perfecti sibi...

Joannes de Limoge, Libellus de dictamine syllogismorum: *Troyes Municipale* 893

Sciendum autem quod conceptus est nomen æquivocum ad obiectum et ad actum intellectus...

Notula de nomine conceptus: *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 829, f. 141

Sciendum est quod sunt quinque universalia...

Raimundus Lull, Compendium Logicæ Algazelis: For mss. see Gm 335 e

Sciendum quod duplex est modus definiendi...

Gualterus Burley, De modo definiendi: *Oxford Magd.* 146, f. 46-47v; *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 2146, f. 244-245 (anon.)

Sciendum quod insolubilia sophismata sunt quando...

De insolubilibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 395, f. 104

Scientiæ secantur quoad modum et res de quibus sunt. Hanc propositionem scribit Aristoteles in tertio libro de anima...

Jacobus de Placentia, Isagoge Porphyrii: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X. cod. 31*, f. 1-28

Scientiarum fertilitate obnixius invitatus...

Thomas Manlevet, De fallaciis: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 255, f. 13-37'; *Qu.* 343, f. 39-91

Scio quod si intendo... dispositio totius ad totum...

Themistius, In Posteriora: *Paris BN* 16907, f. 226r-237v [Al 668]

Scire autem opinamur unumquodque simpliciter sed non sophisticō modo...

Aristoteles, Posteriora Analytica (L.I, Cap II): Ed. Migne *PL* 64, 713

Scire autem opinamur unumquodque... Hanc propositionem descripsit Aristoteles primo huius... Quæritur an omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina...

Joannes Scotus, Qq. super Posteriora: *Oxford Magd.* 162, f. 183; ed. *Venice* 1520, f. 26r

Scire debemus quod nomen verbale...

De nominibus verbalibus: *Wurzburg Minorit.* 1.63, f. 265a-286a [AFH XLIV, 199]

Scire multis modis accipitur sed sive communiter sumitur sive propri...

Guilelmus Hentisberus, De scire et dubitare: *Bruges de la ville* 500, f. 33r-71v

Scire multis modis accipitur sed sive significatur proprie...

Guilelmus Hentisberus, De scire et dubitare: *Erfurt Ampl. Fol.* 313, f. 195-209'; *Qu. 270*, f. 1-36'

Scire multis modis dicitur, communiter proprie magis proprie propriissime...

Caietanus de Thienis, Super de scire et dubitare Hentisberi: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 220*, f. 130-136; ed. Venice 1494, f. 16v

Scire multis modis dicitur sed sive dicatur proprie sive communiter nihil scitur...

Guilelmus Hentisberus, De scire et dubitare: Ed. Venice 1494, f. 12v

Scire multis modis dicitur...

Ricardus Lavingham, De scire et nescire: [Pits 534]

Scire multis modis dicitur...

(De scire): *Florence Naz. Centr. II, IV, 553*, f. 73-75

Scita sunt quattuor secundum genus...

(Robertus Grosseteste), L. II Posteriorum Analyt.: *Vaticana Vat. lat. 760*, f. 62r-74v

Scitum est non conscitum...

Guilelmus Milverley, De scientia: *Oxford New Coll.* 289 [Li]

Scitum est non scitum prout aliter scitur qualiter non scitur...

Sophismata: *Oxford Magd.* 92, f. 86b-93; *Wurzburg Minorit.* I.63, 89v-103v [*AFH XLIV*, 194]

Scribit Philosophus in quarto de generatione animalium...

Comment. in Prædicamenta Aristotelis: *Erfurt Ampl. Fol.* 342, f. 1-29'

Scripta signa universalia quattuor promisimus inquirere...

(Gualterus Burley, De sophismatibus): *Assisi Communale* 249 [*AFH XII, 55*]

... Secunda conclusio est ista: A et B sunt duo corpora...

Conclusiones: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 298, f. 1

Secundarum vero substantiarum. Hic intendit prædicare...

De prædicabilibus: *Oxford Magd.* 92, f. 93

Secundo occurrit liber prædicamentorum Aristotelis in cuius exordio primus passus est quod æquivoca dicuntur...

Franciscus de Mayron, Passus super Prædicamenta: *Bologna Communale dell' 8 Arch. A.96*, f. 37; ed. Venice 1489

Secundum diversas dispositiones terminorum inest duplex actus...

Joannes Pagus, Appellationes: *Paris BN 11412*, f. 83-87; 15170, f. 63-65a [Gm 147 a]; [Hn II, 45: Secundum duas...']

Secundum modum communem exponendi huic libro...

See 'Venerabili ex anglorum...'

Secundum Philosophum in moralibus in quibusdam actionibus...

Gualterus Burley, In librum Posteriorum: *Oxford Bodleian (Rawl.) C 677* [Li]. See also 'Omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina... Secundum Philosophum...'

Secundum Philosophum in prædicamentis quarto capitulo, quadratura...

Guilelmus Hentisberus, Logica: *Erfurt Ampl. Fol. 135*, f. 1-17

Secundum Philosophum primo elenchorum quattuor sunt genera disputationum...

Fallacia: *London Brit. Mus. (Royal) 12 F. XIX*, f. 104

Secundum quod dicit Algazel in metaphysica sua scientia corrigit vitia animæ...

Gerardus de Nogent (?), Logica: *Paris BN 14984* [Hn IV, 253]

Secundum quod vult Algazel in metaphysica sua scientia corrigit vitia animæ...

Durandus de St. Porciano (?), In Aristotelis logicam veterem: For mss. see Gm 70 x

Secundum quod vult Philosophus in principio secundi metaphysicæ, id quod solus homo...

Michael Marbais, Modi significandi: *Bruges de la ville 544*, f. 2r-49v

Secundum quod vult Philosophus in secundo metaphysicæ...

Guilelmus de S. Amore, Priora Analytica: *Barcelona de la Corona (Ripoll.) 109*, f. 187-228v [Gm 160 a]

Secundus hic arreptæ expositionis labor nostræ seriem translationis expediet...

Boethius, Commentaria in Porphyrium: *Vaticana Urbin.* 188, f.

26v; *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 25, f. 16-30*; ed. Migne *PL* 64, 71-158

Seneca dicit in epistolis suis quod homo cum bonum...

Aegidius, *Isagoge Porphyrii, Prædicamenta, Perihermenias: Erfurt Ampl. Fol. 307, f. 1-70*

Sequitur de copulativis pertractandum...

Wyclif, *De copulativis et relativis (Logica, Tr. III)*: [Li]

Sequitur de localibus pertractandum...

Wyclif, *De motu locali (Logica, Tr. III)*: [Li]

Sequitur de speciebus hypotheticis...

Wyclif, *De speciebus hypotheticis (Logica, Tr. III)*: [Li]

Sequitur iam ultimo de propositionibus...

Wyclif, *De propositionibus temporalibus (Logica, Tr. III)*: [Li]

Sequitur sexto de conditionalibus...

Wyclif, *De conditionalibus (Logica, Tr. III)*: [Li]

Sequuntur quædam rasariæ (!) ipsius Ockham, primo probat...

De categoricis et hypotheticis propositionibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 395, f. 100'-102'*

Si consequentia sit necessaria et antecedens...

De individuatione: *Oxford New Coll. 285* [Li]

Si homo est finis universalis...

Robertus (Kilwardby), *Super Porphyrium: Oxford Bodleian (Can. Misc.) 403* [Li]

Si licet indoctis quia non sero propria risus...

Radulphus, *Summa philosophiæ: Erfurt Ampl. Oct. 28, f. 11-16*

Si nihil esset aliud, vir piissime, quod ad scribendum nos...

Omnis doctrina omnisque disciplina intellectiva ex antea existenti efficitur cognitione...

Aristoteles, *Posteriora Analytica (a Roberto transl.): Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 48. Compare 'Ut tibi semel promisi...'*

Si omnis vita nostra philosophiæ disciplinis proficit et usu valet primo omnium mihi insinua quid sit philosophia...

*Dialectica: Vienna NB 2508 (XIth Cent.)*

Si quis operis titulum diligens examinator inspiciat...

Boethius, *De differentiis topicis (L. IV): Laon Communale 453 bis (XIth Cent.); London Brit. Mus. 15 A. VIII, f. 87b; Rome Angel. 705 (Q.2.22), f. 39-49; Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 110, f. 85-93; ed Migne PL 64, 1205-1218*

Sicut a principio istius scientiae determinatum est quod logicæ intentionis est docere...

Albertus Magnus, *Perihermenias*: *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 719, f. 130v; *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 37 (II)*, f. 1-38; *cod. 177*, f. 131-160

Sicut dicit Algazel in metaphysica...

Angelus de Camerino, In artem veterem: *Escorial (Antolin.)* f.III.24, f. 56-123

Sicut dicit Alphorabius de etymologia scientiarum...

Glossa super Perihermenias: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 266, f. 20'-38'

Sicut dicit Aristoteles in libro...

De arte logica: *Oxford St. John's* 198, f. 176-184

Sicut dicit Aristoteles in principio metaphysicæ hominum genus arte et rationibus vivit...

Thomas Aquinas, Posteriora Analytica: *Bruges de la ville* 493, f. 1r-60v; *Erfurt Ampl. Fol.* 104, f. 1-39; *Fol.* 308, f. 1-44; *Fol.* 309, f. 73-112; *Vaticana Urbin.* 215, f. 74; *Vat. lat.* 760, f. 2r-28r (L. I); 761, f. 1r-56v; ed. Paris 1660, I, p. 87

Sicut dicit Aristoteles in principio metheororum hominum genus et arte et rationibus vivit...

Posteriora Analytica: *Brussels Royale* 2912 (6069)

Sicut dicit Aristoteles in tertio de anima...

Joannes Oxrach, In Posteriora: [Li]

Sicut dicit Aristoteles secundo metaphysicæ inconveniens est...

Isagoge Porphyrii: *Oxford Merton* 296, f. 1-7a

Sicut dicit Avicenna logica est de secundis intentionibus adjunctis primis...

De Logica: *Amiens de la ville* 404, f. 55v-57v [Al 410]

Sicut dicit Boethius in libro de divisionibus...

Priora Analytica: *Worcester Cathedral Q.* 13, f. 165b

Sicut dicit Philosophus circa principium tertii physicorum...

See 'Viro religioso fratri Conrado...'

Sicut dicit Philosophus decimo libro ethicorum homo secundum intellectum...

Radulphus de Hotot, Qq. super Posteriora: For mss. see Gm 225 g

Sicut dicit Philosophus decimo metaphysicæ versus finem, unum quodque ens...

Radulphus de Hotot, Qq. super Topica: For mss. see Gm 225 e  
 Sicut dicit Philosophus in decimo ethicorum talis vita quæ vacat  
 contemplationi...

Simon Anglicus, Qq. libri Posteriorum: *Milan Ambros.* C. 161  
*Inf.*, f. 79v-99r; *Oxford Merton* 292, f. 138 (cf. C. Ottaviano,  
 "Qq. super libro Prædicamentorum" di S. di Faversham, Memorie della R. Accad. Naz. dei Lincei, Classe di Scienze Moral. Storiche e Filologiche (Anno CCCXXVII) Serie VI, Vol. III, Fasc. IV, Rome 1930, p. 258, 260)

Sicut dicit Philosophus in elenchis suis: ignoratis...

Theodoricus de Vriberg, De origine prædicatorum: *Erfurt Ampl.*  
*Fol.* 79, f. 113'-119. For other mss. see Gm 45 af

Sicut dicit Philosophus in primo de anima intellectus noster...

Aegidius Romanus, Comment. in artem veterem: *Vaticana Barb.*  
 433 [Gm 400 a]

Sicut dicit Philosophus in primo metaphysicæ hominum genus...

Thomas Aquinas, Posteriora Analytica: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X.*  
*cod.* 44; *cod.* 45. See also 'Sicut dicit Aristoteles in principio...'

Sicut dicit Philosophus in proœmio physicorum scire enim arbitramur...

Joannes de Magistris, Summularum Petri Hispani glossulæ: Ed.  
*Venice* 1490, f. 2

Sicut dicit Philosophus in secundo metaphysicæ oportet erudire...

Prædicamenta: *Oxford Merton* 289, f. 1-33

Sicut dicit Philosophus in secundo Physicorum...

De sex prædicamentis: *Oxford Merton* 288, f. 58-64

Sicut dicit Philosophus in secundo Physicorum, qui non potest distinguere inter manifestum et immanifestum...

Simon Anglicus, Qq. libri Porphyrii: *Milan Ambros.* C.161.  
*Inf.*, f. 5r-11v (cf. C. Ottaviano, "Qq. super libro prædicamentorum" di S. di Faversham, Memorie della R. Accad. Naz. dei Lincei, Classe di Scienze Moral. Storiche e Filologiche (Anno CCCXXVII) Serie VI, Vol. III, Fasc. IV, Rome 1930, p. 257

Sicut dicit Philosophus in tertio de anima...

See 'Sicut Philosophus dicit...'

Sicut dicit Philosophus quarto ethicorum homo secundum intellectum...

De modo significandi: *Erfurt Ampl. Oct. 10*, f. 90-94'

Sicut dicit Philosophus quarto metaphysicæ...

Gualterus Burley, Super octo libris Topicorum: *Erfurt Ampl.*  
*Qu.* 276, f. 100-131

Sicut dicit Philosophus secundo de anima, potentiae distinguntur  
per actus...

Simon Anglicus, Qq. super libro Elenchorum: *Milan Ambros.*  
*C.161.Inf.*, f. 64v-78r; *Oxford Merton* 292, f. 100 (cf. C. Ottaviano, "Qq. super libro *Prædicamentorum*" di S. di Faversham, Memorie della R. Accad. Naz. dei Lincei, Classe de Scienze Moral. Storiche e Filologiche (Anno CCCXXVII) Serie VI, Vol. III, Fasc. IV, Rome 1930, p. 258, 260)

Sicut dicit Philosophus secundo metaphysicæ, inconveniens est syllogismi querere scientiam et modum sciendi...

Porphyrius, De universalis: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 45*, f. 15-18

Sicut dicit Philosophus septimo metaphysicæ...

Angelus de Camerino, Perihermenias: *Escorial f. III. 24*, f. 96  
(cf. D. Perini, *Bibliographia Augustiniana, Scriptores Itali*, "Biblioteca Agostiniana," Vol. I, Florence (1929), p. 173)

Sicut dicit Philosophus sexto metaphysicæ...

See 'Frater Angelus de Camerino... Quia ratio intellectiva...'

Sicut dicit Philosophus sexto Metaphysicæ...

Nicolaus de Orbellis, De scientia mathematica, physica et metaphysica: *Rome Angel. 127 (B.4.4)*, f. 21-92

Sicut dicit Philosophus sexto metaphysicæ, tres sunt partes principales...

Radulphus de Hotot, Qq. super Porphyrium: For mss. see Gm 225 a

Sicut dicit Philosophus tertio de anima...

Angelus de Camerino Prædicamenta: *Padua Anton. XXI*, 488 [Gm 402 a]; *Rome Angel.*, 832 (Q.8.7), f. 20b-66a; 1040 (R.7.21), f. 17b-55

Sicut dicit Philosophus tertio de anima triplex est oppositio rationis:  
prima est simpliciter intelligentia indivisibilium...

Perihermenias: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 45*, f. 27-39. Compare  
'Sicut Philosophus dicit in tertio... triplex est operatio...'

Sicut dicit Tullius, primo de officiis, trahimur instinctu...

Circa librum Priorum queratur primo...

Radulphus de Hotot, Qq. super Priora Aristotelis: For mss. see Gm 225 f

Sicut dicitur quarto metaphysicæ omnis scientia particularis considerat de communi...

Posteriora Analytica: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 43, f. 3-44*

Sicut dux est salvator exercitus sic rationatio cum eruditione...

Joannes Buridan, Logica: *Erfurt Ampl. Fol. 302, f. 1-155*

Sicut dux sui exercitus...

Simon Bredonus, Logica: [Pits 542]

Sicut in principio priorum...

Albertus Magnus, Posteriora: *Erfurt Ampl. Fol. 17, f. 110-195*

Sicut nexus amoris quandoque...

Ricardus Lavingham, De insolubilibus: [Pits 535]

Sicut patet ex textu litteræ Porphyrius...

See 'Omne debitum dimisi tibi...'

Sicut Philosophus dicit in tertio de anima duplex est operatio intellectus...

Thomas Aquinas, I,II Perihermenias: *Vaticana Urbin. 214, f. 204; ed. Paris 1660, I, p. 1-43.* See also 'Dilecto sibi præposito Lovaniensi...'

Sicut Philosophus dicit (in) tertio de anima duplex est operatio intellectus una quæ dicitur indivisibilum intelligentia...

Joannes Scotus, Super Perihermenias (opus secundum): *Rome S. Isidoro 1/14, f. 163r-170r*

Sicut dicit Philosophus in tertio de anima triplex est operatio intellectus... Quæritur an nomen significat rem...

Joannes Duns Scotus, Qq. in I Perihermenias: *Vaticana Vat. lat. 870, f. 48-52v; ed. Lyons 1639, I, p. 211-233.* Compare 'Sicut dicit Philosophus tertio... triplex est oppositio...'

Sicut scribit Algazel...

Henricus de Bruxella, Qq. super Posteriorum: *Vienna NB 2302, f. 26b-44b*

Sicut scribitur primo metaphysicæ propter admirari cœperunt homines philosophari...

See 'Gyrum cœli circuivi sola...'

Sicut significat Aristoteles in libro topicorum aut elenchorum ars disputativa ad tria viam præstat...

Obligationes: *Paris BN 11412 [Hn II, 46]*

Sicut vult philosophus in principio libri perihermenias...

Rodulphus Stodus, Logica, II: *Oxford Bodleian (Can. Misc.) 219 [Li]*

Sicut vult Philosophus secundo metaphysicæ non solum debemus...

Gualterus Burley, De insolubilibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 276, f. 159-162; Oct. 76, f. 21'-34*

Significatio est ens...

Raimundus Lull, De significatione: [Li]

Significatio est rei per vocem...

De significationibus, suppositionibus, etc.: *Erfurt Ampl. Oct. 71, f. 93-95'*

Signum est in prædicamento relationis et dicitur essentialiter...

Rogerus Bacon (?), De syncategorematibus: *Oxford Bodleian (Digby) 55, f. 228 [Gm 312 ap: De signis logicalibus]*

Similiter autem se habet... In hac parte multiplicat oppositionem in universalibus...

Robertus Kilwardby (?), L. II Perihermenias: *Vaticana Urbin. 214, f. 233*

Singulare dupliciter accipitur...

Joannes Beston, Super Universalia Holkot: [Pits 611]

Sit prima quæstio de prædicamentis utrum quando alterum de altero prædicatur...

Blasius de Pelacanibus de Parma, Qq. de prædicamentis: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 208, f. 43-82*

Socrates...

See 'Sortes...'

Solvere non est ignorantis vinculum tertio metaphysicæ capitulo primo. Qui ergo insolubilium vinculo sunt ignari nodum ipsorum ambiguum...

Thomas Bradwardine, Insolubilia: *Bruges de la ville 500, f. 134r-143v; Erfurt Ampl. Oct. 76, f. 6-21'; Venice S. Mark Cl. XI, cod. 12, f. 27-37*

Solvere non est ignorantis vinculum...

De insolubilibus: *Oxford Bodleian (Can. Misc.) 219 [Li]*

Solvere non est ignorantis vinculum... Qui igitur insolubilium...

Ricardus Kilington, Abstractiones: *London Brit. Mus. (Royal) 12 F. XIX, f. 149*

Solvere vinculum ignorantis non est...

Henricus (Harclay?), *Insolubilia: Oxford Bodleian (Can. Misc.) 219* [Li]

Sophisma est oratio deceptiva...

Joannes Thorpe: [Li]

Sophisma ex Dei gratia et huius venerabilis auditorii...

Thomas Moston, Sophismata: *Oxford Magd.* 92, f. 1

Sophisma primum est hoc: Socrates fingit de esse sophisticam (!)...

Sophismata: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 262, f. 96

Sophisma primum: forma in verbo et species...

Collectio sophismatum: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 437, f. 72-80

Sophisma primum: tantum octo sunt partes orationis...

Collectio sophismatum: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 437, f. 50-71'

Sophisticæ disputationis...

Dialectica: *Vienna NB* 2459, f. 115r-117v

Sorte nihil sciente scit aliquid. Quia in sophismate proposito fit mentio de sciente...

Joannes de Gottinghe, Sophisma: *Bruges de la ville* 510, f. 213r-224v

Sortes est albior quam Plato...

Ricardus Billingham, Abbreviatio Guilelmi Kilmington: [Pits 489]

Sortes est albior quam Plato incipit esse albus...

Sophismata 49: *Bruges de la ville* 500, f. 1r-30r

Sortes scit A esse coloratum, quando nullum A est coloratum...

Quædam sophismata: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 234, f. 111-113

Species multiplicata ad medium...

Joannes Baconsthorpe, De multiplicatione specierum: [Pits 454]

Studium sapientiæ quam philosophiam vocamus...

"Apuleius," Perihermenias: *Paris BN* 6288, f. 127v-134r (XIIth cent.) [Al 544]

Studium sapientiæ quod philosophiam vocamus, plerisque videtur tres species seu partes habere...

Philosophia rationalis: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X. cod.* 23, f. 119-125; cod. 27, f. 118 (?)

Studio sam animam nostram ad appetitum translationis... Dicemus quod intentio philosophiæ est comprehendere...

Avicenna, Logica: *Bruges de la ville* 510, f. 37v-54r. See also 'Dico quod intentio...'; 'Dicemus quod intentio...'

Subiectum totius artis grammaticæ est convertibile...

Martinus de Dacia, De modis significandi (Pars III): *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 186, f. 16-21.* See also 'Cum cuiuslibet artificis principia...'

Substantia autem est quæ proprie... Hæc est secunda pars huius libri...

Gualterus Burley (?), Prædicamenta: *London Brit. Mus. (Royal) 12 F. XIX, f. 3*

Substantia est. Postquam de æquivocis et univocis et de nominativis...

Boethius, De substantia (In Categories Aristotelis): *Vaticana Regin. 230.II, f. 44v-50;* ed. Migne PL 64, 181 D

...sufficient hæc ad discretionis contrarietatisque traditionem...

Porphyrius, Isagoge: *Toulouse de la ville 735 (I, 275)*

Sumens reliquias dedit eis... Liber iste agit et tractat de illis sex principiis... Quia notitia subiecti præsupponitur in scientia...

Antonius Andreeae, Qq. super sex Principiis: Ed. Venice 1508, f. 56r

Summo largitoris suffragio...

Tract. de logica: *Vienna NB 4698, f. 18r-27v*

Summus et dux omnium peripateticorum...

In decem Prædicamenta Aristotelis: *Vienna NB 2237, f. 27r-34v*

...sunt penes orationes et considerationes...

Priora: *Rouen Municipale 921, f. 33r-54r [AI 744]*

Sunt quidam qui nomina hæc, scilicet genus, speciem, differentiam proprium et accidens nomina...

De Universalibus: *Vienna NB 2486, f. 1r-4r;* ed. M. Grabmann, *Mediæval Studies, Vol. IX (1947)*, p. 65-70

Supponitur significatis...

See 'Suppositis significativis...'

Suppositio communiter dicta est proprietas...

De suppositionibus terminorum: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 395, f. 87-91'*

Compare 'Post præcedentem summam...'

Suppositio est statio termini...

Ricardus Lavingham, De suppositionibus: [Pits 535]

Suppositio est terminus stans pro se... Suppositio autem dividitur...

Suppositiones Ockham: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 242, f. 24-25*

Suppositio simplex dividitur quinque modis...

Robertus Alington, *Suppositiones*: [Li]

Suppositis significativis incomplexorum terminorum. In hoc tractatu intendo perscrutari...

(G. Burley), *De suppositionibus, appellationibus et copulationibus Bradwardine*: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 276, f. 147-152

Suppositis significativis terminorum incomplexorum. In hoc tractatu intendo perscrutari de quibusdam propositionibus... Circa primum capitulum est sciendum quod suppositio accipitur dupliciter...

Gualterus Burley, *De puritate artis logicæ*: *Bruges de la ville* 501, f. 1r-69v; *Erfurt Ampl. Fol.* 120, f. 74-98'; *Qu.* 259, f. 159-174'; *Qu.* 291, f. 51-63'; *Munich Clm* 4379, f. 97v; *Paris BN* 16130, f. 80r-110v; *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod.* 77, f. 31-44

Suppositiva ad sensum dicta sunt...

Joannes Hynton, *Fallaciæ*: [Li]

Syllogismorum alius demonstrativus alius dialecticus... Iste est tractatus sextus summularum Petri Hispani qui intitulatur tractatus fallaciarum...

Joannes de Monte, *Super logicam Petri H. (Tr. VI)*: Ed. Venice 1500

Syllogismorum alius demonstrativus alius dialecticus... Postquam auctor determinavit in præcedentibus de syllogismo dialectico... Nicolaus de Orbellis, *Logica cum textu Petri H.*: Ed. Venice 1489, f. 44v

Syllogismorum alius demonstrativus alius dialecticus...

Joannes de Magistris, *De fallaciis (Summularum P. H. glossulae)*: Ed. Venice 1490

Tabula quæstionum libri perihermenias ordinatarum per Ioannem Buridanum. Prima quæstio est utrum scientia subiectum...

Qq. Buridani super libro perihermenias: *Erfurt Ampl. Fol.* 306, f. 69'-90'

Tabula quæstionum libri Porphyrii ordinata per magistrum Ioannem Buridanum in qua primo continetur divisio logicæ...

Qq. Buridani super Isagogis Porphyrii: *Erfurt Ampl. Fol.* 306, f. 28-41'

Tabula quæstionum libri prædicamentorum ordinatarum per venerabilem magistrum Ioannem Buridanum et est quæstio prima, utrum bonæ sint datæ definitiones...

Qq. Buridani super Prædicamentis: *Erfurt Ampl.* Fol. 306, f. 42-69'

Tantum unum est...

Petrus Cornubiensis, Logica: *Worcester Cathedral Q.* 13, f. 24

Termini aliqui sunt simplices...

Robertus Alington, De suppositionibus: *Oxford New Coll.* 289

Termini cum quibus sumuntur propositiones, aliquando in sensu composito aliquando in sensu diviso isti sunt...

Paulus Pergulensis, De sensu composito et diviso: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 217*, f. 92-93

Termini privatorii inveniuntur dupliciter ab Aristotele sumi...

Joannes Pagus (?), Insolubilia: *Paris BN 11412 [Hn II, 45]*

Terminorum aliqui sunt simplices...

See 'Termini aliqui...'

Terminorum alijs mentalis alijs vocalis alijs scriptus...

Petrus de Alliaco, Conceptus et insolubilia: Ed. Paris 1498 [Pell 536]

... terminus autem aut significat universale...

De suppositionibus, etc.: *London Brit. Mus. (Royal) 8 A. VI,* f. 47-48, 51-52

Terminus est in quem resolvitur et dividitur propositio...

De sensu composito et diviso: *Venice S. Mark Cl. XI, cod. 13,* f. 2-16

Terminus est in quem resolvitur propositio ut subiectum...

Ricardus Billingham, Speculum puerorum: *Assisi Conv.* 690, f. 189-225 (anon.); *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 30, f. 144'-149'; *Qu.* 243, f. 52-53'; *Qu.* 245, f. 209-232'; *Oct.* 75, f. 1-18; *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 674, f. 110; *Vienna NB* 4698, f. 104r-108r; *Wurzburg Minorit.* I, 63, f. 46v-51r [AFH XLIV, 194]

Terminus est signum orationis constitutivum...

Paulus Venetus, Logica (Cap. I): *Oxford Bodleian (Can. Misc.) 527 Li*; ed. Venice 1502, f. 2r. See also 'Conspiciens in circuitu librorum...'

Terminus est signum... Contra hoc arguitur...

Menghus Blanchellus, Qq. super logicam Pauli Veneti: Ed. Treviso 1476 [GW 4404]

Terminus... Antequam procedatur ad textum movetur talis quæstio, utrum de probationibus propositionum possit esse scientia...

Qq. de probationibus propositionum: *Erfurt Ampl. Oct.* 75, f. 23-52

Tertio sequitur de disiunctivis...

Wyclif, De disiunctivis (Logica, Tr. III): [Li]

Tertium nidum supremum...

Wyclif, Contra determinationes Kilingham: [Li]. Compare 'Tres sunt nidi...'

Testante Lincolnensi in primo posteriorum...

Robertus Cervinus (Carew), Posteriora: [Pits 417]

Teste magistro sententiarum omne quod est aut est signum vel res...

Fridericus de Monachio, Flores logicæ Alberti: *Wurzburg Minorit. I*, 63, f. 288r-306r [AFH XLIV], 199

Themistius in artem veterem ut falso creditur...

Gerardus Nogent (?), Logica vetus: *Oxford Merton* 261

Totum negotium logicum est de sermone...

Robertus Kilwardby, L. Topicorum: *Oxford Bodleian (Can. Misc.)* 403 [Li]

Tractaturi de scientia syllogistica oportet primum scire quod primo tractandum est de syllogismo...

Albertus Magnus, Priora Analytica: *Erfurt Ampl. Fol.* 17, f. 1-109; *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 37*, f. 1-173

Tractaturum de consequentiis pro iuvenum directione...

De consequentiis: *Metz Municipale* 647

Tractatus de consequentiis tenebo Dei adiutorio istum modum...

Marsilius de Inghen, De consequentiis: *Erfurt Qu.* 277, f. 26-71'; *Qu.* 280, f. 152'-178

Tractatus de decem generibus tria genera prædicationis...

Prædicamenta: *Oxford Bodleian (Digby)* 77 [Li]

Tractatus de decem prædicamentis...

Ricardus Lavingham, De decem prædicamentis: [Pits 535]

Tractatus de locis dialecticis primo ponam quasdam divisiones...

Albertus (de Saxonia), Loci dialectici: *Paris BN* 14715, f. 91r-99r

Tractatus de obligationibus tractatum Dei gratia de eisdem in quinque capitula...

Petrus de Alliaco, *De arte obligandi*: Ed. Paris 1489, f. 2 [Pell 531]

Tractatus de scientia syllogistica oportet primum dicere...

Albertus, *De scientia syllogistica: St. Omer Municipale* 602

Tractatus de insolubilibus dividitur in tres partes in quarum prima opiniones...

De insolubilibus: *Erfurt Qu.* 255, f. 1-12'

Tractatus insolubilium dividitur in tres partes...

Rodulphus Strodes, *Insolubilia: Oxford Bodleian (Can. Misc.) 219* [Li]

Tractatus magistri P(etri) H(ispani) duodecim continet capitula...

(Abbreviatio) tractatus Petri H.: *Erfurt Ampl.* 303, f. 19r-v

Tractatus sequens erit de...

De suppositionibus: *Vienna NB* 3217, f. 14r-25v (incomplete)

Tractatus sequens quem ad aliqualem iuvenum eruditionem breviter compilavi...

Petrus de Alliaco, *Tract. exponibilium*: Ed. Paris 1494, f. 2 [Pell 533]

Transcendentia. Ens. Aliquid...

Paulus Pergulensis, *Compendium ad introductionem iuvenum in facultate logicæ: Stuttgart Regional. Cod. H. B. X. 10*, f. 334r-342r [SeT 451]

Tres sunt nidi...

Wyclif, *Contra determinationes Kilingham*: [Li]. Compare 'Tertium nidum supremum...'

Tria discutienda per ordinem...

Siger de Brabantia, *Qq. logicales*: *Paris BN* 16133, f. 57v-58v [Al 672]

Tria facienda sunt, primum declaratio terminorum...

Bernardinus de Monte Ulmi, *Qq. Scotti in librum Prædicamentorum*: [Ss I, 135]

Tria sunt anteprædicamenta...

Guilelmus Hentisberus, *De prædicamentis*: [Pits 527]

Tria sunt genera causarum in entibus...

Simon Faversham, *Qu. libri Priorum: Milan Ambros., C. 161. Inf.*, f. 34v-64v; *Oxford Merton* 292, f. 111 (cf. C. Ottaviano,

*Le "QQ. super libro Prædicamentorum" di S. di Faversham,*  
*Reale Accad. Naz. dei Lincei, Serie VI, Vol. III, Fasc. IV, Rome*  
*1930, p. 258, 260)*

Tria sunt prædicamenta vel genera in quorum quolibet continetur motus...

Guilelmus Hentisberus, Tract. trium prædicamentorum: *Venice S. Mark Cl. XI, cod. 14, f. 66-72*

Tria sunt prædicamenta vel genera in quibus contingit motum fieri proprium... Iste est sextus et ultimus tractatus regularum Hentisberi...

Caietanus de Thienis, De motu locali (Expos. regularum et sophismatum Hentisberi): Ed. Venice 1494, f. 37r

Tria sunt quibus res omnes comprehenduntur, elementa, et ut nunc loquimur prædicamenta...

See 'Antiqua docti quid tum si discere noluit...'

Triplex est principium... Hoc triplex principium sumitur triplex genus...

Adenulphus de Anagni, I-VIII Topicorum: *Bruges de la ville* 493, f. 121r-242v [Gm 186 b]

Triplex est prius immediate...

Adenulphus, Notulæ topicorum: *Perugia Comunale* 1077

Tu credis aliquam propositionem...

Ricardus Billingham, Conclusiones: *Vienna NB* 4698, f. 108r-114v

Tu ergo Balthassar interpretationes narra...

Antonius Andreae, Perihermenias: Ed. Venice 1480 (cf. Nic. Ant. Hispalensis, *Bibl. Hispana Vetus*, Tom. II, Madrid 1788, p. 142)

Tu es asinus...

Qq. asininæ: *Vienna NB* 4698, f. 99r-103v

Tu es asinus. Probatio istius...

Guilelmus Hentisberus, Conclusiones sophisticæ: [Pits 527]

Tu es asinus. Probatur: iste homo est asinus...

Sophismata asinina: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 200, f. 122-126*

Tua, mi Ieronimæ, honesta petitio, domini nostri Iesu Christi...

In primis itaque duas suppositiones hic sophistarum princeps assumit...

Paulus Pergulensis, Insolubilia: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 212*, f. 61-70; *cod. 217*, f. 76-88

Tunc autem sit magis eligendus...

Aristoteles, L. Topicorum (L. III): *Rome Angel. 242 (C.4.10)*, f. 33a-34b

Ubi est circumscrip<sup>t</sup>io corporis ex conscriptione loci proveniens...

Thomas Aquinas, De prædicamento ubi quid cit (Cap. 2): *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 185*, f. 21-22

Una communis opinio in materia insolubilium ad quam communiter habent nunc respondentes refugium...

Angelus de Forosempronii, Insolubilia: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 219*, f. 63-71; *Cl. XI, cod. 18*, f. 18-31

Una propositio quæ non est plures propositiones est quælibet propositio quæ scilicet desinit scire et tamēn scit...

(Guilelmus Hentisberus), De incipit et desinit: *Venice S. Mark Cl. XI, cod. 14*, f. 43-45; ed. Venice 1494, f. 189r

Unicuique virtui proprius...

Comment. super tract. Petri Hispani: *Munich Clm 9676*, p. 97  
[Al 1043]

Uniformiter continue variari...

Joannes Tewkesbury, De alterationibus: [Li]

Universale dicimus esse quod est semper et ubique...

Guilelmus Lubbenham, Posteriora: [Li]

Universale esse satis planum est...

Thomas Aquinas (?), De universalibus: *London Brit. Mus. (Royal) 12 E. XXV*, f. 25 (anon.); *Vaticana Ottobon. 1276*, f. 18 (cf. C. Ottaviano, Tract. de universalibus attribuito a S. Tommaso d'A. Reale Accad. de Italia (Studi e documenti), Rome 1932)

Universale secundum quod tale non existit in rerum natura...

Super Categorica: *Paris BN 16297*

Universalia seu prædicabilia...

See 'De universalibus. Universalia...'

Unus ær cum alio...

Comment. in Categorias Aristotelis: *Vienna NB 2459*. f. 118r-119v

Ut ait Philosophus in primo posteriorum ad hoc quod habeamus scientiam de aliqua re, tria requiruntur...

Super textum Petri Hispani: *Paris BN 258*, f. 77 [Hn VI, 156]  
Ut cupientes per sophisticam... docebo quindecim cautelas...

Notæ de cautelis sophisticis: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 247, f. 199'-200'  
Ut de dicendis in hoc opere cognitio distinctior habentur...

Propositum quidem negotii... Aristoteles intendens dare artem...

Gualterus Burley, *Topica*: *Oxford Merton* 295, ff. 147

Ut dicit Aristoteles in libro elenchorum quattuor sunt genera disputationum...

De fallaciis: *London Brit. Mus. (Royal)* 12 F. XIX, f. 98  
(Ut dici)t Tullius ars est collectio multorum principiorum...

Logica: *London Brit. Mus. (Royal)* 8 A. VI, f. 57-62b, 65-67

Ut habeatur cognitio regiminis in grammatica secundum modos sig-

nificandi...

Franciscus (Mayron?), De modis significandi: *Oxford Merton* 260, f. 34b-62

Ut habeatur modus solvendi obiectiones...

Distinctiones communes usitatæ Parisiis: *Vienna NB* 4007, f. 48v-59r

Ut iuvenes habeant faciliorem cognitionem in suppositionibus terminorum breves regulæ atque generales sunt ponendæ...

(De suppositionibus terminorum): *Munich Clm* 4379, f. 198

Ut iuvenes in quolibet problemate disputantes possint esse exercitati et velociter obviantes...

Gualterus Burley, De puritate artis logicæ: *Los Angeles Univ. South. California (Hoose)* 6, f. 77r; ed. Ph. Boehner, Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure New York, 1951

Ut novi artium auditores plenius intelligent ea quæ in summulis edocentur valde utilis est cognitio dicendorum. In primis quæritur quare artista...

Lambertus de Liniaco Castro (Auxerre), Summulæ logicales: *Erfurt Ampl. Oct.* 66, f. 1-57' ('Logica Burley'); *Troyes Municipale* 2402. For other mss. cf. M. Grabmann, *Die Introductiones in logicam des Wilhelm v. Shyreswood*, "Sitzungsber. der Bayer. Akad. der Wissenschaften," Heft 10, Munich 1937, p. 105-106

Ut scribit Philosophus primo physicorum et declarat, felicitas est humanæ...

De confusionibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Oct. 71*, f. 50'-89'

Ut summularum notitia ad memoriam reducatur ponendæ sunt quædam obiectiones...

Recollectæ super Prædicamentis: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 200*, f. 110-113

Ut testatur Aristoteles in ethicis virtus dividitur per virtutes consuetudinis... De sophisticis autem elenchis etc. Iste liber habet tres partes...

Glossæ in libros Elenchorum Aristotelis: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 26*, f. 32-50

Ut tibi semel promisit ita facio, magnifice Cosma... Omnis doctrina omnisque disciplina intellectiva...

Aristoteles, Posteriora Analytica (Jo. Argyropulo interprete): *Vaticana Urbin. 208*, f. 63 (?); *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 24*, f. 18-34. Compare 'Si nihil esset aliud...'.

Utilēm quandam — ... ionem de consequentiārū obiectionib⁹...

De obiectionib⁹ consequentiārū: *Oxford New Coll. 289*, f. 25-38

Utrum a negativa ad affirmativam prædicato variato penes finitum et infinitum sit bona consequentia...

See 'Circa secundum perihermenias...'.

Utrum ad hunc primum librum novæ logicæ... spectet determinare de syllogismo simpliciter dicto...

See 'Circa initium primi libri priorum...'.

Utrum ad propositionem...

See 'Circa tractatum insolubilium quæritur...'.

Utrum accidens possit intelligi sine subiecto...

See 'Quæstio est utrum accidens...'.

Utrum æquivocum...

See 'Circa librum prædicamentorum Aristotelis consequenter...'.

Utrum æquivocum sit univocum...

Qq. de libro Prædicamentorum: *Erfurt Ampl. Fol. 313*, f. 67-120

Utrum album potest esse nigrum...

Sophismata: *Erfurt Ampl. Oct. 5*, f. 65-71'

Utrum aliqua proportio componatur ex rebus...

(Joannes Venetus), Qq. de logica et metaphysica: *Venice S. Mark Cl. XI, cod. 22*, f. 15-48

Utrum aliqua sint universalia in rerum natura præter signa...

Joannes Scharpe, *Universalia: London Brit. Mus. (Harley)*  
 2178, f. 107b; (*Royal*) 12 B. XIX, f. 56; *Oxford New Coll.*  
 238

Utrum aliquid sit æquivocum...

See 'Circa librum prædicamentorum Aristotelis potest...'

Utrum aliquid sit prius primo tempore...

See 'Nunc quæritur...'

Utrum aliquis in causa possit obligari...

Rogerus Rosetus (?), *De maximo et minimo: Oxford Bodleian*  
*(Can. Misc.) 177 [Li]*

Utrum aliquis possit ex præcepto obligari ad aliquid quod sit contra  
 conscientiam...

De maximo et minimo: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 107*, f. 87-101'

Utrum aliquis terminus positus...

See 'Circa tractatum de appellationibus quæritur...'

Utrum aliquis terminus...

See 'Circa tractatum de ampliationibus quæritur...'

Utrum appellatio est...

De appellatione: *Vienna NB 4698*, f. 161v-164r

Utrum ars logica doceat discernere...

Burley, *De effectu artis logicæ: Erfurt Ampl. Oct. 76*, f. 134-157

Utrum ars sophistica...

See 'Quæritur primo circa primum librum elenchorum...'

Utrum augmentatio sit possibilis...

Joannes de Janduno, *Q. de augmentatione: Venice S. Mark Cl.*  
*X, cod. 221*, f. 193-200

Utrum bona consequentia sic bene definiatur...

De consequentiis: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 282*, f. 1-16

Utrum bonæ sint datæ definitiones...

See 'Tabula quæstionum libri prædicamentorum...'

Utrum consequentia bona formalis et de forma sit illa cuius con-  
 sequens est de intellectu...

Albericus de Chizollis, *Q. de definitione consequentiæ de forma:*  
*Ed. (Venice 1480?) GW 6645*

Utrum conversio sit species argumentationis...

See 'Circa conversiones dubitatur...'

Utrum de demonstratione possit esse scientia...

See 'Circa librum posteriorum primo...'

Utrum de demonstratione sit scientia...

Disputata libri Posteriorum : *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 269, f. 73-120'

Utrum de demonstratione sit scientia tamquam de subiecto proprio...

See 'Circa librum posteriorum quæritur...'

Utrum de enuntiatione...

See 'Circa primum librum perihermenias...'

Utrum de enuntiatione possit esse scientia...

See 'Et primo quæritur...'

Utrum de enuntiatione sit scientia...

Qq. super Perihermenias: *Metz Municipale* 642

Utrum de prædicamentis...

See 'Circa librum prædicamentorum quæritur utrum de...'

Utrum de prædicamentis possit esse scientia...

See 'Aequivoca dicuntur... Circa...'

Utrum de prædicamentis possit et scientia...

Qq. super Prædicamenta: *Erfurt Ampl. Fol.* 297, f. 168-186

Utrum de prædicamentis sit scientia rationalis...

See 'Circa librum prædicamentorum Aristotelis quæritur primo utrum de...'

Utrum de propositione prout...

See 'Circa initium Biligam...'

Utrum de suppositionibus sit scientia... Suppositio est subiectum...

Qq. de suppositionibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Duod.* 14, f. 126'-128'

Utrum de suppositionibus sit scientia aliqua...

Disputata de suppositionibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 284, f. 105-144

Utrum de syllogismo...

See 'Circa primum librum Posteriorum...'

'Circa primum librum Priorum...'

Utrum de syllogismo demonstrativo sit scientia tamquam de subiecto...

See 'Circa initium primi libri posteriorum...'

Utrum de syllogismo dialectico sit scientia...

Hartlevus de Marca, Qq. Topicorum: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 270, f. 76-117'; *Qu.* 273, f. 1-25

Utrum de syllogismo possit esse scientia...

See 'Sicut dicit Tullius...'

Utrum de syllogismo possit esse scientia...

See 'Quæritur primo iuxta librum elenchorum...'

Utrum de syllogismo possit esset (!) scientia...

See 'Circa librum priorum quæratur...'

Utrum de syllogismo potest esse...

See 'Quæritur primo circa librum priorum...'

Utrum de syllogismo simpliciter...

See 'Circa librum priorum primo...'

Utrum de syllogismo simpliciter possit esse scientia...

See 'Quæritur primo iuxta librum priorum...'

Utrum de syllogismo simpliciter sit scientia...

See 'Quæritur circa librum priorum Aristoteles...'

Utrum de syllogismo sophistico...

R. Spalding, Elenchorum: [Li]

Utrum de syllogismo sophistico...

See 'Circa librum elenchorum primo quæritur...'

Utrum de syllogismo sophistico sit scientia sophistica distincta ab aliis partibus logicæ...

See 'Circa initium primi libri elenchorum quæritur utrum...'

Utrum (?) de universalis sit scientia logicalis ad quattuor utilis...

Thesaurus veteris et novæ logicæ: Ed. (Cologne c. 1497) [H 1678]

Utrum decem genera prima convenient...

Guilelmus Russell (?), Prædicamenta: *Oxford Corp. Christi* 126 [Li]

Utrum decem prædicamenta ab invicem sunt distincta...

See 'Circa librum prædicamentorum dubitatur...'

Utrum decem prædicamentis sit aliquid commune univocum intentionale quod sit subiectum...

See 'Circa initium libri prædicamentorum Aristotelis...'

Utrum definitio...

See 'Circa suppositiones...'

Utrum definitio consequentiæ...

See 'Circa primam consequent. quæritur primo...'

Utrum definitio consequentiæ sit bona...

See 'Circa initium primi libri consequentiarum...'

'Circa tractatum de consequentiis...'

Utrum definitio data de propositione hypothetica...

See 'Prima quæstio...'

Utrum definitio obligationis sit bona...

See 'Circa obligationes quæritur...'

Utrum definitio subiecti vel passionis sit medium in demonstratione...

See 'Ad evidentiam dictorum...'

'Omnis homo est risibilis...'

Utrum definitio suppositionis data...

See 'Circa initium suppositionum...'

Utrum definitio sppositionis personalis sit bona...

Qq. de suppositionibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 256, f. 120-154'

Utrum definitiones univocorum et æquivocorum datæ in prædicamentis...

See 'Circa librum prædicamentorum quæritur utrum...'

Utrum demonstratio sit subiectum...

See 'Primo quæritur utrum...'

Utrum demonstratio sit subiectum libri posteriorum...

See 'Primo quæritur utrum...'

Utrum demonstratio sit syllogismus...

See 'Problema est hoc...'

Utrum descriptio æquivocorum sit bene data...

See 'Aequivoca sunt... Dubitatur...'

Utrum dialectica insit...

See 'Quæritur primo circa summulas...'

Utrum dialectica sit scientia...

See 'Quæstio principalis...'

Utrum differentia prædicatur in qualia...

*London Coll. Univ.* 4, f. 248v-249v [AFH XLIV, 206]

Utrum detur minima materia de cuius epo... possit per se fama substantialis introduci...

Angelus de Fossumbruno, Qq. de maximo et minimo: *Venice S. Mark Cl. XI, cod. 18*, f. 32-42

Utrum detur minima materia de cuius potentia possit per se forma aliqua substantialis educi et in eadem conservari...

Angelus de Fossumbruno, Q. de maxima et minima materia: *Vaticana Vat. lat. 760*, f. 78r-83r

Utrum Deus qui creavit mundum sensibilem...

Wyclif, Q. logicæ etc.: [Li]

Utrum divisio propositionis...

See 'Propositionum alia...'

Utrum enuntiatio sit subiectum...

Gossoldus, Qq. in librum perihermenias: *Vienna NB 4911*, f. 126v-135v

Utrum est illa quæ distinguitur formaliter distinguitur realiter...

Determinationes logicæ: *Oxford Corp. Christi 228*, f. 14-27

Utrum ex syllogismis...

See 'Consequenter quæritur...'

Utrum genus possit salvari in una specie. Et videtur quod sic...

Bartholomæus de Brugis, Sophisma: *Bruges de la ville 510*, f. 212v-214r

Utrum genus signat unam naturam vel plures...

Bartholomæus de Brugis, Sophisma: *Bruges de la ville 510*, f. 223v-226r

Utrum habitus ex notitia parvorum logicalium acquisitus sit...

Qq. de parvis logicis Petri Hispani: *Erfurt Qu. 256*, f. 108-119

Utrum hæc sit vera: homo est animal, nullo homine existente...

Siger de Brabantia, Q.: *Vienna Dominik. Kloster 120*; ed. P. Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant et l'Averroisme Latin au XIII<sup>e</sup> Siècle*, in "Les Philosophes Belges," VII, Louvain 1908, pp. 65-70

Utrum idem syllogismus possit plura concludere...

See 'Circa initium secundi libri priorum...'

Utrum illud quod est in genere sit magis eligendum eo quod non est in genere...

See 'Circa initium tertii libri...'

Utrum in accidentibus ab inesse ad esse sit formalis consequentia et e contra...

See 'Circa initium secundi libri topicorum...'

Utrum in generatione...

Tract. sex principiorum: *Rome Angel. 562 (F.3.14)*, f. 75-91

Utrum in hoc libro oporteat determinare de solutione paralogismorum...

See 'Circa initium secundi libri elenchorum...'

Utrum in hoc libro perihermenias...

See 'Ante initium...'

Utrum in insolubilius sit...

See 'Quæritur primo utrum...'

Utrum liber prædicamentorum sit de decem vocibus, decem prima genera rerum significantibus...

Joannes Duns Scotus, Qq. in librum Prædicamentorum: *Oxford Magd.* 162, f. 122; *Rome S. Isidoro* 1/14, f. 134r; *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 870, f. 12r-39v; ed. Lyons 1639, Tom. I, 124-185

Utrum logica...

See 'Circa initium parvorum logicalium quæritur primo...'

Utrum logica nova sit scientia demonstrato ordine...

Disputata Priorum Aristotelis: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 269, f. 1-73

Utrum logica procedat ex communibus...

See 'De sophisticis autem elenchis... Quæritur...'

Utrum logica sit...

See 'Circa initium totius logicæ...'

'Quæritur circa Porphyrium...'

'Quæritur circa tractatus...'

Utrum logica sit de syllogismo tamquam de subiecto...

See 'Quæstio de subiecto...'

Utrum logica sit primo addiscenda quod non patet quia notiora sunt nobis...

Notabilia quæstionum Duns (Scoti): *Oxford Magd.* 92, f. 8; *Magd.* 162, f. 101

Utrum logica sit scientia. Videtur quod non quia modus sciendi non est scientia, logica est modus sciendi...

Joannes Scotus, Qq. super universalibus Porphyrii: *Cremona Governativa* 56 (54.4.3224); *Oxford Bodleian* 643; (*Rawl.*) *S. Isidoro* 1/14, f. 121r-133r; *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 870, f. 1r-11v; *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod.* 28, f. 1-33. See also 'Circa logicalia diligenter intendens...'

Utrum logica sit scientia, arguitur quod non...

Qq. de logica: *Berlin Preuss. Staatsb. Lat. Fol.* 662, f. 1r-3v  
[Al 812]

Utrum logica sit scientia, et arguitur quod non...

See 'Quæritur primo utrum...'

Utrum logica sit scientia...

See 'Circa librum Porphyrii movetur...'

'Circa materiam veteris artis...'

'Quæritur primo circa librum Porphyrii...'

Utrum logica sit scientia ab aliis distincta...

See 'Circa logicam...'

Utrum logica sit scientia practica vel speculativa et ait primo quod non sit speculativa nec practica...

Albertus de Saxonia, Qq. 1-30 in logicam: *Vaticana Urbin.* 1419, f. 1

Utrum logica sit scientia specialis...

See 'Circa initium libri Porphyrii...'

Utrum logica sit scientia specialis ab aliis distinctis...

See 'Circa initium logicæ quæritur...'

Utrum logica sit unus habitus scientificus rationalis ab aliis distinctus...

See 'Circa exordium libri prædicabilium...'

Utrum magis universalia sint nobis prius nota...

*Oxford Magd.* 16, f. 1-6

Utrum medium in demonstratione sit definitio subiecti vel passionis...

Qq. philosophicæ: *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 869, f. 151r-152r

Utrum modus...

See 'Circa secundum librum consequentiarum...'

Utrum motus verus et proprie dictus in aliquo trium prædicamentorum consistat...

See 'Dubium est utrum...'

Utrum necesse sit aliquem scire...

See 'Circa initium exercitii...'

Utrum notitia...

See 'Circa notitiam parvorum logicalium dubitatur...'

Utrum notitia libri elenchorum sit scientia...

Qq. de elenchis: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 269, f. 120'-147'

Utrum notitia libri prædicamentorum sit de decem prædicamentis ut de subiecto...

See 'Circa librum prædicamentorum Aristotelis quæritur primo...'

Utrum notitia parvorum logicalium sit in logica necessaria...

See 'Circa initium parvorum logicalium quæritur primo...'

Utrum notitia tractatum Petri Hispani sit scientia...

See 'Circa initium tractatum...'

Utrum notitiæ libri perihermenias enuntiatio sit subiectum...

See 'Ante initium...'

Utrum nova logica sit scientia...

See 'Circa initium exercitii...'

'Circa initium novæ logicæ exercitii...'

Compare 'Utrum logica nova...'

Utrum omne intrinsecum Deo sit omnino idem essentiæ divinæ, circumscripta quacumque consideratione intellectus...

Q. logicalis: *Oxford Balliol* 208, f. 41-43; *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 876, f. 292 [Gm 344 t: De formalitatibus]

Utrum omnes figuræ...

Joannes Tartays, *De figuris*: [Li]

Utrum omnis forma sit simplex in essentia...

See 'Forma est... Quæritur...'

Utrum omnis motus verus...

See 'Dubium est utrum omnis motus verus...'

'Dubium est utrum motus...'

Utrum omnium conclusionum logicalium...

See 'Circa initium isagogarum...'

Utrum per demonstrationem aggeneretur scientia...

Tabula dubiorum in libris Posteriorum Aegidii Romani: *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 828, f. 138-140v

Utrum perfectio cognitionis causæ secundæ...

Wyclif, Q. logicalis etc.: [Li]

Utrum possit congrue addi...

See 'De difficilibus...'

Utrum possit fieri syllogismus...

See 'Quæritur de obliquis...'

Utrum principia artis obligatoriæ in disputatione dialectica sint necessaria...

See 'Quæritur primo utrum principia...'

Utrum privatio distinguatur realiter a materia...

See 'Quæstio est utrum privatio...'

Utrum quando alterum de altero prædicatur...

See 'Sit prima quæstio...'

Utrum quidditas generis sit a quidditate differentiæ realiter distincta...

See 'Circa initium quarti...'

Utrum quilibet terminus pro quolibet suo...

See 'Circa tractatum de suppositionibus utrum...'

Utrum scientia parvorum logicalium sit nova logica...

Qq. super suppositiones terminorum Thomæ (Manlevelt): *Erfurt Ampl. Qu. 213*, f. 1-35'

Utrum scientia subiectum...

See 'Tabula quæstionum libri perihermenias...'

Utrum scientiæ dialecticæ syllogismus dialecticus sit subiectum...

See 'Circa librum topicorum...'

Utrum scripturæ sint ad placitum signa vocum et voces passionum animæ...

See 'Circa initium primi libri perihermenias...'

Utrum secundæ intentiones essent in prædicamento...

See 'Aliquis homo est species. Circa...'

Utrum sint formæ utiles...

Hieronymus de Praga, De universalibus realibus: *Vienna NB 4483*, f. 71r-78v

Utrum sit aliquis modus salvandi possibilitates...

See 'Circa tractatum insolubilium magistri...'

Utrum sit dare primum et ultimum...

Gualterus Burley: *Oxford Bodleian (Can. Misc.) 177* [Li]

Utrum sit de decem vocibus decem genera rerum significantibus...

See 'Circa librum prædicamentorum quæritur utrum sit...'

'Quæritur circa librum prædicamentorum...'

Utrum subiectum primum...

See 'Quæritur circa librum perihermenias...'

Utrum substantia sit una numero singularis non dicibilis de multis ex materia...

See 'Circa unitatem numeralem...'

Utrum suppositio sit subiectum...

See 'Circa notitiam parvorum logicalium quæritur...'

Utrum syllogismus demonstrativus sit...

See 'Circa primum librum analyticorum...'

Utrum syllogismus demonstrativus sit subiectum huius libri...

Qq. in Posteriora: *Karlsruhe, Landesbibl. St. Blasien 57*, f. 53r-86v [Al 830]

Utrum syllogismus ex hypothesi differat a syllogismo ostensivo...

Joannes Duns Scotus, L. II Priorum: [Li]

Utrum syllogismus sub ratione probabilitatis sit subiectum adæquatum dialecticæ...

See 'Circa initium primi libri topicorum...'

Utrum tantum sint quattuor quæstiones vere scibiles...

See 'Circa initium secundi libri posteriorum...'

Utrum terminus communis...

See 'Omnis homo de necessitate...'

Utrum transcendentia dicantur univoce de Deo et creatura...

Quæstiones logicales: *Oxford Corp. Christi* 126, f. 13b-16

Utrum universale...

See 'Quæritur primo circa Porphyrium...'

Utrum universale habet esse præter operationem intellectus agentis...

*Vaticana Palat.* 1202, f. 257v

Utrum universale in multis ad extra...

In Introductionem Porphyrii: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod. 32,* f. 1-20

Utrum universale in multis ad extra de pluribus prædicabile existens  
ut intentio secunda...

See 'Cum sit necessarium... dubitatur...'

Utrum universale sit primo et per se generabile et corruptibile...

*Vaticana Palat.* 1202, f. 250

Utrum universale sit subiectum in libro Porphyrii...

See 'Est dubitatio...'

Utrum universale sit res extra animam totaliter existens in quolibet  
singulari et de essentia cuiuslibet singularis...

See 'Quæro utrum...'

Utrum universale subiectum libri Porphyrii differat realiter a genere...

Guilelmus Russell, Universalia: *Oxford Corp. Christi* 126, f. 1

Utrum universalia ad aliquem sensum...

See 'Problema correspondens...'

Utrum universalia existant in rerum natura aut non...

See 'Circa universalia sunt dubitationes non paucæ...'

'Circa universalia sunt dubitationes notandæ...'

'Circa universalia sunt dubitationes paucæ...'

Utrum universalia habeant solum...

Q. de universalibus: *Vienna NB* 4296, f. 63r-70r

Utrum universalia sint in particularibus...

See 'Circa naturam...'

Utrum veritatem habeat propositio ista posita in primo posteriorum...  
See 'Dubium est utrum veritatem...'.

Vade contra virum stultum et nesciet; hanc propositionem...

Henricus Coesfeld, Super scripta Billingham: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 243, f. 1-51'

Vallatum multis occupationibus me dilectio vestra compulit ut posteriores analyticos Aristotelis de græco in latinum transferrem... Omnis didascalia et omnis disciplina deliberativa ex præexistente fit cognitione...

Aristoteles, Posteriora Analytica (trans. Toletana): *Toledo Capit.* 17.14, f. 1r-11v [Al p. 48, 122]

...vel aliquid tale...

Sophismata: *London Brit. Mus (Royal) 8 A. VI*, f. 36

Venerabili ex anglorum spectabili prosapia oriundo... Philosophus in tertio de anima volens ostendere modum cognoscendi... Omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina... Secundum modum communem exponendi huic libro...

Aegidius Romanus, Expos. librorum Posteriorum Analyticorum: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 272; *Oxford Bodleian (Can. Misc.)* 373 [Li]; *Rome Angel.* 489 (D.7.15); *Toulouse de la ville* 742 (III, 31); *Vaticana Vat. lat.* 823, f. 87r-249r; 824, f. 1r-122v; 825, f. 1r-66v; 827; 828; 829 (L. II); *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod.* 47: ed. Venice 1488, f. 2r. For other mss. see Gm 400 c

Venite et ambulemus in lumine... Dialectica est ars artium. Incipit liber tractatum Hispani...

Expositio tractatum Petri Hispani secundum Buridanum etc.: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 247, f. 1-199'

...versale vel non universale, universaliter vel non universaliter ut omnis homo albus est...

Aristoteles, De Interpretatione: *Rome Angel.* 953 (R.5.4), f. 80-82

Videntur autem propter. Superius probavit Philosophus syllogismum...

Comment. II Elenchorum Aristotelis: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 275, f. 36-75. For incipit to L. I see 'Quoniam autem syllogismi...'

Videtur autem nec genus neque species...

See 'Incipiunt auctoritates...'

Videtur autem neque genus neque species simpliciter dici...

Tract. philosophiæ: *Brussels Royale* 3316 (II.2568), f. 1-1v  
(fragm., Xth ? cent.)

Vir sapiens dominabitur astris...

Tract. super Isagogas Alkabuy: *Vaticana Palat.* 446, f. 138

Viro religioso fratri Conrado... Dignum et congruum est... Sicut dicit Philosophus circa principium tertii physicorum...

Augustinus de Ancona, In libros Priorum Aristotelis: *Rome Angel.* 199 (B.8.3); *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod.* 41; 42. For other mss. see Gm 409 c

Visis aliquibus regulis de ampliationibus nunc restat videre de appellationibus...

De appellationibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 280, f. 147-152

Viso de ampliationibus videndum de appellationibus...

Marsilius de Inghen, De appellationibus: *Erfurt Ampl. Qu.* 30, f. 133-138'; *Qu.* 277, f. 16-24

Viso de causis veritatis contradictiarum omnium propositionum, scilicet de necessario et de contingenti... De causis veritatis...

*Vaticana Vat. lat.* 760, f. 28-29r

Voces sunt notæ earum passionum...

Robertus Kilwardby, Priora: *Oxford Bodleian (Can. Misc.)* 403 [Li]

Volens parum dicere de terminis priorum...

De maximo et minimo: *Venice S. Mark Cl. XI, cod.* 13, f. 17-22

Volo probare novem modis quod tu es asinus: hæc hinc inde delegi...

Paulus Pergulensis, Sophismata asinina: *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod.* 200, f. 97-109

Vox est æris per linguam percussio quæ per quasdam gutturis portas...

Boethius, Perihermenias Aristotelis (editio secunda): *Venice S. Mark Cl. X, cod.* 179, f. 111-113 (fragm.); ed. Migne *PL* 64, 393 B

Vox est sonus...

Tract. philosophiæ: *Volterra Guarnacci* 83

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*Henry of Ghent, Summae Questionum  
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The *Summae* of Henry of Ghent were extensively used by Duns Scotus, as shown by the latest edition of the Scotus Commission. Scotus is not exactly a disciple of Henry, but quite a few of his problems and arguments are taken directly from the works of Henry.

















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